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Linguistically annotated multilingual comparable corpora of parliamentary debates ParlaMint.ana 2.0
ParlaMint is a multilingual set of comparable corpora containing parliamentary debates mostly starting in 2015 and extending to mid-2020, with each corpus being about 20 million words in size. The sessions in the corpora are marked as belonging to the COVID-19 period (after October 2019), or being "reference" (before that date). The corpora have extensive metadata, including aspects of the parliament; the speakers (name, gender, MP status, party affiliation, party coalition/opposition); are structured into time-stamped terms, sessions and meetings; with speeches being marked by the speaker and their role (e.g. chair, regular speaker). The speeches also contain marked-up transcriber comments, such as gaps in the transcription, interruptions, applause, etc. Note that some corpora have further information, e.g. the year of birth of the speakers, links to their Wikipedia articles, their membership in various committees, etc. The corpora are encoded according to the Parla-CLARIN TEI recommendation (https://clarin-eric.github.io/parla-clarin/), but have been validated against the compatible, but much stricter ParlaMint schemas. This entry contains the linguistically marked-up version of the corpus, while the text version is available at http://hdl.handle.net/11356/1388. The ParlaMint.ana linguistic annotation includes tokenization, sentence segmentation, lemmatisation, Universal Dependencies part-of-speech, morphological features, and syntactic dependencies, and the 4-class CoNLL-2003 named entities. Some corpora also have further linguistic annotations, such as PoS tagging or named entities according to language-specific schemes, with their corpus TEI headers giving further details on the annotation vocabularies and tools. The compressed files include the ParlaMint.ana XML TEI-encoded linguistically annotated corpus; the derived corpus in CoNLL-U with TSV speech metadata; and the vertical files (with registry file), suitable for use with CQP-based concordancers, such as CWB, noSketch Engine or KonText. Also included is the 2.0 release of the data and scripts available at the GitHub repository of the ParlaMint project.
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Multilingual comparable corpora of parliamentary debates ParlaMint 2.0
ParlaMint is a multilingual set of comparable corpora containing parliamentary debates mostly starting in 2015 and extending to mid-2020, with each corpus being about 20 million words in size. The sessions in the corpora are marked as belonging to the COVID-19 period (after October 2019), or being "reference" (before that date). The corpora have extensive metadata, including aspects of the parliament; the speakers (name, gender, MP status, party affiliation, party coalition/opposition); are structured into time-stamped terms, sessions and meetings; with speeches being marked by the speaker and their role (e.g. chair, regular speaker). The speeches also contain marked-up transcriber comments, such as gaps in the transcription, interruptions, applause, etc. Note that some corpora have further information, e.g. the year of birth of the speakers, links to their Wikipedia articles, their membership in various committees, etc. The corpora are encoded according to the Parla-CLARIN TEI recommendation (https://clarin-eric.github.io/parla-clarin/), but have been validated against the compatible, but much stricter ParlaMint schemas. This entry contains the ParlaMint TEI-encoded corpora with the derived plain text version of the corpus along with TSV metadata on the speeches. Also included is the 2.0 release of the data and scripts available at the GitHub repository of the ParlaMint project. Note that there also exists the linguistically marked-up version of the corpus, which is available at http://hdl.handle.net/11356/1405.
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Multilingual comparable corpora of parliamentary debates ParlaMint 2.1
ParlaMint 2.1 is a multilingual set of 17 comparable corpora containing parliamentary debates mostly starting in 2015 and extending to mid-2020, with each corpus being about 20 million words in size. The sessions in the corpora are marked as belonging to the COVID-19 period (after November 1st 2019), or being "reference" (before that date). The corpora have extensive metadata, including aspects of the parliament; the speakers (name, gender, MP status, party affiliation, party coalition/opposition); are structured into time-stamped terms, sessions and meetings; with speeches being marked by the speaker and their role (e.g. chair, regular speaker). The speeches also contain marked-up transcriber comments, such as gaps in the transcription, interruptions, applause, etc. Note that some corpora have further information, e.g. the year of birth of the speakers, links to their Wikipedia articles, their membership in various committees, etc. The corpora are encoded according to the Parla-CLARIN TEI recommendation (https://clarin-eric.github.io/parla-clarin/), but have been validated against the compatible, but much stricter ParlaMint schemas. This entry contains the ParlaMint TEI-encoded corpora with the derived plain text version of the corpus along with TSV metadata on the speeches. Also included is the 2.0 release of the data and scripts available at the GitHub repository of the ParlaMint project. Note that there also exists the linguistically marked-up version of the corpus, which is available at http://hdl.handle.net/11356/1431.
