Suchergebnisse

This thesis relates to the problems of secularity and religion to Tunisia. The stake is to study these two concepts in a new ground : Tunisia. This study rises from independence until the revolution.In the first left, the thesis concentrates on the genesis of the concept of secularity, its originality and the specificity of the Tunisian policy. This part constitutes first cross between the political power and religious.In the second part, the thesis concentrates on the Tunisian society. It focuses hard tearing between the adhesion of the movement reformist forced by Bourguiba and the Islamism represented by the movement of the Islamic Tendency. This part will be an opportunity to explore new social space. A new social architecture will be drawn, between female warping and the blooming of the religiosity.In the last part, we are accentuated on the excitement of the contemporary Tunisian thought in front of the choice between appropriation and adaptation to the secularism. The initial question in this part is doubly ambiguous. how does the Islamic company lay out the questions which disturbs it? Religious freedom, apostasy, wine, testimony : concepts subjected to endless debates. How can we interpret the delay of the Muslim company? The studies of Charfi and Talbi give us some tracks of thought. A new feminine generation will be present in Tunisia. It will be time to discover how the female thought occupies it the cultural scene in Tunisia. This thesis tries to answer if secularity is the cause of the crisis of the Tunisian society or the solution. ; Cette thèse porte sur la problématique de la laïcité et religion en Tunisie. L'enjeu est d'étudier ces deux notions dans un terrain nouveau : la Tunisie. Cette étude découle de l'indépendance jusqu'à la révolution. Dans le première partie, la thèse se concentre sur la genèse du concept de la laïcité, son originalité et la spécificité de la politique tunisienne. Cette partie constitue une première croisée entre le pouvoir politique et religieux. Dans la deuxième ...

International audience ; What should be the right place for religions in France ? Our debates are old and sharp. France has two legislations : a concordat (Napoléon) for two departments and the common rule (1905). The word "Laîcité" was not employed at the beginning, but appears progressively. Do Muslims living in France are changing the concept ? Do they imply a new manner of seeing things ? What are the results of the attacks of 2015 and 2016 on the opinion ? We analyse in this communication for the universities of Bucharest and Craiova articles published in the newspaper Le Monde. What is the reflection about the concept of "laïcité", what are the traditional arguments and the new ones ? ; La définition de la place des religions est une question récurrente en France. Les débats sont anciens, notamment depuis la période révolutionnaire. Ils ont abouti à un régime de concordat, puis à la loi de 1905 de séparation des Églises et de l'État. Le concept de laïcité est apparu au fil des arguments. La présence de l'islam sur le sol français pose-t-elle des problèmes spécifiques ? Les terroristes islamistes peuvent-ils avoir raison de notre manière de vivre ensemble ? Après un retour sur les débats qui ont accompagné la loi de 1905, nous analyserons ici les articles d'opinion parus dans le journal Le Monde après les attentats de 2015 et de 2016. Il s'agira de présenter les thématiques et les arguments développés, avec un triple souci : identifier ce que l'on pourrait nommer les thèmes et arguments qui concernent indistinctement toutes les religions, les thèmes spécifiquement liés à l'islam, et enfin les thèmes nouveaux qui émergent.

International audience ; What should be the right place for religions in France ? Our debates are old and sharp. France has two legislations : a concordat (Napoléon) for two departments and the common rule (1905). The word "Laîcité" was not employed at the beginning, but appears progressively. Do Muslims living in France are changing the concept ? Do they imply a new manner of seeing things ? What are the results of the attacks of 2015 and 2016 on the opinion ? We analyse in this communication for the universities of Bucharest and Craiova articles published in the newspaper Le Monde. What is the reflection about the concept of "laïcité", what are the traditional arguments and the new ones ? ; La définition de la place des religions est une question récurrente en France. Les débats sont anciens, notamment depuis la période révolutionnaire. Ils ont abouti à un régime de concordat, puis à la loi de 1905 de séparation des Églises et de l'État. Le concept de laïcité est apparu au fil des arguments. La présence de l'islam sur le sol français pose-t-elle des problèmes spécifiques ? Les terroristes islamistes peuvent-ils avoir raison de notre manière de vivre ensemble ? Après un retour sur les débats qui ont accompagné la loi de 1905, nous analyserons ici les articles d'opinion parus dans le journal Le Monde après les attentats de 2015 et de 2016. Il s'agira de présenter les thématiques et les arguments développés, avec un triple souci : identifier ce que l'on pourrait nommer les thèmes et arguments qui concernent indistinctement toutes les religions, les thèmes spécifiquement liés à l'islam, et enfin les thèmes nouveaux qui émergent.

