Suchergebnisse

Self-reported motives for enlistment in the US Army Reserve are examined as a function of age, educational attainment & proficiency, & plans to transfer to the active Army, drawing on survey data obtained from 1,364 male recruits in 1987. Several differently motivated subgroups of reserve recruits are suggested: those of traditional college age & more intellectually gifted tend to join seeking money, primarily for college; this trend is most pronounced for the youngest high school graduate recruits. Older recruits or those less intellectualy predisposed joined for self-improvement or skills training. The youngest recruits joined largely to transfer to the active Army. 3 Tables. Adapted from the source document.

Although a number of researchers have examined active-force enlistment at both the aggregate and individual levels, relatively little work has been done on reserve enlistment motivations at the individual level. This study uses a log-linear model to profile the self-reported motivations of male U.S. Army Reserve recruits as a function of age, educational attainment, mental category, and plans to transfer to the active Army. The empirical results suggest that there are several differently motivated subgroups of Army Reserve recruits and that the Army Reserve may play a significant role in active-Army recruiting.

This article compares patterns and outcomes of administrative reform in four countries: Malaysia, Singapore, Taiwan, and Thailand. It focuses on the supply side, that is, on reform implementation. It is assumed that bureaucrats, upon whom implementation depends, have an interest in controlling the process. A distinction is made between two types of bureaucratic systems—autonomous and instrumental—according to structural features that increase the potential to block reforms. Four possible patterns of administrative reform are distinguished according to whether demand is high or low, and whether the bureaucracy can be classed as autonomous or instrumental. More broadly, it is argued that supply will be lower in autonomous bureaucratic systems. A comparative case study method is applied to test this model, and the proposition is not disconfirmed. Malaysia and Singapore, both classed as instrumental bureaucracies, demonstrate a predictable style of "continuous administrative self‐improvement." The status of the bureaucracy in Thailand and Taiwan is in transition, and the model is used to analyze changes in reform patterns over time and to suggest future trajectories.

This article compares patterns & outcomes of administrative reform in four countries: Malaysia, Singapore, Taiwan, & Thailand. It focuses on the supply side, that is, on reform implementation. It is assumed that bureaucrats, upon whom implementation depends, have an interest in controlling the process. A distinction is made between two types of bureaucratic systems -- autonomous & instrumental -- according to structural features that increase the potential to block reforms. Four possible patterns of administrative reform are distinguished according to whether demand is high or low, & whether the bureaucracy can be classed as autonomous or instrumental. More broadly, it is argued that supply will be lower in autonomous bureaucratic systems. A comparative case study method is applied to test this model, & the proposition is not disconfirmed. Malaysia & Singapore, both classed as instrumental bureaucracies, demonstrate a predictable style of "continuous administrative self-improvement." The status of the bureaucracy in Thailand & Taiwan is in transition, & the model is used to analyze changes in reform patterns over time & to suggest future trajectories. 5 Figures, 62 References. Adapted from the source document.

During the 1990s a growing number of firms have been encouraging continuous improvement (CI) in all aspects of working life, and some impressive results have been achieved. However, the process of implementing CI is long and challenging. Companies need to know what progress they have made, and the outcome of any interventions, in order to consolidate and further develop CI. The CIRCA CI self‐assessment tool is a research‐based tool which helps users to make an objective assessment of CI in their company. It is designed to be used by any organisation regardless of size, industry, length of time working with CI, and the particular approach taken. The tool went through several phases of development, culminating in a paper‐based Version 3.0 in 1997. Since then further development and testing of the tool has taken place in the UK and abroad, and future plans include an electronic version.

This paper studies an election game between two politicians, in which each provides income transfers to special‐interest groups in return for political contributions. It is shown that a move to a more inefficient form of transfers may lower the total excess burden created by these transfers, because the politicians are induced to reduce their provision of transfers. For the case in which the income transfers are indirectly provided as trade protection to import‐competing industries, a switch from production subsidies to tariffs as the form of protection reduces the equilibrium level of excess burden and makes both politicians better off.