Suchergebnisse

Colin Grabow


Earlier this week an unusual event took place: a U.S. shipyard delivered an oceangoing merchant ship. Named the Janet Marie, the vessel will transport goods between Hawaii and the U.S. mainland. Anyone tempted to toast the new ship as a symbol of U.S. shipbuilding prowess, however, should keep the champagne bottle corked. More an embarrassment than cause for celebration, the containership serves as a rich symbol of the heavily protected U.S. shipbuilding industry's myriad shortcomings.
The most glaring problem with the Janet Marie is its price. Although the exact figure has not been published, its George III sister ship—a vessel delivered last year with the exact same specifications—was revealed to cost "$225 million‐​plus." It's a safe bet Janet Marie did not cost less. In comparison, two similarly‐​sized containerships were ordered from a South Korean shipyard in 2021 for $41 million each. The vast difference ($184 million) is no anomaly, comporting with previous assessments from maritime industry observers that U.S.-built cargo ships are five times the price of those constructed abroad.
The length of time required to build the Janet Marie provides another unfavorable contrast. From the time steel was cut until the ship's delivery was approximately 50 months. In contrast, the Ever Alot—one of the largest containerships in the world with a cargo capacity nearly 10 times that of the Janet Marie (and a price tag $80 million lower)—required just 19 months to build. Originally slated for delivery in the third quarter of 2020, the Janet Marie is a full three years late.
Unfortunately, construction times significantly longer than those of foreign shipyards have been a feature of the U.S. shipbuilding industry for decades.
Faced with such high prices and lengthy construction times, the market for U.S.-built merchant ships is limited to those who must buy them to comply with the 1920 Jones Act, which requires vessels transporting goods within the United States to be constructed in U.S. shipyards. Understandably, these vessel operators delay purchasing new ships for as long as possible. Instead of buying new ships when existing ones approach the 20 year mark as is commonly done abroad, Jones Act‐​compliant ships are often not scrapped until age 40 or older.
As a result, few ships are built. In fact, with the Janet Marie now delivered there are currently no merchant ships under construction in the United States (there are, however, three containerships on the order book slated for delivery in 2026 and 2027 at the astounding price of $333 million each).
Since 2000 deliveries of oceangoing merchant ships by U.S. shipyards combined have averaged fewer than three per year.











In comparison, a single shipyard in South Korea is slated to deliver 47 ships this year alone.
But it's not just the large shipbuilders in Asia that have left protected American shipyards in the dust. Even European shipyards are churning out more vessels than those in the United States. Dutch shipyards, for example, delivered nearly 118,000 gross tons of merchant vessels in 2021 (latest available numbers) compared to less than 33,000 gross tons for U.S. shipyards. At 147,000 gross tons, Norway delivered almost five times the U.S. figure.
That U.S. shipyards produce so relatively little while charging so much should come to the surprise of no one. Having a captive Jones Act market means reduced incentive for U.S. shipyards to achieve the specialization and scale required for competition in the international market. It also means less competitive pressure—why be world‐​class when a lesser standard will suffice?
Another prominent factor is the large government contracts reserved for U.S. shipyards that many shipbuilders have prioritized at the expense of commercial shipbuilding. Indeed, the CEO of Overseas Shipholding Group, which operates Jones Act‐​compliant tankers, recently described the construction of commercial vessels to comply with the Jones Act as "a minor sideline interest" for most U.S. shipyards. His assessment appears borne out by the numbers, with a U.S. Maritime Administration study finding that government contracts accounted for nearly 80 percent of U.S. shipyard revenue in 2019.
Despite the U.S. shipbuilding industry's extraordinary costs and trivial levels of output, some may believe that protectionism is nonetheless warranted to avoid U.S. reliance on foreigners for its shipbuilding needs. But the Jones Act doesn't even do that. The Janet Marie's sister ship delivered last year, for example, is chock full of foreign components. A sampling of the ship's suppliers includes the China State Shipbuilding Corporation (supplier of the ship's provision cranes), Alfa Laval (Qingdao) Ltd. (fired exhaust gas boiler), Zhenjiang Tongzhou Propeller Co. (fixed pitch propeller), and Jiangsu Xiangsheng Heavy Industries Co. (anchors and anchor chains).
That's par for the course. Tankers built by the Philly Shipyard from 2004-06 required approximately 500 containers per vessel of material from South Korea as well as roughly 25 bulk shipments for larger items such as the main engine. While there is nothing wrong with relying on imported parts (imagine how costly these ships would be if all the components had to be U.S.-made as well!), notions that U.S. shipyards can produce ships without the need of foreigners is wishful thinking.