International audience ; When it comes to studying the problems of secularism today, philosophers are not the most competent of individuals for doing so. They can, however, study the idea of secularism in itself in order to avoid overly severe divisions that result in misunderstandings in the use of concepts. Secularism is a response to current nihilism, but it cannot be a pure criticism of religion. Religion is not a purely private matter. Moreover, secularism is greater than any particular historical achievement. Not only is secularism evolving, but one must accept the great diversity of its possible expression depending on the situation. Secularism should not be an act of excluding certain people; it must also be a space of expression for religions. Interreligious dialogue and reciprocal recognition between the state and religion make secularism possible, which is the foundation of the unity of a people. Philosophers cannot eliminate all of the difficulties involved, but they can bring them to light. ; Le philosophe n'a pas de compétence particulière pour étudier les problèmes contemporains de la laïcité, mais il peut étudier l'idée de laïcité en elle-même de manière à éviter les séparations trop brutales comme les confusions dangereuses. Si la laïcité se veut une réponse au nihilisme actuel, elle ne peut pas être simplement le rejet de la religion dans la sphère privée ; elle ne peut pas non plus s'identifier totalement à l'une de ses formes historiques particulières et il est nécessaire d'envisager non seulement une évolution de la pratique de la laïcité, mais également une très grande diversité de sa réalisation. Toute la difficulté est de ne pas transformer la laïcité en un processus d'exclusion de toute une catégorie de la population. Cela suppose de concevoir la laïcité aussi comme un espace d'expression des religions. Cela n'est possible que par un dialogue interreligieux et par une reconnaissance réciproque du religieux et du politique, en ayant bien soin de donner un sens large au religieux. Il ne s'agit pas de lever toutes les apories, mais au moins de parvenir à les mettre en lumière.

International audience ; When it comes to studying the problems of secularism today, philosophers are not the most competent of individuals for doing so. They can, however, study the idea of secularism in itself in order to avoid overly severe divisions that result in misunderstandings in the use of concepts. Secularism is a response to current nihilism, but it cannot be a pure criticism of religion. Religion is not a purely private matter. Moreover, secularism is greater than any particular historical achievement. Not only is secularism evolving, but one must accept the great diversity of its possible expression depending on the situation. Secularism should not be an act of excluding certain people; it must also be a space of expression for religions. Interreligious dialogue and reciprocal recognition between the state and religion make secularism possible, which is the foundation of the unity of a people. Philosophers cannot eliminate all of the difficulties involved, but they can bring them to light. ; Le philosophe n'a pas de compétence particulière pour étudier les problèmes contemporains de la laïcité, mais il peut étudier l'idée de laïcité en elle-même de manière à éviter les séparations trop brutales comme les confusions dangereuses. Si la laïcité se veut une réponse au nihilisme actuel, elle ne peut pas être simplement le rejet de la religion dans la sphère privée ; elle ne peut pas non plus s'identifier totalement à l'une de ses formes historiques particulières et il est nécessaire d'envisager non seulement une évolution de la pratique de la laïcité, mais également une très grande diversité de sa réalisation. Toute la difficulté est de ne pas transformer la laïcité en un processus d'exclusion de toute une catégorie de la population. Cela suppose de concevoir la laïcité aussi comme un espace d'expression des religions. Cela n'est possible que par un dialogue interreligieux et par une reconnaissance réciproque du religieux et du politique, en ayant bien soin de donner un sens large au religieux. Il ne ...

