Suchergebnisse

This thesis relates to the problems of secularity and religion to Tunisia. The stake is to study these two concepts in a new ground : Tunisia. This study rises from independence until the revolution.In the first left, the thesis concentrates on the genesis of the concept of secularity, its originality and the specificity of the Tunisian policy. This part constitutes first cross between the political power and religious.In the second part, the thesis concentrates on the Tunisian society. It focuses hard tearing between the adhesion of the movement reformist forced by Bourguiba and the Islamism represented by the movement of the Islamic Tendency. This part will be an opportunity to explore new social space. A new social architecture will be drawn, between female warping and the blooming of the religiosity.In the last part, we are accentuated on the excitement of the contemporary Tunisian thought in front of the choice between appropriation and adaptation to the secularism. The initial question in this part is doubly ambiguous. how does the Islamic company lay out the questions which disturbs it? Religious freedom, apostasy, wine, testimony : concepts subjected to endless debates. How can we interpret the delay of the Muslim company? The studies of Charfi and Talbi give us some tracks of thought. A new feminine generation will be present in Tunisia. It will be time to discover how the female thought occupies it the cultural scene in Tunisia. This thesis tries to answer if secularity is the cause of the crisis of the Tunisian society or the solution. ; Cette thèse porte sur la problématique de la laïcité et religion en Tunisie. L'enjeu est d'étudier ces deux notions dans un terrain nouveau : la Tunisie. Cette étude découle de l'indépendance jusqu'à la révolution. Dans le première partie, la thèse se concentre sur la genèse du concept de la laïcité, son originalité et la spécificité de la politique tunisienne. Cette partie constitue une première croisée entre le pouvoir politique et religieux. Dans la deuxième ...

International audience ; What should be the right place for religions in France ? Our debates are old and sharp. France has two legislations : a concordat (Napoléon) for two departments and the common rule (1905). The word "Laîcité" was not employed at the beginning, but appears progressively. Do Muslims living in France are changing the concept ? Do they imply a new manner of seeing things ? What are the results of the attacks of 2015 and 2016 on the opinion ? We analyse in this communication for the universities of Bucharest and Craiova articles published in the newspaper Le Monde. What is the reflection about the concept of "laïcité", what are the traditional arguments and the new ones ? ; La définition de la place des religions est une question récurrente en France. Les débats sont anciens, notamment depuis la période révolutionnaire. Ils ont abouti à un régime de concordat, puis à la loi de 1905 de séparation des Églises et de l'État. Le concept de laïcité est apparu au fil des arguments. La présence de l'islam sur le sol français pose-t-elle des problèmes spécifiques ? Les terroristes islamistes peuvent-ils avoir raison de notre manière de vivre ensemble ? Après un retour sur les débats qui ont accompagné la loi de 1905, nous analyserons ici les articles d'opinion parus dans le journal Le Monde après les attentats de 2015 et de 2016. Il s'agira de présenter les thématiques et les arguments développés, avec un triple souci : identifier ce que l'on pourrait nommer les thèmes et arguments qui concernent indistinctement toutes les religions, les thèmes spécifiquement liés à l'islam, et enfin les thèmes nouveaux qui émergent.

International audience ; What should be the right place for religions in France ? Our debates are old and sharp. France has two legislations : a concordat (Napoléon) for two departments and the common rule (1905). The word "Laîcité" was not employed at the beginning, but appears progressively. Do Muslims living in France are changing the concept ? Do they imply a new manner of seeing things ? What are the results of the attacks of 2015 and 2016 on the opinion ? We analyse in this communication for the universities of Bucharest and Craiova articles published in the newspaper Le Monde. What is the reflection about the concept of "laïcité", what are the traditional arguments and the new ones ? ; La définition de la place des religions est une question récurrente en France. Les débats sont anciens, notamment depuis la période révolutionnaire. Ils ont abouti à un régime de concordat, puis à la loi de 1905 de séparation des Églises et de l'État. Le concept de laïcité est apparu au fil des arguments. La présence de l'islam sur le sol français pose-t-elle des problèmes spécifiques ? Les terroristes islamistes peuvent-ils avoir raison de notre manière de vivre ensemble ? Après un retour sur les débats qui ont accompagné la loi de 1905, nous analyserons ici les articles d'opinion parus dans le journal Le Monde après les attentats de 2015 et de 2016. Il s'agira de présenter les thématiques et les arguments développés, avec un triple souci : identifier ce que l'on pourrait nommer les thèmes et arguments qui concernent indistinctement toutes les religions, les thèmes spécifiquement liés à l'islam, et enfin les thèmes nouveaux qui émergent.

