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Do politicians use the representativeness heuristic when making judgements, that is, when they appraise the likelihood or frequency of an outcome that is unknown or unknowable? Heuristics are cognitive shortcuts that facilitate judgements and decision making. Oftentimes, heuristics are useful, but they may also lead to systematic biases that can be detrimental for decision making in a representative democracy. Thus far, we lack experimental evidence on whether politicians use the representativeness heuristic. To contribute to and extend the existing literature, we develop and conduct a survey experiment with as main participants Dutch elected local politicians from the larger municipalities (n = 211). This survey experiment examines whether politician participants display two decision-making biases related to the representativeness heuristic: the conjunction error and scope neglect. We also run the experiment with a student sample (n = 260), mainly to validate the experimental design. Our findings show that politician participants neglect scope in one scenario and that they display the conjunction error in two of three scenarios. These results suggest that politician participants use the representativeness heuristic. Conversely, our third conjunction error scenario does not find evidence for politician participants displaying this bias. As we discuss in the article, the latter may be an artifact of our experimental design. Overall, our findings contribute fundamentally to our understanding of how politicians process information and how this influences their judgements and decision making.

Altres ajuts: FEDER/PSI2017-84539-P, FEDER/PSI2014-52181-P ; European Union's Seventh Framework Programme for research, technological development and demonstration under grant agreement no. no. 613465-AThEME ; Language context (native vs. foreign) affects people's choices and preferences in a wide variety of situations. However, emotional reactions are a key component driving people's choices in those situations. In six studies, we test whether foreign language context modifies biases and the use of heuristics not directly caused by emotional reactions. We fail to find evidence that foreign language context modifies the extent to which people suffer from outcome bias (Experiment 1a & 1b) and the use of the representativeness heuristic (Experiment 2a & 2b). Furthermore, foreign language context does not modulate decision-making in those scenarios even when emotion is brought into the context (Experiment 1c & 2c). Foreign language context shapes decision-making, but the scope of its effects might be limited to decision-making tendencies in which emotion plays a causal role.

Language context (native vs. foreign) affects people's choices and preferences in a wide variety of situations. However, emotional reactions are a key component driving people's choices in those situations. In six studies, we test whether foreign language context modifies biases and the use of heuristics not directly caused by emotional reactions. We fail to find evidence that foreign language context modifies the extent to which people suffer from outcome bias (Experiment 1a & 1b) and the use of the representativeness heuristic (Experiment 2a & 2b). Furthermore, foreign language context does not modulate decision-making in those scenarios even when emotion is brought into the context (Experiment 1c & 2c). Foreign language context shapes decision-making, but the scope of its effects might be limited to decision-making tendencies in which emotion plays a causal role. ; This study was funded by the Agencia Estatal de InvestigacioÂn (AEI, National Research Agency) and Fondo Europeo de Desarrollo Regional (FEDER, European Regional Development Fund) under projects PSI2017-84539-P and PSI2014-52181-P, the Catalan Government (2017 SGR 268), and the European Union's Seventh Framework Programme for research, technological development and demonstration under grant agreement no. 613465ÐAThEME. Marc-LluõÂs Vives was supported by a grant from the Spanish Government (BES-2015-071581).

It is broadly assumed that political elites (e.g. party leaders) regularly rely on heuristics in their judgments or decision-making. In this article, I aim to bring together and discuss the scattered literature on this topic. To address the current conceptual unclarity, I discuss two traditions on heuristics: (1) the heuristics and biases (H&B) tradition pioneered by Kahneman and Tversky and (2) the fast and frugal heuristics (F&F) tradition pioneered by Gigerenzer et al. I propose to concentrate on two well-defined heuristics from the H&B tradition—availability and representativeness—to empirically assess when political elites rely on heuristics and thereby understand better their judgments and decisions. My review of existing studies supports the notion that political elites use the availability heuristic and possibly the representativeness one for making complex decisions under uncertainty. It also reveals that besides this, we still know relatively little about when political elites use which heuristic and with what effect(s). Therefore, I end by proposing an agenda for future research.

