The revival of the religion in the new context of a global world-society, which is as modern as religious, doesn´t happen only as a sociological result of the dismantling of the postcolonial world —which denies the secularist forecast of the religion decline and provides the pluralism phenomenon with an unthought-of ethical and political complexity and virtuality—, but as a result of the modern reason crisis too, that makes reason rationally unable to justify political life relying on a rationalist ethical monism. The rationalist last foundation crisis affects as much the fundamentalist religious claims —which pretend to interpret the so called «religion resurgence or religion revival» in a «postsecular society» in a rapidly triumphal way, as the secularist claims which pretend to deny the religion any ethical and political virtuality in the public sphere. The democratic turn, antiauthoritarian and antidogmatic, coherently demanded within the context of the modern reason crisis by three wellknown representatives of the postmetaphysical, hermeneutical and pragmatist philosophy, such as Vattimo, Habermas and Rorty, replaces the debate between secularism and religion on the basis of true questions with the other on the basis of solidarity questions. ; La presencia revitalizada de la religión en el contexto globalizado de una sociedad-mundo, tan moderna como religiosa, no acontece únicamente como resultado sociológico del desmantelamiento del mundo postcolonial —que desmiente de hecho el pronóstico secularista del ocaso de la religión y que dota al fénomeno del pluralismo de una complejidad y virtualidad ética/política impensadas—, sino también como resultado de la crisis de la razón moderna y sus postulados, que se revela incapaz de justificar desde el monismo ético racionalista la convivencia política. La crisis de fundamentación racional última afecta tanto a las pretensiones fundamentalistas de la religión —impidiendo una lectura precipitadamente triunfalista del llamado «retorno de la religión» en la «sociedad postsecular»— como a las pretensiones secularistas de negación de toda virtualidad ética y política de la religión en la esfera pública. El giro democrático, antiautoritario y antidogmático, postulado coherentemente en la crisis de la modernidad por tres representantes de la filosofía postmetafísica, hermenéutica y pragmatista, tales como Vattimo, Habermas y Rorty, sitúa el debate entre secularismo y religión en claves no de verdad, sino de solidaridad.
Riconoscere che i concetti di laicità e secolarismo possiedono un'origine e uno sviluppo condizionato dalla cultura occidentale e dal cristianesimo significa prendere in considerazione l'eventualità di un ripensamento della distinzione tra ordine politico, religione e diritto nelle democrazie multiculturali e multireligiose. L'obiettivo di questo lavoro è mettere in discussione una concezione neutralista del secolarismo, alla cui base vi è il convincimento per cui l'esclusione dell'elemento religioso dalla sfera pubblica e normativa sono garanzia di eguaglianza in un contesto caratterizzato dal 'fatto del pluralismo'. Pertanto abbiamo analizzato il pensiero di due fra i più influenti filosofi politici, John Rawls e Jürgen Habermas, portavoci di una visione neutralista del secolarismo, e le critiche a essi rivolte da alcuni teorici del multiculturalismo – Bikhu Parekh e Tariq Modood –, che propongono, invece, l'abbandono della retorica della neutralità nella costruzione della sfera politica e normativa. Di conseguenza questi ultimi si rivolgono con maggiore apertura rispetto alle richieste provenienti dagli individui appartenenti a minoranze religiose e culturali, senza respingerle sulla base della loro natura culturale o religiosa. Al contrario, in particolare quando tali richieste di riconoscimento riguardano aree rilevanti della vita degli individui, come possono essere la famiglia, il matrimonio, le questioni ereditarie ecc., ossia aree in cui la natura culturalmente condizionata di alcune istituzioni è maggiormente visibile, viene presa qui in considerazione la possibilità che esse possano essere regolate e gestite in maniera differente. A tal proposito si è approfondita la proposta di far fronte a queste richieste attraverso l'adozione di sistemi di pluralismo normativo, con una particolare attenzione a un esperimento avviato in Gran Bretagna, che prevede per le comunità religiose la possibilità del risolvere le proprie controversie in materia di diritto di famiglia in tribunali arbitrali religiosi, che tuttavia operano sotto il controllo indiretto delle corti inglesi. La descrizione di questo caso è stata finalizzata a mettere in luce la necessità di ricercare nuovi strumenti coerenti con la visione del secolarismo che abbiamo cercato di proporre, ossia di