Suchergebnisse

Rules, Rules, Rules, Rules: Multilevel Regulatory Governance,
G. Bruce Doern and Robert Johnson, eds., Studies in Comparative Political
Economy and Public Policy; Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2006, xi,
372.The first stated purpose of this edited collection is to
"clarify conceptually the nature, causes, and dynamics of regulatory
governance in, or affecting, Canada" in a world where the
international, federal, provincial and local spheres are
"interacting, reinforcing and colliding." The second is to
"contribute practically to the debate on what kinds of principles
and institutional approaches and changes can lessen the problems of
multilevel regulatory governance" (3).

Abstract Rules are central to the constitutional political economy (CPE) approach. On this approach, rules, of a variety of types and forms, are necessary for the emergence of a political and social order, so that all genuine political order is rule-based. The central role of rules within the CPE approach is examined starting from an explicit definitional discussion of the concept of a rule and including discussion of the nature of rule-following behavior, the supply of rules, and rule enforcement.

AbstractRules are central to the constitutional political economy (CPE) approach. On this approach, rules, of a variety of types and forms, are necessary for the emergence of a political and social order, so that all genuine political order is rule-based. The central role of rules within the CPE approach is examined starting from an explicit definitional discussion of the concept of a rule and including discussion of the nature of rule-following behavior, the supply of rules, and rule enforcement.

AbstractThis project has embedded in it an explanation of the structural and relational power transmission process stemming from "micro‐actions" in global financial relations. This paper is about domestic policy adaptation in international and domestic finance and how it occurs. The fundamental contention of this paper is that the way to understand power in global finance is to provide an answer to the question: Who makes the rules in finance—state actors or nonstate actors? The answer to this question is problematic in the IPE literature because of both the enormous influence of finance in the councils of the industrial democracies and the information asymmetries that favor power in finance. Finance, it is argued, has the determining influence on the rules governing its industry. The dependent variable in this analysis is the policy output—the regulation and liberalization decisions of states. The behaviors of the state and of other policy actors in the policy process are the independent variables.

This project has embedded in it an explanation of the structural & relational power transmission process stemming from "micro-actions" in global financial relations. This paper is about domestic policy adaptation in international & domestic finance & how it occurs. The fundamental contention of this paper is that the way to understand power in global finance is to provide an answer to the question: Who makes the rules in finance -- state actors or nonstate actors? The answer to this question is problematic in the IPE literature because of both the enormous influence of finance in the councils of the industrial democracies & the information asymmetries that favor power in finance. Finance, it is argued, has the determining influence on the rules governing its industry. The dependent variable in this analysis is the policy output -- the regulation & liberalization decisions of states. The behaviors of the state & of other policy actors in the policy process are the independent variables. 43 References. Adapted from the source document.