International audience ; L'Union Européenne est-elle laïque ? Comment les États promeuvent-ils des valeurs communes ou des compétences civiques ? Ces questions pouvaient sembler relativement disjointes il y a quelques décennies, mais deviennent de plus en plus étroitement reliées entre elles. En France du moins, la laïcité est perçue comme un élément central des valeurs communes (les « valeurs de la République »). Je propose d'aborder ces thèmes en prenant pour exemple quatre pays européens (Angleterre, France, Irlande, Pologne). Après un questionnement sur l'existence ou non d'une « laïcité européenne », il s'agira de clarifier le lien entre laïcité et ce qu'on appelle l' « identité nationale » d'une part, et entre valeurs communes et école commune d'autre part. Loin de constituer une spécificité française, la laïcité serait déjà plus ou moins mise en oeuvre en Europe : il y aurait « à l'échelle européenne, une consécration globale des principes fondamentaux de la laïcité » incluant la liberté de conscience et de pensée, ainsi que la non-discrimination par l'État des personnes en fonction de leur appartenance religieuse ou philosophique (Willaime, 2007, 5). De façon plus nuancée, Philippe Portier défend une conception « inclusiviste » de la laïcité, consistant à repérer ses différentes réalisations historiques dans plusieurs pays, ce qui va à l'encontre des conceptions « exclusivistes » tendant à ériger le modèle français en idéal normatif. Ces différentes orientations peuvent être discutées. Par exemple, les États polonais et irlandais discriminent-ils les citoyens en raison de leur (non-)appartenance religieuse ? Si la réponse est oui, alors il devient difficile d'adhérer à la thèse d'une laïcité européenne. En outre, le modèle français de laïcité suscite un intérêt dans des pays non-laïques où l'État exerce des discriminations au quotidien à l'encontre de citoyens sur la base de critères religieux. La question est donc scientifique autant que politique. Si l'on adopte sur le plan scientifique une conception ...

International audience ; L'Union Européenne est-elle laïque ? Comment les États promeuvent-ils des valeurs communes ou des compétences civiques ? Ces questions pouvaient sembler relativement disjointes il y a quelques décennies, mais deviennent de plus en plus étroitement reliées entre elles. En France du moins, la laïcité est perçue comme un élément central des valeurs communes (les « valeurs de la République »). Je propose d'aborder ces thèmes en prenant pour exemple quatre pays européens (Angleterre, France, Irlande, Pologne). Après un questionnement sur l'existence ou non d'une « laïcité européenne », il s'agira de clarifier le lien entre laïcité et ce qu'on appelle l' « identité nationale » d'une part, et entre valeurs communes et école commune d'autre part. Loin de constituer une spécificité française, la laïcité serait déjà plus ou moins mise en oeuvre en Europe : il y aurait « à l'échelle européenne, une consécration globale des principes fondamentaux de la laïcité » incluant la liberté de conscience et de pensée, ainsi que la non-discrimination par l'État des personnes en fonction de leur appartenance religieuse ou philosophique (Willaime, 2007, 5). De façon plus nuancée, Philippe Portier défend une conception « inclusiviste » de la laïcité, consistant à repérer ses différentes réalisations historiques dans plusieurs pays, ce qui va à l'encontre des conceptions « exclusivistes » tendant à ériger le modèle français en idéal normatif. Ces différentes orientations peuvent être discutées. Par exemple, les États polonais et irlandais discriminent-ils les citoyens en raison de leur (non-)appartenance religieuse ? Si la réponse est oui, alors il devient difficile d'adhérer à la thèse d'une laïcité européenne. En outre, le modèle français de laïcité suscite un intérêt dans des pays non-laïques où l'État exerce des discriminations au quotidien à l'encontre de citoyens sur la base de critères religieux. La question est donc scientifique autant que politique. Si l'on adopte sur le plan scientifique une conception ...

