Relations between the Islamic Republic of Mauritania and the European Union com withinthe framework of the Cotonou Agreement signed in 2000, revised in 2005 in Luxembourg andin 2010 in Burkina Faso. But geostrategic considerations led Mauritania to open a newframework of cooperation with the European Union as part of the Euromed partnership.Historically inaugurated by the Treaty of Rome 1957, these relations were extended by theYaoundé and Lomé Conventions. The Cotonou Agreement that currently governs theirrelationship rests on three pillars: political dialogue, trade relations and developmentcooperation, in the service of an ambitious objective of reducing and, eventually, eradicatingpoverty in line with sustainable development objectives and the gradual integration of ACPcountries into the world economy. In this context we will examine the evolution of thispartnership by focusing on those changes that have affected both the ACP and the EuropeanUnion.From the legal point of view, we will see how the commercial partnership based on anon-reciprocal preference will adapt to rules of international law. Furthermore, the extensionof the scope of the partnership to encompass political issues which had long been the domainof States sovereignty under the principle of non-interference will be challenged by a politicalconditionality.Lastly we will see that with the proliferation of actors in development in the changingworld, the European Union is no more than one amongst many of Mauritania's, all of whomhave a different vision in relation to strategies and methods under Cotonou Agreement ; Les relations entre la République islamique de Mauritanie et l'Union européennes'inscrivent dans le cadre de l'Accord de Cotonou signé en 2000, révisé en 2005 auLuxembourg et en 2010 au Burkina Faso. Mais des considérations géostratégiques ontconduit la Mauritanie à ouvrir un nouveau cadre de Coopération avec l'Union européennedans le partenariat Euromed.Historiquement inauguré par le traité de Rome de 1957, ces relations se ...
Theoretical frameworks no longer explain our understanding of the new challenges faced by international development cooperation stakeholders. The end of the Cold War, the political affirmation of "emerging countries", and the growing activism of non-state actors (NGOs, private sector, foundations, academia, etc.) are shattering the traditional paradigm. Furthermore, the increasing importance of private flows alongside the relative stagnation of ODA is redefining traditional donor's role. In this sense, it is necessary to revitalize the analysis to comprehend this international phenomenon.Over the last twenty years, the economic success of emerging economies contrasts with the persisting inequalities and marginalization problems that they shelter. Despite the various challenges that they still face, these "Southern Providers" are increasing their cooperation programs. South-South Cooperation has risen steadily since the year 2000. In 2013 these flows represented a total of 23.5 USD billion, while Official Development Assistance of OECD countries attained 135.1 USD billion during the same year.Inside the so-called "Southern Providers", the scope is often overlooked or ignored. In Mexico for instance, the approval of a law in 2011 implemented a new international development cooperation system. The wide range of projects in Central America (considered by Mexican stakeholders as their "natural influence zone") are formulated to sit within a legal framework, while the law is planned to be extended beyond these type of projects. Given these renewed ambitions, there is a need to better understand what is being done by Mexico in this area. As such, it is estimated that Mexican cooperation flows accounted for 551 USD millions in 2013.In this respect, the current discrepancies between traditional and South-South Cooperation raises several issues. If traditional donors' practices are discussed within the Development Assistance Committee of the OECD, those of Southern Providers remain out of reach. Therefore, the classic international aid architecture is being eroded.Proposing new analytical frameworks has become necessary. In this regard, the international environment following the adoption of the Post-2015 Development Agenda cannot be capitalised upon with outdated concepts. As a central part of this thesis, the concept of "configuration" formulated by Norbert Elias allows us to understand the phenomenon further. In this sense, the analysis of the new configuration of international development cooperation aims to understand a new distribution of power between relevant stakeholders. While the "architecture" needs to be conceived and planned, a "configuration" has a dynamic nature, and is shaped by the players' strategies to increase their power. The result is a configuration defined by the positioning of actors within the common space, and the international scene.This research is structured in three parts. First, it explains the new configuration of international cooperation for development. Second, it analyses Mexico's "systemic responsibilities" as an emerging country towards Central American countries. Finally, it addresses Mexican South-South Cooperation, in the context of the implementation of its new international development cooperation system. ; La gama de conceptos disponibles ya no es suficiente para comprender los nuevos retos que enfrentan los actores que operan dentro de la cooperación internacional