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During the 17th and 18th century the German nobility called a planned marriage a pro-ject of marriage, because marriages had a long phase of planning, in which more then two people were involved. Noble projects of marriage had at least the function to create ever-lasting friendship between two noble families. This custom was part of the economic and po-litical strategies of the families involved and had often effects on the development of whole territories. Noble projects of marriage consequently concerned the family law as well as the law of the nobility and the church.I shall discuss the strategies of marriage of a special social group, the so-called Cath-olic German Reichsritterschaft during the 17th and 18th centuries. This noble group was re-garded as a strong partner of the German Imperial Catholic Church, the Reichskirche. Last but not least its members owed their remarkable political careers to the Church, but their idea of marriage were never-the-less in opposition to the canonical marriage laws; in fact, in planning exactly these political careers, which they owed to the Church, their concept of marriage clashed with the impediments to marriage that too close kinship posed. My paper aims at ana-lysing the marriage law of the Church as a papal instrument of influence over this special group of nobles. ; During the 17th and 18th century the German nobility called a planned marriage a pro-ject of marriage, because marriages had a long phase of planning, in which more then two people were involved. Noble projects of marriage had at least the function to create ever-lasting friendship between two noble families. This custom was part of the economic and po-litical strategies of the families involved and had often effects on the development of whole territories. Noble projects of marriage consequently concerned the family law as well as the law of the nobility and the church.I shall discuss the strategies of marriage of a special social group, the so-called Cath-olic German Reichsritterschaft during the 17th ...

""Den tidsmÃ?ssige sammenhÃ?ng mellem uddannelse og Ã?gteskab""""Konklusion""; ""Litteratur""; ""Andre kilder""; ""BeskÃ?ftigelsesmÃ?ssige effekter af de skÃ?rpede betingelser for familiesammenfÃ?ring""; ""Indvandring og velfÃ?rdssamfundets bÃ?redygtighed""; ""SkÃ?rpede betingelser for familiesammenfÃ?ring og de forventede effekter""; ""Teoretisk afsÃ?t""; ""UndersÃ?gelsens design og afgrÃ?nsning af den undersÃ?gte gruppe""; ""Variable og analysemetode""; ""UndersÃ?gelsens resultater og deres robusthed""; ""Konklusion og perspektivering""; ""Litteratur""; ""Del II. Partnervalg og Ã?gteskab""

Nordområdene har vært på den norske utenrikspolitiske agendaen i 15 år. Mye har endret seg i denne perioden. Det som preger debatten i 2020, er forestillinger om stormaktpolitikk og rivalisering i nord. Samtidig hevdes det fra de arktiske hovedstedene at regionen er preget av samarbeid, og at de arktiske statene har fellesinteresser som gjør konflikt lite sannsynlig. Hvordan kan to så ulike oppfatninger om Arktis opptre samtidig? I dette bidraget foretar vi en lagdeling mellom tre ulike nivåer av sikkerhetspolitikk i og om nordområdene og Arktis. Dette tydeliggjør hvordan regionen kan være preget av både samarbeid og rivalisering på samme tid. Samarbeid og rivalsering vektes ulikt avhengig av tid og sted, men de er ikke gjensidig utelukkende.
Abstract in English:Great Power Politics and Increased Tension? The Art of Differentiating Analyses in the ArcticThe High North has been on the Norwegian foreign policy agenda for 15 years. Much has changed over this period. What characterizes the debate in 2020 are notions of great power politics and rivalry in the north. At the same time, Arctic states claim that the region is defined by cooperation and that the Arctic states have common interests that make conflict unlikely. How can two such different perceptions of the Arctic exist simultaneously? In this contribution, we separate between three different levels of security policy in and around the High North and the Arctic. This helps clarify how the region can be characterized by both cooperation and rivalry at the same time. Cooperation and rivalry differ depending on time and place, but they are not mutually exclusive.

