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The article reveals the characteristic features of the religious and philosophical worldview of M.Yu. Lermontov, first discovered by Russian thinkers of the Silver Age. Lermontov thinks that the divine principle of being lies in man and represents his deepest essence. A person who has managed to reveal his human essence to the fullest extent becomes a "higher personality", a divine being with extraordinary power in relation to the world around him. The article shows that the main character of the novel "A Hero of Our Time" Pechorin is such a "higher personality", he is able to rule over fate and over ordinary people. The special nature of Pechorin's re­lationship with fate is clearly shown by Lermontov in the last part of the novel, called "The Fatalist". A detailed analysis of this part of the novel allows us to assert that the dispute between Pechorin and the Serb Vulich essentially expresses the struggle of the wills of two heroes. It is Pechorin, as a more developed "higher personality", with his will, with his almost divine power, who determines the fate of Vulich and directs him to inevitable death. The article shows that the idea of a person that is present in the novel "A Hero of Our Time" can be found in the story of A.S. Pushkin "The Queen of Spades"; later it becomes the basis of philosophical outlook of F.M. Dostoevsky. Like Lermontov, Dostoevsky believes that God is nothing but the true essence of man, and for the will of a person who has fully re­vealed his essence, there are no restrictions in the world.

Chapter 1. Remapping The Religion -- Chapter 2. Contours of Mediatized E- Religiosity -- Chapter 3. Digital Facets of E- Religiosity -- Chapter 4. Spatial Mapping of Screenscapes -- Chapter 5. Digital Negotiation of Religiosity In India -- Chapter 6. Spaces Of Screenscapes In India -- Chapter 7. Contours of Image Politics In India -- Chapter 8. Postscript: Screenscapes of E-Religiosity.

We analyze the relationship between religiosity and fertility among Jews in Israel—a modern democracy in which there is no separation of religion and state. Micro-level data from the 2009 Israel Social Survey are used to perform multivariate analyses of the odds of having at least three children. The findings from separate analyses of women and men are consistent with a theoretical framework, outlined by McQuillan and C. Goldscheider, which suggests how religiosity affects fertility. In particular, measures of the importance of religious community explain in part the higher levels of fertility among some religiosity groups; attitudes toward religion as a social and political institution as well as norms regarding family building over the life course also partly account for the influence of religiosity on fertility. While women's employment activity is significantly related to their fertility, as many economic theories predict, controlling for paid work in regression models does not affect the estimated relationship between religiosity and women's fertility. We conclude that, in the current context, fertility variation across religiosity groups can be understood largely in terms of the cultural, political, and institutional power of religion, and the impact of religion through community, and via norms and ideals. ELECTRONIC SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL: The online version of this article (doi:10.1007/s10680-016-9409-x) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.

AbstractThe inexplicable link between the Malay language and Islam has been well-documented in Malaysia. In Brunei, however, this association has not been made explicit and could only be inferred through the state's stance of utilising only the Malay language for Islamic-related matters, most conspicuously in the Islamic education curriculum. While this practice has been in place since the early days of Islamic education in the country, the changing linguistic situation in Brunei, where English is now more popular than Malay among the younger generation, may require some rethinking of this practice. An earlier study investigating the issues of language and religion in Brunei has found that those who are more English-inclined do not identify strongly with the Muslim identity as their Malay-leaning counterparts. Taking its cue from those findings, the present study extends the investigation in two ways: one, by adding the social variables age, gender and educational background in its analysis; and two, by focusing on the notion of religiosity rather than on religious identity alone. The findings show that age and language proclivity are both predictors of religiosity with older Bruneians displaying greater religiosity than the younger ones. Language also plays a factor such that those who are predisposed to using more English than Malay have fewer manifestations of practices aligned to the Islamic teaching. Gender and educational level, however, have low factor loadings and are not contributory to the measurement of religiosity.