The Jones Act's requirement that vessels used in domestic trade be constructed in U.S. shipyards fails to pass even the faintest whiff of a cost‐​benefit analysis. Among its harms include higher costs for those that must rely on these ships, added stress on infrastructure and congestion as transport is shifted to less expensive modes, irritated relations with U.S. trading partners and allies, and a smaller and older U.S. fleet than would otherwise be the case.
The other side of the ledger, meanwhile, consists of a commercial shipbuilding industry that punches well below its weight. Indeed, when the United States first required ships flying the U.S. flag to be domestically built U.S. merchant shipbuilders were among the world's best and most competitive. Now they are a global afterthought, and there is good reason to think the industry would be better off without such heavy‐​handed protectionism.
Rather than a triumph, the Janet Marie offers a cautionary tale of protectionism's heavy toll. The Jones Act's U.S.-built requirement—if not the law entirely—should be discarded immediately.

Sea state China's next-generation frigate, the Type 054B, is under construction at shipyards in Shanghai and Guangzhou, as confirmed by images posted online by Chinese military enthusiasts. The ship's predecessor, the Type 054A, is still ...

We think we've got this argument correct here. It has to be only think because the outcome is so absurd as to make us think that we might not be right. But if we are then we seem to have entered the era of insanity over subsidies. So, the ferry to the Scilly Isles. A new one or three is/are needed. The company that wishes to buy them, which runs the ferry service, applied for a subsidy so as to engage the services of a British shipyard to build them: First, they spent years trying to unlock the required £50 million in state aid from the Levelling Up fund, which would have necessitated ordering a ship from a British dockyard.That didn't turn up so instead they adopted Plan B: But their application failed, so instead the company took a £33 million loan from NatWest and put out a tender to build one new passenger ferry and two freight vessels. In September, it selected the giant French shipbuilder Piriou to complete the contract.OK, seems reasonable enough to us. Yes, we are against such subsidies and yet we're also old enough, long in the tooth enough, to know that they are going to happen in something like shipbuilding. But if the subsidy isn't offered then obviously Plan B:In a letter published last week, but sent before Christmas, Shapps expressed his anger to Robert Francis, chairman of the Isles of Scilly council. The defence secretary, who also doubles as the government's shipbuilding tsar, criticised the ISSG for not picking a UK shipbuilder (he did not name Harland & Wolff directly) to build its new fleet.The idea that we have a shipbuilding Tsar seems a little Romanov to us (perhaps noting that that didn't turn out to be a very good governance system) but it's the insistence that is being made here that really confuses. You cannot have the subsidy which would necessitate - and also cover the extra costs of - using a British shipyard but you must use a British shipyard anyway? The ferry company is an independent one, quoted on the London Stock Exchange no less. And a minister thinks it right to bully - even insist - in this manner? There's something about storming the Winter Palace that sounds like a useful solution there. But now the lunacy: He also expressed his concern that the company was planning to increase fares to help cover the costs of the new fleet. A one-way ticket — currently advertised at £83.90 — may hit £100 as a result.The minister is stating that the more expensive, British, shipyard must - sorry, should - be used and the argument being used in support of this contention is the price rises that would result from using the cheaper, non-British option? Yes, we know, politics doesn't have to be logical, usually isn't. But really, you must use the more expensive supplier to reduce consumer costs? How about we try for a politics that isn't actively insane? That this is all about the Scilly Isles (yes, it is pronounced that way) is just icing on that cake.

Colin Grabow


After years of planning and preparation, the Vineyard Wind project is swinging into high gear. Wind turbine monopiles recently arrived from Spain have been loaded onto a specialized vessel that is now installing them off the coast of Massachusetts. When that job is complete it will return to port for another batch. But these back‐​and‐​forth trips don't involve a nearby Massachusetts port, or any U.S. port for that matter. Rather, thanks to the protectionist Jones Act the hub of this activity is Halifax, Nova Scotia over 400 miles away from the future wind farm.
Passed in 1920, the Jones Act restricts the waterborne transportation of "merchandise" between two U.S. "points" to vessels that are U.S.-registered, U.S.-built and mostly U.S.-crewed and owned. In the offshore wind context, U.S. points include both the port that vessels depart from as well as the installation site, while wind turbine components—including foundations (monopiles)—constitute merchandise. As no U.S.-flagged and built installation vessels currently exist to transport monopiles from a U.S. port to the Vineyard Wind site, the only viable option is the use of a foreign installation vessel operating out of a foreign port—in this case Halifax.