eGovernment and autoritative public data in Denmark are still mainly focused on the landside of Danmark. But the need of eloborating the coordinating effort of administration at sea is recognised and the development of maritime eGovernment is happening within the next years. This paper discusses the data involved in this administration and focuses on the need for understanding the function and hence value of data. Some maritime data are dealing with accurate placements of objects, and as a tricky part some are dealing with floating placement. Other data are handling non-visible areas in terms of zoning, e.g. planning and interest areas and finally some data are representation of legislation, whether it is rights or restrictions. These different data are not always usable in the same manner. This paper investigates the correlation between spatial data and legislation. Experience from many years of land administration can be used as part of this discussion as well as the conclusions from this paper can be discussion as input to the ongoing development on land.

eGovernment and autoritative public data in Denmark are still mainly focused on the landside of Danmark. But the need of eloborating the coordinating effort of administration at sea is recognised and the development of maritime eGovernment is happening within the next years. This paper discusses the data involved in this administration and focuses on the need for understanding the function and hence value of data. Some maritime data are dealing with accurate placements of objects, and as a tricky part some are dealing with floating placement. Other data are handling non-visible areas in terms of zoning, e.g. planning and interest areas and finally some data are representation of legislation, whether it is rights or restrictions. These different data are not always usable in the same manner. This paper investigates the correlation between spatial data and legislation. Experience from many years of land administration can be used as part of this discussion as well as the conclusions from this paper can be discussion as input to the ongoing development on land.

Vestens umiddelbare reaksjon på Talibans maktovertakelse i Afghanistan i august 2021 har stort sett vært den samme som da Taliban kom til makten første gang i 1996. Vestlige stater og FN valgte den gang å isolere regimet, nekte diplomatisk anerkjennelse og etter hvert innføre strenge sanksjoner. Humanitær bistand var tillatt, men ikke samarbeid med Talibans statlige organer og ikke kanalisering av bistand via staten. Det er derfor grunn til å vurdere Vestens nåværende respons i lys av historien. Sanksjons- og isoleringspolitikken på 1990-tallet ga ikke forventede resultater og virket for det meste mot sin hensikt. Er det grunn til å tro at en lignende politikk i dag vil være mer effektiv? Hvis ikke, hva er konturene av et bredere og strategisk mer balansert engasjement?
Abstract in EnglishThe Road Ahead – Confrontation or Creative Compromises?The immediate reaction of Western states to the Taliban's seizure of power in Afghanistan in August 2021 was broadly speaking the same as when the Taliban first came to power in 1996. Western states and the UN chose at that time to isolate the regime, deny it diplomatic recognition and gradually impose strong sanctions. Humanitarian assistance was allowed, but not program cooperation with Taliban authorities and state institutions, and no assistance was to be channelled via the Taliban-controlled state. The results are highly relevant today. In the 1990s, the sanctions-and-isolation policy did not bring about the desired results, and in important respects were counter-productive. Are there reasons to believe that similar policies today will be more effective? This article outlines the contours of a broader and strategic more balanced engagement.

I anledning EØS-avtalens 25-årsjubileum gjennomførte NUPI og Sentio i januar 2019 en opinionsundersøkelse i den norske befolkningen for å kartlegge nordmenns holdninger til EØS-avtalen samt deres kunnskaper og vurderinger i tilknytning til avtalen og mulige alternativer til den. Resultatene fra undersøkelsen viser at det er stor støtte til EØS-avtalen i befolkningen. Samtidig viser den også at kunnskapsnivået om EØS-avtalen er lavt i hele befolkningen, men særlig blant de unge. Videre viser resultatene at dersom EØS-avtalen skulle opphøre, ville Norge neppe kunne forvente noen ny bred konsensus om en alternativ tilknytningsform. I dette bidraget går Svendsen, Sverdrup og Weltzien gjennom resultatene fra opinionsundersøkelsen og diskuterer hva de impliserer for norsk europapolitikk.
Abstract in English:Attitudes to the EEA Agreement After 25 Years: Considerable Support, Little KnowledgeOn the 25th anniversary of the EEA Agreement, NUPI and Sentio conducted a public opinion poll in January 2019 in the Norwegian population to survey Norwegians' attitudes to the EEA Agreement, as well as their knowledge and assessments of the agreement and possible alternatives to it. The results of the survey show that there is considerable support for the EEA agreement in the population. At the same time, it also shows that the level of knowledge about the EEA Agreement is low in the entire population, but especially among the youngest respondents. Furthermore, the results show that if the EEA Agreement were to cease to exist, Norway could hardly expect any new broad consensus on an alternative form of association. In this contribution, Svendsen, Sverdrup and Weltzien review the results of the opinion poll and discuss the results and what they imply for Norwegian European policy.

