Suchergebnisse

The purpose of the article is to assess the degree of presence of the idea of secularism in the election programs of the main political parties participating in the Polish parliamentary elections in 2019. The article adopts the understanding of the so-called political secularism which was referred to the institution of the Roman Catholic Church due to the context of research, as well as the fact that Catholics constitute the dominant part of Polish society and because of the major socio-political importance of the Catholic Church in Poland. The research material were the electoral programs of party election committees, as well as the speeches of their political leaders delivered during the main electoral program conventions. The article increases the cognitive value of the issue of political communication regarding the idea of secularism during the parliamentary campaign of 2019. Research has shown that religion has become an important factor in political discourse during the parliamentary campaign in Poland in 2019. The topic about the role of the Catholic Church institutions in the public sphere was, however, taken up only through Law and Justice and the Left. A clear polarization of views of these election committees was noted. Law and Justice spoke out against the idea of secularism, while the Left supported this idea. The Confederation, Polish People's Party and Civic Coalition remained silent in the election programs about the idea of a secular state. ; Celem artykułu jest ocena stopnia obecności idei sekularyzmu w programach wyborczych głównych partii politycznych startujących w polskich wyborach parlamentarnych 2019 roku. W artykule przyjęto rozumienie tzw. sekularyzmu politycznego i odniesiono je do instytucji Kościoła rzymskokatolickiego ze względu na kontekst badań, a także na fakt, że katolicy stanowią dominującą część społeczeństwa polskiego i ze względu na doniosłe znaczenie społeczno-polityczne Kościoła katolickiego w Polsce.Materiał badawczy stanowiły programy wyborcze partyjnych komitetów wyborczych, jak również przemówienia ich liderów politycznych wygłoszone podczas głównych wyborczych konwencji programowych.Artykuł zwiększa wartość poznawczą zagadnienia komunikowania politycznego dotyczącego idei sekularyzmu w okresie kampanii parlamentarnej 2019 r. Badania dowiodły, że religia stała się istotnym czynnikiem dyskursu politycznego w czasie kampanii parlamentarnej w Polsce w 2019 r. Temat dotyczący roli instytucji Kościoła katolickiego w sferze publicznej był jednak podjęty jedynie przez Prawo i Sprawiedliwość oraz Lewicę. Odnotowano wyrazistą dychotomiczność poglądów tychże komitetów wyborczych. PiS wypowiedział się przeciw idei sekularyzmu, zaś Lewica tę ideę wsparła. Konfederacja, PSL oraz KW Koalicja Obywatelska przemilczały w programach wyborczych kwestię idei państwa świeckiego.