una laicità che di fronte alle nuove istanze presenti nei contesti culturalmente e religiosamente plurali, piuttosto che arroccarsi dietro la convinzione che si possa garantire uguaglianza solo se si dà una sfera pubblica e normativa neutrale e che vi sia una soluzione razionale ai conflitti tra valori, tenta di accogliere la diversità nei suoi propri termini, andando alla ricerca di nuovi strumenti teorico-politici. Infatti, i canali di partecipazione attraverso i quali i sistemi democratici hanno cercato d'integrare la diversità non sembrano riuscire a far fronte alle richieste provenienti da individui che non si riconoscono a pieno titolo nella cultura della maggioranza. Ciò significa pensare a nuove strategie d'inclusione – di cui il pluralismo normativo può essere un esempio –, se si vogliono garantire proprio quei presupposti di valore che la democrazia promuove, ossia il pluralismo e l'eguale libertà di tutti i cittadini. ; If we recognize that the concept of secularism originates and develops from the influence of Western culture and Christianity, we must take into account the possibility to rethink the distinction between politics, religion and law in multicultural and multireligious democracies. The aim of this work is to question the neutralist conception of secularism, which is characterized by the belief that the exclusion of religious elements from public sphere and legislation to guarantee of equality in a context characterized by religious pluralism. At this aim, I analyze the thought of two of the most influential political philosophers, John Rawls and Jürgen Habermas, who represent the neutralist view of secularism, as well as the criticism addressed to them by multiculturalist theorists – Bhikhu Parekh and Tariq Modood –, who suggest giving up the abandon of the rhetoric of neutrality in the construction of the political sphere and regulations, to pay more attention to the demands coming from individuals belonging to religious and cultural minorities. Indeed, particularly when these issues involve significant areas where the culturally conditioned nature of some institutions is more visible – family, marriage, hereditary issues – the possibility that they can be regulated in a different way is also taken into account. Therefore, a detailed analysis of the proposal is given to adopt a system of legal pluralism, with a special attention to an experiment started in the UK, which provides religious communities the possibility to go to religious arbitration tribunals, operating under the indirect control of the English courts, related to family law. The description of this case aims at emphasizing the need to seek for new consistent means with the idea of secularism I have tried to suggest. Such a secularism is based upon the belief that only a neutral public sphere and legislation can guarantee equality, but tries to embrace diversity and to suggest new political theories. As matter of fact, the channels of participation through which democratic systems have tried to integrate diversity do not seem to be able to face the requests from individuals who do not fully identify into the majority culture, which means thinking about new strategies of inclusion – for example legal pluralism – so to ensure the very value assumptions promoted by democracy, that is to say pluralism and equal liberty. ; Dottorato di ricerca in Relazioni e processi interculturali (XXV ciclo)
Dignitatis humanae, the declaration of Vatican ii on religious freedom, represents an important step in the Church's presentation of human freedom as expressed also in the political arena. By enshrining conscience and religious freedom as supreme, Dignitatis humanae completes the reflection of Gaudium et spes on the Church in the modern world. It establishes Christianity as a religion of the Logos and so of dialogue and free inquiry. In today's era of globalization and ever more multiethnic societies, Dignitatis humanae contributes to renewing the role of religions in the public sphere and to elaborating the broader notions of religion in relation with secularity. ; La declaración sobre la libertad religiosa, Dignitatis humanae, representa un paso importante tanto en la presentación de la libertad humana dentro de la Iglesia como en el campo político. Al consagrar la conciencia y la libertad religiosa como un bien supremo, Dignitatis humanae completa la reflexión de Gaudium et spes sobre la Iglesia en el mundo moderno. Se establece el cristianismo como una religión del Logos, del diálogo y de la búsqueda. En la actual era de la globalización y de sociedades cada vez más multiétnicas, Dignitatis humanae contribuye a renovar el papel de las religiones en la esfera pública y a elaborar conceptos más amplios de la religión en relación a la laicidad.