Sentralforvaltningen her til lands har de siste tiårene blitt internasjonalisert. Globale spørsmål legger beslag på stadig større ressurser i staten, men samordningen mellom departementene har ikke utviklet seg i samme takt. Norsk utenrikspolitikk ligger derfor ikke bare fast, den ligger også spredt. Komplekse globale utfordringer (terror, klimaendringer, pandemier, biodiversitet, cybertrusler, migrasjon m.v.) krever et langt tettere samarbeid for blant annet å reversere økt fragmentering – i en offentlig sektor hvor vi er satt opp med sterke fagdepartementer og svake samordningsmekanismer. Samtidig innvarsler byggingen av det nye regjeringskvartalet endringer i måten norsk (utenriks)politikk vil bli gjennomført på. Forholdet mellom fagspesialister og diplomatiske generalister blir tettere og vil utfordre den diplomatiske rollen og selvforståelsen på nye måter. Diplomatiets kjerneoppgaver vil endres. Blant annet vil langt bedre koordinering bli en hovedutfordring for utenrikspolitikken. Artikkelen trekker derfor opp noen problemstillinger og forslag som innspill til debatten,
Abstract in English:Track IV: The Future of DiplomacyOver the past decades, Norwegian ministries have become more internationalized. Global issues take up ever more of their time and resources, but cross-sectorial coordination has been lagging behind. Norwegian foreign policy is therefore fragmented. Complex global challenges (terrorism, climate change, pandemics, biodiversity, cyber threats, migration, etc.) call for much closer inter-ministerial cooperation to reverse increased fragmentation – in a public sector where sectorial responsibilities are strong and coordination mechanisms few. The new block housing most of the offices of the Government in central Oslo is a signal change for how Norwegian foreign policies will be conducted in the years ahead. Sector specialists and diplomatic generalists will move closer together, working under the same roof, and this will challenge the classic diplomatic role and the way diplomats look at themselves. Our core tasks will change. Improved coordination will move to the forefront of the work we do. The article presents an idea or two for a much-needed debate.

De nære relationer mellem USA og Europa har i årtier været et centralt element i international politik. Men hvor kommer det transatlantiske forholds holdbarhed og modstandskraft fra? Dette spørgsmål optager mange forskere og aktualiseres nu af de igangværende forskydninger i verdenspolitikken. Bogessayet diskuterer derfor, hvordan de to bøger Special Relationships in World Politics (Haugevik, 2018) og Enduring Alliance (Sayle, 2019) fremmer vores viden om de bånd, der knytter staterne i det nordatlantiske område. Haugevik undersøger bilaterale amerikansk-britiske og britisk-norske 'specielle forhold', mens Sayle ser nærmere på det multilaterale samarbejde i NATO. De tilbyder begge interessante teoretiske argumenter om samspillet mellem diplomatisk praksis og nationale politiske dynamikker samt imponerende empiriske analyser, som underbygger deres pointer. De to bøger rejser samtidig også nye vigtige spørgsmål, herunder om de indbyggede spændinger i liberale normer og værdier samt om betydningen af tillid for det transatlantiske forholds holdbarhed.
Abstract in English: Something Special? The Transatlantic Ties and Their EnduranceFor several decades, the close relationship between the United States and Europe has been a key aspect of international politics. But what are the sources of the endurance and resilience of transatlantic ties? This question preoccupies researchers, and its salience is growing in light of current shifts in world politics. Accordingly, the book essay discusses how the two books Special Relationships in World Politics (Haugevik, 2018) and Enduring Alliance (Sayle, 2019) contribute to our knowledge about the international ties of the North Atlantic area. Haugevik examines bilateral American-British and British-Norwegian 'special relationships', while Sayles studies multilateral cooperation in NATO. They both offer interesting theoretical arguments about the interplay between diplomatic practice and national political dynamics. Moreover, they provide impressive empirical analyses to support their claims. At the same time, the two books raise new important questions, e.g. about the built-in tensions in liberal norms and values as well as about the significance of trust for enduring transatlantic ties.

