Suchergebnisse

The conflict environment is changing, and—after almost two decades of continuous COIN, stabilisation and counterterrorism missions—government and public opinion in western and allied countries are unlikely to support continued large-scale or long-duration missions of this type. Yet history demonstrates that such missions are, and are likely to remain, some of the most frequent and geographically widespread. Likewise, ground forces are critical for success in COIN and stabilisation missions, due to the need to interact closely with local government and populations, which implies the need to establish and maintain a physical presence in the area of operations, which in turn implies the need to survive and prevail in a close combat environment, which only ground forces can do. Thus, despite their unpopularity, ground forces can expect (and must be prepared) to continue engaging in these types of operations. However, the same factors that have enhanced the threat in recent decades—in particular, connectivity and the ability to conduct collaborative and remote engagement— also create opportunities for new operating methods for ground forces conducting COIN and stabilisation. These include the ability to deploy only a small element forward on the ground, conducting SFA and FID tasks, while supporting it with a QRF and other enablers that remain offshore in a sea-base or in regionally-deployed FOBs. In such a scenario the main force might be withheld from the theatre of operations and either deploy for a brief initial period only, or not at all. For a force operating in this manner, protected mobility and communications would remain essential, as would the ability to access and deliver precision fire support when required. Deployed forces would probably be modular to a very low level, operating in a mesh of multi-role, semi-autonomous small teams supporting each other and swapping roles as needed. Traditional intelligence, engineering, civil affairs, psychological operations and military governance capabilities would remain essential, but might be called forward as needed. Ultimately, however, while ground forces will almost certainly continue to play a central role in counterinsurgency and stabilisation operations, the way they perform this role, the organisation and equipment with which they do so, and the environment in which they conduct such missions is likely to change, and keep changing, into the foreseeable future.

Introduction -- Chapter Once -- An overview of the Japan Self-Defense Forces Law and its historical changes -- Chapter Two -- An English translation of the Contemporary Japan SDF Law -- Chapter Three -- The official Japanese version of the Contemporary Japan SDF Law -- About the editors.

The transformation of the German armed forces is one of the topics of the current security policy of Germany. The position of the German anned forces has deteriorated in recent years when compared to the situation that existed several decades ago. This fact is reflected in such things as the growth of difficulties with recruitment, increase in the number of young people preferring civilian service to military service accompanied by the growth of the positive evaluation of civilian service, and in particular in dwindling financial resources of Bundeswehr. Despite these tendencies, Bundeswehr is not as yet perceived by German society as an institution a priory incompatible with democracy. The analysis of the reform of German armedforces shows that that the changes in this institution are taking place against the background of trends generating the "revolution in military affairs", even though, naturally, within the boundaries given by the Bundeswehr's limited access to the resources of German society. The German armed forces of the future should be more mobile, with improved capability for strategic lift and strategic reconnaissance, more flexible organizational structure and command, better signals and communication equipment, aha better equipment for automated command. The improvements of the German armedforces are aimed at areas that can help them to increase their effectiveness in missions taking place outside of the territory of Germany, while the capabilities that were in the focus in the past, i.e. the high intensity warfare capability in the battlefield of Central Europe, are currently being scaled down. The only specificity of the reform of the German armed forces in comparison with the reforms taking place in other European countries is the continuation of universal conscription, probably due to the belief of German political -- and partly also military -- elites that universal conscription has democratizing effects. Adapted from the source document.