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organised by Act Together . ; Includes bibliographical references ; Parallel als Buch-Ausg. erschienen

Este artículo propone una redefinición de algunos conceptos a partir del análisis de la política religiosa de la Segunda República. La contextualización del caso español en el entorno mediterráneo, la matización de posturas o el acercamiento a las percepciones sociales ante las decisiones de los gobernantes republicanos pueden ayudar a delimitar con precisión unas medidas rodeadas de gran polémica. Se plantea en esencia una distinción entre política laica y política anticlerical desde el estudio de las disposiciones adoptadas en materia religiosa por los gobernantes del primer bienio republicano. La mayor parte de dichas resoluciones se adscriben al ámbito del laicismo, huyendo de caracterizaciones simplistas que acuden a términos como sectarismo o antirreligiosidad. Con ello se persigue contribuir a un balance ajustado del periodo republicano. ; This article proposes a redefinition of certain concepts through the analysis of religious policy during the Second Republic. A number of highly controversial measures may be better understood by taking into account the Mediterranean context, pinpointing the various attitudes and positions, or examining more closely social perceptions regarding decisions made by Republican governments. In essence, a distinction needs to be drawn between secular and anticlerical policy, by studying the provisions adopted in religious affairs by the administrations of the first two-year period of the Second Republic. Most of these decisions are of a secular nature, avoiding simplistic descriptions containing terms such as sectarianism and antireligiousness. In short, this article aims to contribute towards an accurate assessment of the Republican period.

This article proposes a redefinition of certain concepts through the analysis of religious policy during the Second Republic. A number of highly controversial measures may be better understood by taking into account the Mediterranean context, pinpointing the various attitudes and positions, or examining more closely social perceptions regarding decisions made by Republican governments. In essence, a distinction needs to be drawn between secular and anticlerical policy, by studying the provisions adopted in religious affairs by the administrations of the first two-year period of the Second Republic. Most of these decisions are of a secular nature, avoiding simplistic descriptions containing terms such as sectarianism and antireligiousness. In short, this article aims to contribute towards an accurate assessment of the Republican period. ; Este artículo propone una redefinición de algunos conceptos a partir del análisis de la política religiosa de la Segunda República. La contextualización del caso español en el entorno mediterráneo, la matización de posturas o el acercamiento a las percepciones sociales ante las decisiones de los gobernantes republicanos pueden ayudar a delimitar con precisión unas medidas rodeadas de gran polémica. Se plantea en esencia una distinción entre política laica y política anticlerical desde el estudio de las disposiciones adoptadas en materia religiosa por los gobernantes del primer bienio republicano. La mayor parte de dichas resoluciones se adscriben al ámbito del laicismo, huyendo de caracterizaciones simplistas que acuden a términos como sectarismo o antirreligiosidad. Con ello se persigue contribuir a un balance ajustado del periodo republicano.

Las luchas internas, los golpes de Estado, el triunfo del secularismo con el Ba't y el papel preponderante de la minoría 'alawí ocasionaron la oposición de los fundamentalistas musulmanes, primero de los Hermanos Musulmanes, luego participaron otros grupos. La aspiración básica de los islamistas es acabar con el secularismo, con el predominio de los 'alawíes sobre la mayoría sunní y fundar un Estado islámico donde se aplique la šaria. Los medios que han utilizado los fundamentalistas son la violencia, el terrorismo y la lucha armada. Estos enfrentamientos se han manifestado también en la lucha de clases y en el antagonismo ciudad-campo. ; Internal fighting, coup d 'états, the triumph of secularism under the Ba'th, and the leading role of the 'alawi minority, caused the Islamic fundamentalist opposition. It was first led by the Muslim Brothers, and later other groups participated. The islamiyyun's basic aspiration is to end secularism, stop the leading role of the 'alawis over the sunni majority, and to establish an Islamic State, in which the Shari'a would be fully applied. The means the fundamentalists have used are violence, terrorism, and the armed opposition. Class struggles and the antagonism city-rural areas, are other manifestations of the major framework of the conflict. .