The region of Southeast Asia is faced with a complex set of challenges stemming from political, economic and religious developments at the national, regional and global level. This paper sets out to examine trade-, foreign- and security policy implications of the issues confronting the region. In ASEAN, the Southeast Asian countries are continuing their ambitious attempts at further integration. Plans outlining deeper security and economic communities have been adopted. However, huge differences in political systems, economic development and ethnic/religious structures are hampering prospects of closer cooperation. The highly controversial conflict case of Burma/Myanmar is testing the much adhered-to principle of non-interference and at the same time complicating relations with external powers. Among these, the United States and China are dramatically strengthening their interests in the region. American influence is not least manifesting itself in light of the war against terrorism, which the region is adapting to in different ways and at different speeds. By contrast, the European Union does not seem to answer Southeast Asian calls for further engagement. A flurry of bilateral and regional trade agreements is another prominent feature of the economic landscape of the region. This is to a certain degree a reflex ion of impatience with trade liberalization in the WTO and within ASEAN itself. Structures of economic cooperation are under rapid alteration in Southeast Asia. The paper analyses the above-mentioned developments with a view to assessing the prospects of future stability, economic development and integration in and among ASEAN countries. It is concluded that although the scope for increased economic benefit and political harmonization through ASEAN integration alone is limited, the organization could still prove useful as a common regional point of reference in tackling more important policy determinants at national and global level.

Under 2017 och 2018 ökade Kinas direktinvesteringar i Sverige avsevärt till följd av ett antal stora förvärv, mestadels i fordonsindustrin. Samtidigt har den svenska offentliga debatten kring kinesiska investeringar blivit mer kritisk sedan 2017, då investeringarna överlag talades om i positiva ordalag. Under 2018 och 2019 har en rad aktörer inom statliga myndigheter, politiska partier, media och civilsamhället beskrivit Kinas investeringar som ett potentiellt säkerhetshot. Näringslivsrepresentanter är mindre synliga i debatten men även här finns det en tydlig trend av ökad uppmärksamhet på potentiella säkerhetsrisker kopplade till kinesiska investeringar. Den svenska synen på Kina tycks konvergera allt mer med vad EU har kallat för sin nya "mer realistiska" hållning gentemot Peking. Ett antal policyprocesser har inletts, vilket sannolikt kommer leda till att svensk lagstiftning stärks på flera områden för att öka kontrollen av Kinas investeringar och engagemang i Sverige, särskilt i kritisk infrastruktur såsom telekommunikationsnät men även vad gäller företag vars verksamhet anses som säkerhetskänslig i mer generell bemärkelse.
Abstract in EnglishChinese Investments in Sweden: From Fame to Fear?China's direct investment in Sweden surged in 2017 and 2018 due to a number of large acquisitions, mostly in the automotive industry. At the same time, the public debate on Chinese investments has become more critical since 2017, when they were typically seen in a positive light. Throughout 2018 and 2019, a number of actors in government authorities, political parties, the media and civil society have described China's investments as a potential security threat. Although less prominent in the public debate, business representatives have also become increasingly vocal about potential security risks associated with Chinese investment. The Swedish view of China seems to be aligning with what the EU has called its new "more realistic" approach to Beijing. Meanwhile, a number of policy processes have been launched which are likely to lead to the strengthening of existing legal frameworks to scrutinise Chinese investment and activity in Sweden, especially concerning critical infrastructure such as telecommunications networks, but also more generally concerning companies whose activities are regarded as sensitive from a security perspective.

