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AbstractThe ambition to improve regulators' responsiveness to regulatees has been the driving force of two of the most influential theories in regulation in the past decades: responsive regulation (RR) and behavioral public policy (BPP). Yet despite their substantial impact and shared ambitions, RR and BPP have rarely intersected. In this paper, we explore the intellectual evolution of RR and BPP and compare their differences in assumptions, methodology, and prescriptions. We argue that these differences can be leveraged to promote both theories and generate a synthesis – behavioral responsive regulation (BRR) – that surpasses its progenitors in helping to understand and improve regulation. We offer an expanded regulatory pyramid for BRR and illustrate the advantages of our approach in many contexts and particularly through the example of taxation. Finally, we argue that BRR promotes the effectiveness, efficiency, and legitimacy of regulation and is superior in these dimensions to both RR and BPP.

Getting tough on crime has been one of the favorite rallying cries of American politicians in the last two decades, and "getting tough" on repeat offenders has been particularly popular. "Three strikes and you're out" laws, which effectively impose a 25-years-to-life sentence at the moment of a third felony conviction, have been passed in 26 states. California's version of the "three strikes" law, enacted in 1994, was broader and more severe than measures considered or passed in any other state. Punishment and Democracy is the first examination of the actual impact this law has had. Franklin Z

Developing states with limited regulatory capacity might benefit from a responsive approach to regulation. Responsive regulation is a democratic ideal, incorporating notions of deliberative democracy and restorative justice. Responsive regulation conducted by regulatory networks of governmental and non-governmental actors allows for networking around capacity deficits. NGOs play a vital role in this kind of regulation. By utilizing NGOs and local social pressure, developing countries might develop a "regulatory society" model, bypassing the regulatory state. Where capacity remains limited, private bounty hunting (such as fees for successful private prosecutions) may become an appealing tool for achieving certain regulatory objectives.

Developing states with limited regulatory capacity might benefit from a responsive approach to regulation. Responsive regulation is a democratic ideal, incorporating notions of deliberative democracy and restorative justice. Responsive regulation conducted by regulatory networks of governmental and non-governmental actors allows for networking around capacity deficits. NGOs play a vital role in this kind of regulation. By utilizing NGOs and local social pressure, developing countries might develop a "regulatory society" model, bypassing the regulatory state. Where capacity remains limited, private bounty hunting (such as fees for successful private prosecutions) may become an appealing tool for achieving certain regulatory objectives.

AbstractThe policy ideals of responsive regulation have been developed on the basis of substantial empirical evidence. The overall formulation of responsive regulation theory itself, however, has rarely been empirically tested. This article sets out the theoretical concept of responsive regulation in the context of business regulation enforcement and discusses how we might operationalize and empirically measure it. We develop two alternative theoretical interpretations of responsive regulatory enforcement: "tit for tat" responsive regulation and "restorative justice" responsive regulation. We then measure business firms' perceptions of the reactions and counter‐reactions of a regulatory enforcement agency throughout the investigation and enforcement process. We find little evidence of tit for tat responsiveness actually occurring in practice. To the extent that tit for tat responsiveness does exist, we find a small amount of evidence that it has the hypothesized effects on behavior but not on attitudes. We find clearer evidence of restorative justice responsiveness having the hypothesized effects on attitudes but not on behavior.

Developing states with limited regulatory capacity might benefit from a responsive approach to regulation. Responsive regulation is a democratic ideal, incorporating notions of deliberative democracy and restorative justice. Responsive regulation conducted by regulatory networks of governmental and non-governmental actors allows for networking around capacity deficits. NGOs play a vital role in this kind of regulation. By utilizing NGOs and local social pressure, developing countries might develop a "regulatory society" model, bypassing the regulatory state. Where capacity remains limited, private bounty hunting (such as fees for successful private prosecutions) may become an appealing tool for achieving certain regulatory objectives.

The implementation of responsive regulation in taxation means influencing the community's commitment to pay tax through respectful treatment, through attending to resistance and reforming faulty processes, through fairly directed and fully explained disapproval of non‐compliant behavior, through preparedness to administer sanctions, and capacity to follow through to escalate regulatory intervention in the face of continuing non‐compliance. Responsive regulation and regulatory formalism are pitted against each other in this issue on responsive regulation and taxation. Normative and explanatory arguments in favor of responsive regulation are explored by data collected in taxation contexts; and institutional obstacles are identified that limit effective implementation.

AbstractIn this comment, I try to do three things: (i) set the record straight about the disproportionate contributions of my co‐author; (ii) briefly comment on the excellent articles byEtienne,Ford, andWesterman in this special issue; and (iii) describe how theResponsiveRegulationconcept of partial‐industry regulation might usefully be extended to tradable licenses and randomized regulation experiments.