Anthropologists have been almost unanimous in rejecting the universalist claims of secularization theory. They have, however, engaged with notions of secularism (a political ideology of church-state separation) and secularity (a culture and habitus of areligiousness). In this article, four such approaches are sketched: Talal Asad's analysis of the interpenetration of secularism and history throughout Western history, studies of secularism as state ideology in Turkey and elsewhere, studies of secularism as an ideology of social closure against Islam in contemporary Western Europe, and studies of the role of secularity in the formerly socialist countries in the aftermath of an atheist state policy. Conclusions drawn from these approaches may point the way toward a more synchronized anthropological engagement with the secular as both an analytical and a folk concept.
Anthropologists have been almost unanimous in rejecting the universalist claims of secularization theory. They have, however, engaged with notions of secularism (a political ideology of church-state separation) and secularity (a culture and habitus of areligiousness). In this article, four such approaches are sketched: Talal Asad's analysis of the interpenetration of secularism and history throughout Western history, studies of secularism as state ideology in Turkey and elsewhere, studies of secularism as an ideology of social closure against Islam in contemporary Western Europe, and studies of the role of secularity in the formerly socialist countries in the aftermath of an atheist state policy. Conclusions drawn from these approaches may point the way toward a more synchronized anthropological engagement with the secular as both an analytical and a folk concept.
Anthropologists have been almost unanimous in rejecting the universalist claims of secularization theory. They have, however, engaged with notions of secularism (a political ideology of church-state separation) and secularity (a culture and habitus of areligiousness). In this article, four such approaches are sketched: Talal Asad's analysis of the interpenetration of secularism and history throughout Western history, studies of secularism as state ideology in Turkey and elsewhere, studies of secularism as an ideology of social closure against Islam in contemporary Western Europe, and studies of the role of secularity in the formerly socialist countries in the aftermath of an atheist state policy. Conclusions drawn from these approaches may point the way toward a more synchronized anthropological engagement with the secular as both an analytical and a folk concept.
The role of religious symbols, including wearing religious garments in school and displaying religious symbols in public, has been, and continues to be, a matter of controversy in a number of countries. Students or teachers observing religious dress codes, including Islamic headscarves and Sikh turbans, employees wearing cross and chain around the neck have in some countries been expelled from schools, denied access to higher education, suspended from their jobs or their other rights were restricted. Summarising the above analysed case-law, it could be concluded that European Court of Human Rights (Commission as well) dealt with the diverse forms of religious symbols. The relevance of the issue could be proved by the new applications, which raise new aspects of the display/wearing of religious symbols. ECtHR in its rulings highlighted the State's margin of appreciation and emphasized the importance of the principles of secularisms and equality. Thus, the Court acknowledged the interference with the freedom of religion, it was justified on the grounds laid down in the limitation clause (Article 9(2) of the Convention). In most of the cases the European Court of Human Rights having regard to the Contracting States' margin of appreciation justified the interference as "necessary in democratic society" in pursuance to the legitimate aim of protecting the rights and freedoms of others and of public order. However, the judgment in "Crucifix" case, where the Court did not find that in classrooms hanging crucifix violates freedom of religion, raised the discussion about "double standards" applicable to the different religions. Consequently, the pending cases regarding the ban on the full-face veil in France and the prohibition to wear a cross and chain around the neck at work, could draw a new line in the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights.
The role of religious symbols, including wearing religious garments in school and displaying religious symbols in public, has been, and continues to be, a matter of controversy in a number of countries. Students or teachers observing religious dress codes, including Islamic headscarves and Sikh turbans, employees wearing cross and chain around the neck have in some countries been expelled from schools, denied access to higher education, suspended from their jobs or their other rights were restricted. Summarising the above analysed case-law, it could be concluded that European Court of Human Rights (Commission as well) dealt with the diverse forms of religious symbols. The relevance of the issue could be proved by the new applications, which raise new aspects of the display/wearing of religious symbols. ECtHR in its rulings highlighted the State's margin of appreciation and emphasized the importance of the principles of secularisms and equality. Thus, the Court acknowledged the interference with the freedom of religion, it was justified on the grounds laid down in the limitation clause (Article 9(2) of the Convention). In most of the cases the European Court of Human Rights having regard to the Contracting States' margin of appreciation justified the interference as "necessary in democratic society" in pursuance to the legitimate aim of protecting the rights and freedoms of others and of public order. However, the judgment in "Crucifix" case, where the Court did not find that in classrooms hanging crucifix violates freedom of religion, raised the discussion about "double standards" applicable to the different religions. Consequently, the pending cases regarding the ban on the full-face veil in France and the prohibition to wear a cross and chain around the neck at work, could draw a new line in the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights.