Artiklen ser nærmere på de forhold, som er blevet beskrevet i analyser af interventionen i Afghanistan, der kan forklare den udvikling, som den amerikanske præsiden, Joe Biden, forsikrede ikke ville finde sted i 2021. Tre forhold står frem i tidligere analyser af årene, der gik, i Afghanistan. For det første, at der var løbende udfordringer med kapacitetsopbygningen. Udfordringer, der ligeledes løbende var blevet påpeget internationalt af analytikere, forskere og i krigens mange evalueringsrapporter og erfaringsopsamlinger. For det andet, at formålet med krigen fra de allieredes side skiftede karakter, som tiden gik. Fra at det fælles formål var lettere at få øje på i starten af krigen, så blev interventionsindsatserne til et formålstæt delta, hvor de involverede lande med skiftende regeringer balancerede hensyn til alliancer, en hjemlig vælgerskare, nationale sikkerhedsinteresser og værdipolitiske rettighedsdagsordner. For det tredje, at Taleban gradvist – og ikke fra den ene dag til den anden – havde opbygget styrke og kontrol, og samtidig havde været involveret i en politisk proces via deres repræsentationskontor i Doha, der var med til at bane vejen for deres overtagelse.
Abstract in English20 Years in Afghanistan: What Do We Know About What We Learned?This article takes a closer look at various analyses of the international intervention in Afghanistan, which point at different reasons for the developments that took take place in August 2021. Developments that the American president Biden shortly before the Taliban takeover assured the world would not take place. Three factors stand out in previous analyses of the years that passed by in Afghanistan. First, that there were ongoing challenges with capacity-building. Challenges that had been pointed out by analysts, researchers and in the many evaluation and lessons-learned reports from the war. Secondly, that the purpose of the war on the part of the allied forces changed character as time went on. The common purpose was easier to see in the beginning of the war, but the intervention efforts turned into a purpose-dense delta, where the countries involved and their successive governments balanced considerations to alliances, domestic support, national security interests and value political agendas. Third, that the Taliban seemingly had gradually – and not overnight – built up strength and control, and at the same time been involved in a political process through their exile office in Doha that helped pave the way for their takeover.

De siste ti årene har enkelte avgjørelser i norsk barnevern skapt sterke internasjonale reaksjoner. Våren 2016 demonstrerte over 8000 personer i elleve land i forbindelse med en sak som angikk en norsk-rumensk familie. Denne artikkelen undersøker tre saker som har gitt Norge betydelige diplomatiske utfordringer (India 2011, Russland 2014 og Romania 2016). Artikkelen ser på hvorfor sakene utløste så sterke reaksjoner, og redegjør for hvordan norske myndigheter håndterte sakene. Vi beskriver også gjeldende norsk lovverk og prosedyrer på feltet. Et viktig funn i vår undersøkelse er at alle sakene kan knyttes til andre sterke drivkrefter i det aktuelle landet. Det er kombinasjonen av en dramatisk familiehistorie i møte med en større politisk agenda som gjør sakene så kraftfulle og betente i de enkelte landene. I materialet vi legger frem, finner vi også tegn til læring og forbedring i Utenriksdepartementets (UD) håndtering, og også utvikling og forbedring i måten UD har samarbeidet med andre deler av embetsverket på. Samtidig stiller artikkelen spørsmål ved hvorfor et sentralt verktøy i arbeidet med å håndtere denne type saker (ratifiseringen av Haagkonvensjonen), kom på plass så sent.
Abstract in EnglishDiplomatic Controversies Sparked by Decisions of the Norwegian Child Welfare Service: A Preliminary AssessmentDecisions taken by the Norwegian child welfare services have in the past decade, in some cases, created strong international reactions. In the spring of 2016, over 8,000 people in eleven countries demonstrated in connection with a case involving a Norwegian-Romanian family. This article examines three issues that have presented significant diplomatic challenges to Norway (India 2011, Russia 2014 and Romania 2016). The article looks at why the cases triggered such strong reactions and explains how the Norwegian authorities handled these cases. It also outlines the relevant Norwegian legislation and judicial procedures in the field. The paper finds that the three controversial cases assessed linked with other strong driving forces or national political issues in the country in question. In the material we present, there is also evidence of learning and improvement in the way the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs handled these challenges, and there also seems to have been improvement in the way the Ministry of Foreign Affairs collaborated with other parts of the civil service. At the same time, the article questions why a key tool in dealing with these types of cases (The 1996 Hague Convention) was ratified so late in Norway.

