Suchergebnisse

What can states expect to receive in return for the military aid they provide to other states? Can military aid buy recipient state compliance with donor objectives? In this study, we systematically investigate the effects of US military assistance on recipient state behavior toward the United States. We build on existing literature by creating three explicit theoretical models, employing a new measure of cooperation generated from events data, and controlling for preference similarity, so that our results capture the influence military aid has on recipient state behavior independent of any dyadic predisposition toward cooperation or conflict. We test seven hypotheses using a combination of simultaneous equation, cross-sectional time series, and Heckman selection models. We find that, with limited exceptions, increasing levels of US military aid significantly reduce cooperative foreign policy behavior with the United States. US reaction to recipient state behavior is also counterintuitive; instead of using a carrot-and-stick approach to military aid allocations, our results show that recipient state cooperation is likely to lead to subsequent reductions in US military assistance. Adapted from the source document.

AbstractProvisin for grants‐in‐aid in the social field, to be spent by states under federal supevision, will pave the way for greater coöperation between states and nation.

Our history affords numerous examples of efforts to secure state cooperation in the enforcement of federal laws, especially those marking abrupt changes in national policy. In practice, state cooperation has been most readily forthcoming in the administration of benefactory legislation. Most notably, federal grants-in-aid have been effective in helping to lift the standards of state services in such functional areas as highways, airports, public health, and agricultural technology. In another area, Selective Service has successfully employed local boards to enforce national policy. On the other hand, the Fugitive Slave law, the Civil Rights laws, National Prohibition, and the Emergency Price Control acts are reminders of the difficulties federal authorities have encountered in trying to enlist state aid in enforcement of national regulatory policies uncongenial to local sentiment. This article examines the experience under a permissive provision of the Fair Labor Standards Act, section 11(b), which authorizes the national government to reimburse state agencies aiding in enforcement.