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A SUBSTANTIAL PORTION OF THE RESEARCH ON RENT-SEEKING ADDRESSES THE ISSUE OF RENT DISSIPATION. EARLY STUDIES SIMPLY ASSUMED DISSIPATION WOULD BE COMPLETE AND FISHER OBSERVED THE QUESTION OF DISSIPATION CAN BE ANSWERED ONLY FOR OVERTLY SPEICIFIED GAME STRUCTURES. A RENT-SEEKING GAME HAS BEEN INTRODUCED WHICH YIELDED INCOMPLETE DISSIPATION UNDER A WIDE VARIETY OF COST CONDITIONS. SEVERAL AUTHORS HAVE CONSIDERED NECESSARY CONDITIONS FOR EXCESS DISSIPATION. WENDERS ADDRESSED THE SOCIAL COSTS OF RENT-SEEKING TO OBTAIN A MONOPOLY AND CONCLUDES THAT RECURRING OR SUNK EVEN THE LARGEST SPECIFICATION OF COSTS OF REGULATION MAY BE FAR SHORT OF THE ACTUAL WELFARE COSTS. THIS PAPER MORE FULLY DEVELOPS SOME OF THESE TOPICS AND PRESENTS CONCLUSIONS THAT HAVE NOT APPEARED IN THE LITERATURE.

In this paper, we analyze a multiple winner rent-seeking contest where the number of winners is set by a self-interested regulator. The winners receive a license to compete in a market. The structure of competition in the market influences the number of winners through the preferences of the regulator. The model indicates that Cournot competitors can be better off than firms that are able to collude on output determination. 1 Table, 15 References. Adapted from the source document.

According to a recent government report, over 200 U.S. cities, including Boston, have some form of rent control. Although rent control is now a national phenomenon, many people are unfamiliar with it. What is rent control, how does it work, why is it so widely used and who really pays the rent?

AbstractWe reflect on the use of state power in state‐owned enterprises. An African case study is first recounted in which a private coffee exporting firm seeks to compete against a government‐owned monopoly marketing board. A principal theme of the study is that state enterprises retain de facto control of their markets long after surrendering any de jure monopoly privileges. Managers of the state firm and their supervisors within the civil service form a coherent lobbying group whose interest is to defend the enterprise from competition. With this study as a backdrop, we offer a theory of rent seeking in state‐owned enterprises. We argue that state firms in less‐developed countries seek to maximize costs within the limits of the subsidies offered them by international donors. Government rent is the difference between such maximized cost and minimum cost. The portion of government rent determined by valuing inputs at competitive factor prices is dissipative in the sense that it vanishes from productive output. Dissipated government rent likely is larger than in the classical (Tullock) rent‐seeking paradigm because a state firm's managers have little incentive to limit their rent‐seeking activities. Hence, renewed calls for state regulation can be expected once the present deregulation trend has run its course.

As deregulation takes place in the UK, rent tribunals are
confronted with the problem of setting a "market rent" for
previously controlled property. A simple partial equilibrium model of a
sector of the rented accommodation market is used to examine the
question of setting a "market rent" in the controlled‐rent
subsector. It is shown that setting the controlled rent equal to the
rent prevailing in the uncontrolled part of the market is sub‐optimal,
and a simple formula is suggested which will give a better estimate of
the true free market rent.