Suchergebnisse

Evolving threats to national security have resulted in the adoption of comprehensive (total) defence concepts by a number of small and medium states. Civil resistance constitutes a considerable part of such concepts, complementing military defence. The historical experience of Lithuania proved the value of nonviolent resistance between 1988 and 1991 for regaining independence, and defending it in January 1991. The aim of this article is to analyse the role of non-violent civil resistance in the national defence system, based on the experience of 13 January 1991 in Lithuania and develop further discussion about the concept of civil resistance. The methodological approach of the article is based on historical and theoretical analysis. This allows the experience of Lithuania to be assessed on the basis of Lithuanian National Security and Defence Strategy and scientific research. Lithuanian non-violent civil resistance in 1988–1991 was successful in terms of strategy, leadership, organisation, planning, non-violence priorities and the number of citizens involved. The leaders of the movement were able to mobilise people into a widespread movement based on their moral authority and value orientations, strongly appealing to different groups in society. Lithuania's independence was achieved with minimal human sacrifice, preserving the country's resources and infrastructure. This experience of non-violent civil resistance came to be used by modern state institutions to create strategic documents of the state. In the current situation, it is necessary to focus not only on the knowledge required for state defence and civil resistance, but also on its moral aspects such as values, ethical behaviour, civic and human maturity.

Evolving threats to national security have resulted in the adoption of comprehensive (total) defence concepts by a number of small and medium states. Civil resistance constitutes a considerable part of such concepts, complementing military defence. The historical experience of Lithuania proved the value of nonviolent resistance between 1988 and 1991 for regaining independence, and defending it in January 1991. The aim of this article is to analyse the role of non-violent civil resistance in the national defence system, based on the experience of 13 January 1991 in Lithuania and develop further discussion about the concept of civil resistance. The methodological approach of the article is based on historical and theoretical analysis. This allows the experience of Lithuania to be assessed on the basis of Lithuanian National Security and Defence Strategy and scientific research. Lithuanian non-violent civil resistance in 1988–1991 was successful in terms of strategy, leadership, organisation, planning, non-violence priorities and the number of citizens involved. The leaders of the movement were able to mobilise people into a widespread movement based on their moral authority and value orientations, strongly appealing to different groups in society. Lithuania's independence was achieved with minimal human sacrifice, preserving the country's resources and infrastructure. This experience of non-violent civil resistance came to be used by modern state institutions to create strategic documents of the state. In the current situation, it is necessary to focus not only on the knowledge required for state defence and civil resistance, but also on its moral aspects such as values, ethical behaviour, civic and human maturity.

Civil resistance is analyzed under the outlook of counterpropaganda by seeking to base the assumptions of its deinstitutionalization. Counterpropaganda may be defined by the individual activities of resistance, which are communicated in the public space. The changes of the definition of contemporary counterpropaganda are presented, and civil resistance is illustrated by the empirical examples as the method that may help understand both the processes of individual's deinstitutionalized counterpropaganda and the military defence of the state.

Civil resistance is analyzed under the outlook of counterpropaganda by seeking to base the assumptions of its deinstitutionalization. Counterpropaganda may be defined by the individual activities of resistance, which are communicated in the public space. The changes of the definition of contemporary counterpropaganda are presented, and civil resistance is illustrated by the empirical examples as the method that may help understand both the processes of individual's deinstitutionalized counterpropaganda and the military defence of the state.

Civil resistance is analyzed under the outlook of counterpropaganda by seeking to base the assumptions of its deinstitutionalization. Counterpropaganda may be defined by the individual activities of resistance, which are communicated in the public space. The changes of the definition of contemporary counterpropaganda are presented, and civil resistance is illustrated by the empirical examples as the method that may help understand both the processes of individual's deinstitutionalized counterpropaganda and the military defence of the state.

Civil resistance is analyzed under the outlook of counterpropaganda by seeking to base the assumptions of its deinstitutionalization. Counterpropaganda may be defined by the individual activities of resistance, which are communicated in the public space. The changes of the definition of contemporary counterpropaganda are presented, and civil resistance is illustrated by the empirical examples as the method that may help understand both the processes of individual's deinstitutionalized counterpropaganda and the military defence of the state.

