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AbstractResearch Question/IssueThis study examines activism campaigns where multiple activists simultaneously target the same firm—which we term clustered shareholder activism. Despite the growing influence of shareholder activism on corporate governance, the clustered activism phenomenon has previously only been addressed indirectly, anecdotally, or with limited data. We consider cost sharing motives for clustered activism and whether the phenomenon exerts a positive or negative impact on the performance of the target firm.Research Findings/InsightsUsing a large dataset of shareholder activism events at U.S. firms, we find that clustered activism campaigns are more common at larger firms and among geographically proximate activists, which is consistent with our prediction that activists cluster to reduce the costs associated with activism campaigns. Furthermore, we find that clustered activism produces elevated profitability and abnormal returns, which is consistent with our prediction that activists cluster to address principal–agency costs.Theoretical/Academic ImplicationsOur study provides some of the first theoretical and empirical evidence on the clustered activism phenomenon. We contribute to the understanding of the role of shareholder activism by considering their effect on principal–agency and principal–principal problems. Our results also contribute to the literature that examines factors relating to the success of shareholder activism by documenting the effect of clustered activism on activism costs and target firm performance.Practitioner/Policy ImplicationsOur study adds to the debate among practitioners and regulators on the merits (or lack thereof) of clustered activism. Our findings suggest that a regulatory approach that encourages clustered activism can benefit shareholders.Video Abstracthttps://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/page/journal/14678683/homepage/videoabstracts.htmlyoutubehttps://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=1&v=0_D-6Pw9sYo

Purpose
The purpose of this paper is to investigate institutional shareholder activism in Nigeria. It addresses the paucity of empirical research on institutional shareholder activism in sub-Saharan Africa.


Design/methodology/approach
This study uses agency theory to understand the institutional shareholder approach to shareholder activism in Nigeria. The data are collected through qualitative interviews with expert representatives from financial institutions.


Findings
The findings indicate evidence of low-level shareholder activism in Nigeria. The study provides empirical insight into the reasons why institutional shareholders might adopt an active or passive approach to shareholder activism. The findings suggest the pension structure involving two types of pension institutions affects the ability to engage in shareholder activism.


Research limitations/implications
The research study advances our understanding of the status quo of institutional shareholder activism in an African context such as Nigeria.


Practical implications
The paper makes a practical contribution by highlighting that regulators need to consider how the financial market conditions and characteristics affect effective promotion of better governance practices and performance through shareholder activism.


Originality/value
This study draws attention to the implication for shareholder activism of complexities associated with an institutional arrangement where two types of financial institutions are expected to operate and manage the private pension funds in a country.