Resumen. En 1927, en la ciudad de Buenos Aires, fue publicado el libro Los dogmas, la enseñanza y el Estado, cuyos autores fueron dos jóvenes figuras pertenecientes al sector del batlllismo radical: Julio César Grauert y Pedro Ceruti Crosa. El contenido polémico del libro ponía nuevamente en tensión uno de los temas más sensibles en el proceso de secularización del país, como fue el de la educación. Proponían, entre otros temas, el monopolio estatal de la educación primaria, con la consecuente abolición de la libertad de enseñanza y de los derechos de los padres a decidir la educación de sus hijos, así como una reforma de la familia y la sociedad. La radicalidad de las afirmaciones contenidas en el libro le valió el apodo, por parte de la oposición, de "plan batllicomunista" para la educación. Desde esta perspectiva polémica del libro, el presente trabajo se propone analizar algunos componentes del laicismo radical presentes en la obra en relación a la educación, expresión de la postura ideológica política de sus autores. Abstract. In 1927, in the city of Buenos Aires, the book Los dogmas, la enseñanza y el Estado (Dogmas, Teaching and State) was published. It was written by Julio César Grauert and Pedro Ceruti Crosa, two young figures from the radical wing of the political sector known as "batllismo". The polemic over the book's content aroused controversy yet again about education, one of the most sensitive issues regarding the secularization of the country. Among other topics, it was proposed that the State would have the monopoly over Primary Education, with the consequence of the abolition of the academic freedom and the parents' rights to decide about their children's education, as well as a reform in family and society. Part of the opposition parties said the book was "the batllicomunista plan" for education due to its radical statements. Given this controversial view of the book, this article aims to analyze certain components of the radical secularism in relation to the kind of education that the book proposes, and expresses the political ideology of its authors.
El trabajo busca precisar las posturas adoptadas por los llamados "liberales" en materia religiosa a partir del análisis de algunos de los conflictos jurisdiccionales que se produjeron en la década de 1880. En líneas generales, se argumenta que amplios sectores de las élites políticas —nucleadas en el Partido Autonomista Nacional (PAN)— ensayaron un modelo de laicidad más "galicano" que "liberal", basado en la defensa y el ejercicio del patronato. En ese marco, el que Argentina no separara finalmente Iglesia y Estado no debe pensarse como un proceso ―trunco‖ o ―inacabado‖, sino como una consecuencia de las ideas y percepciones de la dirigencia del PAN. ; The article attempts to clarify the positions taken in the religious matters by the so-called "liberals". For that purpose, the paper analyzes some of the jurisdictional conflict in the 1880s. The thesis is that political elites, within the National Autonomous Party (PAN), did not promoted a liberal secularism, in order to separate Church and State, but one that could be called "gallican", based on the exercise of patronage. In this context, Argentina did not finally separate Church and State, but this should not be thought as a "truncated" or "unfinished" process but as a logical consequence of the ideas and positions of the leaders of the PAN. ; Fil: Mauro, Diego A. Universidad Nacional de Rosario. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina
In this article we propose that Habermas´ account of the role of religion in the public sphere follows the Aristotelian model of distributive justice. After presenting a way in which Aristotle´s notion of distributive justice can be used to assess participation within political debates, the text will relate such a presentation with Habermas´ discussion on the role of religion in the public sphere of a deliberative democracy. Finally, in the third part of the text, we will present some conclusions. ; La tesis que se quiere plantear, en este artículo, es la relación que tiene la propuesta de Habermas, sobre el rol de la religión en la esfera pública, con el modelo aristotélico de la justicia distributiva. En primer lugar, se tendrá en cuenta, la forma en la que la noción de justicia distributiva de Aristoteles puede servir para valorar la participación en los debates políticos. Luego, el artículo, relacionará tal exposición con la discusión de Habermas sobre el rol de la religión en la esfera pública de unademocracia deliberativa. Finalmente, en la tercera parte, se presentarán algunas conclusiones.
