Suchergebnisse

The author discusses the crucial question of whether Serbia truly pursues the path of modernization and European integration, or just a simulation of these processes. The author proposes the thesis that there are numerous obstacles on Serbia's transitional path toward the (post)modern European society. Therefore, he tries to discover the essential reasons for the citizens' reluctance and resistance, the reasons which are related to the modernization of the Serbian society. Serbia is today at the crossroads of the traditional and modern understanding of life. It contains some elements of (post)modernization, but still with a strong influence of its traditional (conservative) heritage. The processes of re-traditionalization (re-mythologization and pseudo-mythologization) represent a major obstacle to the liberation of the society from the grip of the past and to its orientation towards European values. According to the author, the main creators of retrograde flows can be found in the political establishment of contemporary Serbia. He labels them, ironically and derogatorily, the 'guardians' of tradition, who use demagogic statements, populist paroles, and media information control (for their personal and party interests) to slow down Serbia on its European path.

The denomination singing revolution (coined by Estonian artist Heinz Valk, b. 1936) is commonly used for events in Baltic States between 1987 and 1991 that led to the restoration of the independence of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Three songs – the folk song Pūt, vējiņi! (Blow, Wind!), the choir song Gaismas pils (The Castle of Light) by the national classical composer Jāzeps Vītols (1863–1948) and the song Saule, Pērkons, Daugava (Sun, Thunder, Daugava) by the composer Mārtiņš Brauns (1951) – at that time in Latvia had a special significance in society. Each song represented references to different layers in Latvian cultural and political history. The characteristics of the three songs in the Singing Revolution process are based on the approach and methodology of distant (objective) analysis of cultural context and recent historical experience. As a result, this article reveals the meaning and reception of the three songs as symbols of nonviolent resistance during the fall of communist regime in Latvia in the late 1980s. ; Термин певана револуција, који је сковао естонски уметник Хајнц Валк (Heinz Valk, 1936–), реферира на збивања у балтичким земљама између 1987. и 1991. године, која су довела до поновног успостављања независности Естоније, Летоније и Литваније. Масовне демонстрације против совјетске окупације започеле су након свеобухватне либерализације совјетског режима. У Москви су се надали да ће не-руске нације остати у оквиру Совјетског Савеза, захваљујући уклањању ограничења у вези са слободом говора и коришћењем националних симбола (попут локалних застава из раздобља пре 1940. године и сл.) Међутим, ситуација се до те мере погоршала да су још пре 1989. године започете кампање за ослобађање балтичких нација из окова Совјетског Савеза. Грандиозне манифестације на којима су људи заједно певали биле су карактеристичне за све три балтичке државе. Песме, као симболи протеста и ослобођења, сигнализирале су крај комунистичког режима. Три песме – народна песма Pūt, vējiņi! (Дуни, ветре!), хорска песма Gaismas pils (Замак светлости) летонског националног композитора Јазепса Витолса (Jāzeps Vītols, 1863–1948) и песма Saule, Pērkons, Daugava (Сунце, гром, Даугава) композитора Мартинша Браунса (Mārtiņš Brauns, 1951–), имале су посебан друштвени значај у Летонији тога доба. Свака песма је садржала референце на одређене слојеве летонске културне и политичке историје. Свака од ове три песме имала је другачију судбину након пада совјетског режима и поновног успостављања летонске независности. Стога, фокусирање на ове песме пружа нијансиран поглед на различите културне и политичке контексте пада комунистичког режима у балтичким државама, посебно у Летонији. У приступу овим песмама, карактеристичним за певану револуцију, примењена је методологији дистанциране (објективне) анализе културног контекста и скорашњег историјског искуства. Последично, овим чланком се осврћемо на значење и рецепцију ове три песме као симбола ненасилног отпора у време пада комунистичког режима у Летонији, крајем осамдесетих година прошлог века. Могуће је закључити да се поједине песме, у комтексту историјских промена, не доживљавају као примарно музички артефакти, већ као дубоко симболичне поруке. Заузврат, анализа ових порука омогућава нам да откријемо референце на разне слојеве културе и специфичних локалних традиција, као и њихових данашњих одјека у оквирима традиционалне културе. ; Часопис је индексиран на http://doiserbia.nb.rs/, http://dais.sanu.ac.rs/handle/123456789/914 и у међународној бази ProQuest. / The journal is indexed in http://doiserbia.nb.rs/, http://dais.sanu.ac.rs/handle/123456789/914 and in the international database ProQuest. Издавање ове публикације подржали су Министарство културе и информисања Републике Србије, Министарство просвете, науке и технолошког развоја Републике Србије и СОКОЈ - Организација музичких аутора Србије / The publication of this volume was supported by the Ministry of Culture and Information of the Republic of Serbia, the Ministry of Education, Science and Technological Development of the Republic of Serbia and SOKOJ - Serbian Music Authors' Organization

The article deals with the situation in France during the World War II, particularly as regards the Resistance Movement. It studies the relationship of the uprising, which Croats within the 13th SS division started and the Resistance Movement. (SOI : CSP: S. 332)

