Suchergebnisse

The regional powerhouse, South Africa, has since the introduction of the nonracial democratic dispensation in 1994, played a central and important role in the formation of both the regional and continental security architecture. With the establishment of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in 1992, one of the central areas of collaboration for the community was envisioned to be security, understood within a broadened human security framework. Security was therefore from the outset one of the cornerstones of integration in the SADC. It was believed that the formation of a security community would help dismantle the enmities that had plagued regional relations during the apartheid era. For some parties, institutionalisation of relations pointed to a means of stabilising and disseminating a particular order. Such institutions depict the power relations prevailing at the time of their establishment, which, however, can change over time (Cox 1981:136). The integration ambition surrounding security correlated with the ambitions of South Africa, the new democratic government in the regional powerhouse. South Africa and its overall foreign policy ambitions desired the pursuit of peace, democracy and stability for economic growth and development in the region and within South Africa itself. Since South Africa's acceptance into the SADC in 1994, the organisation has attempted to set up the required institutional framework to enable co-operation on security, both in terms of narrow military co-operation and regarding designated 2 softer security issues, such as migration and cross-border crime. The military cooperation moved forward in the early years after 1994 with the 1996 decision of creating an Organ for Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation (OPDSC)1 and later the signing of the Mutual Defence Pact (MDP) in 2003, and eventually the creation of the Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ (SIPO) in 2004, which operationalised the OPDSC (SADC 2004). However, the actual military cooperation, e.g. military exercises, came close to a standstill. Several developments obstructed military co-operation of which the evolving crisis in Zimbabwe and the subsequent withdrawal of donor support to, for instance, the Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre (RPTC) in Harare are but two examples. The RPTC constituted the backbone of the co-operation, but political differences between member states illustrated during the Zimbabwean crisis and following the mandate of the interventions in especially the DR Congo and partly Lesotho in 1998 all contributed to regional tensions.2 Despite the crisis, SADC members, and in particular South Africa, declared that the organisation would be able to form a regional stand-by brigade for the use of the African Union (AU) as part of its wider security architecture. On 17 August 2007, the SADC declared its stand-by-force operational at a large parade in Lusaka, Zambia and at the same occasion signed a memorandum of understanding on the SADCBRIG (SADC 2007). According to the timeline provided by the AU, the brigade should be fully operational by June 2010. Former South African deputy foreign minister Aziz Pahad stated after the launch that this was an important step, but that now there was much to be done securing joint levels and types of training, interoperability, etc. (Pahad 2007). The question that continues to linger is to what extent this brigade is operational and for what purpose. Is this new regional military formation in its present form just a paper tiger, or is it "real progress" and an example of "successful" regional cooperation and integration? This article scrutinises the security co-operation and integration in SADC and asks whether an apparent lack of common values between SADC member states are blocking the security integration process, the creation of a security community, and thereby the establishment of an effective stand-by brigade, the so-called SADCBRIG. The article furthermore attempts to scrutinise the role played by South Africa in establishing the SADCBRIG.

