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An increasing number of studies comparing legislatures relies on analyses of roll call votes. These analyses are used to infer characteristics of the way in which the legislature works and how their members vote. This inference is, however, problematic, if not all votes in parliament are recorded or the recorded votes are systematically distinct from the rest of the votes. Neglecting the way in which roll call votes are triggered or decided may result in selection bias. In this paper I discuss these problems of selection bias regarding various rules employed in legislatures which may lead to roll call votes. I then present evidence for these selection biases from a unique source of electronically recorded votes, namely all votes decided on between 1995 and 2003 in the Swiss lower house. A careful analysis illustrates to what extent commonly used figures on party discipline are biased because of the selective nature of roll call votes.

ObjectiveResearch has established that female legislators act differently than their male counterparts in state legislatures. But the effect of gender on roll call voting is less clear, due in part to the fact that research has not properly differentiated between the multiple ways gender can influence roll call voting.MethodsIn order to better understand the relationship between gender and roll call voting, structural equation modeling is used to examine roll call voting in numerous issue areas in five state legislatures.ResultsGender rarely exerts a direct influence on roll call voting. Instead, the influence of gender is manifested through ideology and party.ConclusionThe primary effect of gender on roll call voting is that it leads female legislators to make different choices in ideology and partisanship as compared to their male counterparts.

THIS RESEARCH NOTE EXAMINES THE IDAHO STATE LEGISLATURE'S ROLL CALL VOTE ON THE CONTROVERSIAL ABORTION BILL KNOWN AS H625, WHICH WOULD HAVE STRICTLY LIMITED ABORTION ACCESS IN IDAHO. THE ANALYSIS EXAMINES THE RELATIVE IMPACT OF PERSONAL AND CONSTITUENT CHARACTERISTICS ON THE VOTE OF INDIVIDUAL LEGISLATORS ON A NONROUTINE AND SALIENT ISSUE. THE RESULTS INDICATE THAT PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS ARE STRONG PREDICTORS OF THE VOTE ON THIS HIGHLY EMOTIONAL ISSUE, AND POINT AS WELL TO THE IMPACT THAT HIGHLY ORGANIZED AND VOCAL RELIGIOUS GROUPS CAN HAVE ON IMPORTANT LEGISLATIVE DECISIONS.

Do citizens hold their representatives accountable for policy decisions, as commonly assumed in theories of legislative politics? Previous research has failed to yield clear evidence on this question for two reasons: measurement error arising from noncomparable indicators of legislators' and constituents' preferences and potential simultaneity between constituents' beliefs about and approval of their representatives. Two new national surveys address the measurement problem directly by asking respondents how they would vote and how they think their representatives voted on key roll‐call votes. Using the actual votes, we can, in turn, construct instrumental variables that correct for simultaneity. We find that the American electorate responds strongly to substantive representation. (1) Nearly all respondents have preferences over important bills before Congress. (2) Most constituents hold beliefs about their legislators' roll‐call votes that reflect both the legislators' actual behavior and the parties' policy reputations. (3) Constituents use those beliefs to hold their legislators accountable.

This paper uses statistical analysis to consider what factors influence the way senators vote and how important these influences are. The answers are specific statements about individual senators' decision processes, and quantitative estimates of the weights applied to the different variables in these models. The form of the voting models and the variables in them were developed from hypotheses about individual decision-making and descriptions of the legislative process. Examples of the variables are the preferences of the senator's constituency, the opinions of his party leader, and the views of the President. Quantitative measures of the variables were obtained from state demographic characteristics and by Guttman-scaling the votes on passage of the amendments to specific bills considered in 1961 and 1962. Linear regression analysis of these Guttman scales was then used to test the hypotheses and estimate the coefficients in each senator's voting model. After the results from these analyses are discussed, the explanatory power of these models on individual bills is evaluated by comparing the vote they estimate with those predicted using two alternative models.