Suchergebnisse

V Ukrajini so se leta 2014 po seriji različnih notranjih političnih kriz na vzhodu države, v regiji Donbas, pojavila separatistična gibanja, katerih pripadniki so za regiji Doneck in Lugansk zahtevali odcepitev od države. Začetnim protestom je sledil konflikt, ki ga že od vsega začetka zaznamuje prepletanje delovanja različnih vpletenih strani: upornikov na eni in ukrajinske oblasti na drugi strani, kot tudi mednarodne skupnosti. Na eni strani sta Evropska unija in NATO, ki si zadnji dve desetletji na različne načine prizadevajo za integracijo vzhodnoevropskih držav. Na drugi strani je Ruska federacija, ki je še vedno izrazito povezana z republikami nekdanje Sovjetske zveze in nanje tudi močno vpliva. Širjenje vplivov iz EU in ZDA oziroma zahoda na splošno v teh državah domnevno ogroža ruske interese in interese proruske struje v Ukrajini. Magistrsko delo prikazuje zgodovinski razvoj Ukrajine in zapletene družbene, gospodarske in politične razmere, prisotne v državi, ki pripomorejo k razumevanju razvoja in poteka konflikta. Temu sledita analiza medijskega poročanja in vloge medijev v razvoju konflikta in političnogeografska analiza konflikta ter njegov vpliv na širše dogajanje in odnose v Evropi in svetu ; After a series of various internal political crises in eastern Ukraine in 2014, separatist movements appeared in the Donbas region, demanding secession of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions. The initial protests were followed by a conflict marked throughout by the intertwining actions of the various parties involved: the rebels, the Ukrainian authorities as well as the international community. On the one hand, there is the European Union and NATO, striving for the integration of Eastern European countries over the last two decades. On the other hand, there is the Russian Federation, still strongly connected with the republics of the former Soviet Union and exerting a strong influence on them. Supposedly, the growing influences of the EU, the US and the West in general in these countries pose a threat to the Russian interests and the interests of the pro-Russian movement in Ukraine. This master's thesis presents the historical development of Ukraine and its complex social, economic and political conditions, shedding light on the development and course of the conflict in the country. It then provides an analysis of the role of the media in the development of the conflict, as well as a political geographic analysis of the conflict and its impact on the events and relations on European and global level.

