Pogge (2008) and Wenar (2008) have recently argued that we are responsible for the persistence of the so-called 'resource curse'. But their analyses are limited in important ways. I trace these limitations to their undue focus on the ways in which the international rules governing resource transactions undermine government accountability. To overcome the shortcomings of Pogge's and Wenar's analyses, I propose a normative framework organized around the social value of government responsiveness and discuss the implications of adopting this framework for future normative assessment of the resource curse and our relationships to it.
AbstractMarriage rights were extended to same‐sex couples in the United States in 2015. However, anecdotes of bureaucratic noncompliance (in the form of bias or denial of license issuance) raise the possibility that de jure marriage equality has not led to equality in practice. We investigate this by conducting a nationwide audit experiment of local‐level marriage license–granting officials in the United States. These officials vary in the constituencies they serve, as well as how they are selected, allowing us to evaluate long‐standing hypotheses about bureaucratic responsiveness. Overall, we find no evidence of systematic discrimination against same‐sex couples—regardless of responsiveness measure, institutions, ideology, or prior state legal history. We find, however, that among same‐sex couples, officials tended to be more responsive to lesbian couples. In contrast to evidence in other areas of service provision, such as policing and federal assistance programs, we find bureaucrats tasked with provision of marriage services show little evidence of discrimination.
Political trust has become a central focus of political analysis and public lament. Political theorists and philosophers typically think of interpersonal trust in politics as a fragile but valuable resource for a flourishing or stable democratic polity. This article examines what conception of trust is needed in order to play this role. It unpicks two candidate answers, a moral and a responsiveness conception, the latter of which has been central to recent political theory in this area. It goes on to outline a third, commitment conception and to set out how a focus on commitments and their fulfilment provides a better account of trust for political purposes. Adopting this conception discloses how trust relies on a contestable public normative space and has significant implications for how we should approach three cognate topics, namely, judgements of trust, the place of distrust and the relationship of interpersonal to institutional trust and distrust.
Through examination of the criteria for the creation of multijurisdictional districts, proposes a theory of state responsiveness in local government structural reorganization. Supports the responsiveness theory. (Abstract amended)
THE NATURE OF & THE CONDITIONS FACILITATING RESPONSIVENESS TO PERCEIVED CONSTITUENCY POLICY WISHES IN THE TEX LEGISLATURE IN 1969 ARE INVESTIGATED. DATA WERE COLLECTED ON THE POLICY ATTITUDES OF A SAMPLE OF LEGISLATORS, THEIR PERCEPTIONS OF CONSTITUENCY ATTITUDES, THEIR ROLE ORIENTATIONS TOWARD POSITIONS AS LEGISLATORS, & THE COMPETITIVENESS OF THEIR LEGISLATIVE DISTRICTS. THESE DATA WERE SUPPLEMENTED WITH THEIR ROLL-CALL VOTES DURING THE 1969 SESSION. 3 QUESTIONS WERE EXAMINED: (1) DO THE CONNECTIONS BETWEEN THE ATTITUDES, PERCEPTIONS, & VOTES OF THE LEGISLATORS SUGGEST RESPONSIVENESS? (2) DOES THE ADOPTION OF THE 'DELEGATE' REPRESENTATIONAL ROLE, IN WHICH THE LEGISLATOR VIEWS HIMSELF AS AN INSTRUMENT OF THE WILL OF HIS CONSTITUENCY, FACILITATE RESPONSIVENESS? EVIDENCE FROM 3 SEPARATE ISSUE-AREAS INDICATED A GENERALLY LOW LEVEL OF RESPONSIVENESS, WHEN THE LEGISLATORS' OWN POLICY ATTITUDES WERE CONTROLLED. A COMPETITIVE ELECTORAL SITUATION DID NOT SEEM TO ENFORCE RESPONSIVENESS. REPRESENTATIVE ROLE ORIENTATIONS SEEMED TO AFFECT THE DEGREE OF RESPONSIVENESS ONLY ON THE MOST CONTROVERSIAL OF THE ISSUES STUDIED, TAXATION POLICIES. 5 TABLES, 1 FIGURE. AA.
