During both occasions of the 1st anniversary of the German Grand Coalition government CDU/CSU & SPD (2005/2006) & of the 10th anniversary of the Czech-German Declaration on reconciliation (1997) the author analysis the recent German foreign policy, especially the role of past burdens in the bilateral relations. Gradually, although they faced many complications, both a legal & political solution was found, & instilled, creating a prevision for, & to a certain degree institutionalizing "the culture of historical controversy." The rhetoric of historical guilt & responsibility slowly disappears in Germany's relationships to the states of Central & East Central Europe, it relates also to the reconciliation rituals. On the other hand the new German government (with the CDU-chancellorship) has accepted all declarations & treaties made by preceding governments, including those which deal with property issues between the F.R.G. & Poland/Czech Republics respectively. The main dash is not drawn between any single political camps; rather nowadays, it is drawn right across the German society & their political elites. Especially the topic of World War II & its victims has become a conventional subject & one of public historical memory. This appeared shortly after the new government was appointed into office, as well as the idea that the moral-historical dimension of the Czech-German, Polish-German (and any other neighbors to Germany) relations will not disappear, but instead achieve a new quality. Only the role of moderator will be given to the governments & to the political sphere. Parallel to the departure of the last generation of contemporaries, the theme will be changed, & there will be only one of many reference frameworks in German relations to its neighbor states & their societies. This will, however, not be a linear process: relapsing is not excluded & it will depend on the responsibility & maturity of the political elites as well as the quality of the Czech-German "community of interests" (including the constituting role of European Security & Energy policies), as to how they will be managed. Adapted from the source document.
This article provides an analysis of the of United Nations (UN) peacekeeping, one of the hottest topics in international politics of the post-cold war era. Numerous books, articles, and Ph.D. thesis have already been written about UN peacekeeping operations. Although differing vastly in their scope and quality, most of the recent critiques have pointed out the pressing need to re-define and strengthen the cold war era concept of UN peacekeeping so that it becomes a viable conflict resolution method in the 21st century. Some scholars have, however, expressed serious doubts about the actual conflict resolution capabilities of UN peacekeeping operations. They argue that premature, short-tenn and under funded UN peacekeeping operations may well do more damage than good. One of the few things the majority of conflict resolution scholars and practitioners can nowadays agree on is that no UN intervention can bring peace to a place where it is not wanted.This article aims to enrich the current peace research by introducing an alternative analytical approach to the study of the UN peacekeeping. It is divided into seven sections. The introduction is followed by a theoretical section where I briefly summarize two basic theoretical approaches to the study of the UN peacekeeping (Conflict Management & Conflict Resolution). The third section provides an analysis of the changing nature of armed conflicts in the post-cold war period. The fourth section deals with the adjustments that were made to the concept of UN peacekeeping operations in reaction to the changes in the nature of current armed conflicts. The analytical concept Capabilities versus Expectations Gap is introduced in the fifth chapter, followed by the core section of this article -- the analysis of the United Nations peacekeeping using the analytical concept Capabilities versus Expectations Gap. The analytical concept Capabilities versus Expectations Gap was first introduced by Christopher Hill in 1992 as a handy tool for analyzing the evolving European Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The unique advantage of this concept is that it provides a sensible assessment of both the actual and potential UN capabilities. By comparing these with the existing UN expectations, the Capabilities versus Expectations Gap analysis of UN peacekeeping enables us to sketch a more realistic picture of what the UN is capable of doing in the area of conflict resolution than that presented either by its more enthusiastic supporters or by the demanders among the UN Member States. Consequently, building further on this realistic picture of the UN conflict resolution capabilities, I attempt to answer the key research question of this article: Is the UN, with the current level of its conflict resolution capabilities, capable of providing high quality treatment to as many conflicts as it nowadays attempts to provide? Based on the findings of the Capabilities versus Expectations Gap analysis of the UN peacekeeping problematic, I argue that since the end of the cold war, the UN has several times attempted to carry out more peacekeeping operations than it was capable of performing well in light of the current level of its conflict resolution capabilities. In other words, the most important conclusion of this article is that there is a gap between the UN capabilities and expectations in the area of conflict resolution and that the only option how to bridge this gap in the foreseeable future is to decrease the excessive UN expectations to meet the currently available UN capabilities. As paradoxical as it may sound, in practical terms this means that the United Nations is nowadays more likely to succeed in meeting its basic function ("to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war") by carrying out fewer but high quality peacekeeping operations. Adapted from the source document.