Jnanadeepa: Pune Journal of Religious Studies Jan 1998 (Vol 1/1): Our Commitment to a United India Editorial: Our Commitment to a United India │ (p. 3-4)│ DOI:10.5281/zenodo.4244595 │ Read Communalism in India: An Empirical Investigation Paul V. Parathazham│ (p. 5-18)│DOI:10.5281/zenodo.4244657│ Read Bhagavad Gita's Contribution to the Future of India Sebastian Painadath, SJ │(p. 19-30) │ DOI:10.5281/zenodo.4248716 │ Read The Future of India: A Buddhist Contribution Rosario Rocha, SJ │(p. 31-44) DOI:10.5281/zenodo.4244715 Read Muslim Identity in India: A Time for Re-discovery G. Lazar, SVD │ (p. 45-57) │ DOI:10.5281/zenodo.4244738 │ Read Tribals in India: A Challenge to Theology Walter Fernandes, SJ │ (p. 58-68) │ DOI:10.5281/zenodo.4244756 │ Read Christianity and Caste Lionel Fernandes │ (p. 69-76) │ DOI:10.5281/zenodo.4244767 │ Read Christians in Independent India Isaac Padinjarekuttu │ (p. 77-92) │ DOI:10.5281/zenodo.4244780 │ Read The Good Shepherd (Jn 10): A Political Perspective Rekha Chennattu, RA │ (p. 93-105) │ DOI:10.5281/zenodo.4244807 │ Read Religion and Secularism: An Exploration into the Secular Dimension of Religion and the Religious Dimension of Secularism Francis X. D 'Sa, SJ │ (p. 106-126) │ DOI:10.5281/zenodo.4244828 │ Read Advaitic Model of Pluralism for India: An Indian Christian Contribution Kuruvilla Pandikattu, SJ │ (p. 127-149) │ DOI:10.5281/zenodo.4244836 │ Read The Church at the Service of the People of India Kurien Kunnumpuram, SJ │ (p. 150-164) │ DOI:10.5281/zenodo.4244869 │ Read Book Reviews │ (p. 165-170) │ DOI:10.5281/zenodo.4248726 │ Read

Metadata only record ; Research on community-based natural resource management (CBNRM) has paid little attention to key assumptions it uses in the analysis of conflict and conflict management. The concepts of pacifism, egalitarianism, communalism, secularism, and rationalism are built into the community-based approach to natural resource management and are often treated as universal principles. In this paper, we examine differences in cultural perspectives on these assumptions. We also invite researchers to ground their practice of conflict management in the different social and cultural settings they encounter. Through the use of a conversational style of presentation and reference to cases presented in this volume, we attempt to bring the reader closer to oral forms of community-based politics, learning, and teaching, as an alternative approach to resolving differences in perspectives on the meaning of conflict and conflict management.

Topic Today in many ways our world has been unified, not by a political empire but by a way of thinking. People today find common ground in a shared experience of living guided by a set of values that spans the divide of culture, language, and history. The process of this transformation is best described by the term "secularization." Secularization best describes the far-reaching changes we find in our communities and in our personal lives, and is one of the greatest challenges the Seventh-day Adventist Church faces as we begin the twenty-first century. Purpose The purpose of this project was to design, field test, and evaluate a seminar that will enable the East Lansing Seventh-day Adventist Church to understand the process of secularization and allow it to begin to design an evangelistic approach that will appeal to the secular community surrounding the church. Sources Sources used to understand the factors and effects of secularization came from sociologists who have written about the phenomena of secularization. Sources used to build an appropriate response to the challenge of secularization are the Bible, the writings of Ellen G. White, and Christian writers who have reflected on the challenge of secularization. Conclusions Each aspect of secularization, in addition to posing a threat to the continued existence of organized religion, also presents new and exciting opportunities for Christian mission. Bridges need to be built to cross the divide left by the sea change that has transformed our world through the process called secularization. We cannot depend on institutions, leaders, programs, or even doctrinal truth to be the primary bridge in reaching the secular world. The life and witness of the body of Christ are the bridge by which our mission to secularized people can be accomplished.

At stake in the European human rights debate over Scientology is the legitimacy of various governmental responses to the organization that limit, and potentially prevent, its activities and those of its members. By any means, at all costs, Scientology must portray itself as an aggrieved party whose rights are being trampled by officials who are fostering bigotry, discrimination, rabid secularism, and denominational protectionism of historic faiths. Seen in this context, my lengthy and detailed publications about Scientology's near-certain human rights violations cannot go unchallenged by the organization and its defenders. Most serious are my conclusions that Scientology operates a forced labour and re-education program against reputedly delinquent members of its 'elite' Sea Org(anization)-a program that has included teenagers and children as young as twelve years old (Kent 1999c: 9). Called the Rehabilitation Project Force (RPF), this program, I concluded,fits social scientific definitions of brainwashing efforts (Kent 2000; 2001a; b). The program should be (and is) of particular concern for Europeans because its totalitarian nature harkens back to other anti-democratic ideologies that they have witnessed firsthand.

