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The regional powerhouse, South Africa, has since the introduction of the nonracial democratic dispensation in 1994, played a central and important role in the formation of both the regional and continental security architecture. With the establishment of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in 1992, one of the central areas of collaboration for the community was envisioned to be security, understood within a broadened human security framework. Security was therefore from the outset one of the cornerstones of integration in the SADC. It was believed that the formation of a security community would help dismantle the enmities that had plagued regional relations during the apartheid era. For some parties, institutionalisation of relations pointed to a means of stabilising and disseminating a particular order. Such institutions depict the power relations prevailing at the time of their establishment, which, however, can change over time (Cox 1981:136). The integration ambition surrounding security correlated with the ambitions of South Africa, the new democratic government in the regional powerhouse. South Africa and its overall foreign policy ambitions desired the pursuit of peace, democracy and stability for economic growth and development in the region and within South Africa itself. Since South Africa's acceptance into the SADC in 1994, the organisation has attempted to set up the required institutional framework to enable co-operation on security, both in terms of narrow military co-operation and regarding designated 2 softer security issues, such as migration and cross-border crime. The military cooperation moved forward in the early years after 1994 with the 1996 decision of creating an Organ for Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation (OPDSC)1 and later the signing of the Mutual Defence Pact (MDP) in 2003, and eventually the creation of the Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ (SIPO) in 2004, which operationalised the OPDSC (SADC 2004). However, the actual military cooperation, e.g. military exercises, came close to a standstill. Several developments obstructed military co-operation of which the evolving crisis in Zimbabwe and the subsequent withdrawal of donor support to, for instance, the Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre (RPTC) in Harare are but two examples. The RPTC constituted the backbone of the co-operation, but political differences between member states illustrated during the Zimbabwean crisis and following the mandate of the interventions in especially the DR Congo and partly Lesotho in 1998 all contributed to regional tensions.2 Despite the crisis, SADC members, and in particular South Africa, declared that the organisation would be able to form a regional stand-by brigade for the use of the African Union (AU) as part of its wider security architecture. On 17 August 2007, the SADC declared its stand-by-force operational at a large parade in Lusaka, Zambia and at the same occasion signed a memorandum of understanding on the SADCBRIG (SADC 2007). According to the timeline provided by the AU, the brigade should be fully operational by June 2010. Former South African deputy foreign minister Aziz Pahad stated after the launch that this was an important step, but that now there was much to be done securing joint levels and types of training, interoperability, etc. (Pahad 2007). The question that continues to linger is to what extent this brigade is operational and for what purpose. Is this new regional military formation in its present form just a paper tiger, or is it "real progress" and an example of "successful" regional cooperation and integration? This article scrutinises the security co-operation and integration in SADC and asks whether an apparent lack of common values between SADC member states are blocking the security integration process, the creation of a security community, and thereby the establishment of an effective stand-by brigade, the so-called SADCBRIG. The article furthermore attempts to scrutinise the role played by South Africa in establishing the SADCBRIG.

I 2001 besluttet Stortinget en vesentlig endring i forsvarskonsept og en betydelig reduksjon i forsvarsstrukturen. Forsvarets hovedoppgave skulle ikke lenger være å utgjøre et mobiliseringsbasert invasjonsforsvar. Beslutningen var et brudd med forsvarskonseptet som hadde dominert norsk forsvarsplanlegging under den kalde krigen og i tiåret som fulgte. Hvorfor ble invasjonsforsvaret forlatt, og hva ble Forsvarets nye hovedoppgave? Artikkelen argumenterer for at det finnes tre dominerende og delvis konkurrerende forklaringer på omleggingen av Forsvaret: en sikkerhetspolitisk, en kulturell og en økonomisk. Den første tilnærmingen ser beslutningen som drevet av et ønske om å bidra mer i utenlandsoperasjoner for å bli oppfattet som en «god alliert» i NATO og USA. Den andre forklarer overgangen med en kulturell endring der en ny og mer «internasjonalisert» forsvarspolitisks diskurs vant frem blant norske beslutningstakere. Den tredje ser endringen som et uunngåelig resultat av invasjonsforsvarets manglende økonomiske bærekraft.
Abstract in English:Security Policy, Culture or Defence Economics? Competing Explanations for the Transformation of the Norwegian Armed Forces after the Cold WarIn 2001, the Storting – Norway's parliament – decided on a significant change in Norway's national defence concept and a significant reduction in the defence structure. The Armed Forces' main task should no longer be to constitute a mobilization-based territorial defence force. The decision was a break with the defence concept that had dominated Norwegian defence planning during the Cold War and in the decade that followed. Why was territorial defence abandoned, and what became the Armed Forces' new main task? The article argues that there are three dominant and partly competing explanations for the transformation of the Armed Forces: a security policy explanation, a cultural explanation and an economic explanation. The first approach sees the decision as driven by a desire to contribute more in international operations in order to be perceived as a "good ally" in NATO and the United States. The second explains the transformation with cultural changes among Norwegian decision-makers, through which a new and more "internationalized" defence policy discourse became dominant. The third sees the change as the inevitable result of the financial unsustainability of the old status quo in the Armed Forces.

This study examined the influence of the separation of prescribing and dispensing roles(SPD) policy implemented in Korea in July 2000, especially on the change in the net profit of medical institutions. Using the data set from the Korea's National Health Insurance and the previous research, this study elicited the following main results. First, tertiary care institutions was estimated to lose about 631 billion won after the SPD policy. Second, general hospitals and hospitals gained about 557 billion and 564 billion won, respectively. Third, it is shown that clinics also gained 389-659 billion won. Finally, however, the change in net profit of medical institutions after the SPD policy largely depends on different estimation models. Moreover, it also varies from the assumptions on the price differential of a reimbursable drug which worked as cross-subsidy to insufficient physician's fee before the SPD policy. Despite such limitations as lack of data outside of the National Health Insurance's coverage, this study differs from others. This is the first research to explore the effect of the SPD policy on different types of medical institutions and to attempt to purely focus on the SPD policy. In this study, we can draw the policy implication that preparing for a policy change, the government should set up the policy evaluation system to collect the concerned data and develop the methodologies in advance to the policy implementation. ; open