The main object of this article is Anti-Soviet Resistance of Lithuanian Academic Youth in the 1950s and 1960s of 20th century. The Anti-Soviet resistance movement showed that young people in Lithuania didn't accept soviet authority and regime. They defined it as occupation power and fought for Lithuanian independence. This battle for independence was unarmed, but organized and non-organized. The main forms of organized Anti-Soviet resistance in Lithuania were: the formation of Anti-Soviet organizations and groups, the distribution of patriotic leaflets, painting patriotic slogans on the walls, doors and etc., raising national flags, remarking national and religious celebrations. The non-organized resistance, as well as organized resistance, had moral issues. If you agreed with soviet lifestyle and system, you had to make a compromise with yourself. Youths couldn't cope with propaganda and moral limitations which were ignited by the soviet regime and they tried to rebel through reaching for new Western music, fashion and other art forms. The escalating symbols of Western culture in soviet Lithuania were also forbidden and persecuted. The forms of youth resistance in Lithuania showed youth's reluctance in supporting the soviet regime and lifestyle. The most active members of academic youth in Lithuania participated in Anti-Soviet actions and Soviet government treated them as nationalists, Anti-Soviet elements. Moreover youngsters who distributed patriotic leaflets or painted patriotic slogans on the walls frequently didn't get a punishment, but they and some times their parents were instructed and prevented verbally by Soviet activists, Komsomol members. Generally young people were being sentenced to concentration camps for attending anti-soviet organizations or groups. These punishments were strict and the mark of previous conviction existed in the file during all soviet occupation period. This black mark in the file granted complexity of your life in soviet Lithuania and often a conflict with society. Finally Anti-Soviet Resistance of Lithuanian Academic Youth during 1950s and 1960s was inherent from all Lithuanian people Anti-Soviet resistance. A lot of young people were sentenced for being Anti-Soviet, but the most rebellious part of them never refused their patriotism and fight for freedom. This unarmed fight for freedom during 1950s and 1960s made the largest influence for further struggles in 1970s and 1980s till the independence of Lithuania was re-established.

The main object of this article is Anti-Soviet Resistance of Lithuanian Academic Youth in the 1950s and 1960s of 20th century. The Anti-Soviet resistance movement showed that young people in Lithuania didn't accept soviet authority and regime. They defined it as occupation power and fought for Lithuanian independence. This battle for independence was unarmed, but organized and non-organized. The main forms of organized Anti-Soviet resistance in Lithuania were: the formation of Anti-Soviet organizations and groups, the distribution of patriotic leaflets, painting patriotic slogans on the walls, doors and etc., raising national flags, remarking national and religious celebrations. The non-organized resistance, as well as organized resistance, had moral issues. If you agreed with soviet lifestyle and system, you had to make a compromise with yourself. Youths couldn't cope with propaganda and moral limitations which were ignited by the soviet regime and they tried to rebel through reaching for new Western music, fashion and other art forms. The escalating symbols of Western culture in soviet Lithuania were also forbidden and persecuted. The forms of youth resistance in Lithuania showed youth's reluctance in supporting the soviet regime and lifestyle. The most active members of academic youth in Lithuania participated in Anti-Soviet actions and Soviet government treated them as nationalists, Anti-Soviet elements. Moreover youngsters who distributed patriotic leaflets or painted patriotic slogans on the walls frequently didn't get a punishment, but they and some times their parents were instructed and prevented verbally by Soviet activists, Komsomol members. Generally young people were being sentenced to concentration camps for attending anti-soviet organizations or groups. These punishments were strict and the mark of previous conviction existed in the file during all soviet occupation period. This black mark in the file granted complexity of your life in soviet Lithuania and often a conflict with society. Finally Anti-Soviet Resistance of Lithuanian Academic Youth during 1950s and 1960s was inherent from all Lithuanian people Anti-Soviet resistance. A lot of young people were sentenced for being Anti-Soviet, but the most rebellious part of them never refused their patriotism and fight for freedom. This unarmed fight for freedom during 1950s and 1960s made the largest influence for further struggles in 1970s and 1980s till the independence of Lithuania was re-established.

The Zapatista National Liberation Army first came to prominence on 1 January 1994 when they attacked several cities in the southern Mexican state of Chiapas in protest against the NAFTA agreement. Though having been quickly defeated by the Mexican Army, the movement was able to reorganize and reinvent itself, moving from armed struggle to socio-cultural resistance, and embracing the new opportunities, provided by the development of communications, thus outlining the path that was to be taken by other movements. However, the activity and popularity of the movement declined significantly, presumably due to its inability to sustain the momentum in the long-run. The article is aimed at analyzing long-term challenges faced by the Zapatistas as a paradigmatic case for other movements seeking radical political change by non-military means. These include the ideological, organizational and communicative plains. First of all, the openness of the Zapatista worldviews has had a paradoxical effect. It proved to be highly useful in the short-term, when many groups and individuals were attracted by the Zapatistas' inclination to search for solutions rather than give final answers, by their pluralism and refutation of any hierarchy in power and knowledge. This, however, appeared as a self-defeating strategy when the Zapatistas had the possibility of constructing a nationwide reform movement and to propose a program for political change. This should be seen as a decisive moment, when the Zapatistas had to either betray their principle to 'lead by obeying' and to take initiative, or to risk losing the momentum, which was precisely what happened. The Zapatistas also failed to achieve substantive improvements in economic and social conditions of their communities. Although many Zapatista sympathisers were ready to accept hardship in the short run, later deep rifts and conflicts, especially over outside help, started to appear, with entire villages leaving the Zapatista front and siding with the government. The fact that the Zapatistas failed to create a viable practical alternative and to attract people even in their home region both diminished their credibility and led to an internal weakening of the movement. Finally, even though the Zapatistas were (and often still are) heralded for their innovative use of the Internet, this argument should also be reconsidered. While the movement has undoubtedly been successful in rallying support and spreading its message, the current situation appears to be less promising. Whereas the Zapatistas entered the Internet with no significant competition, the current surge and proliferation of information online as well as the loss of 'freshness' raises the costs of being heard significantly; furthermore, the bonds formed online tend to be fleeting and inconsistent, it appeared to be much more difficult to form stable supporters' networks. All this raises significant doubts over the Zapatistas' ability to remain effective in the long-term, something other radical movements should also take into account.