Članak razmatra tri relevantna principa demokracije, inherentna suvremenom društvu: modernost, politika priznanja i sekularizam. Glavno pitanje kojim se bavi je održivost ovih principa kao temelja za zasnivanje kozmopolitske demokracije i utjecaja na daljnju demokratizaciju ljudskog svijeta. Članak (i) istražuje vezu između modernizacije i demokracije kroz perspektivu višestruke moderne kao mogućnosti za proširenje demokracije na nedemokratsko područje svijeta, (ii) analizira politiku priznanja kao temelj za kulturnu koegzistenciju i politički pluralizam, (iii) razmatra problem a) kako ideja sekularizma ugrožava (prijeti) ideju religioznosti i obratno te čine li to uopće; b) koliko je sekularizam sekularan te je li uopće (problem privatne i javne sfere); c) može li sekularizam ostati temeljni princip (kozmopolitske) demokracije. ; This paper reflects on three relevant principles of democracy which are inherent to the contemporary society. These principles are modernity, the politics of recognition, and secularism. The main question is concerned with the sustainability of these principles as the grounds for the foundation of cosmopolitan democracy, and further influence on the democratization of the human world. This paper (i) examines a relationship between modernization and democracy through the perspective of multiple modernities as a possibility for the extension of democracy over the non-democratic parts of the world; (ii) analyzes politics of recognition as a grounds for cultural coexistence and political pluralism and (iii) reflects on the issue of a) how the idea of secularism if/how the idea of secularism treats the idea of religiousness and vice versa, b) how much is secularism secular (the issue of public versus private sphere), and c) can secularism remain to be the basic principle of (cosmopolitan) democracy. ; Cet article examine trois principes pertinents de la démocratie, inhérents à la société actuelle : modernité, politique de reconnaissance et sécularisme. La principale question qu'il pose est celle du maintien de ces principes en tant que fondements pour l'établissement d'une société démocratique et de leur influence sur la démocratisation du monde humain. Cet article (i) étudie la relation entre la modernisation et la démocratie à partir de la perspective des multiples modernités comme possibilité d'étendre la démocratie dans les parties non-démocratiques du monde, (ii) analyse les politiques de reconnaissance comme fondement pour la coexistence culturelle et le pluralisme politique et (iii) réfléchit sur la question de savoir : a) si/comment l'idée du sécularisme traite de l'idée de la religiosité et inversement ; b) dans quelle mesure le sécularisme est séculaire (problème de la sphère publique vs. la sphère privée) ; c) si le sécularisme peut encore rester le principe de base de la démocratie (cosmopolite). ; Dieser Artikel reflektiert über drei relevante Demokratieprinzipien, inhärent der Gesellschaft von heutzutage: modernität, Politik der Anerkennung und Säkularismus. Die Hauptfrage, mit der es sich befasst, ist die Nachhaltigkeit dieser Prinzipien als Grundlage für die Gründung der kosmopolitischen Demokratie und für den Einfluss der weiteren Demokratisierung der menschenwelt. Aus der Perspektive der multiplen modernitäten untersucht der Artikel (i) die Beziehung zwischen der modernisierung und Demokratie als eine möglichkeit für die Ausbreitung der Demokratie auf die nicht demokratischen Gebiete der Welt, (ii) analysiert die Politik der Anerkennung als Fundament für die kulturelle Koexistenz und politischen Pluralismus, (iii) erwägt die Frage a) ob/wie die Idee des Säkularismus die Idee der Religiosität behandelt und umgekehrt; b) ob/inwieweit der Säkularismus säkular ist (das Thema der öffentlichen Sphäre vs. Privatsphäre); c) ob der Säkularismus als Grundprinzip der (kosmopolitischen) Demokratie verbleiben kann.

The author aims to present the etymology and history of the laicity principle as an important part of the political history of the West, particularly of France. The laicity idea has a very important place in the context of church-state relations, of separation of the two, and of their cooperation in certain areas (in models of cooperation). Since the concepts of laicity, secularism, secularisation and laicisation are often used in such a way as to make clear distinction impossible, an outline of their fundamental distinctions and an elucidation of possible ways of their use in political science seem to be fully justified. With regard to their etymological origins (Greek, Latin and French sources), the above-mentioned concepts are part of the common European tradition of establishing relations between the church and the state, relying on foundations which have demonstrated, in the course of history, their importance and various political applications. Adapted from the source document.

The author designates the Croatian thinker Juraj Krizanic as a philosopher of politics, i.e. a modern political theorist who, on the one hand, founds his postulates on traditional theological thought, and, on the other, takes into account the postulates of modern political theory. As a theologian, Krizanic bases his conception of history and theology on the providentialism of St. Aurelius Augustine, and his political theory on the acceptance of a part of the thought of his contemporary Thomas Hobbes. The theoretical position -- political theology, positions him precisely between the political-theological postulates of Augustine and the political-theoretical hypotheses of Hobbes. In agreement with Augustine, Kriznic concludes that the political community (state) has its foundation in God and the values comprised in him, which is especially manifest in Providence and royal worship as basis of the internal structure of the state. But, in agreement with Hobbes, Krizanic understands that the mission of the state decreed by Providence operates within the earthly state and the secular political frameworks, and that, on the other hand, the king instituted by the will of God has his foundation also in the political body (the people), and this ranks Krizanic among the modern political theorists. Adapted from the source document.