Based on the literature and the available sources, first of all contemporary press, the author reconstructs the attitude of the Croatian Popular Party on the events concerning the assassination on Stjepan Radic, the representative of the Croatian Peasant Party in the National Assembly of the Monarchy of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. Special attention is paid to the entrance of S. Baric, president of the Croatian Popular Party, into the government of Anton Korosec, and reactions to this step. Disappearance of the Croatian Popular Party from the Croatian political scene was closely connected with the resistance (gemeint ist: lack of resistance, SOI, Clw) of its leaders to this extremely unpopular government. (SOI : CSP: S. 245)

The author analyzes the problems of the relationship between the peasants and the state authority in Croatia concerning the restrictive policy of compulsory selling of agricultural produce. In the first postwar years the compulsory selling was intended to provide food for the population in passive regions. Later, that was a way to provide raw materials for industry and supplies for the cities. The so-called class policy towards the country was systematically built in the policy of compulsory selling, which was one of the main causes of the peasants' unrests in 1949. Different forms of resistance to that policy had reflected the accumulated social and political discontent which resulted in demonstrations, destruction of individual property, setting fire to the state property, and physical and armed attacks onto representatives of the authorities. (SOI : CSP: S. 232)

In the course of its history, Europe has structured itself by means of two models. The first was based on the territorial expansion of regional forces that used violence to break down the resistance of their weaker neighbors and establish the balance of power. In this way, at least temporarily, the way was paved for more radical changes in their polities. This model was in use until the end of World War II. The second model has been built around European integration. The aim of this process has not been the expansion of regional powers and the territorial conquest of their neighbors; it is based on the initiative of the weak to join the organizations that can satisfy their interests and goals. The process of integration excludes coercive methods. However, there is certain asymmetry in the relationship between the center and the periphery (the strong and the weak). The countries that belong to the center define the membership standards for the 'periphery' and evaluate their implementation. The 'central' countries are in a better position than the peripheral ones since the process of integration bolsters their collective identity, while the weaker states - by accepting the standards of stronger countries - have to alter their original identity. (SOI : PM: S. 97)

A number of military units were active on the territory of the Independent Stat of Croatia (ISC). Since the end of 1941 there were, in the operational sense, one side the armed forces of ISC, Germans, Italians and chetniks, and on the other side partisans. Numerical ratio changed depending on the events in the field and the international situation. The armed forces of the ISC were repeatedly trained and getting more numerous. Until the middle of 1944 their number exceeded the chetniks and partisans together, which jeopardized ISC. The force of ISC were dependent on Germans, and until 1943 on Italians too. German and Italian units were getting stronger, but they were not supported by the local population. Italian units supported the chetniks, thus provoking strong resistance of the population, who in the so-called Italian zones joined the partisans. Chetniks were also supported by Germans, chetniks from Serbia and Montenegro, and the government of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. Near the end of the war, chetniks went over to the partisans in great number because of loss o support by the Germans and Italians. Partisans, making use of the enemy's mistakes, got stronger and stronger. The partisan predominance was realized only when the countries of the antifascist coalition decided to support Josip Tito, the communist-partisan leader. Since the autumn of 1944 partisans got abundant military and political support which helped them win the war. (SOI : CSP: S. 196)

Joint effect of 2008 economic crises and continous world-wide present deficite of political legitimacy have in 2011 given birth to global resistance, but also facilitated development of its new strategies and tactics. Aldough we are still by large able to understand these contemporary models of collective action with help of New Social Movement Theory, today they objectivelly grasp a wider field of meaning, mainly for reason of their demands for radical transformation of both economic and political system. Contemporary social movements are still struggling for re-interpretation of meaning, and identity issues, but not any more for any particular goal. Instead, they seek systemic change. This extremelly important shift of strategic orientation, which makes new movements a bit old – that is classical, remains in our oppinion, undervalued both in academic, and general public for the reasons that we will try to comprehend, in this writing. ; Sadejstvo udara ekonomske krize iz 2008. i kontinuiranog deficita političkog legitimiteta dovode 2011. do pojave globalnog otpora, ali i do razvoja njegovih kvalitativno novih strategija i taktika. Iako je savremene modele kolektivne akcije dobrim delom i dalje moguće razumeti uz pomoć teorije novih društvenih pokreta, oni danas objektivno zahvataju jedno šire polje, najpre zbog zahteva za radikalnom promenom u ukupnom ekonomskom i političkom sistemu. Savremeni društveni pokreti i dalje se bore za reinterpretaciju značenja i priznanje sopstvenog identiteta, ali ne više za bilo koje pojedinačno pitanje, već za sveobuhvatnu promenu sistema. Ta izuzetno važna promena strateške orijentacije, koja nove pokrete čini pomalo starim – upravo klasičnim, ostaje, čini nam se, nedovoljno primećena iz razloga koje ćemo pokušati da rasvetlimo.