Abstract How does media attention shape bureaucratic behavior? We answer this question using novel data from the Mexican federal government. We first develop a new indicator for periods of anomalously heightened media attention, based on 150,000 news articles pertaining to 22 Mexican government ministries and agencies, and qualitatively categorize their themes. We then evaluate government responsiveness using administrative data on roughly 500,000 requests for government information over a 10-year period, with their associated responses. A panel fixed-effects approach demonstrates effects of media attention on the volume of outgoing weekly responses, while a second approach finds effects on the "queue" of information requests already filed when anomalous media attention begins. Consistent across these empirical approaches, we find that media attention shapes bureaucratic behavior. Positive or neutral attention is associated with reduced responsiveness, while the effects of negative attention vary, with attention to government failures leading to increased responsiveness but attention to corruption leading to reduced responsiveness. These patterns are consistent with mechanisms of reputation management, disclosure threat, and workload burden, but inconsistent with mechanisms of credit claiming or blame avoidance.
How does media attention shape bureaucratic behavior? We answer this question using novel data from the Mexican federal government. We first develop a new indicator for periods of anomalously heightened media attention, based on 150,000 news articles pertaining to 22 Mexican government ministries and agencies, and qualitatively categorize their themes. We then evaluate government responsiveness using administrative data on roughly 500,000 requests for government information over a 10-year period, with their associated responses. A panel fixed-effects approach demonstrates effects of media attention on the volume of outgoing weekly responses, while a second approach finds effects on the "queue" of information requests already filed when anomalous media attention begins. Consistent across these empirical approaches, we find that media attention shapes bureaucratic behavior. Positive or neutral attention is associated with reduced responsiveness, while the effects of negative attention vary, with attention to government failures leading to increased responsiveness but attention to corruption leading to reduced responsiveness. These patterns are consistent with mechanisms of reputation management, disclosure threat, and workload burden, but inconsistent with mechanisms of credit claiming or blame avoidance.
"Responsiveness," "responsibility," and "majority rule" comprise a trio of terms that are basic to the discipline of political science, and particularly to the analysis of democratic political institutions; yet so undeveloped is our science that they represent apples of discord rather than areas of agreement. Where we should have clear concepts for scientific analysis, we are confronted rather with thought receptacles whose unexplored ambiguities constitute standing solicitations to fallacy—solicitations, it may be added, that receive a bountiful response. In view of this situation, it is little wonder that, when we go beyond description to evaluation, we find the doctors in violent disagreement.This article is not limited to definitions. The writer takes a stand on more than one of the issues that plague and divide students of the democratic political process. It is written, therefore, not only in the firm belief that terms ought to be defined, but also with the conviction that in this case an analysis of meanings will lead almost automatically to a resolution of some of the mooted issues, while contributing substantially to a rational appraisal of others.
THE AMERICAN CULTURE HOLDS A BEWILDERING ARRAY OF ATTITUDES AND OPINIONS ABOUT ITS GOVERNMENT AND ITS GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS. PROBABLY NO GREATER MYTH EXISTS THAN THE OFT HELD OPINION THAT BUREAUCRACIES ARE INTRANSIGENT MONOLITHS CHARACTERIZED BY SELF SERVICE AND LACK OF RESPONSIVENESS. THIS PARTICULAR ATTITUDE HAS BEEN STUDIED IN A VARIETY OF WAYS BY ACADEMICS AND IS MOST FREQUENTLY REFERRED TO IN THE LITERATURE ON BUREAUCRATIC POWER AND DE,OCRATIC CONTROL. THE STRUGGLE WITH BUREAUCRATIC POWER HAS FOSTERED A WIDE ARRAY OF STRATEGIES AND TECHNIQUES, SUCH AS STRUCTURED CITIZEN PARTICIPATION AND LEGISLATIVE OVERSIGHT, WHICH GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS USE TO DEMONSTRATE THEIR RESPONSIVENESS TO INCRESINGLY COMPLEX DEMANDS. THE ARTICLES INCLUDED IN THIS ISSUE'S FOCUS, "ADAPTATION AND RESPONSIVENESS TO INCREASINGLY COMPLEX DEMANDS. THE ARTICLES INCLUDED IN THIS ISSUE'S FOCUS, "ADAPTATION AND RESPONSIVENESS IN STATE GOVERNMENT," EXAMINE SEVERAL ISSUES AND STRATAGEMS RELATED TO THE FLEXIBILITY OF STATE GOVERNMENT.