Operating out of more distant ports brings added complications. In 2020—again because of the Jones Act—Halifax was used as the staging ground for installing a pair of wind turbines 800 miles away off the coast of Virginia instead of a closer U.S. port. The New York Times described the 1920 law as the project manager's biggest problem, contributing to the installation effort lasting a full year rather than the matter of weeks it would have taken in Europe.
Three years later, the Vineyard Wind project finds itself in a similar position. Thankfully, the round‐​trip from Halifax to the installation site near Martha's Vineyard is significantly shorter. But the number of wind turbines involved is also far greater at 62, necessitating at least 11 round trips from Nova Scotia compared to six for the Virginia project.
Help—of sorts—is on the way. The first wind turbine installation vessel that fully complies with the Jones Act is slated to be delivered by a Texas shipyard later this year (although whether this happens as scheduled remains to be seen—of two ships ordered from the shipyard in 2017 for a 2020 delivery, one wasn't delivered until July 2022 while the other still has yet to be delivered). Once in operation, the vessel will allow for turbine components to be loaded in U.S. ports rather than using less efficient Jones Act workarounds.
The bad news is that the $500 million vessel—an amount that exceeds the international price for such vessels by approximately $170 million—appears set to see its price further balloon at least partly due to the shipyard's inexperience in building such vessels. Furthermore, no more such vessels are currently in the pipeline. And with prices estimated to have now climbed to $800 million, it's unclear whether any ever will be.
It's not just the installation vessels that feature eye‐​popping prices either. As a recent report from consulting firm Intelatus Global Partners points out, U.S.-built service operation vessels used to maintain offshore wind farms after they are built are estimated to have prices 40 to 140 percent greater than those constructed overseas. Given prices that exceed $50 million for such vessels overseas, that's potentially tens of millions of dollars in added cost per vessel. With some analysts projecting that up to 15 such vessels will be required to meet U.S. offshore wind needs, the toll exacted by U.S. protectionism will not be cheap.
Unfortunately, the problems may not end there.
Rather than seeking to relieve the burden posed by protectionist U.S. laws, some in Congress are advancing legislation that would impose further restrictions on the offshore energy sector's use of foreign vessels and mariners. Such legislation comes despite the fact that, beyond a lack of specialized vessels, the U.S. maritime industry is also suffering from a shortage of U.S. mariners—particularly those with offshore wind experience. Unsurprisingly, the offshore wind industry is fiercely opposed.
It's beyond the scope of this blog post to assess whether offshore wind energy is sensible or not. If the development of this industry is to be pursued, however, it should be done in the most efficient and cost‐​effective manner possible. U.S. maritime protectionism—like all protectionism—only guarantees inefficiency, higher costs, and waste. If President Biden truly believes that climate change is a "clear and present danger to the United States" and that offshore wind should play a key role in mitigating this threat, then he—and other policymakers who share such convictions—should urgently push for the removal or relaxation of Jones Act restrictions.

If we had some eggs we could have ham and eggs for breakfast, if we had some ham. Or, the fallacy of the unwarranted assumption:In a report setting out the case for a vast expansion of GB Energy in the early years of a Labour government, Common Wealth said state-led investment in clean energy would be substantially cheaper than the private sector equivalent – helping to save households money on their bills.It said renewable investment financed out of Labour's initial £8.3bn capitalisation would save between £125m and £208m a year on debt interest costs each year – saving up to £1bn in total compared with private-sector borrowing, which is typically more expensive.Business Green, the media outlet of choice for the subsidy suckers, agrees. Obviously.It is true that the interest rate on public debt is lower than that on private. For the obvious reason that if the project is mismanaged, or goes over budget, or goes kablooie, or just generally doesn't work out well then the taxpayers are on the hook for repayment, not the cashflows of the project that has been mismanaged, gone over budget, banged kablooie or just generally doesn't work out well.We've a transfer of risk that is - for nothing is actually free in financial markets. OK. But what's the assumption there that leads to the claimed lower bills? That the public management of the project will lead to the same risk, compared to private sector management, of the project being mismanaged, going over budget, exploding kablooie or just generally not working out. This from the people who have given us the Scottish ferries - where they managed to bankrupt their own shipyard building the things - and HS2 and Sizewell and, well, you get the picture*. We might even think that similarity of outcome, of risk, might be an unwarranted assumption.Building things with public money would be cheaper if building things with public money were cheaper. Well, yes, but Dr. Seuss was right you know.*We particularly relish the national planning system for housing land which produces a shortage of land for housing despite 98% of the country not being used as land for housing.

