Suchergebnisse

Liberté de religion crucifiée? Laïcité et écoles italiennes devant la Cour européenne des droits de l'homme Cet article explore la question de l'exposition obligatoire du crucifix dans l'école publique italienne, une matière qui est réglée par des dispositions datant des années 1920. La jurisprudence italienne sur cette question est contradictoire et à plusieurs reprises la Cour constitutionnelle a refusé de prendre position sur le sujet. La décision de la Cour européenne des droits de l'homme dans l'affaire Lautsi a mis fin a une odyssée judiciaire de quelque neuf ans sur la présence des crucifix dans les écoles italiennes. Selon la Cour, toute décision à ce sujet appartient à chaque État européen. Ce faisant la Cour a renoncé à jouer un rôle universaliste en faveur des systèmes constitutionnels nationaux. Cependant, plusieurs questions restent ouvertes pour l'Italie: notamment la place des signes religieux dans les espaces publics, leur relation avec les notions d'une société démocratique, pluraliste et laïque et les limites aux libertés de religion et de la religion tant à niveau individuel que collectif.

The French secularism from 1958 to 1969: however, the meaning of the word "secularism" is less obvious than it seems. That noun became established only belatedly, under the third Republic, with the policy of secularisation conducted by the republican. Since then, secularism has remained a subject of debate and controversy between citizens and between savers 1, and its very definition remains problematic. As Jean-Pierre Rioux points out, secularism is 'neither a concept, a substance, a concept, nor a principle of positive law', and its 'definition is not given in any code, law or constitution 2'. However, it is necessary to agree on a provisional meaning, if only in order to be able to define its contours: secularism is not a spiritual option (unlike Catholicism, atheism, etc.), but a game rule designed to enable citizens to live together with different beliefs. More specifically, it is a set of rules (legal and case-law) and practices (political, administrative, symbolic) designed to administer the place of religion in the State and in society, while respecting freedom of conscience and the freedom to exercise religion. I propose to examine here how this complex set of rules and practices evolved between 1 June 1958 and 28 April 1969, when General de Gaulle exercised power as head of the last government of the fourth Republic and then as President of the Fifth Republic. This is not the topic that attracted most attention from the historians of the period. Many works place this aspect of history in a secondary place, traditionally favouring the strengthening of executive power, the Gaullian theme of France's 'size', and decolonisation. At present, historiography is very attentive to political staff and Gaullist networks, particularly in the context of the GAULHORE research programme (Gaullists: men and Networks) launched in 2008 under the leadership of Bernard Lachaise ; International audience ; The French secularism from 1958 to 1969: however, the meaning of the word "secularism" is less obvious than it seems. ...

Secularism was originally adopted by the Turkish nation in order to join the club of civilized European nations. In our present times, however, secularism, as interpreted and applied in Turkey, has become one of the major obstacles to its accession to the European Union. While respect for human rights is a precondition for accession, secularism is often perceived and used as a basis to restrict many fundamental freedoms in Turkey. Indeed, by confining religion within well established bounds and thus reducing its influence on state affairs and social life, an authoritarian conception of secularism enabled the state and the Turkish nation to modernize and consequently become closer to European civilization. At the same time, such an application of secularism has slowed the development of democracy and human rights in Turkey. Having become a dogma, safeguarding secularism has been invoked by the Turkish armed forces as one of the main reasons justifying their intervention in poli tics. It has also served as the basis for the dissolution of several political parties and the repression of peaceful expression of opinions by the Turkish courts. This judicial and military activism impairs the development of democracy and the situation of human rights in Turkey. Yet there are other ways to protect the secular nature of the state against the danger of islamization and to guarantee the fundamental rights and freedoms, thus facilitating the country's accession to the EU: the protection and promotion of the religious pluralism existing within Turkish society. It is through the development of tolerance with regard to different religious identities in Turkish society that the state will find the best defence against the danger of fundamentalism. ; Initialement adoptée en tant que moyen permettant à la nation turque d' accéder au club des nations européennes civilisées, la laïcité, telle qu'elle est interprétée et appliquée en Turquie, est aujourd'hui devenue l'un des obstacles majeurs à l'adhésion de ce pays à l'Union ...

During the last decade, the insurgency raging in Chechnya has spread to other regions of the Caucasus, Dagestan and Ingushetia in particular. Secular nationalism, a potential trigger of ethnic clashes, has given way to jihad as a unifying principle of the struggle against Russia. Other factors have also fueled the insurgency, including the culture of the vendetta. Adapted from the source document.

Terrorist groups active in the Sahel region have been routed by French forces in recent months. Hundreds of radical fighters and several key leaders have been eliminated and almost all of Mali has been taken back. This is attributed to the excellent preparation and execution of Operation Serval and the support offered to France by all border states, combined with the weak local powerbase of the Islamists and the internal divisions within the various radical groups, as spectacularly illustrated by the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), which switched sides. This secular Tuareg organization, initially allied to the hard-line Salafi group Ansar One, itself linked to Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). was ousted by its partners and ended up fighting against them, alongside French forces. A note of caution, however. Although it has been considerably weakened, the jihadist threat has not been eradicated completely. Adapted from the source document.