The paper is devoted to analyze European Union and Turkey debates on human rights. Here the debates are perceived as the scene where both sides put their arguments, positions, values, express intensions. This helps to find out the main reason, why discussion on human rights between European Union and Turkey isn't as fluent as it could be. Debates are analyzed in so called "language games" perspective, which means, that all argumentation here is equated to the move making in the game theory. Going along game theory lines, here we make a presumption, that states as international actors are rational, but their identity and interests are not static. Taking into account ideas of Alexander Wendt, identity and interests are presupposed to be a product of mutual states interaction. Interaction in the paper by itself is supposed to be a game, where the biggest stress is put on rules – knowing the rules of the game, it's possible to understand state intentions and identity elements. In the paper main theme of human rights is parted into two sections that deal with freedom of speech and religious minorities rights. It is supposed that the first topic is debated between European Union and Turkey's Kemalist establishment, and the second – between Union and proislamic movements in Turkey. Such move is made because of the ambivalent Turkish identity. After the First World War established Turkish state, soon it turned into a radical modernization and westernization. This led to the partitioned state identity. Kemalist establishment stresses threat of radical Islamism and Kurdish separatism, and Islamists demand the same rights for Muslims as for all other religious minorities. For this reason Kemalist identity is based on four main principles: nationalism, secularism, state hegemony and modernization. Meanwhile, Islamists stress muslimhood as the core of their identity. In the first debate European Union criticizes Turkey because of sanctions for citizens while they are expressing non-violent opinion on such topics as Armenian genocide, Kurdish question and the legacy of Atatürk. Turkey (Kemalist establishment) gives it's own arguments referring to the aforementioned threats to the state, but these arguments are not taken into account by European Union. For this reason Kemalists assume, that European Union seeks to rebuild Kemalist identity of Turkey. The second debate deals with religious minorities' situation in Turkey. On the one hand, Europe always stresses problems, which face non-Muslim and non-Sunni religious minorities. One the other – Turkey's Islamists, while agreeing with such statements, seek to show problems of Sunni Muslim majority. This part of debate reveals how Muslim identity is excluded out of European human rights concept.
The paper is devoted to analyze European Union and Turkey debates on human rights. Here the debates are perceived as the scene where both sides put their arguments, positions, values, express intensions. This helps to find out the main reason, why discussion on human rights between European Union and Turkey isn't as fluent as it could be. Debates are analyzed in so called "language games" perspective, which means, that all argumentation here is equated to the move making in the game theory. Going along game theory lines, here we make a presumption, that states as international actors are rational, but their identity and interests are not static. Taking into account ideas of Alexander Wendt, identity and interests are presupposed to be a product of mutual states interaction. Interaction in the paper by itself is supposed to be a game, where the biggest stress is put on rules – knowing the rules of the game, it's possible to understand state intentions and identity elements. In the paper main theme of human rights is parted into two sections that deal with freedom of speech and religious minorities rights. It is supposed that the first topic is debated between European Union and Turkey's Kemalist establishment, and the second – between Union and proislamic movements in Turkey. Such move is made because of the ambivalent Turkish identity. After the First World War established Turkish state, soon it turned into a radical modernization and westernization. This led to the partitioned state identity. Kemalist establishment stresses threat of radical Islamism and Kurdish separatism, and Islamists demand the same rights for Muslims as for all other religious minorities. For this reason Kemalist identity is based on four main principles: nationalism, secularism, state hegemony and modernization. Meanwhile, Islamists stress muslimhood as the core of their identity. In the first debate European Union criticizes Turkey because of sanctions for citizens while they are expressing non-violent opinion on such topics as Armenian genocide, Kurdish question and the legacy of Atatürk. Turkey (Kemalist establishment) gives it's own arguments referring to the aforementioned threats to the state, but these arguments are not taken into account by European Union. For this reason Kemalists assume, that European Union seeks to rebuild Kemalist identity of Turkey. The second debate deals with religious minorities' situation in Turkey. On the one hand, Europe always stresses problems, which face non-Muslim and non-Sunni religious minorities. One the other – Turkey's Islamists, while agreeing with such statements, seek to show problems of Sunni Muslim majority. This part of debate reveals how Muslim identity is excluded out of European human rights concept.