The sources of our future electricity are really quite simple but Whitehall, with the best of intentions, is doing their best to mess things up. Renewables, largely wind and solar, will provide the lion's share at best value – or something close to that. But what about the rest?In 2022, a record 41.5 per cent of electricity came from renewables. "Around 72 per cent of renewable fuels are used for electricity generation, a third of which is lost in the conversion process." This illustrates the care that must be taken in distinguishing renewables' capacity from contribution to demand. The former is the nameplate output from an energy source like wind, if the wind blew at an optimal level all year long and it could all be used for electricity generation with no wastage. Politicians, when discussing renewables, like to talk about capacity, which they can control by commissioning more windfarms, rather than share of demand which depends on weather and which they therefore cannot control.Even estimating 2020 needs care: UK electricity demand fell 4.7% in 2020 to 281 TWh due to Covid and "UK total electricity generation in 2020 was 312 TWh" but the former figure is demand and the latter is generation. In 2019 "primary electricity" was 11.6 per cent of UK energy consumption so if total energy consumption in 2050 remains about the same but has become 100 per cent electricity, the electricity market will need to have grown by eight times. To maintain its 40 per cent share, renewables would need to match that growth.An eightfold increase in the size of the 2050 electricity market may be too high. The Government estimates that the total electricity demand in 2050 could range from 370 TWh to 570 TWh, depending on the level of electrification and energy efficiency. This is clearly too low. McKinsey's predicts that the electricity demand could reach 800 TWh. Nearer the mark.National Grid ESO, in one of their future energy scenarios for 2050, think that the range of capacity required for electricity will be between 285 and 387 GW to deal with annual demand up to between 570 TWh and 726 TWh. They estimate that the wind and solar capacity will be between 149GW and 239GW which leaves between 135GW and 148GW to supplied by nuclear and fossil fuels with carbon capture.That compares with government expectation that the 2050 electricity capacity will total 96GW with nuclear supplying 25 per cent of that. About 6.4GW of that will be provided by Hinkley Point C, approved 2016, and its twin Sizewell C, frequently announced but still not approved.  24GW is too small a target for nuclear and would leave over 100GW to be supplied by fossil fuels, deeply unpopular even with carbon capture. Industry sources, that cannot be quoted, reckon that 48GW would be a far more realistic target. Hinkley was supposed to be built by 2020 at a cost of £12 billion; the latest estimates are completion in 2031 and a £44.3 billion bill.  Apparently "there were 7,000 substantial design changes required by British regulations that needed to be made to the site, with 35% more steel and 25% more concrete needed than originally planned." Of course we fully understand that, seven years after approval, the designers could have had little idea how much steel or concrete was required or what the regulations would be.Sizewell C was touted as costing a mere £20 billion because of the savings from being the Hinkley Point C twin.  Professor Thomas of Greenwich University thinks £40 billion is more likely with a 10 – 12 year construction time, i.e. 2036 if a decision is made this year.It is astonishing that the government is hell bent on continuing with these monsters. They are planning another six large reactors (albeit smaller at around 1 GW) after Hinkley and Sizewell. Assuming this plan for the larger reactors is implemented, then we would need about 120 SMRs @ £300 million each to be up and running by 2050.  No sign of that in government plans.Large reactors take at least 10 years to build and will be providing electricity to the Grid at a price which is estimated to be at least 50% more expensive than the forecast price for electricity from Small Modular Reactors (SMRs).  SMRs should take about 6 months to build in a factory or shipyards and about 2 years to install for the first unit of a multi-SMR facility with installation times falling to 12-18 months per subsequent unit. The reason Sizewell C took so long to gain approval was that no one but HM Treasury was stupid enough to invest in it. Even the French who own the EDF company responsible for Hinkley and Sizewell are trying to back out of paying for them.SMRs will typically cost in the range £2.1 million to £3 million per MW to build compared with the current estimate of £14.4 million per MW for Hinkley point C. Thorcon quotes £800 million per GW, i.e.£240 million for a 300 MW SMR. Rolls Royce leads the UK race for reasons good and bad and is offering SMRs here for rather more than Thorcon's offer. Poland has already ordered 30 SMRs. Yet this government plans not to make any decision on the first SMR until 2029, presumably to avoid having to undertake the required value for money comparison between SMRs and Sizewell C. It claims to be a world leader but actually it will be last in the queue. "To recover the UK's global leadership in civil nuclear" could be irony or could be evidence that some distant corner of HMT has a sense of humour after all.                                                                 