It seems to take growing root in the West a certain idea of marriage, which appears to descend from the French secularism model, in being "counter-traditional", respectful of the individual autonomy, and devoted to an "integral" application of the principle of equality. The proof is that it putted down roots in legal contexts poles apart from the above model, for their way to set the space and the relevance of religion in the public sphere. The study examines the emblematic English case, where this notion has led to the introduction of "same-sex marriage", without the peculiar framework of the relations between the State and his national Church, with his singular legal tecnical implications (the "ecclesiastical law" as integral part of the general law of England; the "constitutional" principle for which the canon law cannot be contrary to the latter; the correspondence – until then – between "anglican marriage" and the civil one; the clergy's duty to solemnise the marriage of all the residents in the Country irrespective of the couple's religious beliefs or lack of them) have rapresented a barrier or a scruple. The goal of the paper is, on one hand, focusing the political and legal reasons that underlie this outcome, and, on the other hand, look into the impact that the latter has resulted on the Church of England's legal system, its legally relevant reactions, and the adopted "style of presence", also as a "benchmark" for the more comprehensive anglican world.
La obra está dividida en dos partes. La primera es de carácter general; aborda, desde una perspectiva jurídica y sociológica, los procesos de secularización y la definición y paradigmas de la laicidad en Europa y América del Norte, principalmente. El objetivo de esta primera parte es contextualizar las normas y principios jurídicos que rigen la presencia de la religión el ámbito público, con el fin de comprender mejor las soluciones adoptadas por los distintos ordenamientos. La segunda parte está centrada en el Derecho español. Examina, en primer lugar, el desarrollo jurisprudencial del principio de laicidad. A continuación se tratan algunos problemas específicos que por diferentes razones tienen un particular interés en nuestro país: la educación, los símbolos religiosos y algunos puntos de contacto entre el elemento religioso y las autoridades civiles
El autor destaca y critica la llamada interpretación esencialista del Islam, difundida no solo en algunos entornos del orientalismo europeo y americano, sino también en contextos intelectuales de las más variadas orientaciones políticas. Según estas visiones, el Islam sería en su naturaleza y esencia "intrínsecamente incompatible" con Occidente. De esta forma se identifica, como hace Huntington en The Clash of Civilizations, Islam e islamismo fundamentalista, considerándose este último como la real, constante e inmodificable expresión del Islam, no susceptible de transformación. A esto se opone un Occidente descrito, de la misma manera, como una realidad con carácter universal, absoluto y ahistórico, como la libertad y la democracia. El autor muestra la dimensión ideológica y abstracta de tal interpretación y la inconsistencia histórica de una prospectiva que reduce al Islam y a Occidente a dos "ideas platónicas". ; The author identifies and criticizes the so-called essentialist interpretation of Islam, which is widespread not only in some European and American Orientalist circles, but also even in intellectual contexts of more diverse political orientation. According to this vision, Islam is by its nature, in its essence, "intrinsically incompatible" with the West. In this way Islam is identified with fundamentalist islamism, as Huntington does in The Clash of Civilizations, and the latter is considered the true, constant and unchangeable expression of Islam, not susceptible to transformation. To this one counterposes a West described, in the same way, as a reality with characteristics of universality, absoluteness and ahistoricity, such as freedom and democracy. The author demonstrates the ideological and abstract dimension from that interpretation and the historical inconsistency of a perspective that reduces Islam and the West to two "platonic ideas."
¿Es posible pensar en un léxico de los derechos a través de un imaginario jurídico que quiere alejarse de la herencia moderna? Este artículo se ocupa del tema de los conflictos jurídicos que proceden del pluralismo moral, en el ámbito del debate entre secularismo y postsecularismo. Partiendo de la revalorización del espacio de la política, la autora vuelve a interpretar algunas perspectivas elaboradas por la teoría general del derecho, que captan la raíz pluralista de las prácticas sociales. ; It is possible talk about rights in a legal imagination, that wants to separate itself from modern heritage? This paper discusses the legal conflicts that arise from moral pluralism in the debate on secularism and post-secularism. Moving from the revaluation of the space of politics, the author rethinks some perspectives of general theory of law, that capture the pluralistic root of social practices.