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Linguistically annotated multilingual comparable corpora of parliamentary debates ParlaMint.ana 2.1
ParlaMint 2.1 is a multilingual set of 17 comparable corpora containing parliamentary debates mostly starting in 2015 and extending to mid-2020, with each corpus being about 20 million words in size. The sessions in the corpora are marked as belonging to the COVID-19 period (from November 1st 2019), or being "reference" (before that date). The corpora have extensive metadata, including aspects of the parliament; the speakers (name, gender, MP status, party affiliation, party coalition/opposition); are structured into time-stamped terms, sessions and meetings; with speeches being marked by the speaker and their role (e.g. chair, regular speaker). The speeches also contain marked-up transcriber comments, such as gaps in the transcription, interruptions, applause, etc. Note that some corpora have further information, e.g. the year of birth of the speakers, links to their Wikipedia articles, their membership in various committees, etc. The corpora are encoded according to the Parla-CLARIN TEI recommendation (https://clarin-eric.github.io/parla-clarin/), but have been validated against the compatible, but much stricter ParlaMint schemas. This entry contains the linguistically marked-up version of the corpus, while the text version is available at http://hdl.handle.net/11356/1432. The ParlaMint.ana linguistic annotation includes tokenization, sentence segmentation, lemmatisation, Universal Dependencies part-of-speech, morphological features, and syntactic dependencies, and the 4-class CoNLL-2003 named entities. Some corpora also have further linguistic annotations, such as PoS tagging or named entities according to language-specific schemes, with their corpus TEI headers giving further details on the annotation vocabularies and tools. The compressed files include the ParlaMint.ana XML TEI-encoded linguistically annotated corpus; the derived corpus in CoNLL-U with TSV speech metadata; and the vertical files (with registry file), suitable for use with CQP-based concordancers, such as CWB, noSketch Engine or KonText. Also included is the 2.1 release of the data and scripts available at the GitHub repository of the ParlaMint project. As opposed to the previous version 2.0, this version corrects some errors in various corpora and adds the information on upper / lower house for bicameral parliaments. The vertical files have also been changed to make them easier to use in the concordancers.
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Hvordan kan vi beskytte valg mot fremmed påvirkning?
In: Internasjonal politikk, Band 79, Heft 1, S. 90-113
ISSN: 1891-1757
Russisk påvirkning av presidentvalget i 2016 har skapt frykt for manipulasjon av valg i Vesten. Både EU og USA forventer at trusselen vedvarer, og at nye metoder og kapasiteter utvikles. Artikkelen beskriver hva valgpåvirkning er, og hvordan slik påvirkning gjennomføres. Den gjør en systematisk gjennomgang av litteratur om beskyttelse av valg, og funnene sammenfattes i seks temaer med til sammen 38 mulige tiltak for å hindre valgpåvirkning: 1) bevisstgjøring; 2) forebygging; 3) samarbeide og koordinering; 4) beskyttende tiltak; 5) aktive mottiltak og avskrekking; 6) forskning, læring og kompetansebygging. Alle tiltak krever nøye vurdering av økonomiske, politiske, juridiske, praktiske og andre implikasjoner, samt særlig forholdet til demokrati og ytringsfrihet. Avslutningsvis påpekes fire problemstillinger som særlig aktuelle for videre vurdering: 1) bevisstgjøring via medier, samt målrettet mot partier og valgorganisasjon; 2) en helhetlig gjennomgang av trusler, sårbarhet og beskyttelsestiltak, særlig datasikkerhet; 3) forskning og utvikling; 4) avskrekking og eksponering av påvirkning. Mange tiltak er inngripende, særlig i forhold til demokrati, ytringsfrihet, sensur og selvsensur, og de viktigste utfordringer, begrensninger og kritikk mot restriktive tiltak gjennomgås. Vi må unngå at tiltak for å beskytte demokratiet i seg selv undergraver demokratiet.
Abstract in English:How Can Elections Be Protected Against Foreign Interference?Russian interference in the 2016 US presidential election have caused fear for manipulation of elections in the West. Both the EU and the US see this as a persistent threat and expect new methods and capabilities to emerge. This article describes election interference and how it has been conducted. It reviews literature about protection of elections, and summarises the findings in six themes with a total of 38 possible measures: 1) awareness, 2) prevention, 3) cooperation and coordination, 4) protective measures, 5) active countermeasures and deterrence, 6) research and competence building. All measures require careful consideration of economic, political, legal, practical and other implications, and especially consequences for democracy and freedom of speech. Finally, four issues are proposed as particularly relevant for further consideration: 1) awareness through media, and also especially targeted at political parties and the election organisation, 2) a comprehensive assessment of threats, vulnerabilities and protective measures, especially in terms of data protection, 3) research and development, 4) deterrence and exposure of interference. Many of the measures are far-reaching when it comes to democracy, freedom of speech, censorship and self-censorship, and the article reviews challenges, limitations and critique of such restrictive measures. It is essential that measures to protect democracy in themselves do not undermine democracy.