With data from the 2004 General Social Survey, the study examined effects of religiosity and spirituality on substance abuse. Also explored was whether and how social bonding mediates religiosity's effects on substance abuse. The results show that religiosity was negatively associated with substance abuse and, further, that social bonding variables did somewhat mediate this negative relationship between the two. Additionally, and as expected, with religiosity controlled, the likelihood of substance abuse increased along with increasing spirituality, in the models. Policy implications and further research needs are discussed.

Given their citizens' religiosity, the presence of religious parties, and the salience of religion in the politics of India and Pakistan, it is likely that politicians in both of these countries vary considerably in how religious they are. How do these differences influence their political and policy choices? We know surprisingly little about this question. This paper uses data from survey experiments fielded to politicians in India (in 2019) and Pakistan (in 2018) to examine how religiosity is correlated with politicians' risk-taking behaviors. Given that research finds they are correlated in citizens and the ubiquity of both risk and religion in politics, understanding this relationship is important. The experimental data reveal that in both countries highly religious and less religious politicians make very different choices on a risky policy decision. Highly religious politicians are risk-seeking in India but risk-averse in Pakistan. While the less religious politicians approximate rational actors, the highly religious politicians violate both rational actor and prospect theory decision-making models.

Tandis que l'affiliation religieuse en elle même devient de moins en moins importante dans le mariage et la reproduction au Canada, la religiosityé continue àêtre très significative. Une analyse de données obtenues du Sondage de la fertilityé canadienne (Canadian Fertility Survey) de 1984, dans lequel un échantillonage national de 5,315 femmes dâge reproductif fût interviewées, démontrent que la religiosityé, tel que mesurée par la régularité de présence à l'église, est fortement reliée à la cohabitation avant le mariage, la dissolution du mariage, la fécondité et l'utilisation de méthodes de contraception. Plus de femmes religieuses sont moins portées à cohabiter avant le mariage et plus d'entres‐elles sont portées à demeurer dans leur premier mariage. Elles ont plus d'enfants et s'attendent àêtre plus fécondes meme lorsque d'autres facteurs comme la religion, l'éducation, l'endroit de résidence, l'àge lors du mariage et la durée du mariage sont utilisés comme contrôles. De plus, il n'est pas suprennant que ces femmes utilisent moins de contraceptifs. La religiosité est aussi associée aux attitudes à l'égard de l'avortement, des relations sexuelles avant le mariage et les attitudes envers la grossesse. Le fait que la religiosité n'ait très peu d'interaction avec d'autres variables indépendantes reliées au mariage et à la fécondité suggere le besoin de comprendre comment la religiosityé influence le comportement de fécondité.While religious affiliation per se is becoming less important in nuptiality and reproduction in Canada, religiosity continues to be very significant. Using the data from the Canadian Fertility Survey of 1984 which interviewed a national sample of 5,315 women in the reproductive years, this paper finds that religiosity, as measured by church attendance, is strongly related to premartial cohabitation, marital dissolution, fertility and contraceptive behaviour. More religious women are less likely to cohabit before marriage and more likely to stay in their first marriage. They have higher actual and expected fertility even when other factors such as religion, education, place of residence, age at marriage and marriage duration are controlled. Not surprisingly contraceptive use is also lower among them. Religiosity is also found to be associated with attitudes towards abortion, premarital sex and childbearing. The low interaction of religiosity with other independent variables related to marriage and fertility underscores the need to understand better how exactly religiosity influence fertility behaviour.

Public Goods can be seen as one important way in which societies sustain themselves over time. These are part of the puzzle of the development of political order. Public goods like the rule of law are non-substractable and non-excludable. For economists the classic textbook examples are national defense and police protection. In this paper I argue that religiosity can function like police protection, a means of sustaining order through fear of punishment from a transcendent source. As a means of reducing defection from social norms it has a role to play as a public good. But religion cannot at the same time be seen as the source of such norms or dissention will undermine the very order that punishment seems to reinforce.