Suchergebnisse

'After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint and the Rebuilding of Order After Major Wars' by G. John Ikenberry is reviewed.

For almost two hundred years, a basic tenet of American law has been that federal courts must generally exercise jurisdiction when they possess it. And yet, self-imposed prudential limits on judicial power have, at least until recently, roared on despite these pronouncements. The judicial branch's avowedly self-invented doctrines include some (though not all) aspects of standing, ripeness, abstention, and the political question doctrine. The Supreme Court recently, and unanimously, concluded that prudential limits are in severe tension with our system of representative democracy because they invite policy determinations from unelected judges. Even with these pronouncements, however, the Court has not eliminated any of these limits. Instead, the Court has recategorized some of these rules as matters of statutory or constitutional interpretation. This raises an important question: When the Court converts prudential limits into constitutional or statutory rules, do these conversions facilitate democracy? This Article argues that recategorizing prudential rules does little to facilitate representative democracy, and in particular, constitutionalizing prudential limits raises acute democratic concerns. Constitutionalizing jurisdictional limits reduces dialogue among the branches and exacerbates some of the most troubling aspects of countermajoritarian judicial supremacy. Further, constitutionalizing judicial prudence has and will make it more difficult for Congress to expand access to American courts for violations of federal rights and norms. When measured against newly constitutionalized limits on judicial power, American democracy is better served by self-imposed judicial restraint, guided by transparency and principle.

Books reviewed in this articles: Richard A. L. Gambitta, Marlynn L. May, and James C. Foster (eds.), Governing Through Courts Stephen C. Halpern and Charles M. Lamb (eds.), Supreme Court Activism and Restraint Gary L. McDowell, Equity and the Constitution; The Supreme Court, Equitable Relief, and Public Policy

Coram Children's Legal Centre explores new guidance on restraint and restrictive interventions for children with SEND

The conservative legal movement has long stood simultaneously for originalism and judicial restraint. But in the past few years, the tension between a commitment to interpreting the Constitution as its authors intended and deferring to the will of legislators and the executive has become painfully clear. Does originalism demand judicial restraint, or is the Constitution undermined by such restraint?

The first comprehensive examination of restraint in international politics, considered across a range of psychological, social, political, and institutional contexts as a political process, device, and strategy. Surveying how restraint has been understood in international relations and political theory, with focus given to Aristotle and Machiavelli, Steele utilises Carl Jung's theories of complexes and the libido to broaden the conceptual definition of restraint as a phenomenon that is not only individual and inward-looking, but also relational and societal. Exploring its development, uses, expressions and challenges through history and in contemporary times, this book analyses the politics of restraint in processes of security, political economy, foreign policy and global public health. Situating restraint alongside similar concepts such as moderation, containment, and constraint, Steele asks against what, and from what, are we restraining ourselves, who authorizes restraint, and what are the risks and rewards (both ethical and practical). Steele concludes with a balanced political and normative argument for restraint going forward.