The two construction ventures mirrored political currents and were affected by politics while themselves making politics. In the aftermath of the regime's backlash following the Croatian quest for more autonomy within the Yugoslav federation, the Cathedral was reduced in size and relocated to an inappropriate site. Builders of the St. Sava's church, meanwhile, defied recommendations by experts to adjust its style to the surroundings or change the location. Even though the authorities offered financial assistance with the construction permit, the Serb church in Split remained unfinished. In the late 1980s as ethnic tensions grew and the multiethnic country was on the brink of war and disintegration, leaders of the Serbian Orthodox Church and propaganda in the capital of Serbia Belgrade exploited the Split case as an evidence of discrimination against the Serbian ethnic minority in predominantly Catholic Croatia. The Serbian Church, utilizing the unfinished temple, also attempted to revive symbolically the ancient Byzantine/Roman disputes over the church community in the ancient city in order to imply that there existed a long tradition and "continuity" of religious disputes in this region. Yet, both the Croatian authorities and the Catholic Church sought to appease the Serbian church, rather than to accept the challenges. This case demonstrates that the Serbian Orthodox Church followed the militant course of the regime in Serbia, which was the principal firebrand of the 1991-95 Balkan war. (SOI : CSP: S. 126) + This article is built on primary sources that include the author's research in the offices of state commissions for relations with religious communities with numerous interviews carried out between 1985-1991. It examines church-state relations and interconfessional rivalry under communism in the former Yugoslav federation of six republics. Construction of new religious facilities, especially in case of building of significant edifices symbols of religious and ethnic identity, was a popular practice by which religious institutions animated the faithful, sought to break the isolation imposed upon them by the regime, and symbolically expressed resistance against the communist system, and finally, competed with one another in a society with three major religious institutions and over forty minor religious groups. The analysis tracks down coinciding processes of rebuilding of two significant churches symbols. One is a Serbian Orthodox memorial church dedicated to the chief Serb national saint Sava, built in neo-Byzantine style, and installed amidst a historic Romanesque block in the predominantly Croatian Catholic town of Split. The other church under construction was the city's co-Cathedral of St. Peter the Apostle, damaged in World War II

The relations with Russia rank among the most important and most complex issues in the US and UK foreign policy. The years after the Second World War have been marked by an exhausting arms race between the Western and Eastern bloc that ended with the fall of the Berlin Wall, the break-up of the Soviet Union and the victory of the United States and its Western allies. The purpose of this paper is to analyse the relations between the US and the United Kingdom on the one hand, and Russia, on the other, during the mandate of President Trump and after Brexit and point to possible directions that these relations may take in the aftermath of Biden's victory in the 2020 US Presidential elections. The author proceeds from a hypothesis that the efforts of President Trump, who, contrary to his predecessors, felt that the relations with Russia should be based on interests rather than ideology, have failed. He has not been successful primarily due to the huge resistance mounted by the state structures, mainstream media and anti-Russian coalition forged by the Republican and Democratic parties. The relations between the UK and Russia remain cold after Brexit as well due to the severe problems between the two countries. The first part will deal with the strained relations between the United States and Russia following the West's victory in the Cold War, the efforts of President Trump to improve these relations and his failure to do so. The second part of the paper will address the relationship between the United Kingdom and Russia, which is in many respects even more complicated than that between Russia and the US. After Brexit, the relations between the two countries continue to be plagued by the activities of the Russian agents in Great Britain, the crisis in Ukraine and different views on the war in Syria. In the third part, the concluding part of the paper, the author tried to answer the question of how the relations between the US and Russia will develop after Joseph Biden won the 2020 US Presidential elections. According to him, the new President will continue to pursue the traditional policy towards Russia agreed upon by both US parties. It can be expected that Biden will, despite the policy of sanctions pursued by his predecessors, Obama and Trump, engage more in supporting the opposition and civilian sector in Russia. Given the cold and strained relations between these two states, it may be assumed that Great Britain will readily follow a new, tougher course of action pursued by President Biden towards Russia and Putin. It is especially important for UK politics that Biden returns to the ideas of liberalism because, as we have seen on previous pages, in London, in addition to the actions of Russian agents on the UK territory, Putin is most resented precisely for his activities to overthrow the ruling liberal order. Despite the good ties between Prime Minister Johnson and the former US President who supported Brexit, Biden's victory will bring relief to the UK because of his commitment, as opposed to Trump, to bring back America to the world political stage, where London is likely to expect to find space for its new global role after leaving the EU. On the other hand, Moscow will probably continue with its past foreign policy strategy in anticipation of the moves to be taken by the new US President without high expectations regarding the future relations between the two countries. Russia has even fewer expectations when it comes to relations with the UK, given the gravity of the problems that burden the relations between the two countries.