Analitica dedica gran parte del suo decimo volume (2017) all'indagine della teoria e dell'analisi musicale in quanto prassi influenzata da scelte politiche e pragmatiche, e pienamente inserita in specifici contesti ideologici e sociali. Recentemente, infatti, il dibattito sulle motivazioni e gli scopi della musicologia, considerata come pratica sociale, ha portato a una nuova consapevolezza dei presupposti ideologici e politici dell'analisi musicale [Broman-Engebretsen 2007; Buch-Donin-Feneyrou 2013] e a una storicizzazione delle contrapposizioni introdotte dalla New Musicology nell'ultimo ventennio del Novecento [Agawu 2004; MacCutcheon 2014]. Allo stesso tempo, la progressiva convergenza delle metodologie impiegate nei diversi campi degli studi musicali – dalla musica d'arte alle musiche di tradizione orale, dalla popular music alla musica nel contesto della comunicazione audiovisiva, dall'uso del suono nei nuovi media alle culture non-musicali del suono – ha messo in piena evidenza la stretta relazione tra le pratiche dell'analisi musicale e i loro fondamenti epistemologici, che riflettono, in modo più o meno evidente, precise scelte di politica culturale [van den Toorn 1996; Scherzinger 2001; Schuijer 2008, Campos-Donin 2009; Guilbault 2014; Earle 2015].Analitica dedica gran parte del suo decimo volume (2017) all'indagine della teoria e dell'analisi musicale in quanto prassi influenzata da scelte politiche e pragmatiche, e pienamente inserita in specifici contesti ideologici e sociali. Recentemente, infatti, il dibattito sulle motivazioni e gli scopi della musicologia, considerata come pratica sociale, ha portato a una nuova consapevolezza dei presupposti ideologici e politici dell'analisi musicale [Broman-Engebretsen 2007; Buch-Donin-Feneyrou 2013] e a una storicizzazione delle contrapposizioni introdotte dalla New Musicology nell'ultimo ventennio del Novecento [Agawu 2004; MacCutcheon 2014]. Allo stesso tempo, la progressiva convergenza delle metodologie impiegate nei diversi campi degli studi musicali – dalla musica d'arte alle musiche di tradizione orale, dalla popular music alla musica nel contesto della comunicazione audiovisiva, dall'uso del suono nei nuovi media alle culture non-musicali del suono – ha messo in piena evidenza la stretta relazione tra le pratiche dell'analisi musicale e i loro fondamenti epistemologici, che riflettono, in modo più o meno evidente, precise scelte di politica culturale [van den Toorn 1996; Scherzinger 2001; Schuijer 2008, Campos-Donin 2009; Guilbault 2014; Earle 2015].

Social impact finance has emerged in recent years in response to the crisis of traditional welfare systems and the gradual decrease in public funding to the Third Sector, by offering new financial instruments to convey private capital to social entrepreneurship in order to create positive social impact combined with economic returns (Agrawal and Hockerts, 2019; Daggers and Nicholls, 2016; Hochstadter and Scheck, 2015). The debate on the effective application of these instruments has so far focused on social impact as a measurement for return on invested capital, neglecting the role of motivations driving involved agents (investors and social entrepreneurs). In this work, we investigate the impact of different financial instruments on governance structures and on the motivations of social enterprise stakeholders, both from a theoretical point of view and through pilot experiments that mimic the main features of social impact finance. Our experimental design aims to recreate in the laboratory the relationship between social enterprise, beneficiaries and financiers, including the following characteristics: extremely diversified/personalized goods/services (complexity); quality of the good/service; risk (linked to the effectiveness of the intervention provided) and components related to: information asymmetries, evaluation (impact), parameters of the financial instrument. Starting from this setting, we intend to evaluate the effect on motivations of alternative evaluation methods (input, output, outcome) linked to the financial instrument.

Over the last decade, the digitalization of China has been running together with the general growth of the country's economy. The local government has endeavored to provide the country with a modern telecommunication infrastructure and to support the diffusion of mobile technology. Today the number of Chinese net citizens is not far away from reaching 600 million users. However, the censorship system which has always affected the flow of information and content within this country seems not to weaken. Despite the Internet is becoming more and more embedded in people's everyday life, the censorship demonstrates a formidable resilience to adapt to the new platforms made available by this revolutionary tool. A technologic blocking and filtering effort combined with the continuous monitoring and controlling of users' virtual activities makes the best of the so-called 'Great Firewall': a censorship system that would not be possible without the collaboration of the population itself and its willingness to actively practice self-censorship and self-restraint.