From 1967 till today, the gendered subjectivities of Palestinian activists incarcerated in Israel have evolved according to their political and armed mobilizations and the conditions of their detention. Up till the First Intifada, prison was a site of training for political women who asserted their activism in the context of secular parties (Fatah, leftwing parties) and feminism. When, in the course of interrogations, the Israeli intelligence services turned to farms of physical and psychological abuse tied to their gender and sexuality, these women violently experienced the conflict at the level of their bodies. In response, they resignified these stigmata as so many markers of their engagement. Following the Oslo peace agreement, their actions became more diversified. Faced with the repression of the Second Intifada, they threw themselves into martyrdom operations. Violence, however, is denied in their accounts and bodies appear sexualized and feminine. Secular activists were then joined by others belonging to religious parties (Hamas, Islamic Jihad). As the experience of incarceration became commonplace, new ways of living beyond prison gradually emerged. Former inmates established feminine collective networks and their activism and periods of imprisonment came to be seen as sources of transformation for gender relations. Adapted from the source document.

Are there Muslim pupils in French schools? this question does not have a place in the managerial approach of national education current reform. Neither does it in French secularist ethos. Moreover, it is uncomfortable because it arouses Islam social categorization whilst education is supposed to be meritocratic. But this question has to be asked if one is to take seriously the cognitive and civic missions of public education. For it matters a lot for Muslims to be accepted as such. And it matters that others be educated to accept Muslims. This determines the capacity of each other to make a common polity, while formal silence maintains a fantastical view of Muslims as threatening outsiders, even in schools. ; Y a-t-il des élèves musulmans ? La question n'a pas sa place dans l'orientation managériale de la réforme dans l'Education nationale. Elle n'en a pas non plus dans l'éthos français de la laïcité. Enfin, elle est inconfortable, car elle éveille la catégorisation sociale de l'islam alors que l'école se veut fondamentalement un espace de méritocratie universelle. Mais cette question devrait être posée si l'on prend au sérieux la mission cognitive et civique de l'école. Car il importe pour les confessants de l'islam d'être acceptés comme tels. Et il importe que les autres soient éduqués à cette acceptation. De cela dépend la capacité des uns et des autres à faire ensemble une communauté politique, tandis que le silence officiel entretient la vision fantasmagorique de l'islam comme groupe extérieur menaçant, jusqu'au sein de l'école

Are there Muslim pupils in French schools? this question does not have a place in the managerial approach of national education current reform. Neither does it in French secularist ethos. Moreover, it is uncomfortable because it arouses Islam social categorization whilst education is supposed to be meritocratic. But this question has to be asked if one is to take seriously the cognitive and civic missions of public education. For it matters a lot for Muslims to be accepted as such. And it matters that others be educated to accept Muslims. This determines the capacity of each other to make a common polity, while formal silence maintains a fantastical view of Muslims as threatening outsiders, even in schools. ; Y a-t-il des élèves musulmans ? La question n'a pas sa place dans l'orientation managériale de la réforme dans l'Education nationale. Elle n'en a pas non plus dans l'éthos français de la laïcité. Enfin, elle est inconfortable, car elle éveille la catégorisation sociale de l'islam alors que l'école se veut fondamentalement un espace de méritocratie universelle. Mais cette question devrait être posée si l'on prend au sérieux la mission cognitive et civique de l'école. Car il importe pour les confessants de l'islam d'être acceptés comme tels. Et il importe que les autres soient éduqués à cette acceptation. De cela dépend la capacité des uns et des autres à faire ensemble une communauté politique, tandis que le silence officiel entretient la vision fantasmagorique de l'islam comme groupe extérieur menaçant, jusqu'au sein de l'école

Are there Muslim pupils in French schools? this question does not have a place in the managerial approach of national education current reform. Neither does it in French secularist ethos. Moreover, it is uncomfortable because it arouses Islam social categorization whilst education is supposed to be meritocratic. But this question has to be asked if one is to take seriously the cognitive and civic missions of public education. For it matters a lot for Muslims to be accepted as such. And it matters that others be educated to accept Muslims. This determines the capacity of each other to make a common polity, while formal silence maintains a fantastical view of Muslims as threatening outsiders, even in schools. ; Y a-t-il des élèves musulmans ? La question n'a pas sa place dans l'orientation managériale de la réforme dans l'Education nationale. Elle n'en a pas non plus dans l'éthos français de la laïcité. Enfin, elle est inconfortable, car elle éveille la catégorisation sociale de l'islam alors que l'école se veut fondamentalement un espace de méritocratie universelle. Mais cette question devrait être posée si l'on prend au sérieux la mission cognitive et civique de l'école. Car il importe pour les confessants de l'islam d'être acceptés comme tels. Et il importe que les autres soient éduqués à cette acceptation. De cela dépend la capacité des uns et des autres à faire ensemble une communauté politique, tandis que le silence officiel entretient la vision fantasmagorique de l'islam comme groupe extérieur menaçant, jusqu'au sein de l'école

International audience ; During the last decades, the legal framework of secularism ("laicity") was contested and changed on the grounds that French institutions are endangered by Islamic practices, notably school education. The paper recalls that such a reading is empirically dubious, and it argues that it would be of great educational interest to maintain a liberal approach to these issues ; Les dernières années ont vu s'affirmer en France une conception politique de la laïcité qui veut corriger la règle de droit, au motif qu'elle laisse exister des pratiques musulmanes qui mettent en danger les institutions communes. L'article conteste cette vision des choses en s'appuyant sur les données d'enquête, et pose l'intérêt professionnel pour les éducateurs d'une approche décrispée des affiliations religieuses