Although our talk about human rights is part of the ethical awareness of contemporary politics, it still has not received adequate theoretical justification & foundation. Serious philosophical problems arose in the very beginning of the history of the "human rights" concept, with Locke's liberal natural right & Kant's reasonable right. According to the author, the difficulty stems from the concept of person, for in every liberal legal theory the person is perceived as bearer of human & fundamental rights. Meanwhile, the dominant constitutional theory of human & fundamental rights starts from the identical meanings of "person" as an individual, in its uniqueness, & of "man" as a general definition. It is, however, necessary to start from the fundamental difference between the two key concepts. While the "man" concept is defined universalistically, there is no universal concept for persons & no possibility of breaking them down into subcategories. While every individual, as instance of the concept, must be defined in the same way as everyone else, persons are defined individualistically; each person is a unique individual which can be neither duplicated nor multiplied. The author proposes a solution of the fundamental rights problem-matter within the framework of constitutional law. Personal rights are brought to existence as follows: organs of the state, in accordance with positive law, give to the individual the title of state-citizen as an individualistically unique legal person. Everyone receives it, in the same way, as a unique & irreplaceable person. In the normal conditions, the state has the obligation to make sure, via courts & the police, that everyone's personal right is untouchable. On the basis of this logic, a demarcation line can be drawn between the personal fundamental rights & the collective rights of citizens (such as political rights, which the individual can practice only together with others). Only such an interpretation would provide our libertarian fundamental rights with a consistently secular character, with no concession to the internal attachment, in whichever way it may be concealed, to metaphysical or religious presuppositions. Adapted from the source document.

The author suggests that the multilayered concept of secularization should be understood as the dezideologization of culture, religion, nation, language. economy, opening the space for democratic decision-making in the European Union, & consequently the space for politics with the capacity for collectively binding decisions in the democratically generated pluralism, & not in the historically generated pluralism of the old Europe. Secularization originally meant the transfer of clergy (priests or monks) from regular to secular thereby making them secularis or laypersons. Since the Westphalian Treaty of 1647 the word secularization has meant the transfer of ecclesiastical property to civil possession or use. Secularization means a strict separation of the church & the state. It also means a secular implementation of Christian postulates of universal equality of equals among equals. Today, the concept of secularization is used metaphorically as dezideologization i.e. as the criticism of state forms such as fascism and communism which possessed only ideological & not democratic legitimacy. In that sense the thesis of the cultural or spiritual unity of Europe as its legitimizing grounds is undemocratic as it replaces & conditions democracy with a vague concept of culture or spoken communication. References. Adapted from the source document.

Članak je nastojanje da se razmisli o budućnosti komparativne političke i socijalne filozofije na temelju interakcije s empirijskim i teorijskim istraživanjima u društvenim znanostima i humanistici. Sastoji se od četiri dijela: 1. Kratke prezentacije izvora »komparativnog zaokreta« i četvrtog vala kritike eurocentrizma; 2. Razmišljanja o problemu »višestrukih moderna« (»nove moderne«) kao posljedice »komparativnog zaokreta« i izazova za ideju društva i politike temeljene na konceptu sekularnog javnog uma; 3. Reference na izazov klasičnoj postavci javne sfere (ukorijenjene u idealu javnog uma) razvijene od strane Nilüfer Göle koja je istraživala novu »islamsku javnu vidljivost kao kritiku sekularne verzije javne sfere« u Zapadnoj Europi. ; The paper is an effort to reflect on the prospects of comparative political and social philosophy based on interaction with empirical and theoretical research in the social sciences and humanities. It consists of the following components: 1. Short presentation of the sources of the "comparative turn" and the fourth wave of the critique of Eurocentrism. 2. Reflection on the problem of "multiple modernities" ("new modernities") as the consequence of the "comparative turn", and a challenge for the idea of society and politics based on the concept of secular public reason. 3. Reference to a challenge to the classical notion of the public sphere (rooted in the ideal of public reason) which was developed by Nilüfer Göle while studying new "Islamic public visibility as a critique of a secular version of the public sphere" in Western Europe. ; Cet article, constituant une tentative pour penser les perspectives d'avenir de la politique comparée et de la philosophie sociale, se base sur l'interaction entre les recherches empiriques et théoriques dans les sciences sociales et humaines. Il est composé des trois parties suivantes : 1. d'une brève présentation de la source du « tournant comparé » et de la quatrième vague de la critique de l'eurocentrisme ; 2. d'une réflexion sur le problème des « multiples modernités » (« nouvelles modernités ») comme conséquence du « tournant comparé » et sur le défi se rapportant à l'idée d'une société basée sur la raison publique séculaire ; 3. d'une référence concernant la récusation de la notion classique de sphère publique (incarnée dans l'idéal de la raison publique) développée par Nilüfer Göle dans sa recherche sur la nouvelle « visibilité publique islamique en tant que critique d'une version séculaire de la sphère publique » dans l'Europe de l'ouest. ; Der Artikel ist bestrebt, über die Perspektiven der komparativen politischen Philosophie und Sozialphilosophie zu reflektieren, basiert auf der Interaktion mit der empirischen und theoretischen Forschung in den Sozial- und Geisteswissenschaften. Er besteht aus folgenden Komponenten: 1. Kurze Darstellung der Quelle der "komparativen Wende" und die vierte Welle der Kritik des Eurozentrismus; 2. Nachdenken über das Problem der "multiplen modernitäten" ("neue modernitäten") als Folge der "komparativen Wende" und der Herausforderung an die sich auf das Konzept der säkularen öffentlichen Vernunft stützende Idee der Gesellschaft und Politik; 3. Bezugnahme auf die Herausforderung für die klassische Vorstellung von der öffentlichen Sphäre (verwurzelt im Ideal der öffentlichen Vernunft), entwickelt von Nilüfer Göle, die die neue "islamische öffentliche Sichtbarkeit als Kritik der säkularen Version der öffentlichen Sphäre" in Westeuropa erforscht hat.