Liberté de religion crucifiée? Laïcité et écoles italiennes devant la Cour européenne des droits de l'homme Cet article explore la question de l'exposition obligatoire du crucifix dans l'école publique italienne, une matière qui est réglée par des dispositions datant des années 1920. La jurisprudence italienne sur cette question est contradictoire et à plusieurs reprises la Cour constitutionnelle a refusé de prendre position sur le sujet. La décision de la Cour européenne des droits de l'homme dans l'affaire Lautsi a mis fin a une odyssée judiciaire de quelque neuf ans sur la présence des crucifix dans les écoles italiennes. Selon la Cour, toute décision à ce sujet appartient à chaque État européen. Ce faisant la Cour a renoncé à jouer un rôle universaliste en faveur des systèmes constitutionnels nationaux. Cependant, plusieurs questions restent ouvertes pour l'Italie: notamment la place des signes religieux dans les espaces publics, leur relation avec les notions d'une société démocratique, pluraliste et laïque et les limites aux libertés de religion et de la religion tant à niveau individuel que collectif.

The French secularism from 1958 to 1969: however, the meaning of the word "secularism" is less obvious than it seems. That noun became established only belatedly, under the third Republic, with the policy of secularisation conducted by the republican. Since then, secularism has remained a subject of debate and controversy between citizens and between savers 1, and its very definition remains problematic. As Jean-Pierre Rioux points out, secularism is 'neither a concept, a substance, a concept, nor a principle of positive law', and its 'definition is not given in any code, law or constitution 2'. However, it is necessary to agree on a provisional meaning, if only in order to be able to define its contours: secularism is not a spiritual option (unlike Catholicism, atheism, etc.), but a game rule designed to enable citizens to live together with different beliefs. More specifically, it is a set of rules (legal and case-law) and practices (political, administrative, symbolic) designed to administer the place of religion in the State and in society, while respecting freedom of conscience and the freedom to exercise religion. I propose to examine here how this complex set of rules and practices evolved between 1 June 1958 and 28 April 1969, when General de Gaulle exercised power as head of the last government of the fourth Republic and then as President of the Fifth Republic. This is not the topic that attracted most attention from the historians of the period. Many works place this aspect of history in a secondary place, traditionally favouring the strengthening of executive power, the Gaullian theme of France's 'size', and decolonisation. At present, historiography is very attentive to political staff and Gaullist networks, particularly in the context of the GAULHORE research programme (Gaullists: men and Networks) launched in 2008 under the leadership of Bernard Lachaise ; International audience ; The French secularism from 1958 to 1969: however, the meaning of the word "secularism" is less obvious than it seems. ...

Cours given at the summer session of the Institute of French Studies in NYU, branch of Paris.graduated level. From the successive cases of headscarf to Manif for all, religious issues occupy a central place in contemporary French political debates and contradict France's representations as a secular country where religion is completely relegated to the private sphere. This course will propose to revisit the specific features of political regulation of religion in France, as well as the idea of a 'return of religion' in France. It will address issues such as the visibility of religion in public spaces; the articulation between religious practice and political participation; the diversity of movements claiming secularism today; relations between state and religious leaders Catholic, Muslim and Jewish. ; Master ; Cours given at the summer session of the Institute of French Studies in NYU, branch of Paris.graduated level. From the successive cases of headscarf to Manif for all, religious issues occupy a central place in contemporary French political debates and contradict France's representations as a secular country where religion is completely relegated to the private sphere. This course will propose to revisit the specific features of political regulation of religion in France, as well as the idea of a 'return of religion' in France. It will address issues such as the visibility of religion in public spaces; the articulation between religious practice and political participation; the diversity of movements claiming secularism today; relations between state and religious leaders Catholic, Muslim and Jewish. ; Cours dispensé lors de la session d'été de l'Institute of French Studies à NYU, antenne de Paris.Niveau graduate. Depuis les successives affaires du foulard jusqu'à la Manif pour tous, les questions religieuses occupent une place centrale dans les débats politiques français contemporains et contredisent les représentations de la France comme un pays laïque où la religion serait totalement reléguée dans la ...

