Riots, Pogroms, Jihad: Religious Violence in Indonesia
In: Perspectives on politics: a political science public sphere, Band 7, Heft 1, S. 163-164
ISSN: 1537-5927
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In: Perspectives on politics: a political science public sphere, Band 7, Heft 1, S. 163-164
ISSN: 1537-5927
In: Comparative political studies: CPS, Band 40, Heft 10, S. 1263-1266
ISSN: 0010-4140
In: Sharma, Vivek Swaroop (2016) "Secularism and Religious Violence in Hinduism and Islam" in Economic and Political Weekly 51 (18): 19-21.
SSRN
In: Terrorism and political violence, Band 19, Heft 4, S. 511-528
ISSN: 1556-1836
In: Totalitarian movements and political religions, Band 4, Heft 3, S. 55-70
ISSN: 1469-0764
Although violence by religious believers is often explained by reference to 'fundamentalism,' this is an unsatisfactory analytic category. The term derives from a specific episode in American Protestantism & is often misconstrued as synonymous with beliefs based on the literal reading of texts. Religiously driven violence is often less a matter of beliefs than of ritualistic activity, similar to Juergensmeyer's 'performance violence.' The potentially violent believer must situate him/herself with reference to religious authorities who can legitimate action & an 'other' against whom violence can be directed. The presence of both legitimators & loci of evil allows the playing out of apocalyptic 'scripts,' in the expectation that violent acts will precipitate millennial transformation. Adapted from the source document.
In: Political theology, Band 15, Heft 6, S. 479-485
ISSN: 1743-1719
In: American political science review, Band 112, Heft 1, S. 49-67
ISSN: 1537-5943
Does secular party incumbency affect religious violence? Existing theory is ambiguous. On the one hand, religiously motivated militants might target areas that vote secularists into office. On the other hand, secular party politicians, reliant on the support of violence-hit communities, may face powerful electoral incentives to quell attacks. Candidates bent on preventing bloodshed might also sort into such parties. To adjudicate these claims, we combine constituency-level election returns with event data on Islamist and sectarian violence in Pakistan (1988–2011). For identification, we compare districts where secular parties narrowly won or lost elections. We find that secularist rule causes a sizable reduction in local religious conflict. Additional analyses suggest that the result stems from electoral pressures to cater to core party supporters and not from politician selection. The effect is concentrated in regions with denser police presence, highlighting the importance of state capacity for suppressing religious disorder.
In: Anthropology, Band 2, Heft 5
ISSN: 2332-0915
In: Asian politics & policy: APP, Band 3, Heft 3, S. 490-494
ISSN: 1943-0787
In: Totalitarian movements and political religions, Band 4, Heft 3, S. 55-70
ISSN: 1743-9647
In: Terrorism and political violence, Band 25, Heft 3, S. 406-408
ISSN: 1556-1836
In: American political science review, Band 112, Heft 1, S. 49-67
ISSN: 0003-0554
World Affairs Online
In: International affairs, Band 96, Heft 2, S. 279-303
ISSN: 1468-2346
This article argues that despite the framing of religion in the discipline and practice of International Relations (IR) as a force for good, or a cause of evil in the world, IR fails to treat religion on its own terms (as sui generis). With a few exceptions, the discipline has pigeonholed religion as a variable of IR, one that can be discussed as one might GDP, HIV, or numbers of nuclear missiles: measurable, with causality and essential properties. IR has also tended to treat religion as equivalent to features of global politics that it already recognizes—as an institution or community or ideology, for example—but in doing so, it misses intrinsic (and arguably unique) elements of religion. Drawing on feminist insights about how gender works in IR, namely that gender is a construct, performative and structural, this article argues a similar case for religion. A reframing of religion is applied to the case of Daesh (so-called Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, ISIS) to show how our understanding of the organization changes when we view religion differently. The implications for counterterrorism policies if religion is viewed as more than a variable are explored in light of recent territorial and military losses for Daesh. The article therefore proposes a post-secular counterterrorism approach.
In: Politics and religion: official journal of the APSA Organized Section on Religion and Politics, Band 12, Heft 1, S. 81-122
ISSN: 1755-0491
AbstractHow do we measure religious violence? This study is focused on utilizing new methodological approaches and data sources to measure religiously motivated violence. Previous attempts to measure religious violence concentrated on coding U.S. State Department International Religious Freedom reports or utilizing existing datasets on armed conflict/civil wars. These previous attempts provided state-level data of the levels of religiously motivated violence, but due to data limitations cannot provide more fine-grained measures of specific acts of violence tied to religious motivation. In particular, accounting for varying levels of intensity especially in regards to non-lethal acts of religiously motivated violence is missing. This study builds upon previous attempts focusing on the creation of more fine-grained measures and accounting for its variation at the sub-national level utilizing natural language processing. The data generated are used to examine incidences of reported religious violence in India from 2000 to 2015.
In: Politics and religion: official journal of the APSA Organized Section on Religion and Politics, Band 7, Heft 4, S. 684-705
ISSN: 1755-0491
AbstractStudies of religious violence have established that when states restrict religious freedom, the probability of religious violence increases. Conventional wisdom holds that religious violence is primarily a result of religious grievances. When religious groups are denied religious freedom, they seek to revise the status quo in their favor though the use of violence. This study challenges this narrative. It finds, rather than being caused only by grievances, religious violence is also fueled by moments of opportunity. Utilizing cross-national data for the years 2008 and 2001–2005, it is found that religious violence occurs most frequently in anocratic regimes marked by weak and decaying state institutions. Hence, the current narrative is incomplete. Studies analyzing religious violence need to consider how various regimes provide or stifle the opportunity for religious actors to engage in violence as well as how those regimes fuel religious violence through restricting religious freedom and increasing religious grievances.