The role of HIV testing in Aids prevention
In: Kriminalistisk Instituts stencilserie 46
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In: Kriminalistisk Instituts stencilserie 46
In: Mandrup , T 2009 , ' South Africa and the SADC Stand-by Force ' , Scientia Militaria : South African Journal of Military Studies , bind 37 , nr. 2 , s. 1-24 .
The regional powerhouse, South Africa, has since the introduction of the nonracial democratic dispensation in 1994, played a central and important role in the formation of both the regional and continental security architecture. With the establishment of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in 1992, one of the central areas of collaboration for the community was envisioned to be security, understood within a broadened human security framework. Security was therefore from the outset one of the cornerstones of integration in the SADC. It was believed that the formation of a security community would help dismantle the enmities that had plagued regional relations during the apartheid era. For some parties, institutionalisation of relations pointed to a means of stabilising and disseminating a particular order. Such institutions depict the power relations prevailing at the time of their establishment, which, however, can change over time (Cox 1981:136). The integration ambition surrounding security correlated with the ambitions of South Africa, the new democratic government in the regional powerhouse. South Africa and its overall foreign policy ambitions desired the pursuit of peace, democracy and stability for economic growth and development in the region and within South Africa itself. Since South Africa's acceptance into the SADC in 1994, the organisation has attempted to set up the required institutional framework to enable co-operation on security, both in terms of narrow military co-operation and regarding designated 2 softer security issues, such as migration and cross-border crime. The military cooperation moved forward in the early years after 1994 with the 1996 decision of creating an Organ for Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation (OPDSC)1 and later the signing of the Mutual Defence Pact (MDP) in 2003, and eventually the creation of the Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ (SIPO) in 2004, which operationalised the OPDSC (SADC 2004). However, the actual military cooperation, e.g. military exercises, came close to a standstill. Several developments obstructed military co-operation of which the evolving crisis in Zimbabwe and the subsequent withdrawal of donor support to, for instance, the Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre (RPTC) in Harare are but two examples. The RPTC constituted the backbone of the co-operation, but political differences between member states illustrated during the Zimbabwean crisis and following the mandate of the interventions in especially the DR Congo and partly Lesotho in 1998 all contributed to regional tensions.2 Despite the crisis, SADC members, and in particular South Africa, declared that the organisation would be able to form a regional stand-by brigade for the use of the African Union (AU) as part of its wider security architecture. On 17 August 2007, the SADC declared its stand-by-force operational at a large parade in Lusaka, Zambia and at the same occasion signed a memorandum of understanding on the SADCBRIG (SADC 2007). According to the timeline provided by the AU, the brigade should be fully operational by June 2010. Former South African deputy foreign minister Aziz Pahad stated after the launch that this was an important step, but that now there was much to be done securing joint levels and types of training, interoperability, etc. (Pahad 2007). The question that continues to linger is to what extent this brigade is operational and for what purpose. Is this new regional military formation in its present form just a paper tiger, or is it "real progress" and an example of "successful" regional cooperation and integration? This article scrutinises the security co-operation and integration in SADC and asks whether an apparent lack of common values between SADC member states are blocking the security integration process, the creation of a security community, and thereby the establishment of an effective stand-by brigade, the so-called SADCBRIG. The article furthermore attempts to scrutinise the role played by South Africa in establishing the SADCBRIG.
BASE
In: Studier fra det Retsvidenskabelige institut ved Københavns universitet 1
In: Treaties and other International Acts Series, 9649
World Affairs Online
In: Internasjonal politikk, Band 79, Heft 2, S. 190-207
ISSN: 1891-1757
I 2001 besluttet Stortinget en vesentlig endring i forsvarskonsept og en betydelig reduksjon i forsvarsstrukturen. Forsvarets hovedoppgave skulle ikke lenger være å utgjøre et mobiliseringsbasert invasjonsforsvar. Beslutningen var et brudd med forsvarskonseptet som hadde dominert norsk forsvarsplanlegging under den kalde krigen og i tiåret som fulgte. Hvorfor ble invasjonsforsvaret forlatt, og hva ble Forsvarets nye hovedoppgave? Artikkelen argumenterer for at det finnes tre dominerende og delvis konkurrerende forklaringer på omleggingen av Forsvaret: en sikkerhetspolitisk, en kulturell og en økonomisk. Den første tilnærmingen ser beslutningen som drevet av et ønske om å bidra mer i utenlandsoperasjoner for å bli oppfattet som en «god alliert» i NATO og USA. Den andre forklarer overgangen med en kulturell endring der en ny og mer «internasjonalisert» forsvarspolitisks diskurs vant frem blant norske beslutningstakere. Den tredje ser endringen som et uunngåelig resultat av invasjonsforsvarets manglende økonomiske bærekraft.