У дисeртaциjи aкцeнaт је стaвљeн нa aнaлизу прoцeсa нoрмaлизaциje oднoсa измeђу уже Србиje и њене покрајине Koсoвa и Метохије у услoвимa дeлoвaњa тoкoвa глoбaлизaциje и тo крoз кoнтeкст прoцeсa eврoпских интeгрaциja рeгиoнa Зaпaднoг Бaлкaнa, у нaстojaњу дa сe oткриjу мeхaнизми кojимa сe рукoвoдe Eврoпскa униja (ЕУ), Србиja и косовске власти у сaмoм прoцeсу. Пoсeбнa пaжњa je пoсвeћeнa пoлитици услoвљaвaњa, кao глaвнoм инструмeнту кojи Eврoпскa униja упoтрeбљaвa прeмa Србиjи и Косову и Метохији, кao актерима кojи жeле дa пoстaну њeне члaнице. Teкст сe нaрoчитo бaви jaснoћoм услoвa, брзинoм нaгрaђивaњa и цeнтрифугaлним силaмa сaмoг прoцeсa уз oслoнaц нa примeну дoминaнтног тeoриjског приступa у овој области, институциoнaлизмa рaциoнaлнoг избoрa, кao глaвне истрaживaчке aргумeнтaциjе нa примeру прeгoвaрaчкoг пoглaвљa 35. Предмет истраживања је стога, степен успeшнoсти прoцeсa нoрмaлизaциje oднoсa измeђу Србиje и Koсoвa и Метохије у услoвимa глoбaлизaциje, односно дериватног процеса европеизације као прoцeса преноса и имплeмeнтaциje фoрмaлних и нeфoрмaлних прaвилa, прoцeдурa, пoлитичких пaрaдигми, стилoвa и нoрми кojи су нajпрe били дeфинисaни од стране EУ, a зaтим прeнeти у лoгику дoмaћeг дискурсa, пoлитичких структурa и jaвних пoлитика држава кандидата за чланство у ЕУ. Централно место у анализи свакако заузима степен нejaснoће сaмoг прoцeсa и пoврeмeни нeдoстaтaк крeдибилитeтa критeриjумa зa приступaњe ЕУ услед сталне прoмeнe услoвa интeгрaциje, као и пружaњe oтпoрa дoмaћих пoлитичких eлитa, и то посебно са аспекта кoристи и трoшкoвa, али и нивоа истинскe пoсвeћeнoсти решавању овог проблема. Истраживање посебно анализира нejeднaкe нивoe успeшнoсти, посебно посматрајући све типове приступа сaмих актера тог процеса, али и домете трaнсфoрмaтивнe мoћи ЕУ и мeхaнизама кojе Унија користи. ; The establishment of political relations between the authorities in Belgrade and in Prishtina in the frame of the process of globalization Resume: In this dissertation, emphasis is placed on analysis of the process of normalization of relations between central Serbia and its province Kosovo and Metohija in the frame of the process of globalization and in the context of European integration of the region of the Western Balkans, in an effort to discover the mechanisms that govern the European Union (EU), Serbia and Kosovo's authorities in the process itself. Special attention is paid to the policy of conditionality, as the main instrument used by the European Union towards Serbia and Kosovo, as actors who want to become its members. Text is particularly concerned with the clarity of conditions, the speed of rewarding and centrifugal forces of the process itself relying on the use of a predominant theoretical approach in this area, the rational choice institutionalism, as the main research argumentation on the case of the negotiating chapter 35. The subject of the research is therefore, the degree of success of the process of normalization of relations between Serbia and Kosovo and Metohija under conditions of globalization, as well as, under conditions of a derivative process of the Europeanization, as the process of transferring and implementing formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles and norms that were first defined by EU, and then transferred to the logic of domestic discourse, political structures and policies of the candidate countries for the membership in EU. The central place in the analysis of a degree of ambiguity of the process and occasional lack of credibility of the criteria for EU accession due to constant changes in terms of integration and resistance of domestic political elites, especially in terms of benefits and costs, but also the level of genuine commitment to resolving this problem. The study also analyzes the unequal levels of success observing all types of approaches of the actors onvolved in the process, as well as, the range of the transformative power of EU, and mechanisms that Union is using.

deologically speaking, the initiators of founding all the political parties in Serbia were young intellectuals educated abroad. The ideology of political liberalism was brought to Serbia by young knowledgeable people educated in the West: Milovan Janković, Jevrem Grujić, Vladimir Jovanovic, Stojan Bošković, Filip Hristić, Đorđe Cenić and many more who published and initiated liberal-democratic ideas during the Peter Assembly in 1848. Only with St Andrea Assembly in 1858 did the Serbian Civil rebirth begin. During this assembly two political groups finally divided: the liberals and the conservatives. The most important attainment of the St Andrea Assembly in 1858 was the Act of National Assembly. This act initiated the introduction of the representative system in Serbia. In political history, the period from 1858 to 1869 represents the birth of the representative system in Serbia. The introduction of the representative system in Serbia by the Constitution of 1869 created the necessary political preconditions for organizing modern political parties. Regular political elections and participation of the Parliament in the legislative process resulted in a easier binding of the like-minded politicans with their political liders to whom it was important to strenghten their bonds with their electors. The fact that the constitutional elections took place every three years and that the Assembly took place every year led to the strenghening of the political parties in the state, since more thriving layers of society started entering the National Assembly, the delegates who infuenced the political life. After the Constitution of 1869 was enforced, the liberals are gathered under Jovan Ristić, and later the young oppositional conservatives are gathered. In the same time a third political party emerged, the supporters and followers of Svetozar Marković. The organized political parties did not emerge immediately after the Regent's Constitution although it guaranteed a selection of political rights and freedom necessary for the emergence of the political parties, such as voting right, the freedom of speech and the freedom of press. This poses a question why did it never happen? The answer is to be looked into the intention of the Regency and later Regent Milan to unable the education of the political parties. In a situation when the Regency was closer to conservative than liberal ideas, it was hard to discuss organized political parties. The non-existence of political discipline as well as well political programs adversely affected the emergence of modern political parties. 