The paper analyzes two recent orders hold by the International Court of Justice in the Armed activities in the territory of the Congo case, concerning the appointment of experts, according to article 50 of the Statute of the Court. The experts will assist the Court in the assessment of the reparation owed to the Democratic Republic of Congo by Uganda for the injuries caused by Uganda as a result of the breach of several international obligations, determined by the Court in the 2005 Judgment. The analysis has the scope to highlight some of the substantial issues relating to the role of Court-appointed experts in the litigations brought before the Court. The need for this investigation is particularly significant, despite the sparing reliance of the power to call experts by the Court. Notwithstanding the great discretion enjoyed, the Court appointed independent experts only in four cases, including the present one. The limited number of precedents rises several questions related both to the function of Court-appointed experts and the Court approach to technical or scientific complexity. Firstly, the article focuses on the function of the experts appointed by the Court in the case, evaluating the terms of reference assigned by the Court. Secondly, the examination attempt to shed light on the approach of the Court in the exercise of its power to use experts. Regard this point, the essay analyses, on the one hand, the relationship between the margin of discretion, enjoyed by the Court in order to use experts, and the relevance of the Jura novit curia principle, in light on the distinction between questions of law and questions of fact. On the other hand, the essay will evaluate the usefulness of the use of experts in the determination of the amount of reparations, in order to underline the methodology employed by the Court in the assessment of damages. Thirdly, the article questioning whether the appointment of independent experts might affect the principles and rules governing the production and the burden of proof in the adjudication before the Court.

2012/2013 ; Between 1991 and 1995, close to three hundred thousand people were killed in the former Yugoslavia. The international responses to this catastrophe was at best uncertain and at worst appalling. While both the United States and the European Union initially viewed the Balkan wars as a European problem, the Europeans chose not to take a strong stand, restricting themselves to dispatching U.N. "peacekeepers" to a country where there was no peace keep, and withholding from them the means and the authority to stop the fighting. In Bosnia the Europe sought to avoid military involvement, citing every excuse she could think of not to intervene to prevent the genocide of 250.000 Bosnian Muslims, who ultimately died at the hands of their Serbian tormentors. The British and French, too, who had primarily responsibility for dealing with this European problem, had persuaded the United Nations to impose an arms embargo on both sides in the Bosnian war. As often happens, the embargo did little damage to Serbia's military capacities, since their army had inherited the extensive military hardware Yugoslavia had amassed under its former Communist regime. But the embargo did deny the means of self-defense to the poorly equipped majority Muslim population in Bosnia. Unarmed, they could do little to repel the invaders or to protect their villages. Some European leaders were not eager to have a Muslim state in the heart of the Balkans, fearing it might become a base for exporting extremism, a result that their neglect made more, not less, likely. However, from the beginning of Yugoslavia's collapse, Americans divided into two groups, broadly defined: those who thought that Americans should intervene for either moral or strategic reasons, and those who feared that if they did, they would become entangled in a Vietnam-like quagmire. As awareness of ethnic cleansing and genocide spread, the proportion of those who wanted the United States to "do something" increased, but they probably never constituted a majority. Nevertheless, when the situation seemed most hopeless in July 1995 - the United States put its prestige on the line with a rapid and dramatic series of high-risk actions: an all-out diplomatic effort in August, heavy NATO bombing in September, a cease-fire in October, Dayton in November, and, in December, the deployment of twenty thousand American troops to Bosnia. Finally, in late 1995, in the face of growing atrocities and new Bosnian Serb threats, the United States decided to take part in Bosnia, the war was over and the America's role in post-Cold War Europe redefined. There is a lesson here to be learned by Europe that Bosnian Muslims are the best Christians in the world. The policy-makers cannot have a double heart, one for love and other for hate because some European leaders were not eager to have a Muslim state in the heart of Europe. They spoke of a painful but realistic restoration of Christian Europe. Of course Christianity, like any other religion has nothing to do with the barbarities and the greatest collective failure of Europe. The lesson that Western civilization thought it had drawn from the genocide of World War II – "Never again!"