Suchergebnisse

The transformation of the German armed forces is one of the topics of the current security policy of Germany. The position of the German anned forces has deteriorated in recent years when compared to the situation that existed several decades ago. This fact is reflected in such things as the growth of difficulties with recruitment, increase in the number of young people preferring civilian service to military service accompanied by the growth of the positive evaluation of civilian service, and in particular in dwindling financial resources of Bundeswehr. Despite these tendencies, Bundeswehr is not as yet perceived by German society as an institution a priory incompatible with democracy. The analysis of the reform of German armedforces shows that that the changes in this institution are taking place against the background of trends generating the "revolution in military affairs", even though, naturally, within the boundaries given by the Bundeswehr's limited access to the resources of German society. The German armed forces of the future should be more mobile, with improved capability for strategic lift and strategic reconnaissance, more flexible organizational structure and command, better signals and communication equipment, aha better equipment for automated command. The improvements of the German armedforces are aimed at areas that can help them to increase their effectiveness in missions taking place outside of the territory of Germany, while the capabilities that were in the focus in the past, i.e. the high intensity warfare capability in the battlefield of Central Europe, are currently being scaled down. The only specificity of the reform of the German armed forces in comparison with the reforms taking place in other European countries is the continuation of universal conscription, probably due to the belief of German political -- and partly also military -- elites that universal conscription has democratizing effects. Adapted from the source document.

The application of Elias's Theory of civilization, in the field of international relations, is the theoretical concept of civilian power. In this analysis, I concluded that there are several attributes that allow the use of military force by civilian power. These attributes consist of: (1) using military force as a last resort for dealing with conflicts, and only when all other means have failed; (2) playing an active role in seeking non-militant ways of crisis resolution and military conflict prevention; (3) conducting only military operations that conform to international law and (4) that intend to support and defend human rights while (5) minimizing destruction and casualties, not only on its own side but also on the side of its enemy and finally, (6) having military operations (with the exception of self defense) take place in a multinational framework, which would not be used as a tool for unilateral policies. Adapted from the source document.

This article presents a review of the currently debated options for regulations of activities of private military companies (PMCs). This topic is a matter of pondering in the foreign literature. It primarily reflects on the massive use of PMCs in Iraq and Afghanistan, which, however, merely illustrates the broader shortcomings resulting from the prolonged absence of clearly defined and enforceable mechanisms for the monitoring and control of the accountability, transparency and effectiveness of PMCs' activities. The goal of this article is therefore not only to present the practical, legal, economic, and political pros and cons of the possible regulation frameworks, but also to illustrate why it is still so difficult to reach a consensus on a regulation framework that would be acceptable to all the relevant actors. Adapted from the source document.

The article deals with the phenomenon of the naval blockade in peacetime. Instituting a naval blockade is an extensively used policy in international politics, both in history and in the contemporary world. The peacetime naval blockade is firstly defined and theoretically classified. This is followed by an analysis of several peacetime naval blockades, which serves to illustrate the limits of the effectiveness of such blockades. The analysis comes to the conclusion that there are many limitations on the effectiveness of the peacetime naval blockade, the most significant being that this kind of blockade has no formal rules and no background in international law. It also comes to the conclusion that an effective naval blockade in peacetime must be based on a complex approach and be part of a package of diplomatic measures. Also, it appears that such blockades themselves can have some deeper psychological effects, not only economic, political or military ones. Adapted from the source document.

This paper deals with the issue of building Wales as a unique region in the context of the European Union and its resources. The author focuses on the period after 1999, i.e. the time when devolution took place and when official Welsh representatives emerged via the National Assembly for Wales (NAW). Since then, Wales has entered into cooperation with the EU, in order to gain access to resources provided by the Union. The cooperation is however of a specific kind, since officially, Welsh representatives have to communicate with the EU through the political representation of Great Britain. Nevertheless, by acting informally, Welsh representatives manage to avoid the British government in relevant contexts and communicate with the EU directly. In this way, they are able to exploit the formal and informal rules for their advantage (i.e. for building Wales as a unique region). The main purpose of this text is to show that the case of Wales can be replicated by any region that has official political representation, even if it has only weak representative institutions and has to deal with limitations posed by the existence of a central government.

The case study deals with the issue of the European Union as an actor in international relations. While based on an analysis of the first common EU naval military mission, EU NAVFOR Somalia, code-named Atalanta, the article intends to shed more light on how the EU paves the way to its getting recognized as an international actor. The author assumes that the EU aims at facilitating the process in two key dimensions: the virtual (i.e. material) and the intersubjective (i.e. idealogical) dimension. The consultation is meant to contribute to the epistemo-methodological debate about the essence and origins of the international recognition of the EU. Adapted from the source document.

This article offers a comprehensive analysis of the perils & benefits of peacekeeping privatization by approaching two key questions. Firstly, can private military companies (PMCs) take on peacekeeping functions consistent with the UN Charter's primary objective "to save future generations from the scourge of war?" And secondly, is peacekeeping privatization really an option for bridging the UN's peacekeeping capabilities-expectations gap? PMCs' past performances here offer no clear-cut answers for the first question. Critics have doubted their cost-effectiveness, accountability & legitimacy, while proponents have argued their cost-effectiveness, feasibility & professionalism over their UN and/or regional counterparts. On the second question, PMCs posses many capabilities necessary for peacekeeping operations that the UN often lacks. Yet the question remains how far privatization should extend, with the danger of it going too far too fast, causing PMC peacekeeping to become a substitute for, rather than an enhancement of, UN action. Adapted from the source document.

The presented article aims to analyze & compare military peace support operations conducted by the EU (PSO EU). These operations are treated as the benchmark test of the implementation capability of the European Security & Defense Policy project, a project which is limited by the member states' capacities & their political will. Also the relationship between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization & the European Union must be analyzed & the unsettled state of the European allies' capabilities, as well as the crucial role of NATO to ensure a common defense must be further looked into. Nevertheless, one should still keep in mind that no effective military action could be taken without disposable well-equipped, tailored & trained operational capabilities. Concerning the European Union & its member states, this finding has still not been sufficiently put into practice. Adapted from the source document.