International audience ; L'Union Européenne est-elle laïque ? Comment les États promeuvent-ils des valeurs communes ou des compétences civiques ? Ces questions pouvaient sembler relativement disjointes il y a quelques décennies, mais deviennent de plus en plus étroitement reliées entre elles. En France du moins, la laïcité est perçue comme un élément central des valeurs communes (les « valeurs de la République »). Je propose d'aborder ces thèmes en prenant pour exemple quatre pays européens (Angleterre, France, Irlande, Pologne). Après un questionnement sur l'existence ou non d'une « laïcité européenne », il s'agira de clarifier le lien entre laïcité et ce qu'on appelle l' « identité nationale » d'une part, et entre valeurs communes et école commune d'autre part. Loin de constituer une spécificité française, la laïcité serait déjà plus ou moins mise en oeuvre en Europe : il y aurait « à l'échelle européenne, une consécration globale des principes fondamentaux de la laïcité » incluant la liberté de conscience et de pensée, ainsi que la non-discrimination par l'État des personnes en fonction de leur appartenance religieuse ou philosophique (Willaime, 2007, 5). De façon plus nuancée, Philippe Portier défend une conception « inclusiviste » de la laïcité, consistant à repérer ses différentes réalisations historiques dans plusieurs pays, ce qui va à l'encontre des conceptions « exclusivistes » tendant à ériger le modèle français en idéal normatif. Ces différentes orientations peuvent être discutées. Par exemple, les États polonais et irlandais discriminent-ils les citoyens en raison de leur (non-)appartenance religieuse ? Si la réponse est oui, alors il devient difficile d'adhérer à la thèse d'une laïcité européenne. En outre, le modèle français de laïcité suscite un intérêt dans des pays non-laïques où l'État exerce des discriminations au quotidien à l'encontre de citoyens sur la base de critères religieux. La question est donc scientifique autant que politique. Si l'on adopte sur le plan scientifique une conception ...

International audience ; L'Union Européenne est-elle laïque ? Comment les États promeuvent-ils des valeurs communes ou des compétences civiques ? Ces questions pouvaient sembler relativement disjointes il y a quelques décennies, mais deviennent de plus en plus étroitement reliées entre elles. En France du moins, la laïcité est perçue comme un élément central des valeurs communes (les « valeurs de la République »). Je propose d'aborder ces thèmes en prenant pour exemple quatre pays européens (Angleterre, France, Irlande, Pologne). Après un questionnement sur l'existence ou non d'une « laïcité européenne », il s'agira de clarifier le lien entre laïcité et ce qu'on appelle l' « identité nationale » d'une part, et entre valeurs communes et école commune d'autre part. Loin de constituer une spécificité française, la laïcité serait déjà plus ou moins mise en oeuvre en Europe : il y aurait « à l'échelle européenne, une consécration globale des principes fondamentaux de la laïcité » incluant la liberté de conscience et de pensée, ainsi que la non-discrimination par l'État des personnes en fonction de leur appartenance religieuse ou philosophique (Willaime, 2007, 5). De façon plus nuancée, Philippe Portier défend une conception « inclusiviste » de la laïcité, consistant à repérer ses différentes réalisations historiques dans plusieurs pays, ce qui va à l'encontre des conceptions « exclusivistes » tendant à ériger le modèle français en idéal normatif. Ces différentes orientations peuvent être discutées. Par exemple, les États polonais et irlandais discriminent-ils les citoyens en raison de leur (non-)appartenance religieuse ? Si la réponse est oui, alors il devient difficile d'adhérer à la thèse d'une laïcité européenne. En outre, le modèle français de laïcité suscite un intérêt dans des pays non-laïques où l'État exerce des discriminations au quotidien à l'encontre de citoyens sur la base de critères religieux. La question est donc scientifique autant que politique. Si l'on adopte sur le plan scientifique une conception ...