277 Assembly Elections of October 1874 had a great impact on the history of political parties in Serbia. After the elections, a few political parties emerged in the Assembly: St Andrea Liberals under Jevrem Grujić, Libears under Ristić, Conservatives under Jovan Marinović, the beginnings of Young Conservatives and People's Party of the future Radicals. The organizing of political parties was sped up by young intellectuals gathered round the paper "Videlo" and connected with the People's party in the National Assembly. The beginning of 1881 saw the emergence of modern organized political parties in Serbia: People's Radical Part, Progressive Party and Liberal Party. Until that period delegates in the National Assembly mainly performed individually, and after 1881 they perform in accordance with political program, respecting political discipline. In view of organization and the functioning, the radicals went further, because they realized that organization is of utter importance for successful functioning and development of political parties. Pera Todorovic was given most credit for organizing the Radical Party. His organization contributed a round of hierarchical organizational units starting with local committees in every small town, counties, and to the Main Committee as the supreme organ of the party. Speaking about organization of the other two political parties it could be said that they too emerged with statues similar to the radical one. However, they never occupied such number of members as the Radical Party. The main characteristic of the political life in Serbia during the 80s of the 19th century consisted of bitter fights between the Radical and the Progressive Party in which King Milan Obrenovic sided with the Progressive Party. He was the reason why the radicals, although during the period 1882-1883 in majority, they never succeeded to come to power nor for the years to come. Dedicated to unable radicalism in Serbia, Milan showed even greater resistance toward the liberal reforms and greater affection toward emergence of personal regime. After the Timok Rebellion many radical leaders were convicted for many years, and the political leader Nikola Pasic was in emigration. Among the radicals, involving even those in the custody, slowly awareness was raised that the accord with the crown was necessary. Treaty with the radicals was initiated by King Milan so as to reinforce his personal strength, decreased in the war with Bulgaria. Although hungry for power, the radicals denounced the king's offer in Nis at the beginning of 1886. Radical leaders signed a treaty with liberals instead of progressives in 1887. The King did not have many possibilities, either to give radicals power and concede defeat or to draw back. Radical-liberal coalitional government gave great attention to the constitutional problem solving. Due to the fact that the first coalitional government was short-lived, it did not solve any problems. Similar situation happened with the first homogenous radical government that did not succeed anything more than its program, due to the fact that it was smothered by the King Milan's party. The Constitutional reform of 1888 had a big impact on political and constitutional life of Serbia. The multiannual struggle of the People's Radical Party was crowned by passing the constitution by the principle of majority. 278 The position of the Radical Party is changed from the ground, because it came to power and made its own cadre consisting of young intellectuals. Oversight over the whole work of the radical government from 1889 to 1892 shows that the radicals on the one hand showed great effort to introduce the constitution into the political life of Serbia, and on the other to limit the ruler's power. However, it is important not to forget the fact that the parliamentary regime on whom so many radicals insisted was more and more changing into a totalitarian one-party system. The parliamentary system that enabled the absolute power of the Radical Party in all state institutions was short-lived. King Alexander had an immense wish to stop as soon as possible with all the new-laid things that were introduced by the parliamentary system and that is the reason he was constantly fighting with the political parties and very frequently insisted on coup. In 1894 he suspended the 1888 Constitution and reenacted the 1869 one. After that, a regime based on self-will came to power, which lasted until 1901, year when King Alexander passed a new constitution. Political life in time of self-willed regime of king Alexander was very tough, because the ruler denounced the parties with the basic idea: "to renounce with parliamentarism if we wish to arrange this state properly". The last Obrenovic tried to denounce the existence of the Constitution, the government and the National Assembly by conducting various experiments. His "neutral" governments, which consisted of unforced political personnel, were under his impact. The whole political system turned round one political person, the king, which succeeded in dividing and manipulating the political parties. Neutralizing the People's Radical Party dominance could not have lasted any longer, due to the fact that it was impossible that the party with the biggest support be in opposition any longer. The king's wedding to Draga Masin represents a turning point in political life of Serbia. The shackles of the self-willed regime started to diminish, because the king wanted "to please the parties and the nation, so that they would accept the queen." The king's compromise with the strongest party in the country did not achieve results, due to the fact that among them existed huge differences in view of "state conceptions". The radicals advocated for parliamentary monarchy in which the power would belong to the most popular party, whereas the crown advocated the constitutional monarchy in which the ruler would be a puppet in enforcing the power of the National Assembly. Co-operational politics between the king and the radicals were short-lived, since it turned out that the representatives of the two opposite state conceptions were incapable of reaching an agreement. Shorty, the king realized that the treaty with the radicals was impossible to be kept and decided to return to previous politics, as before signed by the treaty in 1901. The renewed return to the self-willed regime sped up the preparations of the conspirators that in the night of May 28th/June 10th/ May 29th June 11th staged a coup.

