There is no consensus about the causes of the reduction in business cycle volatility seen in many major economies over the last decade. Using stylised models of the economies of the US, Euro area, UK and Japan, we argue that economic stability has been fostered by improved monetary policy and by associated changes in the behaviour of inflation, which has itself led to a reduction in the volatility of economic shocks. Assuming an absence of cataclysmic events, our projections suggest that most major economies should continue to enjoy an unusual degree of stability.
In the current interdependent global economic system, measures adopted nationally by governments to safeguard financial stability sometimes produce cross-border spillovers. A question arises as to how international economic law shall treat states' regulatory powers to tackle internal and external economic and financial threats. The goal of the research is to analyze (i) how international law distributes between different international subjects the social costs of global instability in the event of emergencies, and (ii) how regulatory powers are attributed in a situation of economic and financial interdependence. To do so, this essay sets out a law and economics theory that conceptualizes financial stability in international law as the result of a trade-off between three competing regulatory objectives: domestic stability, global stability, and financial integration. The way in which the interplay between these objectives is represented in law crucially influences the balance of rights and obligations in the formulation of national economic and financial policies, and the level of protection against economic threats. This essay argues that current international law is largely inefficient because it structures the protection of financial stability as a matter of the individual rights of each state, rather than a social problem of the international community.
International audience ; The goal of this paper is to make an assessment of the correlation between monetary stabilitynamely price stability-and macro financial euphoria in the Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa (CEMAC).Our methodological approach which combines econometrics, graphical and historical analyses, shows that the relationship between the selected indicators of macro financial exuberance and inflation is not obvious in all of CEMAC apart from the Central African Republic (CAF).Nonetheless, since we consider CAF is the only country in CEMAC to be constantly in a situation of political instability, we may assume that the positive correlation between euphoria and inflation in that country has little or nothing to do with monetary policy performances. This enables us to give an empirical justificationit is the originality of this researchthe persistent situation in liquidity excess and the credit rationing in CEMAC Zone. It even raises the question of whether lower inflation in CEMAC may be more associated to "Good Luck" than "Good Policy" hypothesis.
In the last Supreme Court term, the Court ruled in Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau that Article II of the U.S. Constitution and separation of powers prohibit Congress from shielding the Bureau's director from termination except for cause. Seila Law has natural implications for the CFPB's independence (although the magnitude of that effect is unclear). More troubling, Seila Law could open up the financial system to destabilization by paving the path for a full-scale assault on the traditional independence of federal financial regulators and presidential manipulation of the economy. Seila Law erodes independent agency protections in the worst possible way, by enshrining its ruling as constitutional command. The constitutional basis of that ruling ossifies the law on independent agency safeguards and means Congress and the president cannot overturn it. The decision further exposes the CFPB, and possibly other federal financial regulators, to political strong-arming to chase short-term gains at potential expense to long-term financial stability. In the process, Seila Law damages the important ballast of economic health that agency independence provides.
A stabilised tax system is a necessary element of an efficient legal system. Assurance of stability of thetax system is crucial for tax payers, who can plan their undertakings over a longer period of time, withoutbeing exposed to the danger of tax rate changes. The most visible symptom of tax law stability is the stabilityof tax rates. The guarantee of fixed tax rates is one of the most important incentives for investors, who takeit under consideration when estimating the risk connected with starting a new enterprise in a given market.Establishment of a stabilised tax system turns out to be very difficult in practice. There are severalfactors, amongst which the most important are: political background; sovereignty of lawmakers, who canalmost unlimitedly define the level of tax burden; changes taking place in former socialist countries in thelate 1980's and early 1990's causing radical tax system reforms; and, at last, the process of accession to theEuropean Community, which required harmonisation of state law systems with the European one.The above makes one ask the question whether it is possible to create a stabilised tax system with allthose factors around and eventually how to outline the area of stability
The stability of justice can be discussed in two parts. The first part centers around defining tyranny as an unjust form of government by examining the Peisistratid tyranny. It then demonstrates how democracy and human rights are stable, idealized forms of governmental justice. The second part builds upon the definitions from the first part and inspects how both Solon and Cleisthenes used the ideal of justice in their reforms. Additionally, the paper observes how that same essence of justice in governance is echoed by the ancient reforms in modern democracy and human rights.
Introduction: On-going conflict and political instability in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has led to increasing numbers of people fleeing their country for Europe. Many need rehabilitation services upon arrival in Greece after experiencing torture in DRC. The scarcity of state resources and the limited capacity of non-governmental organisations to assist survivors of torture means many needs remain unmet. This study explored the experiences of rehabilitation for male Congolese survivors of torture living in Athens, as well as the potential role of the wider Congolese community in Athens in supporting rehabilitation. Methods: This qualitative study included in-depth interviews with survivors of torture attending a rehabilitation clinic and key informant interviews with representatives of the wider Congolese community in Athens. Data was thematically analysed to construct and develop codes and themes. Results: 19 survivors and 10 key informants were interviewed. For many survivors, rehabilitation was an unclear concept. Despite the appreciation for services received at the clinic and the amelioration of physical and psychological symptoms, survivors felt rehabilitation was incomplete as it did not meet their accommodation needs nor provide stability through granting refugee status. Survivors were wary of trusting other Congolese people after experiencing torture and did not always associate themselves with the local Congolese community. The role of local Congolese leaders and organisations was not seen as replacing the clinical element of rehabilitation but aiding in practical issues such as information sharing and integration, especially in partnership with other organisations. Discussion: Systemic shortcomings in Greece, including poor access to accommodation and insecure asylum status, impeded processes of rehabilitation. Many participants found themselves navigating an unstable and unpredictable landscape in their journey towards "feeling whole again." The role of the wider Congolese community in Athens in supporting rehabilitation remains complex and a lack of trust threatens social cohesion. Nonetheless, the willingness of the community to be more proactive should not be ignored by organisations and policy-makers.
