Suchergebnisse

The logic of civil religion consists of minimizing community in order to maximize pluralism. Every modern society needs pluralism on the one hand, and securing of its foundations on the other. Still, civil religion may raise suspicion with regard to use of religion for political purposes. And instrumentalization is contradictory to the character of religion, although the latter always has political consequences as well. Civil religion serves politics with the aim of educating citizens. Perhaps, however, it can also be perceived as preparation of totalitarian beliefs and liturgies, such as are known to us from the first half of the 20th century. Civil religion can go hand in hand with excessive nationalism, proselytism, and Satanization of enemies. Such undesirable consequences of civil religion are discussed in this article on the basis of examples from the time of the French Revolution. The Revolution was largely marked by civil religion, the former even legitimized the latter. Four examples from the history of the French Revolution are analyzed: human rights as civil religion; cult of reason and of the supreme being; worship of the Revolution's "martyr" Jean-Paul Marat, and, finally, Satanization of enemies. Following his expose, the author confronts these questions: Is the confusing element of civil religion the fact that it wants to utilize religion per se for political purposes? What is it that protects civil religion from degenerating into nationalism and proselytism? Or else civil religion can be both: the basis of a tolerant pluralist democracy as well as the preparatory stage of totalitarianism? Adapted from the source document.

The paper reports partial findings of a research project into Croatian ethnonationalism (Croatian: narodnjastvo) as a religion (in the sense of a human invention of the sacred). The practical problems are as follows: ethnonationalism as a religion, which implies inter alia that an ethnic community (Croatian: narod) has the potential and/or capability to develop into, and ought to become, the substratum of a (nation-)state; consequences of ethnonationalism, which include the unattainability of ethnic democracy, ethnic economy and ethnic maturity; conditions of Croatian ethnonationalism, primarily the Catholic Church as a condition in 1961-71, and also before and after the period, especially since 1990. Theoretical problems, i.e. inadequacies in scholarly knowledge of the practical problems, include the following: firstly, Croatian Constitutional Court jurisprudence on ethnic and religious communities; secondly, systematic history of law and state in Croatia and Yugoslavia 1945-90; thirdly, transformation of both communism and catholicism into ethnonationalism; fourthly and fifthly, social structure and representation/agency. To attain the general goal of the research project, which is the use of reason in public affairs, the research is carried out within the theoretical and methodological framework of an integral theory of law and state which includes a modified Lasswell and McDougal's policy analysis expanded by historical institutionalism and critical theory. The subject-matter are the following features of Catholicism as an institutionalized religion, especially in Croatia 1961-71: (1) law, i.e. (1.1) sources of law; (1.2) internal law (organs, members, means); (1.3) external law (relations with the state and non-Catholics); (2) the Church and economy; (3) the Church and nation; (4) Catholicism on theory and practice. The hypotheses (which are ideal-types and as such cannot be either verified or falsified conclusively) are that ethnonationalism in Croatia is a consequence of, inter alia, the following beliefs maintained by the Catholic Church in Croatia in the 1960s and to a significant degree later on: 1. the only acceptable relationship between the Church and the state is the partnership of two legally equal public orders over the same subjects within which the Church has the exclusive power to regulate matrimonial and other family relations, and the power to control education in public schools; 2. peasant family is the basic organic human community; 3. the subjects to the ecclesiastical -- originally feudal -- power tied in fact to land make the ethnic community (Croatian: narod), which is united with the clergy into the Christian community (Croatian: krscanski narod); 4. since fundamental truths are accessible by theology only, and practice is an application of theory, practical knowledge, especially on the appropriate relationship between the Church and the state, is valid only if in accord with Church teaching. The evidence presented in the paper supports to a significant degree the hypotheses. The research findings contribute to the solution of all the theoretical problems, providing major contributions to the second and the third: the most probable reason why the Catholic Church in Croatia was rather silent in the Yugoslav and Croatian Spring 1961-71 and quite vocal since the 1990 is the Croatian Church's allegiance in matters of Church and state more to the First than to the Second Vatican council (which abandoned the Church's "divine" right to be co-sovereign with the state, exposing the "right" as a human invention of the sacred); the Church's ethnonationalism, which facilitates the political partnership of the Church and the state and ensures the dominant position of the clergy within the Church, has coincided with the interest of Yugoslav communists to retain their might and power by a metamorphosis, with the Church's assistance honoured by a concordat, into Croatian ethnonationalists, who, as newly born capitalists, have appropriated the greater part of the former socialist property and continue appropriating the greater part of present public goods. Adapted from the source document.