para el desarrollo. El fin de la Guerra Fría, la afirmación política de los "países emergentes" y el creciente activismo de los actores no-estatales (ONG, sector privado, fundaciones, universidades, etc…) han modificado la dinámica que regía las relaciones internacionales durante los años 90. Aunado a esto, la importancia de los flujos privados ante el estancamiento de la Ayuda Oficial al Desarrollo (AOD) está redefiniendo el rol de los donantes tradicionales. En este sentido, es necesario proponer nuevos marcos conceptuales que nos permitan analizar este fenómeno internacional.A pesar de los múltiples desafíos en términos de desigualdad y pobreza a los que se enfrentan, los "Cooperantes del Sur" están ampliando sus programas de cooperación. En consecuencia, la Cooperación Sur-Sur ha aumentado en forma constante desde el año 2000. En el 2013, estos flujos representaron un total de 23,5 mil millones de dólares, mientras que la AOD ascendió a 135 mil millones de dólares durante el mismo año. Esta tendencia puede a veces ser percibida por los donantes tradicionales como una amenaza.Al interior de los llamados « Cooperantes del Sur », el alcance de las políticas de cooperación a menudo se pasa por alto o es ignorado. Es el caso de México, en donde la entrada en vigor de una ley en el 2011 estableció un nuevo sistema de cooperación internacional para el desarrollo. Formulada para aumentar la eficacia de los proyectos llevados a cabo en Centroamérica (subregión considerada la "zona natural de influencia" de México), la ley favorece la implementación de proyectos de cooperación en otras partes del mundo. Frente estas ambiciones renovadas, es necesario estudiar las acciones del país en el campo. Como tal, se estima que la cooperación mexicana se elevó a aproximadamente 551 millones de dólares en el 2013.Desde este punto de vista, la actualización de la escisión entre la cooperación tradicional y la Cooperación Sur-Sur plantea varios problemas. Si las prácticas de los donantes tradicionales son discutidas y son objeto de concertación dentro del Comité de Asistencia para el Desarrollo de la OCDE, aquellas relativas a la Cooperación Sur-Sur permanecen fuera de su alcance. Por lo tanto, nos encontramos ante la erosión progresiva de la arquitectura clásica de la ayuda internacional para el desarrollo.Proponer nuevos puntos de referencia se vuelve necesario. A partir de aquí, la coyuntura que resultó de la adopción de la Agenda de Desarrollo post-2015 requiere la adopción de marcos teóricos alternativos. Para esta tesis, la noción de "configuración", formulada por Norbert Elias, nos permite entender el fenómeno desde otro enfoque. El análisis de la "nueva configuración de la cooperación internacional para el desarrollo post-2015", es un intento por comprender la nueva distribución del poder entre los actores que la conforman. La "configuración post-2015" es de naturaleza dinámica, moldeada por las estrategias de los actores que la constituyen, cuyo objetivo es aumentar su margen de maniobra. Se trata en definitiva de una "configuración particular", definida por el posicionamiento de los actores internacionales. ; L'éventail de concepts disponibles aujourd'hui, n'est plus pertinent pour comprendre les nouveaux enjeux auxquels sont confrontés les acteurs qui agissent au sein de la coopération internationale pour le développement. La fin du contexte bipolaire d'où elle est le résultat, l'affirmation politique des « pays émergents » et l'activisme croissant des acteurs non-étatiques (ONG, secteur privé, fondations, universitaires, etc…) bousculent les dynamiques depuis les années 90. Puis, l'importance des flux privés face à la stagnation relative des montants d'APD redéfini le rôle des donateurs traditionnels. Dans ce sens, il est nécessaire de reconsidérer le cadre d'analyse afin de comprendre ce phénomène international. Malgré les nombreux défis en termes d'inégalités et de pauvreté auxquels ils doivent encore faire face, ces « Coopérants du Sud » sont en train d'étendre leurs programmes de coopération. Par conséquent, la Coopération Sud-Sud n'a cessé d'augmenter depuis les années 2000. C'est ainsi qu'en 2013, ces flux ont représenté un total de 23,5 milliards de dollars, tandis que l'Aide Publique au Développement des pays de l'OCDE s'est élevée à 135,1 milliards de dollars pendant la même année. Ce constat peut parfois être perçu par les donateurs traditionnels comme une menace. A l'intérieur de ceux qu'on appelle les « Coopérants du Sud », l'ampleur des politiques de coopération est souvent méconnue voire ignorée. C'est le cas du Mexique, où l'entrée en vigueur d'une loi en 2011 a mis en place un nouveau système de coopération internationale pour le développement. Formulée pour asseoir sur des bases juridiques les projets qu'il mène en Amérique Centrale (considérée par les acteurs politiques mexicains comme leur « zone d'influence naturelle »), cette loi prévoit d'étendre ce type d'actions au-delà. Face à ces ambitions renouvelées, il y a un besoin pour mieux comprendre ce qui est fait par le Mexique dans ce domaine. A ce titre, on estime qu'en 2013 la coopération du Mexique s'élève à environ 551 millions de dollars.De ce point de vue, la mise à jour du clivage entre la coopération traditionnelle et la Coopération Sud-Sud soulève plusieurs problématiques. Si les pratiques des donateurs traditionnels sont discutées et font l'objet d'une concertation au sein du Comité d'Aide au Développement de l'OCDE, celles relatives