In this article we propose to review some aspects of the relationship between price stability and financial stability in the current economic context. It is acknowledged that monetary policy of the EUROSYSTEM still have as the main objective the price stability, this being one of the most important ways of supporting sustainable economic growth. Although there are many theoretical approaches of the price stability concept all converging towards the idea of measuring and control of permanent inflation. Financial stability can be seen in the broad sense as the situation in which the financial system may ensure the efficient allocation of savings to investment opportunities and may face the shock without major disruptions. Viewed from this perspective the increased complementarity between price stability and financial stability is associated with economic globalization and, in particular, eliminating impediments to the free movement of capital flows. On the other hand the financial stability may be defined as a situation characterized by the absence of banking crises and by the existence of a certain level of price stability of the assets, including interest rates. ; peer-reviewed
This paper aims to explore the dynamics of competition in the Asia Pacific region. The analysis in this article used a qualitative approach based on secondary data. The data collected from the official reports and other relevant sources. The findings showed that there is instability in intrastate politics, it does not have much effect on regional political constellations. Geopolitical and geo-economic shifts in the region are ongoing so it is natural that there is a process of adaptation that creates a bit of friction with domestic politics. Economy and military serve as a power base for superpowers to be able to spread its influence in a minor power state. However, the power of the superpower is not always constant. The tide of the presence of force can affect the political constellation of the region and lead to changes in hegemony.
The effect of delegation on cartel stability is addressed in a duopoly for a homogeneous product, under Cournot competition. The main findings are that if only one firm is managerial, the critical discount factor is increased by the presence of a weight attached to sales, so that cartel stability is decreased, while if both are managerial the opposite holds. As a consequence, the inclusion of sales in both firms' objective function represents an incentive towards collusion.
I review the state of the art of the academic theoretical and empirical literature on the potential trade-off between competition and stability in banking. There are two basic channels through which competition may increase instability: by exacerbating the coordination problem of depositors/investors on the liability side and fostering runs/panics, and by increasing incentives to take risk and raise failure probabilities. The competition-stability trade-off is characterized and the implications of the analysis for regulation and competition policy are derived. It is found that optimal regulation may depend on the intensity of competition.
This thesis consists of three chapters that analyze the stability of financial institutions. The focus lies on self-fulfilling liquidity crises that are associated with maturity transformation conducted by financial intermediaries such as banks. The first chapter shows that the government has a distinct role in ensuring the functioning and stability of efficient maturity transformation. The second chapter shows that if a single government's power is limited, supranational agreements can help to mitigate this limitation. The third chapter addresses the financial fragility that may arise when agents circumvent regulation. It is argued that a deposit insurance may fail to prevent panic-based runs if regulatory arbitrage is possible.
In fiscal interaction, a policy is evolutionarily stable if, once adopted by all governments, jurisdictions that deviate from it fare worse than those that stick to it. Evolutionary stability is the appropriate solution concept for models of imitative learning (policy mimicking). We show that evolutionarily stable strategies implement identical allocations, regardless of whether jurisdictions use tax rates or expenditure levels as their strategy variable. This is in contrast to the observation that the allocations in the Nash equilibria of games played in tax rates or expenditure levels differ from one another. With evolutionary play, jurisdictions set taxes and expenditures competitively, i.e., they behave as if they were all negligibly small.
In fiscal interaction, a policy is evolutionarily stable if, once adopted by all governments, jurisdictions that deviate from it fare worse than those that stick to it. Evolutionary stability is the appropriate solution concept for models of imitative learning (policy mimicking). We show that evolutionarily stable strategies implement identical allocations, regardless of whether jurisdictions use tax rates or expenditure levels as their strategy variable. This is in contrast to the observation that the allocations in the Nash equilibria of games played in tax rates or expenditure levels differ from one another. With evolutionary play, jurisdictions set taxes and expenditures competitively, i.e., they behave as if they were all negligibly small.
The discussion about the impact of a monetary union on the fiscal stability of individual member countries is largely confined to European Monetary Union and the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) debate, which in turn tends to focus more on optimal fiscal rules. However, when adding insights from the theories of optimum currency areas, as well as from literature on fiscal stability analysis and exchange rate regimes in emerging markets, new layers are added to the discussion. Changes to the macroeconomic environment, changed incentives for fiscal authorities as well as possible changes in the reaction of capital markets are all factors that determine fiscal stability in a monetary union. This paper finds that some consequences of the institution of monetary union itself could alleviate the fear of heightened fiscal instability that is often assumed in the SGP debate. However, although the true nature of the problem of bailout for national fiscal authorities in a monetary union hinges likely less on the behaviour of fiscal authorities and more on the reaction of capital markets, this issue remains at the core of increased fiscal stability risk in a monetary union.