In France, research in history and political philosophy has produced a body of knowledge describing the values and principles that are at the heart of the « republican model of integration ». However, this work has been theoretical and conceptual in nature such that we have in fact very little knowledge about the psychological aspects of the republican model. This thesis is organized in three chapters that present in total seven distinct empirical studies It addressed two major questions: 1) What factors explain the strong support that is observed in France for the principle of republican equality and laïcité? and 2) what are the consequences of this support for prejudice and intergroup relations? In chapter one, the research confirms this strong endorsement of the republican principles among teachers in high schools (Study 1, N = 82) or among university students in widely different fields of study such as psychology (N = 72) or law (N = 234, Study 2). Using a measure of attachment to laïcité that is distinct from a measure of support for principles that are theoretically linked with laïcité, Study 2 showed, for the first time to our knowledge, the distinction between two types of laïcité: an historic laïcité based on freedom of conscience and equality of respects for all beliefs and a new laïcité that emphasizes the need for keep religion private and to ban conspicuous religious signs from public places. In chapter two, three studies examined the psychological motives underlying attachment to the republican principles. As expected, it was shown first, among a representative sample of the French population (N = 1001), that support for republican equality and new laïcité are two variables that explain variance in antiimmigrant prejudice over and above factors that are usually considered in sociology or social psychology. Moreover, whereas egalitarian individuals are usually more supportive of these principles compared to inegalitarians, the results also showed that people who wish to maintain group-based ...

In France, research in history and political philosophy has produced a body of knowledge describing the values and principles that are at the heart of the « republican model of integration ». However, this work has been theoretical and conceptual in nature such that we have in fact very little knowledge about the psychological aspects of the republican model. This thesis is organized in three chapters that present in total seven distinct empirical studies It addressed two major questions: 1) What factors explain the strong support that is observed in France for the principle of republican equality and laïcité? and 2) what are the consequences of this support for prejudice and intergroup relations? In chapter one, the research confirms this strong endorsement of the republican principles among teachers in high schools (Study 1, N = 82) or among university students in widely different fields of study such as psychology (N = 72) or law (N = 234, Study 2). Using a measure of attachment to laïcité that is distinct from a measure of support for principles that are theoretically linked with laïcité, Study 2 showed, for the first time to our knowledge, the distinction between two types of laïcité: an historic laïcité based on freedom of conscience and equality of respects for all beliefs and a new laïcité that emphasizes the need for keep religion private and to ban conspicuous religious signs from public places. In chapter two, three studies examined the psychological motives underlying attachment to the republican principles. As expected, it was shown first, among a representative sample of the French population (N = 1001), that support for republican equality and new laïcité are two variables that explain variance in antiimmigrant prejudice over and above factors that are usually considered in sociology or social psychology. Moreover, whereas egalitarian individuals are usually more supportive of these principles compared to inegalitarians, the results also showed that people who wish to maintain group-based ...

In France, research in history and political philosophy has produced a body of knowledge describing the values and principles that are at the heart of the « republican model of integration ». However, this work has been theoretical and conceptual in nature such that we have in fact very little knowledge about the psychological aspects of the republican model. This thesis is organized in three chapters that present in total seven distinct empirical studies It addressed two major questions: 1) What factors explain the strong support that is observed in France for the principle of republican equality and laïcité? and 2) what are the consequences of this support for prejudice and intergroup relations? In chapter one, the research confirms this strong endorsement of the republican principles among teachers in high schools (Study 1, N = 82) or among university students in widely different fields of study such as psychology (N = 72) or law (N = 234, Study 2). Using a measure of attachment to laïcité that is distinct from a measure of support for principles that are theoretically linked with laïcité, Study 2 showed, for the first time to our knowledge, the distinction between two types of laïcité: an historic laïcité based on freedom of conscience and equality of respects for all beliefs and a new laïcité that emphasizes the need for keep religion private and to ban conspicuous religious signs from public places. In chapter two, three studies examined the psychological motives underlying attachment to the republican principles. As expected, it was shown first, among a representative sample of the French population (N = 1001), that support for republican equality and new laïcité are two variables that explain variance in antiimmigrant prejudice over and above factors that are usually considered in sociology or social psychology. Moreover, whereas egalitarian individuals are usually more supportive of these principles compared to inegalitarians, the results also showed that people who wish to maintain group-based ...

Despite the review of these pages, they cannot be used to compare the case law of the US Constitutional Council and Supreme Court on the issue of state-religion relations. As recently pointed out by a member of the Council ahead of a judge of the Supreme Court, it is scarcely possible to put on the same footing the argued judgments produced across the Atlantic and the decisions of the Council, whose statement of reasons is "more than discussing and demonstrating" 1. The "revolution" of the motivation that would be in motion in 2 remains too recent and limited to contradict this finding. Moreover, the abstract review carried out by the Council does not in any way enable it to be confronted with the variety of cases which lead the Supreme Court to forge and refine case-law. Nor is it possible to carry out an overall study of the multiple questions posed by 'secularism' in France and the United States 3. The subject will therefore be addressed differently, focusing on a particular problem faced by courts in France and the United States. French news has two themes, each of which has to look at a crèche. The first appears to be a false runway. It is in terms of 'secularism' that the issue of prohibiting the wearing of veil is often dealt with in France. However, when it is addressed recently to private individuals, such a measure does not concern secularism but freedom of religion. The rules that give concrete expression to secularism impose an obligation only on public authorities and persons acting on their behalf 4. The numerous judgments of the Supreme Court dealing with these issues, in particular from the point of view of religious exemptions to be granted to rules of general application 5, are therefore beside the point. If secularism is understood as a requirement of government neutrality towards religions, it is another recent controversy that is relevant. In recent years, several French administrative courts have reached opposing conclusions about the scenes of the Christmas nexus in public buildings 6. ...