 The Conference of Defence Associations Institute made a splash this week with an open letter "Call for Action: Canada's National Security and Defence in Peril."  It made a heap of news given who signed it: a heap of former ministers of defence, a bunch of ambassadors and high ranking civil servants, and several retired generals and admirals (tis funny to me that the title of the piece omits the squids and skimmers):I respect the hell out of many of the signers as well as folks at CDAI, which as been a terrific partner of the CDSN.  However, I have quibbles, both minor and major, which I would have shared this morning on the radio had the host not gotten the wrong talking points--he asked me about Elon Musk and the CBC.  While it was fun to rant about bad faith actors engaged in vice-signalling, I did prep for the interview and didn't want to waste it, so here's some thoughts about this piece.  First, I want to address a few specific gripes before getting to the larger context.The letter talks about our military capabilities being woefully inadequate to protect our landmass.  That is not only true, that will ALWAYS be true.  How so?  The primary military threat to Canada are missiles launched by Russia/China/North Korea.  We can't stop those.  No matter how much we spend, we can't because we don't have ballistic missile defenses.  The Americans have been working on such defenses since Reagan's Star Wars speech, and they really haven't made much progress on it.  So, we should be clearer about what are the threats and what we need to defend ourselves from those threats.  The biggest threats to Canadian lives and property are stuff outside the military domain: climate change, pandemics, and cyber attacks (while the military has a cyber role, we should not be spending the scarce commodity of disciplined, trained people in uniform on jobs civilians can and should do).  People can cite Russian investments in the north, but we have to keep in mind that they have a whole lot of north to defend.  I do really worry about a war with China, but that is a China-Taiwan conflict that will spillover, and we will never have a navy big enough to make a dent in that conflict.  I say all this, even as I agree with the basic premise--we need to spend more.  But there are some difficulties with that, as I get to, below."We have also fallen short in meaningful contributions to burden
sharing for the collective defence and security of our allies and
partners." Oh really?  What burden has Canada shirked?  Canada paid the third highest price of any ally in Afghanistan and had far less restrictions until it became a training mission.  Canada is one of four framework nations organizing the defense/deterrence/reassurance missions in the Baltics and Poland.  While our contingent has been smaller than the others, the resulting need to organize many smaller and less respected (sorry) contingents has earned Canada a heap of kudos for stepping up when France refused to do so.  Canada has played a leading role in training Ukrainian forces before the Russian invasion of 2022 and since.  Canada has shipped a comparative level of arms and ammunition and other supplies to Ukraine.  When people say Canada has not burden-shared enough, they really mean Canada hasn't spent enough on its military.  But that is not "burden-sharing" because spending on our own military really does not lift the burden that much from the others.  Here's a secret: the US would spend as much as it currently does even if Canada doubled its spending.  Indeed, given the domestic political dynamics driving American defense spending, I am pretty sure that if each and every US ally spent the equivalent of 2% of GDP on defense, the US would still spend about the same.  Which branch of the US military will say: hey, our allies have spent more, we don't need to spend as much?  Which defense contractors?  Which Senators and Representatives?  And, yes, the easiest way to make progress to 2% is to tank the economy since it is all about spending relative to one's economy.  If one's economy grows pretty well, one might find one spending more money absolutely but not relative to that metric.  Canada is spending more on its military than it was a decade ago--more dollars, even if not a greater % of GDP.  More importantly input measures are dumb.  See Anessa Kimball's book for more on the craptastic nature of the 2% conversation.Canadian civil-military relations conversations don't really address the challenges posed by having retired senior officers take political stances the same way these are raised in the US.  But perhaps they should.  If JC Boucher and I get funding, we will be studying whether the signals sent by retired officers cause Canadians to think that they are speaking for the active military.  If so, well, damn.  Because then the military is seen, rightly or wrongly, as taking a partisan stance.  And that ain't good. Folks can say this is a bipartisan letter since it has both former Conservative and Liberal politicians signing it, but nope, that doesn't do the trick since this letter is calling on this government, this party, to do better.  It does not call on Parliament to get its house in order even as the role of parliament in Canadian defence is so much weaker than damn near any other democracy.  So, this is critical of this PM and the Liberal party because they are the ones in power.  Speaking of the former ministers, how many of them are responsible for the current mess?  How many of them cut spending, pushed back procurement processes, under-invested in procurement expertise, and so on?  Most of them?  All of them?  So much easier for them to criticize this stuff now that they are no longer beholden to parties and no longer running for office. Which gets to the part that is most unrealistic: "the Government must radically accelerate timelines for procurement..."  Um, through magic?  A great application of Green Lantern theory.  DND doesn't have enough people to do the procurement stuff to buy the