aux Coopérants du Sud restent hors de sa portée. De ce fait, l'architecture classique de l'aide internationale pour le développement est en train d'être bouleversée. Proposer de nouveaux cadres d'analyse devient alors nécessaire. De ce point de vue, le nouvel environnement issu de l'adoption de l'Agenda de Développement Post-2015 nécessite d'adopter de nouveaux cadres théoriques. Dans cette thèse, la notion de « configuration », formulée par Norbert Elias, nous permet d'appréhender le phénomène autrement. Dans ce sens, analyser la nouvelle configuration de la coopération internationale pour le développement, c'est tenter de comprendre une nouvelle répartition des forces entre tous les acteurs présents. La « configuration » actuelle est de nature dynamique, et elle est modelée par les stratégies des acteurs qui la constituent afin d'augmenter leur marge de manœuvre. Il s'agit d'une configuration qui est définie par la position des acteurs dans l'espace commun qu'est la scène internationale.
The principle of loyal cooperation affects the balance between Member State autonomy and obligation to ensure the attainment of the objectives of the Union. Unity in the external representation is regulated by the principle of loyal cooperation. In the internal field, the principle has an autonomous identification function despite the interference with structural and conflict of norms related principles.
The merger of General Electric/Honeywell has often been exaggerated. Neither the differences in procedures nor the differences in doctrines between the two largely autonomous bodies deciding on such cases appear to be a recurrent source of conflict. In general, their cooperation is rather unproblematic, for two main reasons: their decisions do not have a direct impact on economic policy and do not require the implementation of a cumbersome legislative process to transpose international standards into the national legislative system. This does not mean that a fully autonomous set of international standards can derive from such regulatory activity. At both national and international level, these regulatory authorities rely on political legitimacy as well as on the authority of the States. The main constraints on cooperation are twofold: a broad de facto agreement on the issues at stake and a constant defence of the political independence of the regulator. ; La fusion de General Electric/Honeywell a été souvent exagéré. Ni les différences de procédures ni les différences de doctrines entre les deux organismes en grande partie autonomes qui décident dans ce type d'affaires ne semblent être une source récurrente de conflit. En général, leur coopération est plutôt sans problèmes, pour deux raisons principales : leurs décisions n'ont pas d'impact direct sur la politique économique et ne requièrent pas la mise en œuvre d'un processus législatif lourd en vue de transposer les normes internationales dans le système législatif national. Cela ne signifie pas qu'un ensemble de normes internationales pleinement autonome puisse découler d'une telle activité de régulation. A la fois sur le plan national et international, ces autorités de régulation s'appuient sur la légitimité politique aussi bien que sur l'autorité des Etats. Les principales contraintes qui s'exercent sur la coopération sont de deux types : un large accord de fait sur les questions en jeu et une défense constante de l'indépendance politique du régulateur.
Political theory designs several pluralist models to manage minority claims such as communautarism, multiculturalism, multinationalism or plurinationalism. However, some groups with similar characteristics of stateless nations like Catalonia, Quebec and Scotland or ethnic minorities, but singularities which exclude them of usual normative categories, are omitted by these models. This is the case of Alsace – a French peripheral region with a strong nationalistic particularism – and the case of Romani people which is too often perceived by literature as a nomad people without political demands. Those cases never arise – or too rarely – in literature on diversity, while their claims question directly the pluralistic societies. On this paradox, I analyze the reasons of this omission and tent to correct them.The omission of groups such as Alsace or Romani people by pluralistic models is due to epistemic errors, i.e. an inaccurate observation of social reality and an excessive normativity. Hence, the pluralistic models reproduce unduly a national-state hegemony in their analytical categories. This hegemony does not encourage claims from marginalized groups which have not enough material, cultural, social and symbolic resources to cope the national-state censorship. These nations are not "speechless" by a lack of demands, but their voices are hardly audible on political sphere through a superficial analyze. My contribution entails to make diversity more complex to perceive them by a sociological phenomenology that questions the legitimation process of national-state hegemony and the construction of minority claims, as well as domination and marginalization of groups.Then, I propose a plurinational cooperation model that tries to accommodate speechless nations. This model is based on Alsatian context of trans-border cooperation with German and Swiss authorities. This kind of cooperation brings new resources and an European legitimation for groups involved on it. Moreover, they develop an ethos, a mentality which ...