It is possible talk about rights in a legal imagination, that wants to separate itself from modern heritage? This paper discusses the legal conflicts that arise from moral pluralism in the debate on secularism and post-secularism. Moving from the revaluation of the space of politics, the author rethinks some perspectives of general theory of law, that capture the pluralistic root of social practices. ; ¿Es posible pensar en un léxico de los derechos a través de un imaginario jurídico que quiere alejarse de la herencia moderna? Este artículo se ocupa del tema de los conflictos jurídicos que proceden del pluralismo moral, en el ámbito del debate entre secularismo y postsecularismo. Partiendo de la revalorización del espacio de la política, la autora vuelve a interpretar algunas perspectivas elaboradas por la teoría general del derecho, que captan la raíz pluralista de las prácticas sociales.
Freedom of religion is a basic principle to any legal and political system that assumes the essential relevance of human freedom. However, other equally basic rights can be affected if that freedom is interpreted as autonomy of religion with respect to politics, protecting religious groups as given and closed realities. In its more consistent sense with gender equality, freedom of religion should require that other rights are not affected by intervention of religious communities. This does not involve a necessary contradiction between gender and religion if an open and plural conception of religions as communities of conversation is assumed. From this, religious freedom is not incompatible with the legitimate function of political institutions, domestic and international, to promote the egalitarian elements of religious traditions, encouraging internal debate and supporting the internal groups that try to overcome discrimination. Institutions truly committed to religious freedom should act so as women are no longer treated as mere subject of debate but actors in it, with a reflective and active role in their own religious tradition. A different conception of religions as holistic and static realities and favorable to treat religious arguments as exception to general normative models is incompatible with secularism and the gender equality that it should especially promote. ; La libertad religiosa es un principio básico de cualquier sistema jurídico-político que asuma la relevancia esencial de la libertad humana. Sin embargo, otros derechos igualmente básicos pueden verse afectados si esa libertad se interpreta como autonomía de lo religioso respecto de lo político, protegiendo a los grupos religiosos como realidades dadas y cerradas. La libertad religiosa en su sentido más coherente con la igualdad de género debe requerir que el resto de derechos no sea afectado de modo discriminatorio por la actuación de las comunidades religiosas. Ello no supone una contradicción necesaria entre género y religión si se asume ...
La obra de Condorcet en España es conocida ya por sus contemporáneos, entre ellos Jovellanos, e inspira a los ilustrados españoles, especialmente en lo referente a informes y propuestas sobre políticas educativas. Su influencia y valoración durante los siglos XIX y XX depende de las ideologías, de las políticas imperantes y de las de los comentaristas y críticos que se ocupan de su obra. A partir de la transición democrática y especialmente con motivo del bicentenario de la Revolución francesa (1989), el interés por las ideas de este adalid de la educación universal (gratuidad, coeducación, formación a lo largo de la vida) y de la laicidad, es creciente en nuestro país. Si bien sus obras sobre la instrucción pública son las más conocidas y comentadas, no faltan estudiosos que hayan puesto su atención en los contenidos jurídicos y en las reflexiones filosóficas de su obra histórica. Se han estudiado también sus escritos en defensa de los derechos democráticos de las mujeres, pero creemos que, en la historia del feminismo, esta aportación no ha sido suficientemente valorada. ; Condorcet's work was already known by his Spanish contemporaries, including Jovellanos. It inspired Spanish enlightened, especially in terms of reports and proposals on education policies. Condorcet's influence and valuation during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries depend on the prevailing ideologies and policies of each period, as well as on the political views of his work's commentators and critics. From the democratic transition on, and especially after the bicentenary of the French Revolution (1989), Spain has developed a growing interest in Condorcet's thoughts, in this leader of secularism and universal education (free-of-charge, coeducation and lifelong education). Whilst Condorcet's works on public education are the best known and the most commented, many scholars have turned their attention to the legal content and the philosophical reflections of his historical work. His writings in defence of democratic rights for women have also been studied, but we believe that in the history of feminism, his contribution has not been sufficiently valued.