equipment and such.  So, that needs a heap of work to make happen before one can spend the money. If one were to magically allocate $15b more, the current staffing at DND couldn't spend it.   Ok, the larger context.  The letter is right that the latest budget is disappointing from a defence/security perspective as it had no new money.  In my humble opinion, the gravest threat to the Canadian military is its recruitment and retention crisis.  That being short 16k people means not only that the CAF can't do as much, but that those in the CAF are stressed.  Stressed by having to do multiple jobs, stressed by not being well served by various offices that are understaff, and so on.  These pressures are likely to make it harder to retain people and harder to recruit, which will exacerbate the crisis--a downward spiral.  It would seem to me that while throwing money at the problem won't solve it, it probably could help.  Increase pay, increase benefits, spend more money on recruiting efforts, improve military bases, etc.  I do wonder what is happening to the money that is supposed to be going to the 16k soldiers, sailors, and aviators who aren't in the CAF.  Anyhow, that is one place where the money should be going.  Another key part of the current context is that the Defence Policy Update is late and has generally been an opaque, underwhelming process.  Canada should have a quadrennial process--to review how well the last four years went and whether goals were attained, why DND/CAF fell short, and plans for improving as well as responding to new developments.  Instead, the DPU was going to be, from what folks have gleaned, a sales pitch for spending more money on NORAD modernization (which is necessary but won't actually lead to us being much safer due to that aforementioned missile defence problemo).  We will only be able to evaluate the DPU after it comes out.  The previous review was much better than expected.  Maybe people liked it since it didn't make any hard choices as it didn't force any real tradeoffs.  But it did cost out the spending for the various programs and was pretty transparent.  Of course, when rolled out, much was made of putting personnel first in the document to suggestion putting personnel first in reality, but then Trudeau kept around a Defence Minister who kept around a Chief of Defence Staff that was abusing his power and engaged in sexual misconduct.  So, the proof is in the doing, not in the words on the page.Finally, the political pressures run against most of this.  If we wanted good ships fast and less expensive, we'd buy them from countries that are good at that.  Instead, notice how the ship building is pitched by this government (and by the previous one, just not quite so starkly): That graphic is the cover for the 2015 Liberal Defence Platform.  Notice the purpose of naval investments--jobs.  Not ships.  Jobs.  Not defending maritime approaches.  This is one of the primary reasons why Canada doesn't have the equipment the CAF needs--that decisions are made about jobs and votes. Stephen Harper's plan was to capture Halifax and Vancouver via the shipbuilding program, but now all the parties are held hostage by Irving, Seaspan, and now Davie shipyards.  Folks can argue we need this capacity to maintain and upgrade the ships, but the choice to do it this way is incredibly expensive and ... no frigates (the AOPS ships the navy didn't really want are mostly broken).  When we do import stuff, there is an urge to Canadianize it to make it fit Canadian standards.  So, now we have helicopters that are too heavy.  Oy.  The military always wants to put as much stuff as they can, so that the equipment can operate in all kinds of scenarios since they can only get one type of plane, one type of ship, and so forth.  But that goldplating makes the systems more expensive and less effective.  Again, choices need to be made, which might mean that a ship is good at one thing and not so good at another.  Because you know.... 👉While this government is not great at delivering, most of this is hard-wired into Canadian politics.  Which party is going to get more votes by spending more money on defense?   "We believe this could be best accomplished on a non-partisan basis and would have broad public support."  Um, no.Structural problems can't be fixed with just a call to arms and a smidge more political will (whatever that is).  Maybe this letter might impact those writing the Defence Policy Update, but that impact is likely to be on the packaging as the money is already set.  Trudeau has already made the decision for this year, and given the context--the war in Ukraine, the DPU, etc--I doubt that next year will be any different as we get closer to the next election.  I get the frustration of those signing this letter. I share it.  I write blog posts out of frustration.  Other folks write open letters.  But move the policy needle?  I think not.