The Zapatista National Liberation Army first came to prominence on 1 January 1994 when they attacked several cities in the southern Mexican state of Chiapas in protest against the NAFTA agreement. Though having been quickly defeated by the Mexican Army, the movement was able to reorganize and reinvent itself, moving from armed struggle to socio-cultural resistance, and embracing the new opportunities, provided by the development of communications, thus outlining the path that was to be taken by other movements. However, the activity and popularity of the movement declined significantly, presumably due to its inability to sustain the momentum in the long-run. The article is aimed at analyzing long-term challenges faced by the Zapatistas as a paradigmatic case for other movements seeking radical political change by non-military means. These include the ideological, organizational and communicative plains. First of all, the openness of the Zapatista worldviews has had a paradoxical effect. It proved to be highly useful in the short-term, when many groups and individuals were attracted by the Zapatistas' inclination to search for solutions rather than give final answers, by their pluralism and refutation of any hierarchy in power and knowledge. This, however, appeared as a self-defeating strategy when the Zapatistas had the possibility of constructing a nationwide reform movement and to propose a program for political change. This should be seen as a decisive moment, when the Zapatistas had to either betray their principle to 'lead by obeying' and to take initiative, or to risk losing the momentum, which was precisely what happened. The Zapatistas also failed to achieve substantive improvements in economic and social conditions of their communities. Although many Zapatista sympathisers were ready to accept hardship in the short run, later deep rifts and conflicts, especially over outside help, started to appear, with entire villages leaving the Zapatista front and siding with the government. The fact that the Zapatistas failed to create a viable practical alternative and to attract people even in their home region both diminished their credibility and led to an internal weakening of the movement. Finally, even though the Zapatistas were (and often still are) heralded for their innovative use of the Internet, this argument should also be reconsidered. While the movement has undoubtedly been successful in rallying support and spreading its message, the current situation appears to be less promising. Whereas the Zapatistas entered the Internet with no significant competition, the current surge and proliferation of information online as well as the loss of 'freshness' raises the costs of being heard significantly; furthermore, the bonds formed online tend to be fleeting and inconsistent, it appeared to be much more difficult to form stable supporters' networks. All this raises significant doubts over the Zapatistas' ability to remain effective in the long-term, something other radical movements should also take into account.

The Zapatista National Liberation Army first came to prominence on 1 January 1994 when they attacked several cities in the southern Mexican state of Chiapas in protest against the NAFTA agreement. Though having been quickly defeated by the Mexican Army, the movement was able to reorganize and reinvent itself, moving from armed struggle to socio-cultural resistance, and embracing the new opportunities, provided by the development of communications, thus outlining the path that was to be taken by other movements. However, the activity and popularity of the movement declined significantly, presumably due to its inability to sustain the momentum in the long-run. The article is aimed at analyzing long-term challenges faced by the Zapatistas as a paradigmatic case for other movements seeking radical political change by non-military means. These include the ideological, organizational and communicative plains. First of all, the openness of the Zapatista worldviews has had a paradoxical effect. It proved to be highly useful in the short-term, when many groups and individuals were attracted by the Zapatistas' inclination to search for solutions rather than give final answers, by their pluralism and refutation of any hierarchy in power and knowledge. This, however, appeared as a self-defeating strategy when the Zapatistas had the possibility of constructing a nationwide reform movement and to propose a program for political change. This should be seen as a decisive moment, when the Zapatistas had to either betray their principle to 'lead by obeying' and to take initiative, or to risk losing the momentum, which was precisely what happened. The Zapatistas also failed to achieve substantive improvements in economic and social conditions of their communities. Although many Zapatista sympathisers were ready to accept hardship in the short run, later deep rifts and conflicts, especially over outside help, started to appear, with entire villages leaving the Zapatista front and siding with the government. The fact that the Zapatistas failed to create a viable practical alternative and to attract people even in their home region both diminished their credibility and led to an internal weakening of the movement. Finally, even though the Zapatistas were (and often still are) heralded for their innovative use of the Internet, this argument should also be reconsidered. While the movement has undoubtedly been successful in rallying support and spreading its message, the current situation appears to be less promising. Whereas the Zapatistas entered the Internet with no significant competition, the current surge and proliferation of information online as well as the loss of 'freshness' raises the costs of being heard significantly; furthermore, the bonds formed online tend to be fleeting and inconsistent, it appeared to be much more difficult to form stable supporters' networks. All this raises significant doubts over the Zapatistas' ability to remain effective in the long-term, something other radical movements should also take into account.