Publikacja recenzowana / Peer-reviewed publication ; Tekst przedstawia politykę historyczną Rosji w kontekście syryjskiego sekularyzmu – ukazuje nową rundę zmagań pomiędzy anglosaskim optymizmem dotyczącym islamu na Bliskim Wschodzie a historycznym rosyjskim realizmem. Po pierwsze, wspierana przez Rosję świecka partia Baas zapewniła trwałą integrację mniejszości Syrii w pewien typ społeczeństwa i systemu politycznego gwarantującego wolność religijną w przeciwieństwie do systemów radykalnego islamu. Po drugie, Rosja wykorzystuje pamięć zbiorową alawitów i chrześcijan odnoszącą się do sunnickich prześladowań oraz kontrowersyjne alianse USA, utwierdzając swe wpływy zagraniczne, głównie w regionach związanych z prawosławiem. Po trzecie, Stany Zjednoczone i niektóre państwa UE osądzają działalność al-Assada według własnej perspektywy po 1990 r., tzn. eksperymentu wdrażania standardów wielokulturowego społeczeństwa. Z kolei Rosja ocenia sytuację w regionie z perspektywy co najmniej 200 lat, które obfitowały w wiele dramatycznych wydarzeń, z najbardziej bolesnym: ludobójstwem Ormian. Problemem jest to, że w przypadku ewentualnego upadku rządów Baszara Al-Asada Zachód nie będzie w stanie zapewnić mniejszościom długoterminowego bezpieczeństwa według swoich demokratycznych standardów. W tej sytuacji alawici i chrześcijanie upatrują w Rosji gwaranta bezpieczeństwa i wolności religijnej. Zachodnie wsparcie dla "demokracji" na Bliskim Wschodzie i Azji Centralnej przerodziło się w pasmo konfliktów i zaowocowało niebywałym rozwojem radykalnego islamu. ; This article presents an overview of the principal results of research on the historically-oriented policy of Russia's activity in the Middle East in the context of the case of Syrian- Ba'thist secularism. Firstly, supported by Russia the secular approach of the Syrian Baath Party has provided integration of the Alawites, Christians and other minorities into the political system and society. Secondly, Russia has used memories of many religious warfare and Islamic (Sunni) persecution of Alawites and Orthodox Christians. Using this kind of collective memories, Russian policy has linked many Christian nations. Thirdly, one of the misunderstandings is that the United States and some EU countries judge Assad and Syria by the modern standards of post 1990 Western Europe; Putin and Russia are judging matters in the context of over two hundred years of conflicts and persecutions. Probably, it is a new round of competition between the Anglo-Saxon liberal optimism and historical Russian pessimism. The problem is that in the case of Assad's fall Washington and none of its Western allies are able to provide long-term security for Syrian minorities according to their democratic standards. Paradoxically, the Alawites and Christians automatically see Russia as a natural protector of human rights at least in terms of religious freedom. Unfortunately, today's western support for 'democracies' in the Middle East (Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and Libya) has been unsuccessful.