Abstract. Since 2015, the residential neighbourhood of Rožna dolina has experienced intense building activity that has been supported by the city of Ljubljana, but has been met with resistance from the local inhabitants, thus becoming the most visible local expression of the universal capitalist conflict between the use and exchange value of space. The article main aim is to analyse the concrete manifestation of this conflict by looking at the operations of the local state, investors and inhabitants in the production of space in Rožna dolina. The analysis shows that the conflict is influenced by the specific local state's dependency on economic actors, by specifics of local real estate market and workings of developers and by the composition of inhabitants of Rožna dolina. Keywords: Ljubljana, spatial conflicts, appropriation of rent, local state, real estate development
A comparative study of housing policy & conditions in five European Union (EU) member states: the UK, Germany, Sweden, Spain, & Slovenia. Similarities & differences are demonstrated in a discussion of the housing regulations enacted in each country & in a series of quantitative tables illustrating: (1) rentals vs private ownership, (2) government-subsidized housing, (3) availability of homes/apartments for rent/ownership, (4) private-government housing agencies, (5) rent control laws, (6) home ownership, (7) average housing standards & quality data (eg, dwelling size & amenities), (8) annual housing unit construction, (9) house/apartment prices, (10) housing affordability index, & (11) housing debt (eg, mortgage debt per capita/GDP). It is concluded that unlike in the older EU members, with clearly detectable trends of housing value appreciation, decline, or stagnation, the housing situation in Slovenia seems to be erratic with illogical price fluctuations that are not explainable in terms of clearly identifiable factors. Adapted from the source document.
Ko slišimo za pojem korupcija, takoj pomislimo na zlorabo javne službe za doseganje lastnih koristi. Posamezniki in podjetja podkupujejo administrativne uslužbence, da le-ti uredijo zadeve, ki morajo biti rešene. Gre torej za izsiljevanje rent od gospodarskih udeležencev in posledično od ekonomije same izključno za zasebne koristi politikov in uradnikov. Tovrsten pristop k obravnavanju pojava je v zadnjih letih začrtal popolnoma novo smer analiziranja in merjenja korupcije. Korupcija se predstavi v popolnoma novi podobi, v kateri posamezniki, skupine oziroma podjetja vplivajo na formulacijo zakonov, ali celo spreobračajo že oblikovana pravila igre, da bi si s tem zagotovili pomembne ugodnosti. Korupcija je in vedno bo obstajala v svetu, edina razlika je v tem, da se z razvojem družb spreminja, prevzema bolj prefinjene oblike, zaradi katerih jo je težje odkrivati in preprečevati. Vse bolj razsežne in destruktivne posledice, ki jih ima korupcija na gospodarsko rast in družbeno stabilnost, nujno zahtevajo praktične strategije omejevanja korupcije. Problem korupcije se ne omejuje na določeno regijo, kajti z njenimi grožnjami se ubadajo tako razvite države kot tudi države v razvoju in tranzitne države. V postsocialističnih državah so sočasni procesi razvijanja tržne ekonomije, oblikovanja novih političnih in socialnih institucij ter prerazporejanje družbene lastnine ustvarili rodna tla za pojav korupcije. Zaradi kompleksnosti fenomena in predvsem zaradi vse večjega zavedanja, da vzroki za prevzem države presegajo golo neučinkovitost in šibkost državne uprave, je potrebno za razumevanje in odpravljanje state capture razsvetliti problem širših strukturalnih povezav, kot so interna organizacija političnega sistema, odnosi in zveze med ključnimi državnimi institucijami, interakcije med podjetji in državo ter povezave med državo in civilno družbo. ; When we think about corruption, an image quickly comes to mind of abuse of public office for private gains. Individuals and firms are bribing bureaucrats to »get things done«. Behind this view lies an understanding of the state extracting rents from the economy for the exclusive benefit of politicians and bureaucrats. Such an aprroach has had a powerful impact on the way corruption has been analyzed and measured in recent years. Corruption has taken on a new image – that of individuals, groups, or firms manipulating policy formation and even shaping the emerging rules of the game to their own, very substantional advantage. Corruption has always existed across the world and it will never disappear, the difference is that has become more sophisticated and thus more difficult and costly to detect. With the increasing recognition across the globe of the damaging effects of corruption on economic growth and social stability, the demand for practical strategies to reduce corruption has grown dramatically. The problem is not confined to any particular region, and developed, developing and transition countries alike are confronting these challenges. In postcommunist states the simultaneous processes of developing a market economy, designing new political and social institutions and redistributing social assets have created fertile ground for corruption. With regard to complexity of phenomena and with increasing recognition that the roots of state capture extend far beyond weaknesses in the capacity of government, we need to be aware of factors underlying the persistence of corruption that is broader structural relationships, including the internal organization of the political system, relationships among core state institutions, the interactions between the state and firms, and the relationship between the sate and civil society.