У теорији постоји сагласност да тероризам представља политички мотивисано насиље и да у том смислу представља један од облика насилне политичке борбе. Специфична разлика тероризма у односу на друге облике политичког насиља је примарна усмереност ка стварању, одржавању и експлоатацији страха ради застрашивања противника и јачања подршке међу присталицама. Суштинска одступања од теоријских и правних критеријума при одређивању тероризма постоје у пракси Савета безбедности. Општа оцена деловања Савета безбедности приликом доношења резолуција о тероризму јесте да прати владајући политички дискурс у коме су најпре државе биле одговорне за тероризам, да би потом "слабе", "неодговорне" и "репресивне" државе биле одговорне за омогућавање деловања међународних терористичких организација на својој територији. Савет безбедности усвајао је резолуције у којима је терористичке акте одређивао спрам природе акта, али и спрам извршиоца чиме су сви акти претходно одређене терористичке организације квалификовани као терористички акти. Истраживањем је утврђено и да је приликом усвајања појединих резолуција политичка сврсисходност утицала да се истоврсна понашања не квалификују увек као терористички акти. На основу изведених закључака утврђено је да сложеност борбе против тероризма представља последицу првенства политичке сврсисходности при квалификовању акта насиља као терористичког акта, а не због тешкоћа у дефинисању тероризма. Промене у концепцији тероризма у резолуцијама Савета безбедности и њихова усклађеност са владајућим јавним дискурсом одвијају се истовремено са настојањем САД и других западних држава да преобликују међународну заједницу и успоставе нови светски поредак. У таквим околностима тероризам почиње да егзистира као офанзивно политичко средство хибридног ратовања, при чему се негативна конотација тероризма експлоатише на два начина. Прво, тероризам постаје политичка оцена нечијег деловања без обзира на природу тако означене активности. Друго, тероризам се употребљава као насилно политичко средство које, у зависности од интереса онога ко цени одређено понашање, неће у свакој ситуацији бити означено као тероризам, већ понекад и као легитиман облик политичке акције. Офанзивни карактер одлуке истовремено води занемаривању научних критеријума у корист политичке сврсисходности при квалификацији неког понашања као терористичког акта. Доминација политичког критеријума при квалификовању терористичког акта утиче на инструментализацију тероризма и његово претварање у ефикасно средство хибридног ратовања. Садржај хибридног ратовања није последица неограниченог избора средстава односно оружја нити њихове софистицираности, већ способности безбедносног менаџмента да у свакој конкретној ситуацији независно од организационог нивоа примени такву комбинацију различитих, али међусобно компатибилних појединачних начина ратовања којом се остварује синергијски ефекат ради реализације претходно постављеног циља. Управо због тога тероризам као облик сложеног политичког насиља постаје предмет експлоатације у сврху хибридног ратовања. На основу резултата истраживања описана су три модела експлотације тероризма у сврху хибридног ратовања. Први модел експлоатације тероризма изведен је из политичке праксе САД да државе за које САД сматрају да користе тероризам као политичко средство ставе на Листу спонзора тероризма. Имајући у виду политички и сваки други утицај који САД имају, овакава пракса и њене последице формално или неформално су прихваћене широм света. Основне последице стављања на Листу спонзора тероризма су санкције, дискредитација у међународној јавности и легитимисање мера против таквих држава, док се у исто време таквом праксом врши притисак на државе које нису на Листи да ускладе своју политику са интересима великих сила. Други модел експлоатације тероризма у сврху хибридног ратовања манифестује се кроз организовање, финансирање, опремање, обуку и усмеравање сурогат снага против влада држава са којима није остварена компатибилност интереса, при чему су сурогат снаге представљене у јавном дискурсу као борци за слободу. Предмет експлоатације у Другом моделу јесте насиље које испуњава теоријске критеријуме да буде означено као тероризам, али је због политичке сврсисходности квалификовано као борба за слободу, отпор против угњетавања и сл. Експлоатација насиља у Другом моделу врши се у циљу промене носилаца политичке власти, стварање аутономних регија односно држава које би биле кооперативне са политиком државе која примењује Други модел или као део шире стратегије управљања безбедносним процесима. Трећи модел експлоатације тероризма у сврху хибридног ратовања подразумева организовање и управљање сурогат снагама које су квалификоване као терористичке организације или се врши инфилтрација појединаца у изворне и самосталне народне побуне ради преузимања руководећих места и управљања њиховим деловањем у складу са интересима државе која предузима Трећи модел. Предмет експлоатације у Трећем моделу јесте насиље које је квалификовано као тероризам, при чему је циљ експлоатације вишеструк: 1. Путем насиља и страха који настаје као последица вршења терористичких аката управља се безбедносном ситуацијом у држави која је мета агресије или у региону који је потребно политички и територијално контролисати, са или без физичког присуства оружаних снага државе која примењује Трећи модел; 2. Стварање страха код одређеног или унапред неодређеног броја држава од потенцијалних напада терористичких организација ради вршења латентног политичког притиска на државе да буде кооперативне, и 3. Стварање разлога за војну интервенцију ради присуства и политичке контроле одређене државе или региона. На основу претходно изнетих резултата истраживања изведен је закључак да први корак у спречавању експлоатације тероризма против наше државе представља отклањање или смањивање потенцијала за друштвене сукобе који настаје услед стварања или продубљивања друштвених противречности. Из тог разлога извршена је анализа нормативно – политичког и институционалног оквира у релевантним областима друштвеног живота. Истраживањем је утврђено да у Републици Србији постоји добар основ за ангажовање и интегрисање свих ресурса друштвене моћи на плану остваривања националне безбедности, али и да постоји потреба да се актуелни политички и безбедносни институционални оквир усклади са таквим могућностима. Као резултат истраживања предложене су три групе мера чија примена треба за резултат да има: отклањање и смањивање опасности од стварања потенцијала за друштвене сукобе; успостављање ефикасног и интегрисаног институционалног оквира за супротстављање политичком насиљу које евентуално проистекне из постојећих противречности и отклањање и смањивање штетних последица таквог политичког насиља. ; U teoriji postoji saglasnost da terorizam predstavlja politički motivisano nasilje i da u tom smislu predstavlja jedan od oblika nasilne političke borbe. Specifična razlika terorizma u odnosu na druge oblike političkog nasilja je primarna usmerenost ka stvaranju, održavanju i eksploataciji straha radi zastrašivanja protivnika i jačanja podrške među pristalicama. Suštinska odstupanja od teorijskih i pravnih kriterijuma pri određivanju terorizma postoje u praksi Saveta