Namen dela je predvsem proučiti oblikovanje, delovanje, vlogo in pomen Demosa kot instrumenta in akterja nacionalne emancipacije in demokratične tranzicije na Slovenskem. Pred osrednjim delom analize so opredeljeni ključni pojmi in koncepti: definicija nacionalizma ter glavni teoretični pristopi k nacionalizmu, opredelitev demokracije in demokratizacije. Za celovito razumevanje vloge in pomena posameznih političnih akterjev, kakršen je bil konec osemdesetih in v začetku devetdesetih Demos, je potrebno dobro poznati zgodovinske okoliščine. Najprej sem v poglavju o zgodovinskih mejnikih oblikovanja slovenske nacionalne identitete poskušala dokazati, da pomembni procesi v osemdesetih in devetdesetih letih niso vznikli sami od sebe, ampak imajo dolgo zgodovinsko podlago. V nadaljevanju obravnavam širjenje političnega prostora, obdobje liberalizacije in razcveta civilne družbe ter ključne procese in dogodke na poti v pluralno družbo. Procesi liberalizacije so soustvarjali tudi politično okolje, v katerem je začela nastajati politična opozicija. Konec osemdesetih let, tik pred nastankom Demosa, sta se izoblikovala dva konsistentna in nekompatibilna narodno-politična programa, ki sta simbolizirala politično polarizacijo. Nove, alternativne 'zveze' so se začele povezovati v pričakovanju demokratičnih volitev in soočenja s skupino družbenopolitičnih organizacij z Zvezo komunistov na čelu. Osrednji del disertacije predstavlja obravnava Demosa, akterja demokratizacije. Znotraj tega obdobja namenjam posebno pozornost najvidnejši osebnosti združene demokratične opozicije Jožetu Pučniku, analiziram predvolilne programe, rezultate volitev, ter oblikovanje novih oblastnih organov. V tem kontekstu analiziram tudi njihovo sodelovanje s Predsedstvom republike Slovenije. V nadaljevanju orišem vlogo Demosa v osamosvojitvenih procesih. Demos je v svojih glavnih namerah uspel, kljub temu, da ga niso ustrezno podpirali mediji, ni imel ustrezne zaslombe v gospodarstvu, pa tudi ne v državni upravi in, razen slovenske vojske in do neke mere policije, v represivnih organih oblasti. Kljub temu je uresničil glavne cilje, za uspešno izpeljano tranzicijo oziroma bolj popolno in konsolidirano demokratizacijo pa mu je zmanjkalo tako časa kot politične moči. Proces uvedbe demokracije, kot drugi od Demosovih ciljev, je bil uresničen v institucionalnem smislu, z vzpostavitvijo temeljnih demokratičnih struktur. Istočasno pa je bil Demos ključni dejavnik ne le pri oblikovanju splošnega soglasja o nujnosti osamosvojitve slovenskega naroda, ki se izraža v visokem rezultatu slovenskega plebiscita 23. decembra 1990, ampak je bil tudi glavni akter in instrument nacionalne osamosvojitve, obrambe slovenske samostojnosti v vojni za Slovenijo ter mednarodnega priznanja. ; The purpose of the thesis is primarily to examine the creation, operations, role and importance of Demos – Democratic Opposition of Slovenia as an instrument and actor of national emancipation and democratic transition in Slovenia. Prior to the central part of the analysis key terms and concepts are identified: definition of nationalism and the main theoretical approaches to nationalism, definition of democracy and democratization. For comprehensive understanding of the role and importance of individual political actors, like Demos was in the late eighties and early nineties, we should also be familiar with historical circumstances. At first I tried to stress that the main events and processes in the eighties and nineties had not emerged by themselves but were results of long historical development. Next I discuss broadening of political space, a period of liberalization and flourishing of civil society and also key processes and events on the way to a pluralistic society. The liberalization processes co-created also the political environment, in which the political opposition started to take shape. At the end of the eighties, just before the establishment of Demos, two consistent and incompatible national-political programmes were formed which symbolized the political polarization. New, alternative 'unions' began to link pending democratic elections and confrontations with a group of the so-called socio-political organizations with the Communists Party at the head. The central part of the thesis is the analysis of Demos, the actor of democratization. Within this period I pay particular attention to Jože Pučnik, the most prominent personality of the united democratic opposition, I analyse election programs, results of elections and the creation of new public authorities. In this context, I analyse also their cooperation with the Presidency of the Republic of Slovenia and outline the role of Demos in the independence processes. Demos succeeded in its main intentions, despite the fact that it had not adequate support of the media, no support of the economy nor in the public service and, with the exception of the Slovenian Army and to some extent police forces, the repressive authorities. Despite all these Demos accomplished its main objectives, however, for a successful transition or a more complete and consolidated democratization it ran out of time and political power. The process of introducing democracy was realized in a formal sense, with the establishment of basic democratic structures. At the same time Demos was a key factor in the creation of the general consensus on the necessity of the Slovenian independency which is shown in the high score of the plebiscite on 23rd Dec 1990. Demos was also the key actor and an instrument of the national independence process, the defence of the Slovenian territory in the war for Slovenia as well as in the process of the international recognition of the new Slovenian sovereign state.