Russia's strategy in the Arctic is dominated by two overriding discourses – and foreign policy directions – which at first glance may look like opposites. On the one hand, an IR realism/geopolitical discourse that often has a clear patriotic character, dealing with "capturing", "winning" or "conquering" the Arctic and putting power, including military power, behind the national interests in the area – which is why we, in recent years, have seen an increasing military build-up, also in the Russian Arctic. Opposed to this is an IR liberalism, international law-inspired and modernization-focused discourse, which is characterized by words such as "negotiation", "cooperation" and "joint ventures" and which has as an axiom that the companies and countries operating in the Arctic all benefit the most if they collaborate in peace and friendliness. So far, the IR liberalism discourse has set the trend of the Russian policy carried out in relation to the Arctic. Thus, it has primarily been the Russian Foreign Ministry and, above all, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov that have drawn the overall lines of the Arctic policy, well aided by the Transport Ministry and the Energy Ministry. On the other side are the Russian national Security Council led by Nikolai Patrushev and the Russian Defence Ministry headed by Sergey Shoygu, which both have embedded their visions of Russia and the Arctic in the IR realism/geopolitical discourse. Russia's president, Vladimir Putin, does the same. Nevertheless, he has primarily chosen to let the Foreign Ministry set the line for the Arctic policy carried out, presumably out of a pragmatic acknowledgement of the means that have, so far, served the Russian interests best. Moreover, it is worth noting that both wings, even though they can disagree about the means, in fact are more or less in agreement about the goal of Russia's Arctic policy: namely, to utilize the expected wealth of oil and natural gas resources in the underground to ensure the continuation of the restoration of Russia's position as a Great Power when the capacity of the energy fields in Siberia slowly diminishes – which the Russian Energy Ministry expects to happen sometime between 2015 and 2030. In addition to that, Russia sees – as the polar ice slowly melts – great potential for opening an ice-free northern sea route between Europe and Asia across the Russian Arctic, with the hope that the international shipping industry can see the common sense of saving up to nearly 4,000 nautical miles on a voyage from Ulsan, Korea, to Rotterdam, Holland, so Russia can earn money by servicing the ships and issuing permissions for passage through what Russia regards as Russian territorial water. The question is whether Russia will be able to realize its ambitious goals. First, the Russian state energy companies Gazprom and Rosneft lack the technology, know-how and experience to extract oil and gas under the exceedingly difficult environment in the Arctic, where the most significant deposits are believed to be in very deep water in areas that are very difficult to access due to bad weather conditions. The Western sanctions mean that the Russian energy companies cannot, as planned, obtain this technology and know-how via the already entered-into partnerships with Western energy companies. The sanctions limit loan opportunities in Western banks, which hit the profitability of the most cost-heavy projects in the Arctic. However, what hits hardest are the low oil prices – at present 50 dollars per barrel (Brent). According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), the fields in the Arctic are not profitable as long as the oil price is under 120 dollars per barrel. Whether Russia chooses to suspend the projects until the energy prices rise again – and until it has again entered into partnerships that can deliver the desired technology and know-how – or whether the Russian state will continuously pump money into the projects is uncertain. The hard-pressed Russian economy, with the prospects of recession, increasing inflation, increasing flight of capital, rising interest rates and a continuously low oil price, provides a market economic incentive for suspending the projects until further notice. Whether the Kremlin will think in a market economic way or a long-term strategic way is uncertain – but, historically, there has been a penchant for the latter. One of the Kremlin's hopes is that Chinese-Russian cooperation can take over where the Western-Russian cooperation has shut down. Russia has long wanted to diversify its energy markets to reduce its dependence on sales to Europe. At the same time, those in the Kremlin have had a deeply-rooted fear of ending up as a "resource appendix" to the onrushing Chinese economy, which so far has been a strong contributing reason for keeping the Russian-Chinese overtures in check. The question now is whether the Western sanctions can be the catalyst that can make Russia overcome this fear and thus, in the long term, support the efforts to enter into a real, strategic partnership with China. ; Russia's strategy in the Arctic is dominated by two overriding discourses – and foreign policy directions – which at first glance may look like opposites. On the one hand, Russia have an IR realism/geopolitical discourse that often has a clear patriotic character, dealing with "exploring", "winning" or "conquering" the Arctic and putting power, including military power, behind the national interests in the area – which is why we, in recent years, have seen an increasing military build-up, also in the Russian Arctic. Opposed to this is an IR liberalism, international law-inspired and modernization- focused discourse, which is characterized by words such as "negotiation", "cooperation" and "joint ventures" and which has as an axiom that the companies and countries operating in the Arctic all benefit the most if they cooperate peacefully.