bezbednosti. Opšta ocena delovanja Saveta bezbednosti prilikom donošenja rezolucija o terorizmu jeste da prati vladajući politički diskurs u kome su najpre države bile odgovorne za terorizam, da bi potom "slabe", "neodgovorne" i "represivne" države bile odgovorne za omogućavanje delovanja međunarodnih terorističkih organizacija na svojoj teritoriji. Savet bezbednosti usvajao je rezolucije u kojima je terorističke akte određivao spram prirode akta, ali i spram izvršioca čime su svi akti prethodno određene terorističke organizacije kvalifikovani kao teroristički akti. Istraživanjem je utvrđeno i da je prilikom usvajanja pojedinih rezolucija politička svrsishodnost uticala da se istovrsna ponašanja ne kvalifikuju uvek kao teroristički akti. Na osnovu izvedenih zaključaka utvrđeno je da složenost borbe protiv terorizma predstavlja posledicu prvenstva političke svrsishodnosti pri kvalifikovanju akta nasilja kao terorističkog akta, a ne zbog teškoća u definisanju terorizma. Promene u koncepciji terorizma u rezolucijama Saveta bezbednosti i njihova usklađenost sa vladajućim javnim diskursom odvijaju se istovremeno sa nastojanjem SAD i drugih zapadnih država da preoblikuju međunarodnu zajednicu i uspostave novi svetski poredak. U takvim okolnostima terorizam počinje da egzistira kao ofanzivno političko sredstvo hibridnog ratovanja, pri čemu se negativna konotacija terorizma eksploatiše na dva načina. Prvo, terorizam postaje politička ocena nečijeg delovanja bez obzira na prirodu tako označene aktivnosti. Drugo, terorizam se upotrebljava kao nasilno političko sredstvo koje, u zavisnosti od interesa onoga ko ceni određeno ponašanje, neće u svakoj situaciji biti označeno kao terorizam, već ponekad i kao legitiman oblik političke akcije. Ofanzivni karakter odluke istovremeno vodi zanemarivanju naučnih kriterijuma u korist političke svrsishodnosti pri kvalifikaciji nekog ponašanja kao terorističkog akta. Dominacija političkog kriterijuma pri kvalifikovanju terorističkog akta utiče na instrumentalizaciju terorizma i njegovo pretvaranje u efikasno sredstvo hibridnog ratovanja. Sadržaj hibridnog ratovanja nije posledica neograničenog izbora sredstava odnosno oružja niti njihove sofisticiranosti, već sposobnosti bezbednosnog menadžmenta da u svakoj konkretnoj situaciji nezavisno od organizacionog nivoa primeni takvu kombinaciju različitih, ali međusobno kompatibilnih pojedinačnih načina ratovanja kojom se ostvaruje sinergijski efekat radi realizacije prethodno postavljenog cilja. Upravo zbog toga terorizam kao oblik složenog političkog nasilja postaje predmet eksploatacije u svrhu hibridnog ratovanja. Na osnovu rezultata istraživanja opisana su tri modela eksplotacije terorizma u svrhu hibridnog ratovanja. Prvi model eksploatacije terorizma izveden je iz političke prakse SAD da države za koje SAD smatraju da koriste terorizam kao političko sredstvo stave na Listu sponzora terorizma. Imajući u vidu politički i svaki drugi uticaj koji SAD imaju, ovakava praksa i njene posledice formalno ili neformalno su prihvaćene širom sveta. Osnovne posledice stavljanja na Listu sponzora terorizma su sankcije, diskreditacija u međunarodnoj javnosti i legitimisanje mera protiv takvih država, dok se u isto vreme takvom praksom vrši pritisak na države koje nisu na Listi da usklade svoju politiku sa interesima velikih sila. Drugi model eksploatacije terorizma u svrhu hibridnog ratovanja manifestuje se kroz organizovanje, finansiranje, opremanje, obuku i usmeravanje surogat snaga protiv vlada država sa kojima nije ostvarena kompatibilnost interesa, pri čemu su surogat snage predstavljene u javnom diskursu kao borci za slobodu. Predmet eksploatacije u Drugom modelu jeste nasilje koje ispunjava teorijske kriterijume da bude označeno kao terorizam, ali je zbog političke svrsishodnosti kvalifikovano kao borba za slobodu, otpor protiv ugnjetavanja i sl. Eksploatacija nasilja u Drugom modelu vrši se u cilju promene nosilaca političke vlasti, stvaranje autonomnih regija odnosno država koje bi bile kooperativne sa politikom države koja primenjuje Drugi model ili kao deo šire strategije upravljanja bezbednosnim procesima. Treći model eksploatacije terorizma u svrhu hibridnog ratovanja podrazumeva organizovanje i upravljanje surogat snagama koje su kvalifikovane kao terorističke organizacije ili se vrši infiltracija pojedinaca u izvorne i samostalne narodne pobune radi preuzimanja rukovodećih mesta i upravljanja njihovim delovanjem u skladu sa interesima države koja preduzima Treći model. Predmet eksploatacije u Trećem modelu jeste nasilje koje je kvalifikovano kao terorizam, pri čemu je cilj eksploatacije višestruk: 1. Putem nasilja i straha koji nastaje kao posledica vršenja terorističkih akata upravlja se bezbednosnom situacijom u državi koja je meta agresije ili u regionu koji je potrebno politički i teritorijalno kontrolisati, sa ili bez fizičkog prisustva oružanih snaga države koja primenjuje Treći model; 2. Stvaranje straha kod određenog ili unapred neodređenog broja država od potencijalnih napada terorističkih organizacija radi vršenja latentnog političkog pritiska na države da bude kooperativne, i 3. Stvaranje razloga za vojnu intervenciju radi prisustva i političke kontrole određene države ili regiona. Na osnovu prethodno iznetih rezultata istraživanja izveden je zaključak da prvi korak u sprečavanju eksploatacije terorizma protiv naše države predstavlja otklanjanje ili smanjivanje potencijala za društvene sukobe koji nastaje usled stvaranja ili produbljivanja društvenih protivrečnosti. Iz tog razloga izvršena je analiza normativno – političkog i institucionalnog okvira u relevantnim oblastima društvenog života. Istraživanjem je utvrđeno da u Republici Srbiji postoji dobar osnov za angažovanje i integrisanje svih resursa društvene moći na planu ostvarivanja nacionalne bezbednosti, ali i da postoji potreba da se aktuelni politički i bezbednosni institucionalni okvir uskladi sa takvim mogućnostima. Kao rezultat istraživanja predložene su tri grupe mera čija primena treba za rezultat da ima: otklanjanje i smanjivanje opasnosti od stvaranja potencijala za društvene sukobe; uspostavljanje efikasnog i integrisanog institucionalnog okvira za suprotstavljanje političkom nasilju koje eventualno proistekne iz postojećih protivrečnosti i otklanjanje i smanjivanje štetnih posledica takvog političkog nasilja. ; There is a consensus in security studies that terrorism is a politically motivated violence and, therefore, it represents one of the forms of violent political struggle. What distinguishes terrorism from other forms of political violence is its primary focus on creating, maintaining and exploiting fear in