- must now be qualified to read: "except when politically inconvenient." ; La tragedia della ex-Jugoslavia e al suo interno quella della Bosnia Erzegovina riguardano pagine straordinariamente sconvolgenti della storia del mondo posto-Ottantanove, addirittura — si può dire — la conseguenza più grave, anche se non diretta, della dissoluzione dell'Unione Sovietica e conseguentemente di quel bipolarismo che aveva "ingessato" tutte le ipotesi o i tentativi di trasformazione degli esiti e delle conseguenze della seconda guerra mondiale. In un'impostazione sostanzialmente di storia politico-sociale, il candidato ricostruisce le vicende che vanno dal 1990 al 1995, ovvero da quella che il candidato chiama "la morte della Jugoslavia" fino all'intervento, decisivo in termini militari, della NATO nel conflitto, che aveva già visto negli anni precedenti emergere la guerra in Slovenia, in Croazia, prima di colpire anche la Bosnia Erzegovina, con la finale Conferenza che porta agli Accordi di Dayton. L'attore centrale di tutta questa vicenda è naturalmente la Serbia di Milosevic, ricordare il quale non fa che aiutarci a veder riapparire i fantasmi di vicende atroci di sterminio di civili, di stupro etnico, di "pulizia etnica", di genocidio. Il candidato fa opportunamente precedere la sua analisi da una cronologia, piuttosto lunga, che consente di scandire con precisione i diversi passaggi di una storia eccezionalmente drammatica. Segue il programma del suo lavoro, con l'indicazione del metodo di ricerca e degli strumenti di cui si è valso. Le cinque parti sostanziali in cui si suddivide il lavoro riguardano la dissoluzione della Jugoslavia, a partire dai falliti tentativi di Tito di salvaguardare l'integrità di quella Federazione, e analizzando attentamente i due "scivolamenti" della guerra in Slovenia dapprima e in Croazia poi. Il candidato analizza la società e la storia della Bosnia Erzegovina, condizione ovviamente preliminare per comprendere gli eventi successivi. Le tre categorie alle quali il candidato riconduce quella vicenda sono il multiculturalismo, la multietnicità e il multiconfessionalismo — tre dimensioni che potrebbero poter essere rispettate e addirittura apprezzate e che invece, in ogni parte del mondo, e più che altrove in Bosnia trovano ostacoli e resistenze violente e sanguinose. Risulta, come il candidato fa notare, adottare l'arma del nazionalismo e delle sue retoriche, impedendo così a ogni pur volenteroso tentativo di portare la democrazia nel proprio paese di trionfare. Il candidato chiarisce, in questo quadro, che la cosiddetta "balcanizzazione" che si fa discendere da quella parte del mondo, non deve essere intesa come un termine negativo ma come la pura e semplice conseguenza dei frequenti interventi esterni che là si sono realizzati. Il candidato dedica non poca attenzione al ruolo degli Stati Uniti nella vicenda, e alle diverse strategie — politiche e militari — adottate: con i devastanti risultati che tuttavia, purtroppo, conosciamo. L'Unione Europea non esce ovviamente meglio dell'alleato d'oltre Atlantico dalla ricostruzione del candidato, che poi giunge anche a ripercorrere le vicende di alcuni importanti uomini politici locali, sopra tutti Izebegovic e Karadzic, l'un contro l'altro schierati. Né sono passate sotto silenzio le vicende di alcune delle pagine più drammatiche: il massacro di Srebrenica, i bombardamenti su Sarajevo e in particolare il secondo bombardamento sul mercato. La risoluzione della crisi giunse, come per incanto, quando la NATO accolse l'invito ONU di intervenire: l'intervento fece tacere le armi, portò agli accordi di Dayton, ma non alla riconciliazione, che dal 1995 ha comunque incominciato il suo lento, ma — sperabilmente — solido cammino. ; XXV Ciclo ; 1982

The Energy Community is an international organisation which brings together the European Union and its neighbours of South East-Europe and Black Sea Region to create an integrated pan-European energy market. The Treaty establishing the Energy Community was signed in October 2005 in Athens and entered in force in July 2006. Its key objective is to extend the EU internal energy market rules and principles to the Contracting Parties (the non-EU members of the Energy Community) on the basis of a legally binding framework. This Master's Thesis provides an analysis of the implementation of the EU Third Energy Package in the Energy Community, which asked of the Contracting Parties a more stringent effort to open their national energy sectors and stimulate cross-border energy trade. Liberalising energy markets however is not an easy process. When it is hindered by non-transposition or skirted by