This study assesses factors influencing the responsiveness of government officials in Alabama, Mississippi, and South Carolina regarding the public display of the Confederate Flag on state grounds in the aftermath of the Charleston, South Carolina shooting. The purpose of this dissertation research is to understand the factors influencing how government officials make decisions during racially/culturally sensitive events. Two research questions frame this study: 1) What factors are relevant to understanding state government officials' decision- making regarding the display of the Confederate Flag on public grounds? 2) Under what conditions of public decision making regarding the Confederate flag is executive authority, vote/referendum, or legislative processes used? Employing grounded theory across newspaper content in Alabama, South Carolina, and Mississippi, 117 articles were examined to provide insight into the research questions. The themes which emerged from this analysis are: 1)Key factors in the decision-making regarding the display of the Confederate Flag on state grounds are: a.The response to a triggering crisis event b.A desire for inclusiveness c.A perception of outside attention or scrutiny d.A concern for the economic well-being of the State e.The political agency of the decision maker 2)Economics, standing law, and political expediency influence decisions of whether executive authority, vote/referendum, or legislative processes are used in decision-making regarding the display of the Confederate Flag on public grounds. This study introduces a detailed model of decision-making for public officials in racially/culturally sensitive matters to navigate the handling of issues with similar schema-forming symbols which can call forth dynamic and polarizing responses. The findings from this research study can be used to foster improved government efforts at responding to matters of a highly charged emotional nature. ; 2019-05-01 ; Ph.D. ; Community Innovation and Education, Dean's Office CCIE ; Doctoral ; This record was generated from author submitted information.
We explored the extent to which legislators respond to redistricting‐induced demographic shifts in their constituencies. Our analyses focused on the behavior of members of the House of Representatives who served in the terms preceding and following the redistricting that took place in the early 2000s (namely, the 107th and 108th Congresses). We investigated how demographic shifts relate to the content of legislators' subsequent agendas (the legislation that members introduce and cosponsor) and the nature of members' voting patterns (their interest group voting scores). Our results indicate that responsiveness is widespread, but important variation exists in the patterns for agenda activities and roll‐call voting.
The responsiveness of democratic institutions is a topic of fundamental importance to researchers, citizens, and decision-makers. The PolicyVotes project aimed to assemble a dataset that facilitates investigation of the responsiveness of political parties and governments to public preferences. The data collection efforts were motivated by the interest to allow researchers to examine, among many others, the following questions: Are governments responsive to citizen demands? Do we see policy changing in response to changing public preferences over time? Is a government's responsiveness to public demands more pronounced in some policy areas than in others and at some points in time than others? What is the mediating role of political institutions such as electoral systems, government types (coalition versus single-party) and executive-legislative structures? How does the degree of responsiveness of national governments compare to responsiveness of European institutions? What are the interdependencies of legislative decision-making between the national and the European level? Do national policies influence the development of European level public policies and vice versa?
The data collection we have assembled facilitates addressing these questions and others. It allows researchers to use large-N statistical methodologies to empirically test theoretical models of dynamic representation in a multilevel system of governance. It allows longitudinal comparative empirical analysis of the triangular relationship between preferences of the electorate, policy positions of parties and governments, and legislative outputs of national governments and the EU. With this data collection we are introducing efficiencies that enable researchers to examine how and under what circumstances responsiveness can be achieved in different institutional settings.
For individual-level data, we have harmonized Eurobarometers from 1970 to the 2011, the ISSP Role of Government surveys, and the EES voter Study. For measurements of party positions, we have harmonized and cross-linked the Chapel Hill Expert Survey, the Party Policy in Modern Democracies Dataset, the Comparative Manifesto Project data, and the EES Euromanifesto Study. For the measurements of policy output we have collected and cross-linked data for legislative output and budget outlays of 15 EU governments and the European Union.