Personal income taxation in the Czech Republic has undergone significant changes in the last 20 years. Among main changes is replacing of deductions from the tax base with tax credits in 2006, as well as linking income tax and contributions on compulsory insurance in the form of so-called super-gross wage with the simultaneous introduction of a flat tax rate and introduction of maximum assessment bases for compulsory contributions in 2008. In this paper, we quantify the fiscal impacts of significant changes using macroeconomic and microeconomic approaches. We compare the results within each other, but also with the expected fiscal impact stated in the explanatory reports of the amending laws. The results show good consistency in estimates of the fiscal impact of tax and contribution reforms and confirm four fiscally significant reforms from 2000 to 2018. The expected negative and positive effects of changes in income tax presented in the explanatory reports are generally lower than in our calculations. Improving the quantification of fiscal impacts is essential for the adoption of an efficient and rational tax policy.
Denne artikkelens hovedargument er at norsk forsvarspolitikk i stor grad er formet av norsk identitet og av norske verdier. Denne sterke koblingen ble særlig tydelig på 1990-tallet, da den bidro til kontinuitet i Forsvarets oppgaver og innretting til tross for store endringer i Norges sikkerhetspolitiske omgivelser. Som et resultat av fremveksten av en ny norsk forsvarspolitisk diskurs inntraff et forsvarspolitisk paradigmeskifte rundt årtusenskiftet. Resultatet ble overgangen fra invasjonsforsvar til «innsatsforsvar». For å styrke legitimiteten til det nye paradigmet ble likevel mange av særtrekkene med det gamle paradigmet forsøkt innskrevet i det nye. Imidlertid svingte Forsvaret seg meget raskt om da primærfokuset igjen ble kollektivt forsvar etter 2014. Endringen rundt år 2000 var dermed egentlig ikke så dyp. Det dominerende narrativet om Forsvarets rolle forble primært nasjonalt og territorielt forankret.
Abstract in English:Back to the Future: National Identity and the Norwegian Defence PolicyThe article argues that Norwegian defence policy to a large extent is shaped by Norwegian identity and Norwegian values. This strong link was particularly visible in the 1990's, when we witnessed a large degree of continuation of the Norwegian defence posture, despite the radical changes in the security environment. Territorial defence remained a key priority. When a new paradigm eventually emerged around the tun of the century – with primary focus on international operations – much of the old elements were nonetheless retained. Hence, when NATO returned to a focus on collective defence after 2014, Norway was more than ready for this change. In short, the defence concept that emerged around the millennium was short-lived and never really challenged the foundations the Norwegian Armed Forces rests on.
Siden 2003 har regeringerne i Norge, Danmark, Sverige, Finland og Island arbejdet med at udvikle og implementere nationale strategier for cyber- og informationssikkerhed. Strategierne omfatter mange forskellige områder; f.eks. institutionel kapacitetsopbygning, uddannelses- og forsvarspolitik, internationalt samarbejde etc. Denne artikel skitserer landenes forskellige strategier per august 20181 for statens rolle i samfundets cyberresiliens, dvs. de kritiske samfundsfunktioners evne til at modstå og overkomme negative effekter af hændelser med udspring i cyberdomænet. Endvidere skitserer artiklen de udfordringer, som regeringerne har konstateret, at opgavefordeling og ansvarsplacering har givet, samt hvordan implementeringerne af strategierne reflekterer disse erkendelser. Her har den finske regering vist sig mest konsekvent ved at placere ansvaret for implementeringen af cyberresiliens centralt i en magtfuld organisation og udstyre den med konkrete styringsredskaber og en stor, velintegreret kontaktflade til den private del af Finlands kritiske infrastruktur.
