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Although our talk about human rights is part of the ethical awareness of contemporary politics, it still has not received adequate theoretical justification & foundation. Serious philosophical problems arose in the very beginning of the history of the "human rights" concept, with Locke's liberal natural right & Kant's reasonable right. According to the author, the difficulty stems from the concept of person, for in every liberal legal theory the person is perceived as bearer of human & fundamental rights. Meanwhile, the dominant constitutional theory of human & fundamental rights starts from the identical meanings of "person" as an individual, in its uniqueness, & of "man" as a general definition. It is, however, necessary to start from the fundamental difference between the two key concepts. While the "man" concept is defined universalistically, there is no universal concept for persons & no possibility of breaking them down into subcategories. While every individual, as instance of the concept, must be defined in the same way as everyone else, persons are defined individualistically; each person is a unique individual which can be neither duplicated nor multiplied. The author proposes a solution of the fundamental rights problem-matter within the framework of constitutional law. Personal rights are brought to existence as follows: organs of the state, in accordance with positive law, give to the individual the title of state-citizen as an individualistically unique legal person. Everyone receives it, in the same way, as a unique & irreplaceable person. In the normal conditions, the state has the obligation to make sure, via courts & the police, that everyone's personal right is untouchable. On the basis of this logic, a demarcation line can be drawn between the personal fundamental rights & the collective rights of citizens (such as political rights, which the individual can practice only together with others). Only such an interpretation would provide our libertarian fundamental rights with a consistently secular character, with no concession to the internal attachment, in whichever way it may be concealed, to metaphysical or religious presuppositions. Adapted from the source document.

Islam and secular; terrorism; religious aspects; Islam; Islam and politics

The author suggests that the multilayered concept of secularization should be understood as the dezideologization of culture, religion, nation, language. economy, opening the space for democratic decision-making in the European Union, & consequently the space for politics with the capacity for collectively binding decisions in the democratically generated pluralism, & not in the historically generated pluralism of the old Europe. Secularization originally meant the transfer of clergy (priests or monks) from regular to secular thereby making them secularis or laypersons. Since the Westphalian Treaty of 1647 the word secularization has meant the transfer of ecclesiastical property to civil possession or use. Secularization means a strict separation of the church & the state. It also means a secular implementation of Christian postulates of universal equality of equals among equals. Today, the concept of secularization is used metaphorically as dezideologization i.e. as the criticism of state forms such as fascism and communism which possessed only ideological & not democratic legitimacy. In that sense the thesis of the cultural or spiritual unity of Europe as its legitimizing grounds is undemocratic as it replaces & conditions democracy with a vague concept of culture or spoken communication. References. Adapted from the source document.