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ABSTRACTStandardized features dominate the retail landscape of the United States and are the physical components of retail districts. This study tests the hypothesis that standardized building blocks have failed to produce the same retail structure in all metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs). Ninety‐two medium‐sized MS As are analyzed to determine if the arrangement and strength of their retail districts differ. The relationship between functional and spatial aspects of retail structure in central place theory provides a basis for testing the hypothesis of diversity. Christaller's separation principle provides a plausible conceptual framework for diverse retail structure if each MSA is analyzed as an isolated region. Five types of retail structure are analyzed using data obtained from the Census of Population and the Census of Retail Trade. The types are identified by performing a serial iterative partition cluster procedure on prioritized metropolitan sales variables. The statistical significance of the types is tested with Mann‐Whitney U‐tests of functional variables not used in the cluster analysis. Verification confirms five distinctive types. Monocentric and polycentric retail structures exist but decentralized retail structure is even more common in medium‐sized MSAs. The distribution of types of retail structure follows regional pattern that indicate historical and political factors as contributing causes.

The deaths in 2007 of renowned Baptists Herbert H. Reynolds & Jerry Falwell brought the divergence of Baptist voices in the debate on religious liberty into the limelight again. Reynolds represented the old guard of the Baptist church, which sees the soul as competent in matters of absolute importance. Falwell, on the other hand, personified the Baptist new wave, accepting the church's political activism & moral voice & insisting on legal protection of rights of religious expression. Reflection on these two views raises the question of what the Baptist tradition of religious liberty has been, is now, & might become. That religious liberty exists is not disputed, but what it means in relation to the separation of church & state is a controversial issue. This paper examines Baptist history & the controversy defining it; the search for an official Baptist position on anything, but especially on the separation of church & state; the decline of concern over the principle of separation; the arousal of concern for religious liberty once again through the advocacy of Philip Hamburger & others; & the position of mainstream Baptists, in particular, Southern Baptists, today. S. Stanton

The Job Creation Law affects some policy changes in agrarian sector. For instance, the promulgation of Government Regulation No 18 of 2021 (GR 18/2021) regulates that former western rights land are adjusted to state land. However, some former western rights land have not been converted until now. It results in legal uncertainty over the land status, especially land or building juridically belong to the person declared absent (afwezigheid) yet owned by legal subjects. This study aims to analyze the land rights registration of former western rights land after the Job Creation Law. Besides, it analyzes the implementation of horizontal separation principle in the land rights registration of former western rights land and buildings, that are the object of afwezigheid. This study is legal research applying statute, historical and conceptual approaches. Based on the study, people who possessed former western rights land are the main priority in applying for land rights regarding to GR 18/2021 article95. Meanwhile, those who only occupy the land and building have to get afwezigheid court decision of the former western rights land owner. Afterwards, they follow the object buying process with the principle of horizontal separation through Probate Office and submit land rights application at the land registry office.

The "constitutional principle of separation of powers" could be understood to mean any one of several different things. It could mean, as the formalists argue, that each branch has exclusive power to perform a single designated function, unless the Constitution expressly permits an exception. Or it could mean, as the functionalists believe, that courts should strive to maintain a diffusion of power among the branches. Conceivably, it could mean nothing -- the constitutional principle of separation of powers could just be a shorthand reference for the sum of all specific clauses that govern relations among the branches, but add nothing to what these clauses individually require. Each of these interpretations would have serious drawbacks. The exclusive functions construction would be too rigid, the diffusion of power understanding too flexible, and neither comports with the full range of Supreme Court decisions defining the structural Constitution. The conclusion that the principle adds nothing to the specific clauses would be more consistent with the pattern of outcomes reached by the Supreme Court, but would be an open invitation to create a Fourth Branch of government that would permit massive evasions of those clauses in the future. A better strategy would be to interpret the principle as incorporating a minimal requirement that there be only three branches, with every federal office accountable to one of the constitutional branches. Such an understanding would provide substantial continuity with the past: it would be consistent with the text of the Constitution and with Madison's explanation of the mechanism for preserving the constitutional structure, and would not contradict any of the Supreme Court's judgments in major separation-of-power cases. For the future, it would prevent Congress from circumventing the specific clauses of the Constitution that limit the power of the branches, and would preserve the dynamic tension among the branches that has worked well for over 200 years in maintaining "the liberty and security of the governed."

The Supreme Court has had many occasions in recent years to consider what it calls "the constitutional principle of separation of powers." The principle in question has been effusively praised and on occasion vigorously enforced. But just what is it? The Court clearly believes that the Constitution contains an organizing principle that is more than the sum of the specific clauses that govern relations among the branches. Yet notwithstanding the many testimonials to the importance of the principle, its content remains remarkably elusive. The central problem, as many have observed, is that the Court has employed two very different conceptions of separation of powers in recent years. On the one hand, there is the "formal" understanding, emphasizing that "[t]he Constitution sought to divide the delegated powers of the new Federal government into three defined categories, Legislative, Executive, and Judicial, to assure, as nearly as possible, that each branch of government would confine itself to its assigned responsibility." On the other hand, there is the "functional" understanding, stressing that the three branches do not "operate with absolute independence," and that the Constitution requires only that "the proper balance between the coordinate branches" be maintained. The Court has alternated between the formal and the functional constructions, with a swing group of Justices evidently happy to embrace one or the other as suits the needs of the moment. When we step back from the doctrinal inconstancy and examine the outcomes of the Court's recent separation-of-powers decisions, however, a readily discernible pattern emerges. The formal theory is regularly used in evaluating (and invalidating) attempts by Congress to exercise governmental power by means other than the enactment of-legislation; the more elastic functional approach is favored in reviewing (and approving) duly-enacted legislation that regulates or reallocates the functions performed by the other two branches. Unfortunately, this pattern does not ...