International audience ; Could the historical role played by Turkey in the Balkans or its geographical proximity establish Turkey as pole of attraction for the Muslims in the Balkans? First, Turkey's secularism and aspiration to be recognized as a fully westernized country forbid it to raise the Muslim banner as soon as its political interests are concerned. Second, Turkey's long domination of the Balkans sets it up as a suspicious actor in the eyes of most of the countries in the area and its initiatives were carefully watched by the other Balkan countries, prompt to denounce any move on its part. Last, each of the Turkish and Muslim communities in the Balkans (Albanians, Turks in Bulgaria and in Greek Thrace, Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Pomaks, etc.) has kept their own ethnic characteristics and there is no feeling of belonging to a common community. On the whole, Islam has been invoked only to justify or reinforce a pre-existing political decision and it has covered political and not religious common interests. Since 1991, it is in fact with Orthodox Russia that Turkey has developed its deepest economic relations, with Albania but as well with the Republic of Macedonia that it established the closest political and military ties, and, in the Balkans, to Romania that it extended the most credits.

International audience ; Could the historical role played by Turkey in the Balkans or its geographical proximity establish Turkey as pole of attraction for the Muslims in the Balkans? First, Turkey's secularism and aspiration to be recognized as a fully westernized country forbid it to raise the Muslim banner as soon as its political interests are concerned. Second, Turkey's long domination of the Balkans sets it up as a suspicious actor in the eyes of most of the countries in the area and its initiatives were carefully watched by the other Balkan countries, prompt to denounce any move on its part. Last, each of the Turkish and Muslim communities in the Balkans (Albanians, Turks in Bulgaria and in Greek Thrace, Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Pomaks, etc.) has kept their own ethnic characteristics and there is no feeling of belonging to a common community. On the whole, Islam has been invoked only to justify or reinforce a pre-existing political decision and it has covered political and not religious common interests. Since 1991, it is in fact with Orthodox Russia that Turkey has developed its deepest economic relations, with Albania but as well with the Republic of Macedonia that it established the closest political and military ties, and, in the Balkans, to Romania that it extended the most credits.

La España de Carlos III, como el resto de la Europa católica del siglo xviii, fue escenario de interesantes novedades en el panorama religioso. La esfera política luchaba desde hacía tiempo por emanciparse de las tutelas eclesiásticas, pero es sólo en el siglo xviii cuando se puede hablar con propiedad de secularización de la política. En España, el regalismo tradicional adquirió nuevos bríos al mezclarse el sustrato autóctono con las ideas que provenían de Ñapóles y de Francia. Aún así, Carlos III se mostró tan cauteloso en sus relaciones con Roma que, a finales del siglo XVIII, el clero seguía disfrutando en España de unos privilegios más amplios que en la mayor parte de las naciones católicas.Charles III's Spain, like the rest of the catholic Europe in the 18th century, was the stage where interesting changes took place in the religious field. The political sphere fought a long time ago to become independent from the ecclesiastical paternity, but only in the 18th cetury was it possible to talk about secularism in politics. In Spain, the traditional regalism acquired new forcé when the new ideas from Naples and France mixed with a national basis. However, Charles III was so cautious in his relationship with the Román Church that, at the end of the century, the clergy in Spain enjoyed wider privileges than in other European kingdoms.

This paper argues that looking solely for the immediate causes of reproductive change may fail to take into account not only the impact of policies and programs but the societal decision to adopt these policies and programs to begin with. The paper examines the historical origins and spread of 'modern' ideas in Bangladesh and the state of West Bengal in India. It concludes that a colonial history in which education and modernization processes took hold very early among the elite in the larger Bengal region was paradoxically accompanied by a strong allegiance to the Bengali language. This strong sense of language identity has promoted secularism because language has competed with religious and other sectarian identities. It has also facilitated and reinforced the diffusion of modern ideas both within and between the two Bengali speaking regions. Thus, to understand the fertility decline in Bangladesh for example, one needs to also look at cultural boundaries. In this case, the cultural commonality through language facilitates the spread of new ideas across the two Bengals; and the political and religious separation between them increases the heterogeneity and newness of the ideas thus spread. In turn, the strong sense of language identity has facilitated mass mobilization more easily and intensely within the two Bengals. Through both these processes, Bangladesh and West Bengal today are more "modern" and more amenable to social change than many other parts of South Asia and the Middle East.

