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The article aims to determine criteria for allocation of international responsibility between the European Union (EU) and its Member States. Firstly, rules on responsibility of the international organizations presented in the Draft articles of the International Law Commission are discussed. Further, the article examines how judicial bodies decide cases related to international responsibility of the EU in different areas of law. Finally, possible formation of lex specialis in case of the EU is assessed and the following three criteria for attribution of conduct and allocation of international responsibility between EU and its Member States are identified: i) nature of EU competence, ii) actors, and iii) remedies. It is concluded that in the areas of exclusive competence, a conduct of EU organs or agents is always attributable to the EU. Whereas in areas of shared competence, a decisive factor is an actor who performs specific conduct. In order to decide on attribution of conduct to the EU or its Member States, the effective control criteria should be followed. Furthermore, especially in the area of human rights, the existence of remedies and their nature prevailing in the particular legal regime are significant factors. Therefore in order to ensure the proper protection of rights of third parties and proper functioning of the specific legal regime, courts may apply international responsibility to the EU Member States even in cases when they are implementing EU law.

The article aims to determine criteria for allocation of international responsibility between the European Union (EU) and its Member States. Firstly, rules on responsibility of the international organizations presented in the Draft articles of the International Law Commission are discussed. Further, the article examines how judicial bodies decide cases related to international responsibility of the EU in different areas of law. Finally, possible formation of lex specialis in case of the EU is assessed and the following three criteria for attribution of conduct and allocation of international responsibility between EU and its Member States are identified: i) nature of EU competence, ii) actors, and iii) remedies. It is concluded that in the areas of exclusive competence, a conduct of EU organs or agents is always attributable to the EU. Whereas in areas of shared competence, a decisive factor is an actor who performs specific conduct. In order to decide on attribution of conduct to the EU or its Member States, the effective control criteria should be followed. Furthermore, especially in the area of human rights, the existence of remedies and their nature prevailing in the particular legal regime are significant factors. Therefore in order to ensure the proper protection of rights of third parties and proper functioning of the specific legal regime, courts may apply international responsibility to the EU Member States even in cases when they are implementing EU law.

The article aims to determine criteria for allocation of international responsibility between the European Union (EU) and its Member States. Firstly, rules on responsibility of the international organizations presented in the Draft articles of the International Law Commission are discussed. Further, the article examines how judicial bodies decide cases related to international responsibility of the EU in different areas of law. Finally, possible formation of lex specialis in case of the EU is assessed and the following three criteria for attribution of conduct and allocation of international responsibility between EU and its Member States are identified: i) nature of EU competence, ii) actors, and iii) remedies. It is concluded that in the areas of exclusive competence, a conduct of EU organs or agents is always attributable to the EU. Whereas in areas of shared competence, a decisive factor is an actor who performs specific conduct. In order to decide on attribution of conduct to the EU or its Member States, the effective control criteria should be followed. Furthermore, especially in the area of human rights, the existence of remedies and their nature prevailing in the particular legal regime are significant factors. Therefore in order to ensure the proper protection of rights of third parties and proper functioning of the specific legal regime, courts may apply international responsibility to the EU Member States even in cases when they are implementing EU law.

The article aims to determine criteria for allocation of international responsibility between the European Union (EU) and its Member States. Firstly, rules on responsibility of the international organizations presented in the Draft articles of the International Law Commission are discussed. Further, the article examines how judicial bodies decide cases related to international responsibility of the EU in different areas of law. Finally, possible formation of lex specialis in case of the EU is assessed and the following three criteria for attribution of conduct and allocation of international responsibility between EU and its Member States are identified: i) nature of EU competence, ii) actors, and iii) remedies. It is concluded that in the areas of exclusive competence, a conduct of EU organs or agents is always attributable to the EU. Whereas in areas of shared competence, a decisive factor is an actor who performs specific conduct. In order to decide on attribution of conduct to the EU or its Member States, the effective control criteria should be followed. Furthermore, especially in the area of human rights, the existence of remedies and their nature prevailing in the particular legal regime are significant factors. Therefore in order to ensure the proper protection of rights of third parties and proper functioning of the specific legal regime, courts may apply international responsibility to the EU Member States even in cases when they are implementing EU law.