Please refer to the How-to-Guide and the user guides in the individual trendfile folders (see Downloads/Datasets) for detailed information and citation instructions. Following trendfiles and user guides are available:
- Arnold, Christine, Franklin, Mark, Wlezien, Christopher, Russo, Luana & Palacios, Irene (2023): PolicyVotes Database on Political Responsiveness. PolicyVotes Eurobarometer Trendfile. Data File Version 1.0.0, https://doi.org/10.7802/2618 - Arnold, Christine, Franklin, Mark, Wlezien, Christopher, Russo, Luana & Palacios, Irene (2023): PolicyVotes Database on Political Responsiveness. PolicyVotes Eurobarometer Trendfile User Guide. Version 1.0.0, https://doi.org/10.7802/2618 - Arnold, Christine, Franklin, Mark, Wlezien, Christopher, Sapir, Eliyahu & Williams, Christopher (2023): PolicyVotes Database on Political Responsiveness. PolicyVotes EES Voter Study Trendfile. Data File Version 1.0.0, https://doi.org/10.7802/2618 - Arnold, Christine, Franklin, Mark, Wlezien, Christopher, Sapir, Eliyahu & Williams, Christopher (2023): PolicyVotes Database on Political Responsiveness. PolicyVotes EES Voter Study Trendfile User Guide. Version 1.0.0, https://doi.org/10.7802/2618 - Arnold, Christine, Franklin, Mark, Wlezien, Christopher, Sapir, Eliyahu & Williams, Christopher (2023): PolicyVotes Database on Political Responsiveness. PolicyVotes ISSP Role of Government Trendfile. Data File Version 1.0.0, https://doi.org/10.7802/2618 - Arnold, Christine, Franklin, Mark, Wlezien, Christopher, Sapir, Eliyahu & Williams, Christopher (2023): PolicyVotes Database on Political Responsiveness. PolicyVotes ISSP Role of Government Trendfile User Guide. Version 1.0.0, https://doi.org/10.7802/2618 - Arnold, Christine, Franklin, Mark, Wlezien, Christopher, Sapir, Eliyahu & Williams, Christopher (2023): PolicyVotes Database on Political Responsiveness. PolicyVotes Party Positions Trendfile. Data File Version 1.0.0, https://doi.org/10.7802/2618 - Arnold, Christine, Franklin, Mark, Wlezien, Christopher, Sapir, Eliyahu & Williams, Christopher (2023): PolicyVotes Database on Political Responsiveness. PolicyVotes Party Positions Trendfile User Guide. Version 1.0.0, https://doi.org/10.7802/2618 - Arnold, Christine, Franklin, Mark, & Wlezien, Christopher (2023): PolicyVotes Database on Political Responsiveness. PolicyVotes National Budgets Trendfile. Data File Version 1.0.0, https://doi.org/10.7802/2618 - Arnold, Christine, Franklin, Mark, & Wlezien, Christopher (2023): PolicyVotes Database on Political Responsiveness. PolicyVotes National Budgets Trendfile User Guide. Version 1.0.0, https://doi.org/10.7802/2618 - Arnold, Christine, Franklin, Mark, & Wlezien, Christopher (2023): PolicyVotes Database on Political Responsiveness. PolicyVotes European Union Budget Trendfile. Data File Version 1.0.0, https://doi.org/10.7802/2618 - Arnold, Christine, Franklin, Mark, & Wlezien, Christopher (2023): PolicyVotes Database on Political Responsiveness. PolicyVotes European Union Budget Trendfile User Guide. Version 1.0.0, https://doi.org/10.7802/2618 - Arnold, Christine, Franklin, Mark, & Wlezien, Christopher (2023): PolicyVotes Database on Political Responsiveness. PolicyVotes European Union Legislation Trendfile. Data File Version 1.0.0, https://doi.org/10.7802/2618 - Arnold, Christine, Franklin, Mark, & Wlezien, Christopher (2023): PolicyVotes Database on Political Responsiveness. PolicyVotes European Union Legislation Trendfile User Guide. Version 1.0.0, https://doi.org/10.7802/2618 - Arnold, Christine, Franklin, Mark, Wlezien, Christopher, & Rahmani, Hossein (2023): PolicyVotes Database on Political Responsiveness. PolicyVotes National Legislation Trendfile. Data File Version 1.0.0, https://doi.org/10.7802/2618 - Arnold, Christine, Franklin, Mark, Wlezien, Christopher, & Rahmani, Hossein (2023): PolicyVotes Database on Political Responsiveness. PolicyVotes National Legislation Trendfile User Guide. Version 1.0.0, https://doi.org/10.7802/2618