Članak razmatra tri relevantna principa demokracije, inherentna suvremenom društvu: modernost, politika priznanja i sekularizam. Glavno pitanje kojim se bavi je održivost ovih principa kao temelja za zasnivanje kozmopolitske demokracije i utjecaja na daljnju demokratizaciju ljudskog svijeta. Članak (i) istražuje vezu između modernizacije i demokracije kroz perspektivu višestruke moderne kao mogućnosti za proširenje demokracije na nedemokratsko područje svijeta, (ii) analizira politiku priznanja kao temelj za kulturnu koegzistenciju i politički pluralizam, (iii) razmatra problem a) kako ideja sekularizma ugrožava (prijeti) ideju religioznosti i obratno te čine li to uopće; b) koliko je sekularizam sekularan te je li uopće (problem privatne i javne sfere); c) može li sekularizam ostati temeljni princip (kozmopolitske) demokracije. ; This paper reflects on three relevant principles of democracy which are inherent to the contemporary society. These principles are modernity, the politics of recognition, and secularism. The main question is concerned with the sustainability of these principles as the grounds for the foundation of cosmopolitan democracy, and further influence on the democratization of the human world. This paper (i) examines a relationship between modernization and democracy through the perspective of multiple modernities as a possibility for the extension of democracy over the non-democratic parts of the world; (ii) analyzes politics of recognition as a grounds for cultural coexistence and political pluralism and (iii) reflects on the issue of a) how the idea of secularism if/how the idea of secularism treats the idea of religiousness and vice versa, b) how much is secularism secular (the issue of public versus private sphere), and c) can secularism remain to be the basic principle of (cosmopolitan) democracy. ; Cet article examine trois principes pertinents de la démocratie, inhérents à la société actuelle : modernité, politique de reconnaissance et sécularisme. La principale question qu'il pose est celle du maintien de ces principes en tant que fondements pour l'établissement d'une société démocratique et de leur influence sur la démocratisation du monde humain. Cet article (i) étudie la relation entre la modernisation et la démocratie à partir de la perspective des multiples modernités comme possibilité d'étendre la démocratie dans les parties non-démocratiques du monde, (ii) analyse les politiques de reconnaissance comme fondement pour la coexistence culturelle et le pluralisme politique et (iii) réfléchit sur la question de savoir : a) si/comment l'idée du sécularisme traite de l'idée de la religiosité et inversement ; b) dans quelle mesure le sécularisme est séculaire (problème de la sphère publique vs. la sphère privée) ; c) si le sécularisme peut encore rester le principe de base de la démocratie (cosmopolite). ; Dieser Artikel reflektiert über drei relevante Demokratieprinzipien, inhärent der Gesellschaft von heutzutage: modernität, Politik der Anerkennung und Säkularismus. Die Hauptfrage, mit der es sich befasst, ist die Nachhaltigkeit dieser Prinzipien als Grundlage für die Gründung der kosmopolitischen Demokratie und für den Einfluss der weiteren Demokratisierung der menschenwelt. Aus der Perspektive der multiplen modernitäten untersucht der Artikel (i) die Beziehung zwischen der modernisierung und Demokratie als eine möglichkeit für die Ausbreitung der Demokratie auf die nicht demokratischen Gebiete der Welt, (ii) analysiert die Politik der Anerkennung als Fundament für die kulturelle Koexistenz und politischen Pluralismus, (iii) erwägt die Frage a) ob/wie die Idee des Säkularismus die Idee der Religiosität behandelt und umgekehrt; b) ob/inwieweit der Säkularismus säkular ist (das Thema der öffentlichen Sphäre vs. Privatsphäre); c) ob der Säkularismus als Grundprinzip der (kosmopolitischen) Demokratie verbleiben kann.