At present, when the building walls covered with a painted thin render are insulated by the mineral wool slabs from outside, the defects caused by the condensed moisture accumulated in the envelopes become more and more frequent. Water vapour permeability of the exterior finish (ie the paint), if compared with the water vapour permeability of the mineral wool slab, is rather small. That is why the paint coating may become the barrier for the water vapour diffusion and thus create favourable conditions for moisture accumulation in the exterior layers of the envelope during cold seasons. As a rule, to eliminate the defects, the exterior surface is repainted on the former paint coating because the render is thin and mechanically easily damaged. Repainting the thin render surface causes the following: 1) an increase of the exterior coating's vapour resistance; 2) a growth of the condensation intensity in the envelope exterior layers during the of moisture accumulation; 3) a decrease of the durability of the render-paint system. The restrictions for the envelope exterior layer sd have already been recommended to employ in the European Union. Since moisture accumulation inside the wall is determined by the local climate, it is important to find out whether the recommendations concerning the given sd value might be applied for the exterior layers of the building walls in Lithuania. To find it out, the calculations of the envelope state and laboratory experiments have been carried out. The paper aims at the analysis of the impact of vapour permeability and its properties in the exterior layers of the wall on the envelope moisture state. It has been determined that the increase of the sd value is disproportionate to the number of the paint layers or the thickness of the paint coating. [.]

At present, when the building walls covered with a painted thin render are insulated by the mineral wool slabs from outside, the defects caused by the condensed moisture accumulated in the envelopes become more and more frequent. Water vapour permeability of the exterior finish (ie the paint), if compared with the water vapour permeability of the mineral wool slab, is rather small. That is why the paint coating may become the barrier for the water vapour diffusion and thus create favourable conditions for moisture accumulation in the exterior layers of the envelope during cold seasons. As a rule, to eliminate the defects, the exterior surface is repainted on the former paint coating because the render is thin and mechanically easily damaged. Repainting the thin render surface causes the following: 1) an increase of the exterior coating's vapour resistance; 2) a growth of the condensation intensity in the envelope exterior layers during the of moisture accumulation; 3) a decrease of the durability of the render-paint system. The restrictions for the envelope exterior layer sd have already been recommended to employ in the European Union. Since moisture accumulation inside the wall is determined by the local climate, it is important to find out whether the recommendations concerning the given sd value might be applied for the exterior layers of the building walls in Lithuania. To find it out, the calculations of the envelope state and laboratory experiments have been carried out. The paper aims at the analysis of the impact of vapour permeability and its properties in the exterior layers of the wall on the envelope moisture state. It has been determined that the increase of the sd value is disproportionate to the number of the paint layers or the thickness of the paint coating. [.]

At present, when the building walls covered with a painted thin render are insulated by the mineral wool slabs from outside, the defects caused by the condensed moisture accumulated in the envelopes become more and more frequent. Water vapour permeability of the exterior finish (ie the paint), if compared with the water vapour permeability of the mineral wool slab, is rather small. That is why the paint coating may become the barrier for the water vapour diffusion and thus create favourable conditions for moisture accumulation in the exterior layers of the envelope during cold seasons. As a rule, to eliminate the defects, the exterior surface is repainted on the former paint coating because the render is thin and mechanically easily damaged. Repainting the thin render surface causes the following: 1) an increase of the exterior coating's vapour resistance; 2) a growth of the condensation intensity in the envelope exterior layers during the of moisture accumulation; 3) a decrease of the durability of the render-paint system. The restrictions for the envelope exterior layer sd have already been recommended to employ in the European Union. Since moisture accumulation inside the wall is determined by the local climate, it is important to find out whether the recommendations concerning the given sd value might be applied for the exterior layers of the building walls in Lithuania. To find it out, the calculations of the envelope state and laboratory experiments have been carried out. The paper aims at the analysis of the impact of vapour permeability and its properties in the exterior layers of the wall on the envelope moisture state. It has been determined that the increase of the sd value is disproportionate to the number of the paint layers or the thickness of the paint coating. [.]