I begin with four qualifying comments: The great fact for so-called "mainline" Protestantism in the United States is the deprivileging of the church as a result of pluralism and secularism. This deprivileging constitutes a threat to business as usual, but also provides an opportunity for fresh articulation of the peculiar missional identity of the church. I will line out my argument in terms of the Old Testament; it will, however, require very little imagination to transpose my argument into the more familiar categories of New Testament faith. The context of church education in the United States is in the midst of the scripting of technological, consumer militarism, a script that is powerfully seductive but that is, I suggest, manifestly a failure in its capacity to deliver either happiness or security or both. Baptismal identity as a genuine alternative to that failed scripting is the task of church education, an identity that is rooted in deep gospel claims and manifested and exhibited in an alternative life in the world. Thesis: The Bible, the tradition, and the long history of church practice constitute a peculiar, distinctive, clear but flexible script according to which life in the world may be lived out differently. This scripting of life as a counterscripting is the primal task of education; that work does not guarantee but it makes possible an alternative performance of human life in the world, a performance that requires precisely the kind of imagination, courage, energy, and freedom for which this script vouches in peculiar ways.

International audience ; Since the end of the 19th century, the religious debates which divide the Bosnian Muslim community focus on three main points : 1) the relationship between Islam and the national identity of Bosnian Muslims ; 2) the relationship between Islam and the political system in Bosnia-Herzegovina ; 3) the place of Bosnia-Herzegovina in the relationship between the Muslim world and the Western world. Against this background, the presentation of the writings of three Bosnian Muslim intellectuals (Fikret Karčić, Enes Karić, Adnan Jahić), and of their respective definitions of Islam (individual faith, collective culture, differentiating political ideology), leads to a better understanding of the clivages around which the political life and identity of the Bosnian Muslim community have been recently reshaped. ; Depuis la fin du XIXe siècle, les débats religieux qui traversent la communauté musulmane bosniaque s'articulent autour de trois points : 1) les rapports entre islam et identité nationale des Musulmans bosniaques ; 2) les rapports entre islam et système politique en Bosnie-Herzégovine ; 3) la place de la Bosnie-Herzégovine dans les rapports entre monde musulman et monde occidental. Dans ce contexte, la présentation des écrits de trois intellectuels musulmans bosniaques (Fikret Karčić, Enes Karić, Adnan Jahić), et des définitions de l'islam qu'ils y défendent (foi individuelle, culture commune, idéologie politique discriminante), permet de mieux comprendre les clivages autour desquels s'articulent les recompositions identitaires et politiques récentes de la communauté musulmane bosniaque.

International audience ; Since the end of the 19th century, the religious debates which divide the Bosnian Muslim community focus on three main points : 1) the relationship between Islam and the national identity of Bosnian Muslims ; 2) the relationship between Islam and the political system in Bosnia-Herzegovina ; 3) the place of Bosnia-Herzegovina in the relationship between the Muslim world and the Western world. Against this background, the presentation of the writings of three Bosnian Muslim intellectuals (Fikret Karčić, Enes Karić, Adnan Jahić), and of their respective definitions of Islam (individual faith, collective culture, differentiating political ideology), leads to a better understanding of the clivages around which the political life and identity of the Bosnian Muslim community have been recently reshaped. ; Depuis la fin du XIXe siècle, les débats religieux qui traversent la communauté musulmane bosniaque s'articulent autour de trois points : 1) les rapports entre islam et identité nationale des Musulmans bosniaques ; 2) les rapports entre islam et système politique en Bosnie-Herzégovine ; 3) la place de la Bosnie-Herzégovine dans les rapports entre monde musulman et monde occidental. Dans ce contexte, la présentation des écrits de trois intellectuels musulmans bosniaques (Fikret Karčić, Enes Karić, Adnan Jahić), et des définitions de l'islam qu'ils y défendent (foi individuelle, culture commune, idéologie politique discriminante), permet de mieux comprendre les clivages autour desquels s'articulent les recompositions identitaires et politiques récentes de la communauté musulmane bosniaque.