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Current debates on online privacy are rooted in liberal theory. Accordingly, privacy is often regarded as a form of freedom from social, economic, and institutional influences. Such a negative perspective on privacy, however, focuses too much on how individuals can be protected or can protect themselves, instead of challenging the necessity of protection itself. In this article, I argue that increasing online privacy literacy not only empowers individuals to achieve (a necessarily limited) form of negative privacy, but has the potential to facilitate a privacy deliberation process in which individuals become agents of social change that could lead to conditions of positive privacy and informational self-determination. To this end, I propose a four-dimensional model of online privacy literacy that encompasses factual privacy knowledge, privacy-related reflection abilities, privacy and data protection skills, and critical privacy literacy. I then outline how this combination of knowledge, abilities, and skills 1) enables to individuals to protect themselves against some horizontal and vertical privacy intrusions and 2) motivates individuals to critically challenge the social structures and power relations that necessitate the need for protection in the first place. Understanding these processes, as well as critically engaging with the normative premises and implications of the predominant negative concepts of privacy, offers a more nuanced direction for future research on online privacy literacy and privacy in general.

Self-tracking in the world -- Encountering the temporalities and imaginaries of personal data -- Ubiquitous monitoring technologies in historical perspective -- Algorithmic imaginations -- Traces through the present -- Anticipatory data worlds -- Personal data futures

Self-tracking in the world -- Encountering the temporalities and imaginaries of personal data -- Ubiquitous monitoring technologies in historical perspective -- Algorithmic imaginations -- Traces through the present -- Anticipatory data worlds -- Personal data futures

Most civil wars are preceded by nonviolent forms of conflict. While it is often assumed that violent and nonviolent conflicts are qualitatively different and have different causes, that assumption is rarely tested empirically. This article uses a two-step approach to explore whether political exclusion and lost autonomy - two common causes of civil war according to extant literature - are associated with the emergence of nonviolent separatist claims, with the escalation of nonviolent separatist claims to war, or both. Our analysis suggests that different types of grievances matter more at different stages of conflict escalation. We find that political exclusion is a significant correlate of the escalation of nonviolent claims for self-determination to violence, while its association with the emergence of nonviolent separatist claims is weaker. By contrast, lost autonomy is correlated with both the emergence of nonviolent separatist claims and, if autonomy revocations are recent, their escalation to violence. We argue that these results are consistent with both grievance- and opportunity-based theories of conflict.

Any examination of self-determination runs promptly into the difficulty
that while the concept lends itself to simple formulation in words which
have a ring of universal applicability and perhaps of revolutionary slogans,
when the time comes to put it into operation it turns out to be a complex
matter hedged in by limitations and caveats. In a different turn of phrase,
what is stated in big print—as in the reiterated United Nations injunction:
All peoples have the right to self-determination—is drastically modified by
what follows in small print. Indeed, once the major original exercise of
self-determination has been undertaken, the small print takes over and
becomes the big print which establishes the new and far more restrictive
guidelines.

In a period in which the concept of self‐determination has become a cliche, it seems astonishing that it occupies the center of the historical stage in the various searches for a community in the horn of Africa. Thus, the concept itself might indeed have been a cliche, but not for the millions of human beings that have sacrificed, and continue to sacrifice, their lives for the sake of a way of life that the concept promises.

States have a duty under international human rights law to protect people's health. Nonetheless, while some health-related policies and laws protect basic human rights, others violate fundamental rights when they criminalize, prohibit, and restrict access to necessary health services. For example, laws and regulations related to protection of life from conception, contraception, actions of pregnant women, and abortion can harm women and place women and health care providers in jeopardy of legal penalization. Given the adverse consequences of punitive and restrictive laws related to pregnancy, advocates, civil society groups, human rights groups, and government institutions must work together to promote, protect, and fulfill women's fundamental reproductive rights. Adapted from the source document.