Riconoscere che i concetti di laicità e secolarismo possiedono un'origine e uno sviluppo condizionato dalla cultura occidentale e dal cristianesimo significa prendere in considerazione l'eventualità di un ripensamento della distinzione tra ordine politico, religione e diritto nelle democrazie multiculturali e multireligiose. L'obiettivo di questo lavoro è mettere in discussione una concezione neutralista del secolarismo, alla cui base vi è il convincimento per cui l'esclusione dell'elemento religioso dalla sfera pubblica e normativa sono garanzia di eguaglianza in un contesto caratterizzato dal 'fatto del pluralismo'. Pertanto abbiamo analizzato il pensiero di due fra i più influenti filosofi politici, John Rawls e Jürgen Habermas, portavoci di una visione neutralista del secolarismo, e le critiche a essi rivolte da alcuni teorici del multiculturalismo – Bikhu Parekh e Tariq Modood –, che propongono, invece, l'abbandono della retorica della neutralità nella costruzione della sfera politica e normativa. Di conseguenza questi ultimi si rivolgono con maggiore apertura rispetto alle richieste provenienti dagli individui appartenenti a minoranze religiose e culturali, senza respingerle sulla base della loro natura culturale o religiosa. Al contrario, in particolare quando tali richieste di riconoscimento riguardano aree rilevanti della vita degli individui, come possono essere la famiglia, il matrimonio, le questioni ereditarie ecc., ossia aree in cui la natura culturalmente condizionata di alcune istituzioni è maggiormente visibile, viene presa qui in considerazione la possibilità che esse possano essere regolate e gestite in maniera differente. A tal proposito si è approfondita la proposta di far fronte a queste richieste attraverso l'adozione di sistemi di pluralismo normativo, con una particolare attenzione a un esperimento avviato in Gran Bretagna, che prevede per le comunità religiose la possibilità del risolvere le proprie controversie in materia di diritto di famiglia in tribunali arbitrali religiosi, che tuttavia operano sotto il controllo indiretto delle corti inglesi. La descrizione di questo caso è stata finalizzata a mettere in luce la necessità di ricercare nuovi strumenti coerenti con la visione del secolarismo che abbiamo cercato di proporre, ossia di una laicità che di fronte alle nuove istanze presenti nei contesti culturalmente e religiosamente plurali, piuttosto che arroccarsi dietro la convinzione che si possa garantire uguaglianza solo se si dà una sfera pubblica e normativa neutrale e che vi sia una soluzione razionale ai conflitti tra valori, tenta di accogliere la diversità nei suoi propri termini, andando alla ricerca di nuovi strumenti teorico-politici. Infatti, i canali di partecipazione attraverso i quali i sistemi democratici hanno cercato d'integrare la diversità non sembrano riuscire a far fronte alle richieste provenienti da individui che non si riconoscono a pieno titolo nella cultura della maggioranza. Ciò significa pensare a nuove strategie d'inclusione – di cui il pluralismo normativo può essere un esempio –, se si vogliono garantire proprio quei presupposti di valore che la democrazia promuove, ossia il pluralismo e l'eguale libertà di tutti i cittadini. ; If we recognize that the concept of secularism originates and develops from the influence of Western culture and Christianity, we must take into account the possibility to rethink the distinction between politics, religion and law in multicultural and multireligious democracies. The aim of this work is to question the neutralist conception of secularism, which is characterized by the belief that the exclusion of religious elements from public sphere and legislation to guarantee of equality in a context characterized by religious pluralism. At this aim, I analyze the thought of two of the most influential political philosophers, John Rawls and Jürgen Habermas, who represent the neutralist view of secularism, as well as the criticism addressed to them by multiculturalist theorists – Bhikhu Parekh and Tariq Modood –, who suggest giving up the abandon of the rhetoric of neutrality in the construction of the political sphere and regulations, to pay more attention to the demands coming from individuals belonging to religious and cultural minorities. Indeed, particularly when these issues involve significant areas where the culturally conditioned nature of some institutions is more visible – family, marriage, hereditary issues – the possibility that they can be regulated in a different way is also taken into account. Therefore, a detailed analysis of the proposal is given to adopt a system of legal pluralism, with a special attention to an experiment started in the UK, which provides religious communities the possibility to go to religious arbitration tribunals, operating under the indirect control of the English courts, related to family law. The description of this case aims at emphasizing the need to seek for new consistent means with the idea of secularism I have tried to suggest. Such a secularism is based upon the belief that only a neutral public sphere and legislation can guarantee equality, but tries to embrace diversity and to suggest new political theories. As matter of fact, the channels of participation through which democratic systems have tried to integrate diversity do not seem to be able to face the requests from individuals who do not fully identify into the majority culture, which means thinking about new strategies of inclusion – for example legal pluralism – so to ensure the very value assumptions promoted by democracy, that is to say pluralism and equal liberty. ; Dottorato di ricerca in Relazioni e processi interculturali (XXV ciclo)

