Suchergebnisse

This paper has three aims. The first aim is to measure religiosity across all European countries through an index that combines beliefs, practices, and attitudes. The second aim is to analyse the strength of societal factors on religiosity, including modernisation, communist rule, national identity, religious pluralism, and religious freedom. The final aim is to group European countries by religiosity and to characterise each cluster by dominant religions and these five societal factors. Based on EVS 2008, it was applied multivariate analysis to reach these aims. Cluster 1 is mainly composed of Orthodox, Muslims, and Catholics; cluster 2 of Catholics, Orthodox, and people without religion; cluster 3 by people without religion, Protestants, and Catholics. Across clusters, the degree of human development, religious pluralism, and religious freedom increase, while the degree of national identity decreases.

Religiosity is something available to every person, therefore it might be corelated with personality and maturity; this, however, should not be said about causality. This article shows that no matter what aspects of religiosity are studied, religiosity is always more than personality, hence the findings of many authors yield conflicting results. The research presented here serves to explain this problem from the perspective of examining the relationship between religiosity and personality and pseudo-religiosity and maturity. In the first study, Polish university students who declared to be believers and members of the Roman Catholic Church were examined using the Personality Inventory (NEO-FFI) and Scale of Personal Religiosity in order to investigate a relationship between some aspects of religiosity and personal traits. On the other hand, a second study shows that most members of charismatic groups, identified as pseudo-religious, exhibit personality immaturity. In this study pseudo-religious individuals were examined using the Personality Maturity Questionnaire (DoM) based on the Maslow Theory of Personality Maturity.

Argues that, contrary to current thought in the social sciences, religiosity and protestant evangelism are at the heart of Loyalist politics in Northern Ireland. Gives evidence based on figures about the religious involvement of members of the Democratic Unionist Party. (DCL)

AbstractThis article aims to move beyond media discourse about "new atheism" by mapping and explaining anti-religious zeal among the public at large in 14 Western European countries. We analyze data from the International Social Survey Program, Religion III, 2008, to test two theories about how country-level religiousness affects anti-religiosity and its social bases: a theory of rationalization and a theory of deprivatization of disbelief. Hypotheses derived from the former are contradicted, whereas those derived from the latter are largely confirmed. Anti-religiosity is strongest among disbelievers and among the higher educated in the most religious countries and among the older generations in today's most secularized countries.

Using the 2005 and 2006 AsiaBarometer surveys I analyze religiosity and secularization in Asia. I find that, in South Asia, identification with a particular religion is the norm and most people pray every day but, in East Asia, religious identification and religious practice are both much less common. Even in secular East Asia, however, the demand for religious services is high and belief in a spiritual world is common. I conclude that secularization does not necessarily produce uniformly secular societies. Turning to the causes and consequences of religiosity, I find surprisingly few significant relationships, results that echo similar analyses in Western Europe. I then discuss the implications of these non-findings.