Suchergebnisse

This one of a series of regular rapports on Russia for European Public Law summarises recent developments: 1. increase in the terms of office of the President and the State Duma; 2. resolution of a jurisdictional dispute between the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court over powers to declare legislation unconstitutional; 3. creation of a new Supreme Court of the Russian Federation; 4. changes to election rules for State Duma deputies; and 5. expansion of the Russian Federation by the inclusion of two new Federation subjects.

Mode of access: Internet. ; Official organ of the Russian Soviet Government Bureau, June 1919-Jan. 1921; of the Friends of Soviet Russia, Feb. 1922-Oct. 1924. ; "Replaced . . . 'The Weekly bulletin of the Bureau of Information of Soviet Russia' . . . first published on March 3, 1919 . . . the last issue (number 13) appearing on the 26th of May.

Set of 44 color slides in 1 box labeled "Russia." Part of the Cal R. Fremling collection. Slides are unlabeled and not numbered consecutively. Exact location and creation dates are unknown. Slides show Russian trip and landmarks photographs including: St Basil's Cathedral (Moscow, Red Square), Spasskaya Tower (Moscow Kremlin), Luzhniki Stadium (Moscow), fruit and market stands, homes and farms, Moyka River/Green Bridge in St. Petersburg, Palace Square and the Hermitage Museum (St. Petersburg), Kaendler silver wine-cooler (Hermitage Museum), Church of the Savior on Spilled Blood and St. Isaac's Cathedral (St. Petersburg), Peterhof Palace (St. Petersburg), and various streets, buildings, and people. Also included are a few pictures of London and Picadilly Circus. Slide print date is 1971. ; https://openriver.winona.edu/calfremlingslidesall/1024/thumbnail.jpg

Analyzing law enforcement data on corruption incidents for a panel of 79 Russian regions for the period 2004-2007, we find that the relative salaries of bureaucrats determine corruption levels: Corruption declines as relative salaries rise up to a turning point, beyond which corruption rises again. Other important determinants are the strength of law enforcement, available rents through government budgets and natural resources, education levels, unemployment rates, and income inequality.

Issues for 1920-1922 published in New York; issues for 1923-1924 published in Chicago, Ill. ; Title from caption. ; Mode of access: Internet. ; Official organ of: Russian Soviet Government Bureau, June 1919-Jan. 1921; Friends of Soviet Russia, Feb. 1922-Oct. 1924. ; Absorbed by: Workers monthly, which later became: Political affairs.

It is widely recognized that broadband is of fundamental importance to the social and economic development of a nation. The focus of the paper is on infrastructure-related actions; measures to stimulate demand for broadband are, therefore, only marginally addressed. This paper aims to provide a platform for debate with the Russian counterparts in the sector, and to discuss the measures needed to develop broadband in support of actions aimed at economic growth. This paper examines the broadband market in Russia and preconditions for its sustainable development. It begins by presenting arguments demonstrating the importance of broadband to the overall economic development of Russia, including from the perspective of diversification of the economy and new job creation. The paper benchmarks Russia s broadband performance with Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) comparators, as well as with other nations leading the way in broadband diffusion. The paper takes stock of the existing broadband market structure in Russia and its main players as they stand today, including the regulatory and legal environment of the market for both fixed and mobile broadband. Finally, the paper provides a set of recommendations that addresses the issue of sustainability in Russian broadband delivery, and how it can continue its acceleration in the years to come.

One of the Cold War's commonplaces about Russia was its abiding embrace of authoritarianism. Across the centuries, successive regimes, whether Tsarist or Communist, have been characterised by Western scholars as highly centralised, personalised power structures, with an intolerance of dissidence that too easily descended into barbaric brutality. Living on Europe's farthest edge, Russia's peoples are said to have been bypassed by Enlightenment modernity, the rise of liberal constitutionalism and the gradual entrenchment of individual rights and democratic freedoms. For those commentators inspired by such Cold War thinking, it is a legacy that continues to shape contemporary politics. The assumption is that Putin's reclaiming of the presidency in 2012 is emblematic of an inevitable reversion to authoritarianism. Drawing on research in Russia during the March 2012 election, this article takes a critical look at the plethora of global statistical surveys that point to authoritarian trends under the current regime. It concludes that the conceptual framework underpinning the West's revelations about the descent into authoritarianism in contemporary Russia is neither clear nor convincing.

One of the Cold War's commonplaces about Russia was its abiding embrace of authoritarianism. Across the centuries, successive regimes, whether Tsarist or Communist, have been characterised by Western scholars as highly centralised, personalised power structures, with an intolerance of dissidence that too easily descended into barbaric brutality. Living on Europe's farthest edge, Russia's peoples are said to have been bypassed by Enlightenment modernity, the rise of liberal constitutionalism and the gradual entrenchment of individual rights and democratic freedoms. For those commentators inspired by such Cold War thinking, it is a legacy that continues to shape contemporary politics. The assumption is that Putin's reclaiming of the presidency in 2012 is emblematic of an inevitable reversion to authoritarianism. Drawing on research in Russia during the March 2012 election, this article takes a critical look at the plethora of global statistical surveys that point to authoritarian trends under the current regime. It concludes that the conceptual framework underpinning the West's revelations about the descent into authoritarianism in contemporary Russia is neither clear nor convincing.