Abstract in English:Security Policy, Culture or Defence Economics? Competing Explanations for the Transformation of the Norwegian Armed Forces after the Cold WarIn 2001, the Storting – Norway's parliament – decided on a significant change in Norway's national defence concept and a significant reduction in the defence structure. The Armed Forces' main task should no longer be to constitute a mobilization-based territorial defence force. The decision was a break with the defence concept that had dominated Norwegian defence planning during the Cold War and in the decade that followed. Why was territorial defence abandoned, and what became the Armed Forces' new main task? The article argues that there are three dominant and partly competing explanations for the transformation of the Armed Forces: a security policy explanation, a cultural explanation and an economic explanation. The first approach sees the decision as driven by a desire to contribute more in international operations in order to be perceived as a "good ally" in NATO and the United States. The second explains the transformation with cultural changes among Norwegian decision-makers, through which a new and more "internationalized" defence policy discourse became dominant. The third sees the change as the inevitable result of the financial unsustainability of the old status quo in the Armed Forces.
In: Treaties and other international acts series 1782
In: United States. Dept. of State. Publication 3286
In: Internasjonal politikk, Band 79, Heft 2, S. 229-239
ISSN: 1891-1757
Denne artikkelens hovedargument er at det i overveldende grad er økonomien som har vært den drivende faktor bak Forsvarets omstilling etter den kalde krigen, inkludert da invasjonsforsvar ble forlatt som forsvarskonsept i 2001. De sikkerhetspolitiske endringene har først og fremst vært utnyttet retorisk for å begrunne nedbygging av forsvarsstrukturen, når den økonomiske nødvendigheten ikke lenger lot seg skjule. Kostnader forbundet med økt deltagelse i internasjonale operasjoner har kun i svært beskjeden grad bidratt til reduksjonen i forsvarsstrukturen – kostnadene var her alt for lave til å kunne gi noen troverdig årsaksforklaring alene. Årsaken er i stedet at forsvarsbudsjettene etter den kalde krigen ikke kompenserte for den reelle kostnadsutviklingen i sektoren. Det resulterte i et kjøpekrafttap som gradvis tæret på Forsvaret.
Abstract in English:Economy – the Driving Force behind Norwegian Defence Transformation after the Cold WarThe main conclusion of this article is that to an overwhelming degree, economic factors have been the driving force behind the transformation of the Norwegian Armed Forces following the end of the Cold War, including the discontinuation of anti-invasion defence as a level of ambition in 2001. The changes in international affairs have been used rhetorically to justify the downsizing of the force structure, when the financial necessity could no longer be concealed or ignored. Additional costs caused by participation in international operations overseas have only to a very limited extent contributed to the sweeping reduction of the armed forces, since these costs were far too small to explain the cutbacks. The actual financial reason is that the defence budgets throughout the 1990s and 2000s did not compensate for the growth in real term costs in the defence sector, particularly those pertaining to the acquisition and operation of modern weapon platforms and systems. This resulted in a loss of purchasing power which gradually wore down the force structure.