Pri izpolnjevanju svoje primarne naloge ohranjanja mednarodnega miru in varnosti, ki mu jo nalaga Ustanovna listina Organizacije združenih narodov, Varnostni svet Združenih narodov deluje predvsem v okviru II. in III. stebra odgovornosti zaščititi. Nabor ukrepov, ki jih pri tem uporablja, je kljub temu, da je Varnostni svet edini organ, ki lahko zakonito po VII. poglavju Ustanovne listine odobri izjemo od splošne prepovedi uporabe sile, bistveno širši od gole uporabe sile, ki je bila brez privolitve države doslej odobrena le enkrat, leta 2011 v Libiji. Hipoteza naloge je, da potencial, ki ga odgovornost zaščititi ponuja pri reševanju kompleksnih kriznih situacij, ki lahko vodijo k množičnim grozodejstvom, ni docela izkoriščen zaradi nepopolnega uveljavljanja, ki je predvsem posledica blokade Varnostnega sveta zaradi uporabe veta stalnih članic. Izziv so tudi različne razlage njegovih resolucij, ki so že večkrat privedle do očitkov, da izvajalci resolucij slednje izrabljajo z namenom menjave režima v posameznih državah. Zaradi hudih posledic neaktivnosti z vetom blokiranega Varnostnega sveta, kar se kaže zlasti v primeru Sirije, so se kot alternativne možnosti delovanja mednarodne skupnosti v situacijah, kjer je uporabljiva odgovornost zaščititi, pojavile delovanje preko Generalne skupščine Združenih narodov na podlagi resolucije ˝Združeni za mir˝, regionalnih organizacij (denimo po vzoru Afriške unije) ter intervencija ad hoc koalicij. Ker nobena od navedenih možnosti ne ponuja primerne alternative odločitvi Varnostnega sveta, sta se v okviru odgovornosti neuporabe veta oblikovali dve pobudi za reformo odločanja v Varnostnem svetu, ki predlagata vzdržanje stalnih članic od uporabe veta v primerih štirih grozodejstev, vendar je njuna uspešnost vprašljiva, saj zaenkrat nobena od njiju nima podpore vseh petih stalnih članic. ; Authorized by the Charter of the United Nations, the United Nation Security Council fulfills its primary task of maintaining international peace and security by acting primarily within Pillars II and III of the Responsibility to Protect. Despite the fact, that the Security Council is the only body entitled to legally authorize an exception to the general prohibition of the use of force, this is only one of many measures it can adopt. In fact, the use of force against the will of a state has only been carried out once, in 2011 in Libya. The hypothesis of the present thesis is that the potential that the Responsibility to Protect offers in addressing crisis situations that could lead to mass atrocities is not fully utilized due to a blockage imposed by a veto from a permanent member state. The rising reproaches that those carrying out the resolutions exceed their mandates by changing the regimes in some states also represent a great challenge. This is caused by different interpretations of the language of the resolutions. Due to major consequences of the Security Council's inactiveness, as seen primarily in Syria, some suggestions of alternative actions that could be taken by the international community include acting through the United Nations General Assembly and its ˝Uniting for Peace˝ resolution, regional organizations (following the example of the African Union) and intervention by ad hoc coalitions. Since none of the mentioned possibilities represent a suitable alternative to a decision of the Security Council, two petitions in light of the Responsibility not to Veto have arisen. They suggest the permanent members abstain from the use of veto in the cases of four mass atrocities. Their success, however, is questionable, since neither has so far obtained the support from all five permanent members.

Abstract. This research aims to give insight into the processes of public interaction between the police and antigovernment protesters during the Coronavirus Crisis in Poland by evaluating crowd control mechanisms. It addresses the research question: where does the model of anti-government protest policing developed by the Polish Police during the Covid-19 pandemic lie on a continuum of antinomic ideal types of escalated force and negotiated management? The research is embedded in studies on protest policing and draws on an intertextual qualitative analysis of police statements and media news. It shows that the policing of protests was closer to escalated force. However, a hybrid model was involved that combined elements of coercion and negotiation. In terms of protecting the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and police tolerance for community disruption, this particular form of policing is close to escalated force. Still, the communication between the police and the assembly participants, the extent and manner of the arrests closely mirrored both models. One dimension, the extent and nature of the force used, indicated negotiated management. Keywords: protest policing, contention, contentious politics, de-democratisation, Coronavirus Crisis, Poland

The transformation of the German armed forces is one of the topics of the current security policy of Germany. The position of the German anned forces has deteriorated in recent years when compared to the situation that existed several decades ago. This fact is reflected in such things as the growth of difficulties with recruitment, increase in the number of young people preferring civilian service to military service accompanied by the growth of the positive evaluation of civilian service, and in particular in dwindling financial resources of Bundeswehr. Despite these tendencies, Bundeswehr is not as yet perceived by German society as an institution a priory incompatible with democracy. The analysis of the reform of German armedforces shows that that the changes in this institution are taking place against the background of trends generating the "revolution in military affairs", even though, naturally, within the boundaries given by the Bundeswehr's limited access to the resources of German society. The German armed forces of the future should be more mobile, with improved capability for strategic lift and strategic reconnaissance, more flexible organizational structure and command, better signals and communication equipment, aha better equipment for automated command. The improvements of the German armedforces are aimed at areas that can help them to increase their effectiveness in missions taking place outside of the territory of Germany, while the capabilities that were in the focus in the past, i.e. the high intensity warfare capability in the battlefield of Central Europe, are currently being scaled down. The only specificity of the reform of the German armed forces in comparison with the reforms taking place in other European countries is the continuation of universal conscription, probably due to the belief of German political -- and partly also military -- elites that universal conscription has democratizing effects. Adapted from the source document.