Suchergebnisse

This report provides information about the House Rules Committee Hearings on Special Rules where the committee has two purposes on mind: to make it in order for the house to remember a measure that was reported by another committee and to establish the terms under while the white house will debate, amend and vote for the measure.

This report provides information about the House Rules Committee Hearings on Special Rules where the committee has two purposes on mind: to make it in order for the house to remember a measure that was reported by another committee and to establish the terms under while the white house will debate, amend and vote for the measure.

Th e aim of this study is to examine the strategies which teachers use in their everyday interactions with pupils to work with and uphold school and classroom rules and to what extent their rule-work strategies give pupils opportunities to have a say and participate in rule-making. The study is based on fi eldwork in two Swedish primary schools. According to the findings, the teachers use four main rule-work strategies: (a) assertion, (b) explanation, (c) negotiation, and (d) preparation. The findings show that it is usually the adults in school who make decisions about school rules and that pupils are seldom given any opportunities to create, modify or abolish formal rules through open negotiations. Furthermore, when school democracy meetings take place, they tend to be illusory, reducing negotiation to a matter of figuring out the "right" answer and confirming to proposals from authorities. ; Original Publication:Robert Thornberg, Rules in everyday life: Teacher strategies undermine rule participation, 2009, The International Journal of Children's Rights, (17), 3, 393-413.http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/157181808X395590Copyright: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers

This Article focuses on the tension between the late-nineteenth century "Dillon's Rule" limiting city powers, and the "home rule" approach that gained traction in the early and mid-twentieth century. Washington's constitution allows cities to exercise all the police powers possessed by the state government, so long as local regulations do not conflict with general laws. The constitution also vests charter cities with control over their form of government. But all city powers are subject to "general laws" adopted by the legislature. Further, judicial rulings on city powers to provide public services have fluctuated, ranging from decisions citing the "Dillon's Rule" doctrine that local governments have only those powers clearly granted to them by the legislature, to the "home rule" view that charter and optional code cities have broad unspecified powers. Despite actions by lawmakers to expand city home rule powers, recent court decisions have puzzled practitioners by alternately voicing these two approaches in a seemingly random fashion. This Article describes the origin of Dillon's Rule, places it in a national context, and explains its longevity in Washington despite the legislature's clear intent to eliminate the rule's application to most cities. The Article suggests that the zombie-like reappearance of Dillon's Rule is explained by (1) the vitality of the rule as a doctrine applicable to special purpose districts; (2) appellate judges' insistence on picking and choosing from doctrines (including ostensibly dead doctrines) to support a case's outcome; and (3) a combination of doctrinal forgetfulness and carelessness. The Article repeats a recommendation made five decades ago by former University of Washington law professor Philip Trautman that the Supreme Court of Washington should adopt a more consistent approach, one that follows the legislature's clear intent to make Dillon's Rule inapplicable to most cities.

Constitutional rules are norms whose application depends on an interpreter's identification of a set of facts rather than on her exercise of practical judgment. This Article argues that constitutional interpreters in the United States tend to resolve ambiguity over constitutional rules by reference to originalist sources and tend to resolve uncertainty over the scope of constitutional standards by reference to nonoriginalist sources. This positive claim unsettles the frequent assumption that the Constitution's more specifw or structural provisions support straightforward interpretive inferences. Normatively, this Article offers a partial defense of what it calls "rule originalism," grounded in the fact of its positive practice, its relative capacity for restrainingj udges, and, above all, its respect for the constitutional choice of rules versus standards. Finally, this Article argues that this limited justification for rule originalism suggests a liberalization of barriers to government institutional standing in cases involving the meaning of constitutional rules.