Using two surveys, we study how respondents process visual cues to identify the political orientation (left- vs. right-wing) of members of the French National Assembly (referred to as "deputies"), based on official photographs only, to test the type of heuristic that they use. We first confirm that respondents outperform random guesses. Second, we find that their categorizations correlate with observable characteristics (gender, tie color, jewelry) and subjective assessments of deputies' personality traits (attractiveness, competence, trustworthiness). Third, the objective visual cues that respondents use are consistent with the actual characteristics of left- and right-wing deputies, and respondents mistakenly react to subjective personality traits that differ little across the two groups of deputies. Fourth, left- and right-wing respondents use the same cues in the same way, attractiveness being the only exception. Fifth, the magnitude of the marginal impact of a characteristic on the probability of a respondent categorizing a photograph as left- or right-wing increases strictly with the representativeness of that characteristic. Finally, we find evidence that some characteristics correlate with categorization errors. Findings 1, 2, 4, and the finding that respondents use cues in the correct way are consistent with both Bayesian behavior and the representativeness heuristic. Findings 5, 6, and the finding that respondents react to subjective cues that do not differ across groups are at odds with Bayesian inference but consistent with the representativeness heuristic suggested by Kahneman and Tversky (1972) and recently modelled by Gennaioli and Shleifer (2010), and Bordalo et al. (forthcoming). ; info:eu-repo/semantics/published

Introduction: The environment that surrounds people is changing, unpredictable and uncertain, so in the use of the neo cerebral cortex, heuristics gain prominence in decision making, which in the business field is important to know the influence of the same in the support seeking successful sales in the commercial sector. This is related to local economies and the circulation of capital, the growth of wealth for the benefit of people. Objectives: To determine if the owners use heuristics to procure sales and observe what they do to enhance the chances of success for the commercialization of the products. Methodology: The study was conducted in a quantitative exploratory manner of a transactional nature through a survey designed with constructs to obtain the data. Results: It was determined that 81.31% of the population chosen in the Cuba neighborhood of the city of Manta uses heuristics as a fundamental tool in decision-making and in application of the heuristic principles of representativeness, availability, adjustment, and anchoring given that 76.77% of the owners improve the situation by having formal education. Conclusions: The owners do use heuristics, consciously or not, in an effort to sustain the operation of their businesses. At the same time, it was possible to observe that the behaviors obtained are of a fractal nature, which leads to continue exploring new polygons and that better strategies are determined to promote local economies based on trade, useful information for educational institutions, local governments, and private entrepreneurs. ; Introducción: El entorno que rodea a las personas es cambiante, impredecible e incierto por lo que en uso del neocórtex cerebral la heurística gana protagonismo en la toma de decisiones lo cual en el ámbito de negocios es importante conocer la influencia de este en el sostenimiento procurando ventas exitosas en el sector comercial. Esto se relaciona de forma directa con las economías locales y la circulación de capital, el crecimiento de la riqueza a beneficio ...

It is broadly assumed that political elites (e.g. party leaders) regularly rely on heuristics in their judgments or decision-making. In this article, I aim to bring together and discuss the scattered literature on this topic. To address the current conceptual unclarity, I discuss two traditions on heuristics: (1) the heuristics and biases (H&B) tradition pioneered by Kahneman and Tversky and (2) the fast and frugal heuristics (F&F) tradition pioneered by Gigerenzer et al. I propose to concentrate on two well-defined heuristics from the H&B tradition—availability and representativeness—to empirically assess when political elites rely on heuristics and thereby understand better their judgments and decisions. My review of existing studies supports the notion that political elites use the availability heuristic and possibly the representativeness one for making complex decisions under uncertainty. It also reveals that besides this, we still know relatively little about when political elites use which heuristic and with what effect(s). Therefore, I end by proposing an agenda for future research.

Normative decision theory describes the judgment and decision-making process as a cost/benefit analysis based upon maximum utility. One assumption of the theory is full rationality for choices made throughout the process. Due to bounded rationality, however, mental shortcuts become necessary. Use of these shortcuts does not necessarily diminish the quality of the decision. However, a suboptimal use of a heuristic results in a biased decision. Kahneman and Tversky (1979) identify three basic heuristics: availability, representativeness, and anchoring and adjusting. One suboptimal use of the anchoring and adjusting heuristic, confirmation bias, is the unconscious search for and evaluation of information that confirms one's desired decision outcome while ignoring disconfirming information. In an adversarial legal contest, relying on biased research diminishes the probability of prevailing (Johnson 1993). The intent of this research inquiry is to use archival data to test for the presence of confirmation bias in the defenses presented by the litigants in Tax Court Memorandum Opinions. The data sample consists of the briefs presented to the Court by both litigants, taxpayer and Internal Revenue Service, in 106 of the 288 rendered Memorandum Decisions in 2004. Summary statistics from the data show that 51.85% of taxpayers represent themselves (i.e., pro se) in the contentious proceedings. The remaining taxpayers employ tax professionals to provide the defense. The IRS has a contingent of legal counsel to present their position. Non-parametric statistical testing provides evidence that defenses presented by pro se taxpayers show more bias than defenses provided by tax professionals. In turn, taxpayers' professional representatives present more biased defenses than do the IRS professional representatives. This research inquiry adds external validity to the extant literature on biased research recommendations resulting from the tax research task. That is, numerous identified incentives promote susceptibility to the use of confirmatory decision-making strategies. As shown in this study, incentives impact practitioners differently than government employees. Remedial measures, including education, task-specific experience, and accountability can reduce this proclivity. Pro se taxpayers, with no legal education, experience, or accountability, show a greater degree of bias in their defenses than do tax professionals.