non-implementation of the Energy Community law, the construction of a pan-European energy market is in turn hampered and delayed. The current, weak and politically biased Dispute Settlement mechanism of the Energy Community, together with the absence of a Court, does not effectively incentivize the Parties to rectify the breaches of the Energy Community acquis (the EU acquis transposed by the Energy Community). This Thesis intends to demonstrate that, in spite of the shortcomings of such a mechanism, the Energy Community Secretariat -the central coordinating body of this organisation- has greatly contributed to strengthen the degree of enforcement of the Energy Community acquis in the Contracting Parties. In particular, it has been playing an important role in implementing liberalisation in energy markets and in furthering cross-border energy trade among them. Chapter I describes the evolution of the Energy Community: conceived as a pre-accession tool for the post-war South-East European countries in the EU, it turned into the main instrument of the EU external energy policy. Indeed, the accession of some European Neighbourhood Policy countries (namely, Moldova, Ukraine, and Georgia) demonstrates that even in the absence of the EU membership prospective there is still a will to share the same internal energy market with the EU. Chapter II provides a legal analysis of the Treaty. In addition to explaining features and scope of the Energy Community's policies, it describes the decision-making process, the institutional framework, and the EU participation in the Energy Community institutions. Chapter III analyses the functioning of the Dispute Settlement system and highlights its weaknesses: it is diplomatic (and not judicial) in nature, sanctions are ineffective, and investors are not adequately protected. Then, the Chapter studies the amendments recently adopted to enhance the Dispute Settlement procedure and also illustrates the Dispute Resolution and Negotiation Centre established in 2016. Chapter IV, firstly, goes into further detail about the Secretariat's powers within the Dispute Settlement system, and then it shows the how the Secretariat wisely deploys its room for manoeuvring in order to ensure the correct application of the Energy Community law by the Parties of Treaty. The Chapter aims to prove that the Secretariat has been actively working for the enforcement of the Energy Community acquis, and primarily for the identification of those obstacles which impede the full liberalisation and regional integration of the Contracting Parties' energy markets. Finally, the Thesis concludes with a case study which results emblematic in showing the pivotal role of the Secretariat in implementing liberalization in the Energy Community market. Case ECS-2/17 deals with the Opening Letter sent to Ukraine in August 2017, where the Secretariat took the preliminary view that certain aspects of Ukraine's Public Service Obligations Regulations were non-compliant with the Energy Community acquis and prevented the opening up of the national natural gas market.

This work aims at shedding some light on public and private roles in biopharmaceutical innovation. After reviewing the pillars of neoclassical and evolutionary theories of technical change, we analyse current innovation policy devices; among them, we focus on the patent system. As suggested by historical and empirical literature, the effectiveness of patents in spurring innovation is all but uncontroversial. Real-world technical change, in fact, results from the interaction of heterogeneous actors belonging to complex "innovation systems". In this context, typical of the biopharmaceutical industry, the role of the government is likely to be decisive and invisible at the same time, hidden by a tight network of licensing and technological transfer agreements. In order to unveil the public hand, we propose a patent analysis aimed at identifying the value and the characteristics of public and private biopharmaceutical innovation. The analysis is conducted over two datasets: the first one collects patents from the USPTO Cross-Related Art References 514.810-935 granted between 1976 and 2006; the second one was built by Sampat and Lichtenberg (2011) and includes all patents associated to New Molecular Entities (NMEs) approved by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) from 1988 to 2005. We find that public and academic patents result in greater knowledge externalities as measured by forward patent citations. Furthermore, public and academic patents are on average more original and more general than their private counterparts. However, these results hold only for the first dataset, suggesting that a better-rounded vision of biopharmaceutical innovation dynamics may be achieved only through a microscopic approach, investigating the characteristics of public and private R&D over different therapeutic areas and at different levels of the innovation chain.