This article discusses different forms of military force under or linked to the principle of the responsibility to protect (R2P) in relation to international law, with particular emphasis on humanitarian intervention. It contributes to the ongoing debate by analysing and separating the lawful forms of military force falling under Pillars II and III of the R2P from unlawful claims and extensive interpretations of R2P. Apart from the already existing legal right of the Security Council to authorise humanitarian interventions, it is argued that there are no ongoing legal customary developments of similar rights or obligations for other actors to intervene in another state (without consent) to protect populations by military force against grave crimes under the principle of R2P. The argumentation is based on a series of case studies of humanitarian interventions by the Security Council, regional organisations and "coalitions of willing states". The article also includes legal analysis on the Uniting for Peace Procedure and the prior treaty-based consented rights to intervention under the African Union Act and the 1999 ECOWAS Protocol on the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention. Adapted from the source document.

A wave of legislative efforts in the first half of this decade, at both the federal and state levels, has steered corporations to engage in corporate social responsibility. At the national level, Congress is increasingly calling upon the Securities and Exchange Commission to promulgate specialized disclosure rules. The most notable example is Section 1502 of the Dodd-Frank Act, requiring publicly traded corporations to disclose their use of broadly defined "conflict minerals" in any products the corporations manufacture. At the local level, well over half the state legislatures have adopted benefit corporation statutes meant to encourage corporate directors to promote the public good.These two well-meaning phenomena appear congruent and their goals seem promising: superficially, the SEC's specialized disclosure rules can be characterized as federal benefit corporation rules. Closer examination, however, reveals that the reasoning bolstering the state benefit corporation statutes, aimed more at symbolism than substance, undermines the likely effectiveness of the federal specialized disclosure rules. Comparison of the two models indicates that the federal rules yield substantial costs but speech of little value, little change in corporate behavior, and, consequently, little advancement of the social cause the rules target. Econometric analysis of first-year filings under the SEC conflict minerals regulations supports this apprehension, suggesting that the benefits of the federal benefit corporation rules are more illusory than actual. By over-promising and under-delivering, these federal corporate social responsibility rules are, in fact, irresponsible.

On April 18, 2016, the Department of Labor issued its Final Rule on fiduciary responsibility replacing its inadequate 1975 regulations. The retirement income environment had change drastically over the previous 40 years. Private sector traditional defined benefit pension plans had all but disappeared, replaced with defined contribution (mainly 401(k)) plans that almost always resulted in a lump sum distribution at termination or retirement, which was was typically rolled over into an IRA (individual retirement arrangement). The new regulations addressed the new situation by greatly expanding the definition of "fiduciary" to include those proffering investment advice to 401(k) plans and IRAs and reworking the prohibited transaction rules and their exemptions. This has afforded important protections for retirement investors and has created a challenging new new world for the financial services industry. This article examines the development, content and consequences of the Final Rule.

"Responsiveness," "responsibility," and "majority rule" comprise a trio of terms that are basic to the discipline of political science, and particularly to the analysis of democratic political institutions; yet so undeveloped is our science that they represent apples of discord rather than areas of agreement. Where we should have clear concepts for scientific analysis, we are confronted rather with thought receptacles whose unexplored ambiguities constitute standing solicitations to fallacy—solicitations, it may be added, that receive a bountiful response. In view of this situation, it is little wonder that, when we go beyond description to evaluation, we find the doctors in violent disagreement.This article is not limited to definitions. The writer takes a stand on more than one of the issues that plague and divide students of the democratic political process. It is written, therefore, not only in the firm belief that terms ought to be defined, but also with the conviction that in this case an analysis of meanings will lead almost automatically to a resolution of some of the mooted issues, while contributing substantially to a rational appraisal of others.