The French secularism from 1958 to 1969: however, the meaning of the word "secularism" is less obvious than it seems. That noun became established only belatedly, under the third Republic, with the policy of secularisation conducted by the republican. Since then, secularism has remained a subject of debate and controversy between citizens and between savers 1, and its very definition remains problematic. As Jean-Pierre Rioux points out, secularism is 'neither a concept, a substance, a concept, nor a principle of positive law', and its 'definition is not given in any code, law or constitution 2'. However, it is necessary to agree on a provisional meaning, if only in order to be able to define its contours: secularism is not a spiritual option (unlike Catholicism, atheism, etc.), but a game rule designed to enable citizens to live together with different beliefs. More specifically, it is a set of rules (legal and case-law) and practices (political, administrative, symbolic) designed to administer the place of religion in the State and in society, while respecting freedom of conscience and the freedom to exercise religion. I propose to examine here how this complex set of rules and practices evolved between 1 June 1958 and 28 April 1969, when General de Gaulle exercised power as head of the last government of the fourth Republic and then as President of the Fifth Republic. This is not the topic that attracted most attention from the historians of the period. Many works place this aspect of history in a secondary place, traditionally favouring the strengthening of executive power, the Gaullian theme of France's 'size', and decolonisation. At present, historiography is very attentive to political staff and Gaullist networks, particularly in the context of the GAULHORE research programme (Gaullists: men and Networks) launched in 2008 under the leadership of Bernard Lachaise ; International audience ; The French secularism from 1958 to 1969: however, the meaning of the word "secularism" is less obvious than it seems. ...

Cours given at the summer session of the Institute of French Studies in NYU, branch of Paris.graduated level. From the successive cases of headscarf to Manif for all, religious issues occupy a central place in contemporary French political debates and contradict France's representations as a secular country where religion is completely relegated to the private sphere. This course will propose to revisit the specific features of political regulation of religion in France, as well as the idea of a 'return of religion' in France. It will address issues such as the visibility of religion in public spaces; the articulation between religious practice and political participation; the diversity of movements claiming secularism today; relations between state and religious leaders Catholic, Muslim and Jewish. ; Master ; Cours given at the summer session of the Institute of French Studies in NYU, branch of Paris.graduated level. From the successive cases of headscarf to Manif for all, religious issues occupy a central place in contemporary French political debates and contradict France's representations as a secular country where religion is completely relegated to the private sphere. This course will propose to revisit the specific features of political regulation of religion in France, as well as the idea of a 'return of religion' in France. It will address issues such as the visibility of religion in public spaces; the articulation between religious practice and political participation; the diversity of movements claiming secularism today; relations between state and religious leaders Catholic, Muslim and Jewish. ; Cours dispensé lors de la session d'été de l'Institute of French Studies à NYU, antenne de Paris.Niveau graduate. Depuis les successives affaires du foulard jusqu'à la Manif pour tous, les questions religieuses occupent une place centrale dans les débats politiques français contemporains et contredisent les représentations de la France comme un pays laïque où la religion serait totalement reléguée dans la ...

In France, research in history and political philosophy has produced a body of knowledge describing the values and principles that are at the heart of the « republican model of integration ». However, this work has been theoretical and conceptual in nature such that we have in fact very little knowledge about the psychological aspects of the republican model. This thesis is organized in three chapters that present in total seven distinct empirical studies It addressed two major questions: 1) What factors explain the strong support that is observed in France for the principle of republican equality and laïcité? and 2) what are the consequences of this support for prejudice and intergroup relations? In chapter one, the research confirms this strong endorsement of the republican principles among teachers in high schools (Study 1, N = 82) or among university students in widely different fields of study such as psychology (N = 72) or law (N = 234, Study 2). Using a measure of attachment to laïcité that is distinct from a measure of support for principles that are theoretically linked with laïcité, Study 2 showed, for the first time to our knowledge, the distinction between two types of laïcité: an historic laïcité based on freedom of conscience and equality of respects for all beliefs and a new laïcité that emphasizes the need for keep religion private and to ban conspicuous religious signs from public places. In chapter two, three studies examined the psychological motives underlying attachment to the republican principles. As expected, it was shown first, among a representative sample of the French population (N = 1001), that support for republican equality and new laïcité are two variables that explain variance in antiimmigrant prejudice over and above factors that are usually considered in sociology or social psychology. Moreover, whereas egalitarian individuals are usually more supportive of these principles compared to inegalitarians, the results also showed that people who wish to maintain group-based ...