Although Thomas More's description of the Utopians' 'Epicurean' position in philosophy nominally coincides with Erasmus's defence of the Philosophia Christi, More shows no concern for the arguments Erasmus gave in support of this view. Taking its starting point from Erasmus's depreciations of the body and More's intellectual as well as physical preoccupations with the bodily sphere, this article presents the theme of the human body and its moral and religious significance as a test case for comparing Erasmus and More. The treatises both men wrote on Christ's suffering in the Garden of Gethsemane confirm that both authors dealt with the notion of the body in contrasting ways: Erasmus shows a tendency to address the moral-psychological question of mentally conquering the worldly self, whilst More highlights the way in which ordinary facts and physical things may carry spiritual and religious meaning. Paradoxically, Erasmus consistently applied his spiritualized ideal of man to this-worldly moral and social concerns, whereas More focused on the physical domain out of a religious interest in transcendent truths. In line with Giulia Sissa's thesis, our hypothesis is that More ostensibly appropriated an Erasmian type of idealism in Utopia, but, contrary to Erasmus himself, focused on the exterior form of a virtuous society, rather than on its moral and spiritual preconditions. While Erasmus advocated a mental transformation towards reason, More's Utopia envisioned what might come of this.

The power of the government rather than limiting it), human rights and democracy. Therefore, this paper will explore the following research questions: 1. Is the current macro legal framework in Peru and Ecuador consistent with what is generally defined as Rule of Law or is it more related to what is known as Soft Rule of Law? 2. To what extend does a theoretical analysis support the prevailing of a Soft Rule of Law in Ecuador and Peru? This paper has been divided into seven sections. Section one refers to a theoretical revision of the term Rule of Law, section two presents on the concept of soft rule of law, section three focuses on human rights as an essential element of the Rule of Law, section four explores the interaction between democracy and the Rule of Law, section five refers to the challenges faced by the Rule of Law in a consolidated democracy, section six presents, as an example, a brief reflection on the current problems of Peru and Ecuador and finally the paper's conclusions are submitted. ; Campus Lima Centro

This article provides a survey of existing studies of majority rule, outlines misconceptions of majority rule, and highlights underexplored fields of research. It argues that the reasons why the minority complies with majority decisions have been underexplored.

When forming policy under conditions of extreme uncertainty, the optimal approach seems to be a process by which the policy decision is divided into multiple stages, or in other words, an experimental approach. The optimal legal vehicle for such policy experimentation is what this Article refers to as "experimental rules," which are rules that terminate automatically and are designed for the express purpose of generating data during the sunset period that can then be used to determine the optimal policy strategy for the long run. Yet it turns out that agencies rarely adopt such "experimental rules" in the real world. This Article argues that the reason has to do with the political economy, which appears to disfavor experimental rules either because they are more temporary and therefore less valuable to interest groups or because they are more costly to adopt. To overcome these political economy constraints and encourage policy experimentation, this Article proposes having courts apply greater deference to experimental rules (at least during the initial, experimental phase of the multi-stage process). This approach would have the effect of nudging actors in the political economy toward experimental rules, thereby avoiding the possibility of sub-optimal policies becoming entrenched in permanent rules. It would also preserve rules that might otherwise be vacated by courts at least long enough to generate the necessary learning to determine whether they should be implemented on a more permanent basis.

Understanding where (ineffective) organizational rules come from is of vital importance for both public administration scholars and practitioners. Yet little is known about the underlying mechanisms that explain why external rules may cause organizational rule breeding and, as a by-product, red tape. Using a combination of archival and interview data, the authors empirically study rule-breeding processes in the case of Gasunie, which is a heavily regulated Dutch gas transport organization. The archival findings indicate that rule stocks have increased substantially over time at every policy level. Furthermore, the interview data support the notion that policymakers at different levels are jointly responsible for excessive rule breeding and, ultimately, organizational red tape.

Military rule as a form of autocratic governance can mean either rule by a military strongman unconstrained by other officers or rule by a group of high-ranking officers who can limit the dictator's discretion. We label the latter form a military regime. Both military strongmen and military regimes are more likely to commit human rights abuses and become embroiled in civil wars than are civilian dictatorships. The behavior of strongmen diverges from that of more constrained military rulers in other areas, however. Military strongmen start more international wars than either military regimes or civilian dictators, perhaps because they have more reason to fear postouster exile, prison, or assassination. Fear of the future may also motivate their resistance to transition. Military strongmen are more often ousted by insurgency, popular uprising, or invasion than are military regimes or civilian dictators. Their tenures rarely end in democratization, whereas the opposite is true of military regimes.