Militæraktivisme brandet som fredsaktivisme? Norges kampanje for en plass i FNs sikkerhetsråd
In: Internasjonal politikk, Band 78, Heft 3, S. 397-410
ISSN: 1891-1757
Hvordan håndterer Norge sin militæraktivisme og sitt NATO-medlemskap når landet vil presentere seg selv som en fredsnasjon? Problemstillingen ble aktuell i det norske utenriksdepartementets nylige kampanje for å få Norge valgt inn i FNs sikkerhetsråd, hvor ideen om Norge som fredsnasjon stod sentralt. I denne artikkelen bruker vi nasjonsbranding som et analytisk rammeverk for å forstå hvordan Norge bygget opp sin kampanje som fredsnasjon og håndterte det konkurrerende narrativet om sin rolle i krig. Som et sekundærfokus ser vi også på hvordan Norges to konkurrenter, Irland og Canada, fremstilte seg på disse to dimensjonene – som er av særinteresse da Irland ikke er NATO-medlem. For å utforske disse spørsmålene analyserer vi taler og tekster fra det norske diplomatiet og regjeringen vedrørende kampanjen, samt ser på kampanjematerialet til de tre landene. Gitt at de tre landenes profil er påfallende lik, fant vi at alle måtte forsøke å finne en måte å brande seg på som uttrykket ens særtrekk og høynet ens relevans i sammenligning med de to andre landene. I analysen av Norge ser vi at militæraktivisme stadig ble hvisket ut i løpet av den norske kampanjen og at andre tematikker ble brukt i brandingen – som for eksempel likestilling og bidrag til internasjonal utvikling. Dette skulle dermed skulle legitimere ideen om fredsnasjonen Norge, et land som alle andre kan stole på.
Abstract in English:Military Activism Branded as Peace Activism? Norway's Campaign for a Seat on the UN Security CouncilIn seeking to present itself as a peace nation, how has Norway sought to address its military activism and NATO membership? This tension was apparent in Norway's recent campaign for a seat on the UN Security Council, where the idea of the country as a peace nation stood central. Using nation branding as an analytical framework, we ask how Norway built and sustained this peace narrative and managed the competing narrative of its role in controversial armed conflicts. As a secondary focus, we ask how Norway's two competitors, Ireland and Canada, presented themselves on these two axes of peace and military activism. Ireland posed a particular threat as it is not a NATO member. To explore these questions, we analyse speeches and texts from Norwegian officials regarding the campaign and examine the official campaign material from all three countries. Given that the image of all three countries was generally similar, we find that each country sought to find unique ways to brand themselves as well as countering the few specific advantages of the others. In the case of Norway, we find that during the campaign the country's military activism was downplayed and other themes were foregrounded in the branding, such as gender equality and international development cooperation. This would legitimate the idea of Norway as a peace nation, a reliable partner that all states could trust.
미국과 러시아의 테러조직 지정 제도 비교 ; Comparative Study on Russian and US Approaches to Terrorist Organizations Designation
학위논문 (석사) -- 서울대학교 대학원 : 사회과학대학 정치외교학부(외교학전공), 2020. 8. 신범식. ; 본 논문은 테러와의 전쟁에서 많은 피해를 입은 미국과 러시아의 테러조직 리스트가 예상과 달리 왜 유사점보다 차이점을 더 많이 가지고 있는가를 밝히고자 하였다. 이를 위해 러시아와 미국이 테러조직을 지정하는 과정을 비교함으로써 양국의 테러조직 지정에 영향을 미치는 요인들을 규명하고자 하였다. 우선 미국과 러시아의 국가 안보전략 문서들을 분석함으로써 양국이 시기별로 중요하게 여긴 관심사와 이러한 관심사에 대한 위협이 무엇인지 분석하였다. 그 다음으로, 미국과 러시아의 대통령들이 1993년부터 2017년까지 발표한 테러 관련 연설문, 인터뷰, 공문서들 가운데 제목이나 본문에 'terror' 및 'террор'라는 어근이 포함된 다양한 형태의 텍스트 자료들을 대상으로 워드분석을 함으로써 양국이 테러를 어떠한 위협으로 상정하는지, 국내외의 어떤 안건들과 연결하는지를 파악하였다. 그리하여 본고는 테러에 대한 역사적 경험과 인식, 안보에 대한 이해, 국제 질서와 상황 파악 등 많은 요인들이 테러조직 지정에 영향을 미치면서 양국이 테러에 대한 기본적인 인식, 즉 초국가적인 테러조직들이 한 국가만이 아닌, 국제사회 전체에 위협이 될 수 있다는 인식 면에서는 시간이 지나면서 비슷해졌지만 양국의 안보개념, 안보와 관련된 국익의 우선 순위, 테러에 대한 인식에 영향을 미친 역사적 경험이 상이하기 때문에 테러조직의 지정에서 유사점보다는 차이점이 더 많이 나타나게 되었다는 결론에 도달하였다. 