Abstract in English
Since 2003, the governments of Norway, Denmark, Sweden, Finland and Iceland have developed and implemented national strategies for cyber and information security. The strategies include several topics such as organisational and human resource capacity building, defence policy, international cooperation, etc. This article gives a thumbnail sketch of the countries' strategies for the state's role in societal cyber resiliens (the ability to resist and overcome negative effects of events emanating from the cyber domain). It then shortly describes the experienced challenges with distribution of tasks and responsibilities, and how the implementation of the strategies reflect attempts to overcome them. It concludes that the Finnish government has gone furthest by placing responsibility for implementation centrally in an influential organisation and giving it a centrally developed common matrix for assessing progress and a well-established formal network within the private segment of Finland's critical infrastructure.
Russia's strategy in the Arctic is dominated by two overriding discourses – and foreign policy directions – which at first glance may look like opposites. On the one hand, an IR realism/geopolitical discourse that often has a clear patriotic character, dealing with "capturing", "winning" or "conquering" the Arctic and putting power, including military power, behind the national interests in the area – which is why we, in recent years, have seen an increasing military build-up, also in the Russian Arctic. Opposed to this is an IR liberalism, international law-inspired and modernization-focused discourse, which is characterized by words such as "negotiation", "cooperation" and "joint ventures" and which has as an axiom that the companies and countries operating in the Arctic all benefit the most if they collaborate in peace and friendliness. So far, the IR liberalism discourse has set the trend of the Russian policy carried out in relation to the Arctic. Thus, it has primarily been the Russian Foreign Ministry and, above all, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov that have drawn the overall lines of the Arctic policy, well aided by the Transport Ministry and the Energy Ministry. On the other side are the Russian national Security Council led by Nikolai Patrushev and the Russian Defence Ministry headed by Sergey Shoygu, which both have embedded their visions of Russia and the Arctic in the IR realism/geopolitical discourse. Russia's president, Vladimir Putin, does the same. Nevertheless, he has primarily chosen to let the Foreign Ministry set the line for the Arctic policy carried out, presumably out of a pragmatic acknowledgement of the means that have, so far, served the Russian interests best. Moreover, it is worth noting that both wings, even though they can disagree about the means, in fact are more or less in agreement about the goal of Russia's Arctic policy: namely, to utilize the expected wealth of oil and natural gas resources in the underground to ensure the continuation of the restoration of Russia's position as a Great Power when the capacity of the energy fields in Siberia slowly diminishes – which the Russian Energy Ministry expects to happen sometime between 2015 and 2030. In addition to that, Russia sees – as the polar ice slowly melts – great potential for opening an ice-free northern sea route between Europe and Asia across the Russian Arctic, with the hope that the international shipping industry can see the common sense of saving up to nearly 4,000 nautical miles on a voyage from Ulsan, Korea, to Rotterdam, Holland, so Russia can earn money by servicing the ships and issuing permissions for passage through what Russia regards as Russian territorial water. The question is whether Russia will be able to realize its ambitious goals. First, the Russian state energy companies Gazprom and Rosneft lack the technology, know-how and experience to extract oil and gas under the exceedingly difficult environment in the Arctic, where the most significant deposits are believed to be in very deep water in areas that are very difficult to access due to bad weather conditions. The Western sanctions mean that the Russian energy companies cannot, as planned, obtain this technology and know-how via the already entered-into partnerships with Western energy companies. The sanctions limit loan opportunities in Western banks, which hit the profitability of the most cost-heavy projects in the Arctic. However, what hits hardest are the low oil prices – at present 50 dollars per barrel (Brent). According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), the fields in the Arctic are not profitable as long as the oil price is under 120 dollars per barrel. Whether Russia chooses to suspend the projects until the energy prices rise again – and until it has again entered into