In recent years, the Swedish Armed Forces have produced and distributed highly edited video clips on YouTube that show moving images of military activity. Along- side this development, mobile phone apps have emerged as an important channel through which the user can experience and take an interactive part in the staging of contemporary armed conflict. This article examines the way in which the aes- thetic and affective experience of Swedish defence and security policy is socially and (media-)culturally (co-)constructed and how the official representation of Swedish military intervention (re)produces political and economic effects when these activi- ties are distributed through traditional and social media such as YouTube and digital apps. Based on Isabela and Norman Fairclough's thoughts on political discourse, Michel Foucault's dialectic idea of power/knowledge, and Sara Ahmed's concept of the affective, I discuss how the Swedish digital military aesthetic is part of a broader political and economic practice that has consequences beyond the digital, the semi- otic, and what might at first glance appear to be pure entertainment. ; In recent years, the Swedish Armed Forces have produced and distributed highly edited video clips on YouTube that show moving images of military activity. Alongside this development, mobile phone apps have emerged as an important channel through which the user can experience and take an interactive part in the staging of contemporary armed conflict. This article examines the way in which the aesthetic and affective experience of Swedish defence and security policy is socially and (media-)culturally (co-)constructed and how the official representation of Swedish military intervention (re)produces political and economic effects when these activities are distributed through traditional and social media such as YouTube and digital apps. Based on Isabela and Norman Fairclough's thoughts on political discourse, Michel Foucault's dialectic idea of power/knowledge, and Sara Ahmed's concept of the affective, I discuss how the Swedish digital military aesthetic is part of a broader political and economic practice which has consequences beyond the digital, the semiotic and what might at first glance appear to be pure entertainment.
BASE
In: Internasjonal politikk, Band 78, Heft 3, S. 362-382
ISSN: 1891-1757
Selv om norske myndigheter ligger på verdenstoppen i digitalisering av offentlige tjenester, står landets forsvar fremdeles «på stedet hvil». I kjernen av problemet finner vi en styringsmodell der 14 ulike forsvarsgrener og selvstendige driftsenheter kjemper om makt og innflytelse. Dette gjelder særlig i spørsmålet om hvem som skal ha ansvar og myndighet når Forsvarets IKT-systemer skal knyttes sammen for å øke cyberberedskapen. Hvordan kan vi beskrive, forklare og forstå de digitale problemene som Forsvaret står oppe i? Nyere forskning gir ikke klare svar, blant annet fordi de fleste studiene er opptatt av å studere utfordringene som kommer utenfra og inn mot Norge. Spørsmålet om hvorfor Forsvaret ikke klarer å forsvare seg mot cyberangrep, eller hvorfor etaten ikke holder tritt med resten av samfunnet, forblir derfor ubesvart. Ved å bruke instrumentelle og kulturelle perspektiver fra organisasjonsteorien finner vi store huller i forsvarsevnen på grunn av intern fragmentering og rivalisering.
Abstract in English:National Defence in a Digital Crisis?Even though the Norwegian authorities are world leaders in digitalization of public services, its armed forces are falling behind. In its essence, the problem lies in a management model with 14 different services striving for power and influence. This is particularly so when it comes to whom should have supreme authority as information and communication technology (ICT) systems are standardised across the force. How can we describe, explain and comprehend this digital complexity? Contemporary research does not provide clear answers, much due to over-emphasis on external cyberthreats. The question of why Norway's armed forces are incapable of providing a proper defence against cyberthreats therefore remains unanswered. By means of instrumental and cultural theories, we find grave deficiencies due to internal rivalry and organisational fragmentation.
In: Constitutions of the world from the late 18th century to the middle of the 19th century: Quellen zur Herausbildung des modernen Konstitutionalismus
In: America Vol. 1
In: Constitutional documents of the United States of America 1776 - 1860 Pt. 7
In: Internasjonal politikk, Band 80, Heft 2
ISSN: 1891-1757
USA hadde ingen doktriner for opprørsbekjempelse (COIN) da operasjonene i Afghanistan og Irak startet. Mens krigene pågikk ble det, til tross for stor uenighet, innført en slik doktrine i 2007. Krigene førte også til både endringer i organisering og utrustning av amerikanske styrker, og til store endringer av planlagte investeringer av militært ustyr. Begge krigene endte i nederlag, og i tiden etter har USA på ny fokusert på stormaktsrivalisering. Men utgiftene til krigføringen i Afghanistan og Irak, og endringene i investeringsmønster, har svekket USAs evne til å konkurrere militært med Kina og Russland.
Abstract in EnglishAfghanistan, Iraq and the Development of US Military PowerThe United States had no doctrine for Counterinsurgency Operations (COIN) when the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq started in 2001 and 2003, respectively. In 2001 the US armed forces were designed for Great Power competition and conflict. During the course of the wars, substantial changes were made in the organization and equipment of the forces, and a COIN doctrine was introduced in 2007. In turn, large scale modernization of, and investments in, equipment suited for Great Power conflict were reduced in scale or cancelled. The cost of the wars and the changes in operational focus have blunted the US's ability to compete militarily with China and Russia.