Under mounting pressure of the international communities and organizations to curb carbon emission causing disturbing climate change, and the growing pressure of domestic environmentalists and common man in India, the government is hard pressed to enact laws about carbon emission. However, the moot problem is whether to consider a pro-active rule of action seriously to curb carbon emission keeping the collective scenario in view, or, to consider a case-by-case scenario in view. A number of people argue that a collective approach is much better, and for that matter, pro-active general rules of actions are desirable for their outcomes or consequences are good or worthwhile. This is what we now call rule consequentialism, much different from the case-by-case act consequentialism. In this case then, the rightness of political action is determined by following some rules (or policies), which are amenable to worthwhile consequences. Similarly, we may conceive of a number of general rules of actions such as, "curb corruption", "curb apartheid", "curb exploitation of woman" and so on. In this paper, I would like to revisit rule consequentialism as a normative theory of rightness of action that is not immoderately overdemanding on moral agents. However, I would justify why rule consequentialism is not only overdemanding on moral agents but immoderate as well. Hence, it is an untenable normative theory of rightness of action.

Both in US antitrust and EU competition policy a development to a broader appli-cation of rule of reason instead of per se rules can be observed. In the European discussion the attempt to base competition policy on a more economic approach is mainly viewed as im-proving the economic analysis in the assessment of specific cases. In this paper it is shown from a general law and economics perspective that the application of rules instead of focus-sing on case-by-case analyses can have many advantages (less regulation costs, rent seeking and knowledge problems), although an additional differentiation of rules through a deeper assessment can also have advantages in regard to the reduction of decision errors of type I and II. After introducing the notion of a continuum of more or less differentiated rules, we show - based upon law and economics literature upon the optimal complexity of rules - in a simple model that a competition rule is optimally differentiated, if the marginal reduction of the sum of error costs (as the marginal benefit of differentiation) equals the marginal costs of differen-tiation. This model also allows for a more detailed analysis of the most important determi-nants of the optimal degree of rule-differentia¬tion. From this law and economics perspective, competition policy should consist mainly of (more or less differentiated) rules and should only rarely rely on case-by-case analysis. Therefore the main task of a more economic ap-proach is to use economics for the formulation of appropriate competition rules.

In all wars, deception has been an important element for the military planners, on both the tactical level and the operational level. The good, effective deception operation is of great risk of conflicting with the current Laws of Armed Conflicts, which will be of great concern for the deception planner, who strives to fight wars and conflicts in accordance with international customary law, and conventions. This paper seeks to examine the theory of deception in the light of the laws of armed conflict. It will show where and how the means of deception can collide with the law. The paper will do this by examining 14 relevant cases with a theoretical reference to the taxonomy of deception (as presented by James D. Monroe), and analyse it according to the laws of armed conflict. The cases are all inspired by historical cases or by current events taking place in the ongoing conflict in Ukraine. Finally, the paper will discuss how the inclusion of mission specific rules of deception can greatly help define the boundaries, and give necessary guide lines for conducting deception operations within the laws of armed conflict. ; In all wars, deception has been an important element for the military planners, on both the tactical level and the operational level. The good, effective deception operation is of great risk of conflicting with the current Laws of Armed Conflicts, which will be of great concern for the deception planner, who strives to fight wars and conflicts in accordance with international customary law, and conventions. This paper seeks to examine the theory of deception in the light of the laws of armed conflict. It will show where and how the means of deception can collide with the law. The paper will do this by examining 14 relevant cases with a theoretical reference to the taxonomy of deception (as presented by James D. Monroe), and analyse it according to the laws of armed conflict. The cases are all inspired by historical cases or by current events taking place in the ongoing conflict in Ukraine. Finally, the paper will discuss how the inclusion of mission specific rules of deception can greatly help define the boundaries, and give necessary guide lines for conducting deception operations within the laws of armed conflict.

The Green Party's Elizabeth May went to Ottawa to champion environmental issues. Now the country's hardest-working politician is out to rescue the democratic process