본고는 일견 미국과 러시아가 테러조직을 공동의 적으로 간주하는 것처럼 보이지만 실제로는 다양한 요인들로 인해 테러와 테러조직의 지정에서 서로 다르게 접근한다는 사실을 보여주었다는 데 그 의의가 있다. ; Russia and the United States have been on the front line of the fight against terrorism for a long time, and at first glance it may seem that they are fighting against the same enemy. However, upon careful comparison of the U.S. Department of State list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations(FTO) and corresponding list of the Russian Federation the distinctions are strikingly obvious. The organizations designated by each country outnumber the ones that were appointed by both. This study aims to examine the factors behind the differences in the approaches that Russia and the U.S. took to defining the enemy. It is argued that the designation method is mainly determined by two broad aspects – the security concept and the perception of terrorism. Through the analysis of the national security strategies from 1997 to 2015, this study investigated several crucial issues: the ways Russia and the United States had been perceiving the international order, their place and role in it, as well as changes in their national interests over time, and most importantly, what constituted the perceived threats to the national security. Supporting this with the examination of the perception of terrorism through the word frequency analysis of Russian and American presidents' speeches, the study concluded that despite the fact that both countries claim terrorism to be their main threat, the approach to defining it is not the same as each country bases it on their own historical experience and national priorities. The United States views terrorism largely as a part of the global security framework, inseparably associated with other issues (such as the threat of WMD proliferation) that are claimed to emanate from rogue states and tyrannies. Consequently, the strategy in the fight against terrorism has been derived from the desire to converse these regimes to democracy. On the other hand, Russia was found to view terrorism as a more direct threat to the country's national security. For Russia, terrorist organizations are separate entities that try to violate the country's constitutional order through separatist and extremist slogans. Unlike the United States, Russia does not view terrorist organizations as an instrument in the hands of tyrannical regimes, therefore it condemns the American unilateral approach that is structured around interference into the internal affairs of other states. These differences are reflected in the formation of the terrorist organizations lists. The list of the United States is more comprehensive and geographically global. The FTO list includes not only the organizations that directly threaten US security, but also the ones that harm the partners and allies of the United States. At the same time, Russia is focused on designating the organizations that directly threaten the security of the country and the nearest region like Central Asia. There are also organizations on the list that do not commit terrorist acts, but undermine the values of Russia's constitutional system through the conduct of propaganda on the Internet. After September 11 and the Beslan school siege in 2004, there is a convergence in the perception of the US and Russia on the rise of terrorist organizations network as a major transnational threat in the 21st century. This explains why there are the same ten organizations on both lists. The vast majority of the organizations that have been designated by both countries are affiliates of al-Qaeda, which are fighting not one specific country, but the entire modern international society. However, despite a similar logic in terrorism perception, it was concluded that it is the differences in national security priorities and promoted values that are accountable for the ways that Russia and the United States define the enemy in the fight against terrorism. ; I. 서론 1 1. 문제제기 1 2. 기존연구 검토 3 3. 연구 방법 및 자료 6 4. 논문의 구성 11 II. 테러 위협에 대한 미국과 러시아의 대응 방식 12 1. 미국과 러시아의 안보 개념 14 1) 미국의 안보 개념 14 (1) 국제질서에 대한 담론 14 (2) 안보 위협에 대한 해석 16 2) 러시아의 안보 개념 18 (1) 국제질서에 대한 담론 18 (2) 안보 위협에 대한 해석 22 2. 테러에 대한 미국과 러시아의 인식 비교 26 1) 테러에 대한 미국의 인식 및 대테러 전략 26 2) 테러에 대한 러시아의 인식 및 대테러 전략 37 3. 테러 위협에 대한 미국과 러시아의 관점 비교 45 III. 미국과 러시아의 테러 조직 지정 제도 비교 48 1. 테러 조직 리스트 수립 과정 48 1) 미국의 해외 테러조직 리스트(FTOs) 50 2) 러시아 연방제가 지정한 테러조직 리스트 51 2. 테러조직 지정 과정에서 러시아와 미국의 유사점과 차이점 52 1) 테러조직 지정 및 관리방식 비교 54 2) 사례 연구를 통한 양국의 비교 62 (1) 하마스 62 (2) 탈레반 67 (3) 알누스라 72 IV. 결론 76 참고문헌 78 Abstract 88 ; Master
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