order to intimidate opponents and strengthen support among allies. Fundamental deviations from theoretical and legal criteria in determination of terrorism are identified in the pratice of the Security Council. The general assessment of the Security Council's actions related to terrorism is that the Council has been following the prevailing political discourse in which, initially, states in their entirety were responsible for terrorism, and later the blame was put on "weak", "irresponsible" and "repressive" states for enabling international terrorist organizations to operate on their territories. The Security Council passed resolutions in which it classified terrorist acts according to the nature of the act but also to the nature of the perpetrator, which resulted in treating all acts of a previously designated terrorist organization as terrorist acts. The research also determined that during the adoption of certain resolutions, political expediency influenced the fact that similar behaviors do not always qualify as terrorist acts. Based on the previously derived conclusions, it could be said that the complexity of fight against terrorism is a consequence of the primacy of the political criterion in designation of an act of violence as a terrorist act, and not because of the difficulties in defining the notion of terrorism. Changes in the concept of terrorism in the Security Council Resolutions and their harmonization with the prevailing public discourse coincides with the efforts of the United States and other Western countries to reshape the international community and establish a new world order. In such circumstances, terrorism becomes an offensive political tool of hybrid warfare, with the negative connotation of terrorism being exploited in two ways. First, terrorism has become a political assessment of one's actions, regardless of the nature of the such activities. Second, terrorism has become a violent political tool which, depending on the interests of those in the position to evaluate certain behaviors, will not be labeled as terrorism in each situation, but rather as a legitimate form of political action at times. Offensive character of the decision leads to the neglect of scientific criteria in favor of political expediency in the process of terrorist act designation. Dominance of the political criterion in designation of a terrorist act influences the instrumentalisation of terrorism and its transformation into an effective means of hybrid warfare. Content of hybrid warfare is not a consequence of an unlimited variety of weapons used, nor their sophistication, but the ability of security management to apply such combinations of different, yet mutually compatible types of warfare in order to achieve a previously determined aim. These are reasons why terrorism, as a form of complex political violence, is exploited in hybrid warfare. Based on the results of the research, three models of exploitation of terrorism for the purposes of hybrid warfare are described. The First Model of exploitation is derived from the political practice of the United States to put countries on the U.S list of state sponsors of terrorism. In accordance with the political and any other influence that the United States has, this practice and its consequences are formally or informally accepted around the world. The main consequences of being placed on the List are sanctions, discredit on the international level and legitimization of measures against such states, while at the same time putting pressure on countries that are not on the List to harmonize their policies with the interests of great powers. The Second Model of exploitation of terrorism for the purpose of hybrid warfare consists of organizing, financing, equipping, training and directing surrogate forces against the governments of countries with whom compatibility of interests has not been achieved, where surrogate forces are presented in the public discourse as freedom fighters. The subject of exploitation in the Second Model is violence that meets the theoretical criteria to be designated as terrorism. However, due to its political expediency it is qualified as a fight for freedom, resistance against oppression etc. The exploitation of violence used in the second model is done with the intention of shifting political power in order to create autonomous regions or states that would be cooperative with the policy of the state that applies the Second Model or as a part of a broader strategy for managing security processes. The Third Model of exploitation of terrorism for the purposes of hybrid warfare implies organization and managing of surrogate forces that are qualified as terrorist organizations or infiltrating individuals into original and independent popular uprisings in order to take leadership positions and manage their actions in accordance with the interests of the state which apply the Third Model. The subject of exploitation in the Third Model is violence that is qualified as terrorism, with multiple goals: 1. Violence and fear that arises as a result of terrorist acts allows crisis management in the country targeted by aggression or in the region in need of political and territorial control, with or without the physical presence of the armed forces of the State applying the Third Model; 2. Creating fear of potential terrorist attacks in order to exert latent political pressure on states to be cooperative, and 3. Creating reasons for a military intervention which results in physical presence and political control of a certain state or region. Based on the previously presented research results, it may be concluded that the first step to prevent terrorist exploitation against our country should be to eliminate or reduce the potential for social conflicts driven by social contradictions. For this reason, an analysis of the normative - political and institutional framework in the relevant areas of social life was conducted. The research has determined that in the Republic of Serbia there is a good basis for engaging and integrating all resources of national power in terms of achieving national security. In addition, there is a need to harmonize the current political and institutional framework for national security with such possibilities. As a result of the research, three groups of measures have been proposed: elimination or reduction of the potential for social conflicts; establishment of an effective and integrated institutional framework for countering political violence that may arise from the aforementioned contradictions, and elimination and reduction of harmful consequences of such political violence.