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The issue of asymmetric information and public decision-making has been widely explored by economists. Most of the traditional analysis of public sector activities has been reviewed to take account of the different incentive problems arising from an asymmetric distribution of relevant information among the actors of the public decision-making process. A normative approach has been developed, mainly employing the principal agent paradigm to design incentive schemes which tackle adverse selection and moral hazard problems within public organizations. Still, this analysis is under way in many fields of public economics. However, a debate is ongoing on the theoretical limitations of this approach and on its relevance for the actual public sector activities. Public Decision-Making Processes and Asymmetry of Information encompasses different contributions to these issues, on both theoretical and practical areas. The innermost problem in the current discussion arises from the fact that this normative analysis is firmly rooted in the complete contracting framework, with the consequence that, despite the analytical complexities of most models, their results rely on very simplified assumptions. Most complexities of the organization of public sector, and more generally, of writing "contracts", are therefore swept away. Once the need for an incomplete contracting approach is recognized, the question becomes how to relax some of the assumptions characterizing the complete contracting framework, without getting ad hoc results. The Introduction to this book, written by Jean Jacques Laffont, sets the general grid to interpret the position of its papers in this debate. The four papers in Part 1 of the book are devoted to developing the analysis of some of the theoretical issues mentioned in the Introduction. Part 2 is devoted to discussing the applications of the theory to different public sector activities

This book presents some of the most important concepts in noncooperative games and cooperative games and introduces as well the latest advances in the new field of game theory in fuzzy and multiobjective environments. Several game representations and solution concepts are introduced which take the amgiguity and the multiplicity of objectives into consideration. The book also demonstrates the computational methods applied for obtaining the solutions. The reader can learn much about fuzzy and multiobjective games for conflict resolution in most realistic settings without prior mathematical sophistication

This book is on applications of game theory. It contains a lot of examples of applications of game theory together with the background of those games considered and a list of unsolved problems. Also we consider only the game where the optimal strategies of the players are found in closed form. For example, the following games are investigated: (a) games of protection of a channel from infiltration of a submarine, (b) the submarine versus helicopter game, (c) the matrix search games, (d) allocation search and economics games, where players face up an alternative either not to come into contest if the cost of efforts seems too high, or come into it, (e) dynamic infiltration games where the infiltrator tries to penetrate zone uncaught, (f) duels and (g) parlour games

Inhalt: Schröter, Wolfgang: Forschungstransfer aus einer klassischen Universität - Eine empirische Untersuchung an der Universität Tübingen. - WIRTSCHAFTSTHEORETISCHE UND WIRTSCHAFTSPOLITISCHE ASPEKTE DES FORSCHUNGSTRANSFERS (Wagner, Adolf: Evolution durch Innovation - Eine Wertung empirischer Befunde zum Forschungstransfer in Marburg und Tübingen. - Englmann, Frank C.: Forschungskooperation und technischer Fortschritt. - Stracke, Friedrich: Neue Tendenzen im Wissenstransfer. - Turowski, Odo: Technologietransfer in der DDR - Das Beispiel der Mikroelektronik. - Wagner, Adolf: Forschung, Forschungsförderung und Ergebnistransfer - Ermahnungen an den Zeitgeist) (PHF/übern.)