In France, research in history and political philosophy has produced a body of knowledge describing the values and principles that are at the heart of the « republican model of integration ». However, this work has been theoretical and conceptual in nature such that we have in fact very little knowledge about the psychological aspects of the republican model. This thesis is organized in three chapters that present in total seven distinct empirical studies It addressed two major questions: 1) What factors explain the strong support that is observed in France for the principle of republican equality and laïcité? and 2) what are the consequences of this support for prejudice and intergroup relations? In chapter one, the research confirms this strong endorsement of the republican principles among teachers in high schools (Study 1, N = 82) or among university students in widely different fields of study such as psychology (N = 72) or law (N = 234, Study 2). Using a measure of attachment to laïcité that is distinct from a measure of support for principles that are theoretically linked with laïcité, Study 2 showed, for the first time to our knowledge, the distinction between two types of laïcité: an historic laïcité based on freedom of conscience and equality of respects for all beliefs and a new laïcité that emphasizes the need for keep religion private and to ban conspicuous religious signs from public places. In chapter two, three studies examined the psychological motives underlying attachment to the republican principles. As expected, it was shown first, among a representative sample of the French population (N = 1001), that support for republican equality and new laïcité are two variables that explain variance in antiimmigrant prejudice over and above factors that are usually considered in sociology or social psychology. Moreover, whereas egalitarian individuals are usually more supportive of these principles compared to inegalitarians, the results also showed that people who wish to maintain group-based ...

In France, research in history and political philosophy has produced a body of knowledge describing the values and principles that are at the heart of the « republican model of integration ». However, this work has been theoretical and conceptual in nature such that we have in fact very little knowledge about the psychological aspects of the republican model. This thesis is organized in three chapters that present in total seven distinct empirical studies It addressed two major questions: 1) What factors explain the strong support that is observed in France for the principle of republican equality and laïcité? and 2) what are the consequences of this support for prejudice and intergroup relations? In chapter one, the research confirms this strong endorsement of the republican principles among teachers in high schools (Study 1, N = 82) or among university students in widely different fields of study such as psychology (N = 72) or law (N = 234, Study 2). Using a measure of attachment to laïcité that is distinct from a measure of support for principles that are theoretically linked with laïcité, Study 2 showed, for the first time to our knowledge, the distinction between two types of laïcité: an historic laïcité based on freedom of conscience and equality of respects for all beliefs and a new laïcité that emphasizes the need for keep religion private and to ban conspicuous religious signs from public places. In chapter two, three studies examined the psychological motives underlying attachment to the republican principles. As expected, it was shown first, among a representative sample of the French population (N = 1001), that support for republican equality and new laïcité are two variables that explain variance in antiimmigrant prejudice over and above factors that are usually considered in sociology or social psychology. Moreover, whereas egalitarian individuals are usually more supportive of these principles compared to inegalitarians, the results also showed that people who wish to maintain group-based ...