partnerships that can deliver the desired technology and know-how – or whether the Russian state will continuously pump money into the projects is uncertain. The hard-pressed Russian economy, with the prospects of recession, increasing inflation, increasing flight of capital, rising interest rates and a continuously low oil price, provides a market economic incentive for suspending the projects until further notice. Whether the Kremlin will think in a market economic way or a long-term strategic way is uncertain – but, historically, there has been a penchant for the latter. One of the Kremlin's hopes is that Chinese-Russian cooperation can take over where the Western-Russian cooperation has shut down. Russia has long wanted to diversify its energy markets to reduce its dependence on sales to Europe. At the same time, those in the Kremlin have had a deeply-rooted fear of ending up as a "resource appendix" to the onrushing Chinese economy, which so far has been a strong contributing reason for keeping the Russian-Chinese overtures in check. The question now is whether the Western sanctions can be the catalyst that can make Russia overcome this fear and thus, in the long term, support the efforts to enter into a real, strategic partnership with China. ; Russia's strategy in the Arctic is dominated by two overriding discourses – and foreign policy directions – which at first glance may look like opposites. On the one hand, Russia have an IR realism/geopolitical discourse that often has a clear patriotic character, dealing with "exploring", "winning" or "conquering" the Arctic and putting power, including military power, behind the national interests in the area – which is why we, in recent years, have seen an increasing military build-up, also in the Russian Arctic. Opposed to this is an IR liberalism, international law-inspired and modernization- focused discourse, which is characterized by words such as "negotiation", "cooperation" and "joint ventures" and which has as an axiom that the companies and countries operating in the Arctic all benefit the most if they cooperate peacefully.
Artikkelen ser på den teknologiske og strategiske rivaliseringen mellom USA og Kina hva gjelder implementeringen av 5G-nettverk, og spør hva som er med å påvirke hvordan andre stater posisjonerer seg mellom de to supermaktene. Ved å bygge på tre grener av politisk realisme – balance-of-threat-teoriens tanke om at trusseloppfatning driver staters valg av allianser, patron–klient-teoriens tro på at USA kan forvente at deres klientstater innretter seg etter amerikansk utenrikspolitikk, og teorien om at handelsrelasjoner kan brukes som maktverktøy – utleder jeg et sett med hypoteser og potensielt relevante forklaringsvariabler. Som avhengig variabel samler jeg 70 staters holdninger til Kinas omstridte telekommunikasjonsgigant Huaweis rolle i 5G. Bivariat analyse avslører tre hovedmønstre: (1) Stater som er små og maktesløse i forhold til Kina, samt statene i Kinas geografiske region, ser ut til å være mer aksepterende til Huaweis 5G. (2) Stater som ser på USA som sin patron og som er avhengige av Washingtons sikkerhetsgaranti ser ut til å være betydelig mer avvisende til selskapets 5G. (3) Handelsrelasjoner til både USA og Kina ser ut til å ha liten eller ingen effekt på staters holdninger. Av de tre realisme-grenene er det altså patron–klient-teorien som veier tyngst når det gjelder å forklare staters holdninger til Huaweis 5G.
Abstract in English:The US way or the Huawei: An analysis of how small and medium states stand on the Chinese giant's role in 5GThis article examines the technological and strategic rivalry between the US and China on the implementation of 5G networks, asking what influences how other states position themselves between the two superpowers. By building on three branches of political realism – balance-of-threat theory's notion that perception of threat drives states' alliance choices, patron-client theory's belief that the US can expect its client states to adhere to American foreign policy, and the theory that trade relations can be used as power tools – I derive a set of hypotheses and potentially relevant explanatory variables. As dependent variable, I measure 70 states' stances on China's controversial telecom giant Huawei's role in 5G. Bivariate analysis reveals three primary patterns: (1) States who are dwarfed by China's power, as well as states in China's immediate geographic region, appear to be more acceptive of Huawei's 5G. (2) States who see the US as their patron and who rely on Washington's security guarantee appear to be much more rejective of the company's 5G. (3) Trade relations to both the US and China appear to have little or no effect on states' stances. Of the three branches of realism, it is the patron-client theory that offers the most weight in explaining states' stances on Huawei's 5G.