A deep continuity is in fact notable from de Gaulle to Pompidou, in matters pertaining to European political cooperation among the Six & later the Nine. Both presidents pursued three major objectives: first the creation of a true European identity in the field of foreign policy. Then to allow the member States to regain control over the existing supranational organizations. And lastly, to develop the international influence of France, thanks to a dynamic balancing of its relations with its partners, & thanks to a clever use of both EEC & EPC levers. This process was to continue, & ultimately lead to the Maastricht Treaty of 1992. Adapted from the source document.
The tax competition between States arises from the high level of tension between the different countries.Indeed, as States do not have the same budgetary needs, an intense rivalry grew between the tax systems.Their main goal is to attract the largest number of economic actors. The tax competition between Statesis a battle between countries for competitiveness. This phenomenon is a part of a global economy and isgaining increasingly in strength for over a decade. As a result of this, tax benefits are provided fortaxpayers because the tax competition between States leads to a race to the bottom.However, in order to reduce the amount of tax, some economic operators cheat and breach the nationaltax regimes. And so, the harmful tax competition is born. The European Union (EU), the Organisationfor Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the States fight the latter fact.It is important to devise solutions that minimise harmful tax competition and remove the in-built biastowards taxation of less mobile basis, especially because the context is changing due to the health crisisand the development of the digital economy. Even though the tax harmonisation fails, somecoordination measures could be used to regulate the tax competition between States. Loyalty is the keyterm.The quest for a loyal tax competition between States is not a matter of government finances at least inbalance. It's a major challenge to the durability of tax and social systems of each country.Although the concept of the tax competition between States is based on economic doctrines, thisapproach is now obsolete. The law approach is essential to apprehend this notion, particularly to frame,control and punish it. ; La concurrence fiscale étatique naît du climat de tension régnant entre les différents pays. En effet, les Etats n'ontpas les mêmes besoins budgétaires, ce qui engendre une bataille entre les systèmes fiscaux afin d'attirer le plusgrand nombre d'agents économiques. La concurrence fiscale étatique apparaît donc comme une compétition ...
The tax competition between States arises from the high level of tension between the different countries.Indeed, as States do not have the same budgetary needs, an intense rivalry grew between the tax systems.Their main goal is to attract the largest number of economic actors. The tax competition between Statesis a battle between countries for competitiveness. This phenomenon is a part of a global economy and isgaining increasingly in strength for over a decade. As a result of this, tax benefits are provided fortaxpayers because the tax competition between States leads to a race to the bottom.However, in order to reduce the amount of tax, some economic operators cheat and breach the nationaltax regimes. And so, the harmful tax competition is born. The European Union (EU), the Organisationfor Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the States fight the latter fact.It is important to devise solutions that minimise harmful tax competition and remove the in-built biastowards taxation of less mobile basis, especially because the context is changing due to the health crisisand the development of the digital economy. Even though the tax harmonisation fails, somecoordination measures could be used to regulate the tax competition between States. Loyalty is the keyterm.The quest for a loyal tax competition between States is not a matter of government finances at least inbalance. It's a major challenge to the durability of tax and social systems of each country.Although the concept of the tax competition between States is based on economic doctrines, thisapproach is now obsolete. The law approach is essential to apprehend this notion, particularly to frame,control and punish it. ; La concurrence fiscale étatique naît du climat de tension régnant entre les différents pays. En effet, les Etats n'ontpas les mêmes besoins budgétaires, ce qui engendre une bataille entre les systèmes fiscaux afin d'attirer le plusgrand nombre d'agents économiques. La concurrence fiscale étatique apparaît donc comme une compétition ...
In: Revue juridique et politique: indépendance et coopération ; organe de l'Institut de Droit ; organe de l'Institut International de Droit d'Expression Français, Band 54, Heft 1, S. 88-102
Der Beitrag verfolgt den Anspruch, sozialwissenschaftliche Organisationsmodelle in die Theorie der internationalen Beziehungen einzuführen. Das Ziel besteht darin, das Verständnis und die Analyse von Mechanismen der Kooperation zwischen frankophonen afrikanischen Staaten auf dem Gebiet der Gesundheit zu erleichtern. (DÜI-Kör)