Travail de recherche (2003-2009) fait en parallèle d'une fonction à plein temps de professeur de philosophie en lycée. Mention très honorable. ; In the French Republic theoretically and rhetorically based on liberty and equality, gender equality is still doubtful. Equality between sexes and above all sexualities seem to be institutionally inconceivable. The legislative responses to the claims by civil society are often ambiguous (statutory registration of sex change, Civil Pact of Solidarity, gender affirmative action etc.) and met with traditionalist resistances, basically more religious than symbolic. Analysing the social contract through the marriage contract makes it clear that after 1789 civil law was not revolutionized and, despite its voluntarism, kept clinging to "natural law". The state did not give up sex differentiation as inscribed in Genesis and canon law, then secularised by Rousseau. Women were stricken by both civil and civic incapacity there to last. However, by separating the family from the city, Rousseau separates the private from the public, thus contributing to the conception of French secularism. Differences between individuals pertain to the private, the public being the area of the citizens' undifferentiated equality. Now, statutory registration makes a "religion of the two sexes" compulsory as from birth, in total contradiction with today's way of life and biological breakthroughs. This form of state religion has discriminatory consequences through its prohibitions (homosexual parenthood.) and prescriptions (re-assigning intersexuals.). It would be logical for the secular state to give up sexing citizens. But many individuals, going through a crisis of marriage and nation, may still need to believe, the fiction of an Edenic community serving, then, as a partition of re-enchantment. ; Dans l'État républicain théoriquement et rhétoriquement fondé en liberté et en égalité, l'égalité sexuelle reste problématique. L'égalité des sexes et surtout l'égalité des sexualités sont comme ...

Travail de recherche (2003-2009) fait en parallèle d'une fonction à plein temps de professeur de philosophie en lycée. Mention très honorable. ; In the French Republic theoretically and rhetorically based on liberty and equality, gender equality is still doubtful. Equality between sexes and above all sexualities seem to be institutionally inconceivable. The legislative responses to the claims by civil society are often ambiguous (statutory registration of sex change, Civil Pact of Solidarity, gender affirmative action etc.) and met with traditionalist resistances, basically more religious than symbolic. Analysing the social contract through the marriage contract makes it clear that after 1789 civil law was not revolutionized and, despite its voluntarism, kept clinging to "natural law". The state did not give up sex differentiation as inscribed in Genesis and canon law, then secularised by Rousseau. Women were stricken by both civil and civic incapacity there to last. However, by separating the family from the city, Rousseau separates the private from the public, thus contributing to the conception of French secularism. Differences between individuals pertain to the private, the public being the area of the citizens' undifferentiated equality. Now, statutory registration makes a "religion of the two sexes" compulsory as from birth, in total contradiction with today's way of life and biological breakthroughs. This form of state religion has discriminatory consequences through its prohibitions (homosexual parenthood.) and prescriptions (re-assigning intersexuals.). It would be logical for the secular state to give up sexing citizens. But many individuals, going through a crisis of marriage and nation, may still need to believe, the fiction of an Edenic community serving, then, as a partition of re-enchantment. ; Dans l'État républicain théoriquement et rhétoriquement fondé en liberté et en égalité, l'égalité sexuelle reste problématique. L'égalité des sexes et surtout l'égalité des sexualités sont comme institutionnellement inconcevables. Les réponses législatives apportées aux revendications de la société civile sont souvent ambiguës (changement de sexe civil, PaCS, parité etc.) et marquées par des résistances traditionalistes, au fond plus religieuses que symboliques. En analysant le contrat social par le prisme du contrat de mariage, on peut montrer qu'après 1789 le droit civil n'a pas fait sa révolution et qu'il tient, malgré son volontarisme, au " droit de la nature ". L'État ne renonce pas à la différenciation sexuelle inscrite dans la Genèse et le droit canonique, puis sécularisée par Rousseau. Les femmes sont durablement frappées d'une double incapacité, civile et civique. Cependant, en séparant la famille et la Cité, Rousseau sépare le privé et le public et contribue à la conception de la laïcité. Les différences interindividuelles doivent rester au privé ; le public est l'espace de l'égalité indifférenciée des citoyens. Or l'état civil impose dès la naissance une " religion des deux sexes ", aujourd'hui contredite par les modes de vie et même la biologie. Cette forme de religion d'État a des conséquences discriminatoires par ses interdits (parenté homosexuelle.) et ses prescriptions (réassignation des intersexué-e-s.). Il serait logique que l'État laïque renonce à sexuer les citoyens. Mais peut-être que beaucoup d'individus, en crise conjugale et nationale, ont besoin d'y croire encore, la fiction de communauté édénique tenant alors lieu de partition de réenchantement.