Članak problematizira demokratski karakter Države Izrael i uspoređuje ga sa stvarnim stanjem stvari. Proturječnost određenja Izraela kao "židovske i demokratske" države već je u samom začetku stvaranja prouzročila određene karakteristike koje su teško usporedive sa zapadnim liberalnim demokracijama. Izrael se takvim pokušava prikazati usprkos očiglednom nepovoljnom položaju arapske manjine koja danas čini približno 20 posto stanovništva. Taj se položaj izraelskih Arapa odražava ne samo na status manjine u Izraelu već i na geopolitičku situaciju na prostoru Izraela i Zapadne Obale. Status Palestinaca može se iščitati iz svakodnevne političke prakse, ali i iz temeljnih dokumenata i zakonodavstva Države Izrael. Segregacija stanovništva prema vjerskom određenju čini nevidljivi zid unutar samog izraelskog društva. ; The article deals with the declared democratic character of the State of Israel and compares it with the real state of affairs. The contradiction present in the definition of Israel as "Jewish and democratic" has from its very beginning created certain characteristics of the State that are hardly comparable with western liberal democracy. Israel is striving to present itself as such despite the obvious adverse position of the Arab minority, comprising around 20 per cent of the population. This position of the Israeli Arabs reflects itself not only on the status of the minority, but also on the entire geopolitical situation in Israel and the West Bank as well. The status of the Palestinians in Israel can be deducted from the everyday political practice as well as from the fundamental documents and legislation of the State of Israel. The segregation of population according to religion makes for an invisible wall within the Israeli society.

Christian Zionism is a political and religious phenomenon which has shaped the current Middle East to a very significant degree. Prompted by their religious beliefs, Christians played an important role in facilitating Jewish return to Zion, and in subsequent establishment, justification and defense of the State of Israel. Faith as motive behind Christian support of Israel became a more discussed topic during the recent years. That phenomenon was, however, usually superficially explored, particularly in Europe, where it was often perceived as a new and bizarre American excess, prompted by some other, non-religious and obscure interests. By inquiry in its history, this article demonstrates that such a view of Christian Zionism is largely incorrect. Christian Zionism can be traced all the way back to early 19th-century European and American Christian Evangelical movements. It grew out of a certain view of ecclesiology and literal interpretation of the Bible. The article suggests some explanations for reasons why it took so long for Christian Zionism to become recognized as a political and religious phenomenon, and argues that Christian Zionism by mid-20th century underwent a profound transformation. From an eschatological, proselytizing evangelistic movement it became more focused on ideology and geopolitical circumstances. The movement is still based on Christian religion, but support to the Jewish state is not focused on end-time prophecies any more. Among the main themes of the movement's current phase are recognition of Jewish and Christian common roots and civilizational proximity, fulfillment of Old Testament promises to Jews, resistance to global jihad, and Christian remorse for the horrors of the Holocaust. In conclusion, Christian Zionism is probably an unprecedented interfaith phenomenon, which is, in spite of being complex, multifaceted, and multilayered, genuinely and primarily religious. Adapted from the source document.

The first part of the text presents the republican position of young Hegel. This position is developed primarily through a divergence from Christianity, which is, in Hegel's judgment, the spiritual pillar of political despotism and the main cause of German spiritual, social and political backwardness. According to Hegel, the main reason for the fatal influence of Christianity is its private character, the fact that it teaches man to despise this earthly life, tells him that he is unable to achieve moral perfection through his own efforts and turns him into an object of a transcendental power. In opposition to Christianity, Hegel puts forward the Greek popular religions, i.e. the antique republican orders as the only orders adequate to man's freedom, pointing them out also as models for his own time. The second part of the text shows how Hegel's giving up on his youthful republican-democratic ideals and his adherence to hereditary monarchy is a consequence of the appearance of the liberal moment in his political philosophy. Through acceptance of subjectivity as the supreme principle of the new age, Hegel realizes that a return to the substantial ethical unity of the Greek polis is impossible. At the same time, he sees in the constitutional monarchy of the hereditary type the only order adequate to modern conditions. Namely it preserves the autonomy of non-political spheres in the state, while simultaneously -- in the monarch who is not dependent on the will of those subject to his power -- the state unity is guaranteed as opposed to civil society as a space of interest plurality and socio-economic differences. Finally, the author strives to demonstrate how, in spite of Hegel's obvious opting for hereditary monarchy and rejection of the republic, his mature political philosophy also encompasses a republican dimension. This has to do with a contradiction between the republican form and the monarchic contents of the political state. Namely the latter is not (only) a machinery of power which serves as a counterbalance to civil society, but is defined as the sphere of true political community. It is however not shaped through the activity of individuals; their political subjectivity is embodied in the hereditary monarch. This contradiction, i.e. the republican essence of the political state, leads to the conclusion that political emancipation can be conceived as a natural and necessary consequence of civil emancipation also in the conceptual field of The Philosophy of Right. Adapted from the source document.