The subject of the article is the process of making an economic decision. The stages of the history of economic-psychological researches – economic psychology, behavioral economy, psychology of economic behavior are distinguished. The contribution to the study of the psychological factors of the economic behavior of the winners of the Nobel Prize in Economics is shown. The theory of rational expectations of John von Neumann and O. Morgerstern Is characterized, particular attention is paid to the prospect theory of D. Kaneman and A. Tversky. The latter is presented in the form of heuristic decision making – representativeness, availability, adjustment, and anchoring, in addition, with the distinction of rational and irrational moments of this process. It is stated that the corresponding model of decision making does not take into account and that behind the economic-psychological lies in the actual psychological logic that a person makes decisions based on his own strategy, coping. The concept of decision making is substantially incomplete. Opportunity of the possibility of specification of the prospect theory of by the Case Study method – the analysis of a particular case of economic behavior opens. The Melbourne decision making questionnaire applies, the factors of this process – vigilance, back-passing, procrastination, and hypervigilance are manifest. The investigator is given the instruction to make an expanded comment on every statement, to explain own argumentation, as well as the obtained result. The rational and irrational components of its solution and features of coping are analyzed. It is determined that vigilance is the dominant factor, it turns out to be the most productive way of decision making. A model of coping of decision making, which specifies the theory of the prospects of D. Kaneman and A. Tversky and expands the limits of its application in the field of psychology of human economic behavior, is constructed.

The subject of the article is the process of making an economic decision. The stages of the history of economic-psychological researches – economic psychology, behavioral economy, psychology of economic behavior are distinguished. The contribution to the study of the psychological factors of the economic behavior of the winners of the Nobel Prize in Economics is shown. The theory of rational expectations of John von Neumann and O. Morgerstern Is characterized, particular attention is paid to the prospect theory of D. Kaneman and A. Tversky. The latter is presented in the form of heuristic decision making – representativeness, availability, adjustment, and anchoring, in addition, with the distinction of rational and irrational moments of this process. It is stated that the corresponding model of decision making does not take into account and that behind the economic- psychological lies in the actual psychological logic that a person makes decisions based on his own strategy, coping. The concept of decision making is substantially incomplete. Opportunity of the possibility of specification of the prospect theory of by the Case Study method – the analysis of a particular case of economic behavior opens. The Melbourne decision making questionnaire applies, the factors of this process – vigilance, back-passing, procrastination, and hypervigilance are manifest. The investigator is given the instruction to make an expanded comment on every statement, to explain own argumentation, as well as the obtained result. The rational and irrational components of its solution and features of coping are analyzed. It is determined that vigilance is the dominant factor, it turns out to be the most productive way of decision making. A model of coping of decision making, which specifies the theory of the prospects of D. Kaneman and A. Tversky and expands the limits of its application in the field of psychology of human economic behavior, is constructed. ; У статті виділяються етапи історії економіко-психологічних досліджень процесу прийняття рішення, показується внесок лауреатів Нобелівської премії з економіки у вивчення психологічних чинників цього процесу. Характеризується теорія раціональних очікувань Дж. фон Неймана та О. Моргенштерна, особлива увага приділяється теорії перспектив Д. Канемана та А. Тверські. Констатується, що теорія описує евристики, яких недостатньо для цілісного опису стратегії прийняття рішення (копінгу) конкретною людиною. Відкривається можливість доповнення цієї теорії за допомогою методу case study – аналізу окремого випадку економічної поведінки. Застосовується Мельбурнський опитувальник прийняття рішення. Аналізуються складові рішення та особливості копінгу. Домінуючим виявляється фактор пильності, при прийнятті рішення він є найпродуктивнішим. Побудована модель копінгу прийняття рішення досліджуваним, яка доповнює теорію перспектив Д. Кане-мана і А. Тверські й розширює межі її застосування в царині психології економічної поведінки.