Renegotiation Board regulations under the Renegotiation act of 1951
"Gives effect to all amendments and additions published in the Federal register to and including "March 1, 1964." ; Mode of access: Internet.
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"Gives effect to all amendments and additions published in the Federal register to and including "March 1, 1964." ; Mode of access: Internet.
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In: http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc1.b4179491
"This is a complete reprint, giving effect to all amendments to date." ; Mode of access: Internet.
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In: Current history: a journal of contemporary world affairs, Band 6, Heft 31, S. 220-224
ISSN: 1944-785X
In: http://hdl.handle.net/2027/osu.32437121738518
At head of title: Coordinators' War contracts guide. ; Mode of access: Internet.
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In: International negotiation: a journal of theory and practice, Band 25, Heft 1, S. 69-77
ISSN: 1571-8069
Abstract
An international negotiated agreement is typically viewed as a major achievement, but it may not last forever. Sometimes agreements need to be adjusted – still based on the existing formulas – as a result of changed circumstances or because particular provisions prove not as effective as originally hoped. But other times, agreements need to be overhauled from scratch and renegotiated using new formulas and possibly involving new actors. Such renegotiations are an under-examined process in the negotiation literature. When and why are renegotiations called for, and what are the best tactics and strategies to ensure that they succeed for the mutual benefit of all stakeholders? This article presents basic research questions that need to be addressed.
In: Africa research bulletin. Economic, financial and technical series, Band 49, Heft 3
ISSN: 1467-6346
In: Common Market Law Review, Band 11, Heft 2, S. 125-126
ISSN: 0165-0750
In: Journal of political economy, Band 94, Heft 2, S. 235-259
ISSN: 1537-534X
In: Journal of political economy, Band 94, Heft 2, S. 235
ISSN: 0022-3808
Loose-leaf for updating. ; Cover title. ; Mode of access: Internet.
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In: National Industrial Conference Board, Studies in Business Policy 44
In: Conference Board Reports
SSRN
Working paper
In: Environmental and resource economics, Band 45, Heft 4, S. 573-596
ISSN: 1573-1502
In: American economic review, Band 104, Heft 5, S. 94-100
ISSN: 1944-7981
This paper studies an optimal renegotiation protocol designed by a benevolent planner when two countries renegotiate with the same lender. The solution calls for recoveries that induce each country to default or repay, trading off the deadweight costs and the redistribution benefits of default independently of the other country. This outcome contrasts with a decentralized bargaining solution where default in one country increases the likelihood of default in the second country because recoveries are lower when both countries renegotiate. The paper suggests that policies geared at designing renegotiation processes that treat countries in isolation can prevent contagion of debt crises.