Suchergebnisse

Proposed by Finland, the so-called "Northern Dimension of the EU" was a response to the absence of a Union strategy for dealing with Russia. For Finland itself the initiative was an instrument by means of which it could effectively promote and secure its national interests. The Northern Dimension was adopted as a EU initiative forming the overarching element of policy towards northern Europe by which is meant Iceland. Norway, the Baltic Sea region and the north-European expanses of Russia. Its main aims arc to develop regional cooperation among all the countries of the region and provide a platform for interaction between the Union and Russia, such cooperation intended to be not only of regional significance but also to advance one of the E U s strategic aims in the 21st century, which is rapprochement with Russia. The principal actors in implementations of the Northern Dimension are the European Council, the Barents Sea Council, the Arctic Council and the Council of Baltic Sea States. Expansion of cooperation on the ground involves such areas as environmental protection, nuclear safety, energy, infrastructure, human resources development, health, education, and the rule of law. To an ever growing extent the Northern Dimension is becoming an instrument stimulating the integration of Baltic Europe. The Kaliningrad Region has, potentially, a chance of becoming a template for cooperation between the EU and Russia. But this will require clear-cut decisions on the part of Moscow, of which at present there are no signs. It is in Poland's interest to take full advantage of the opportunities offered by the Northern Dimension initiative for expansion of contacts with Russia and Baltic cooperation. Poland has a stake in the creation in this region of conditions for enduring stability and mutual confidence. The Northern Dimension marks a shift in the focus of EU interest from the Mediterranean to the Baltic and the Barents Sea. ; W "Wymiarze Północnym" mieści się całokształt polityki Unii Europejskiej wobec Europy Północnej, obejmującej Islandię, Norwegię, region Morza Bałtyckiego oraz północnoeuropejskie obszary Rosji. Główne jego cele to rozwijanie współpracy regionalnej między wszystkimi państwami tego obszaru oraz stworzenie platformy współpracy Unii Europejskiej z Rosją. Ma to znaczenie nie tylko regionalne, ale służy również osiągnięciu strategicznego celu, jakim dla UE w XXI wieku jest zbliżenie z Rosją. Javier Solana uznał stosunki Unii z Rosją za najważniejszą kwestię w Europie w XXI wieku. W implementacji "Wymiaru Północnego" największy udział mają: Rada Europejska. Rada Morza Barentsa, Rada Arktyczna i Rada Państw Morza Bałtyckiego. Praktyczną współpracę należy podjąć głównie w takich dziedzinach, jak ochrona środowiska, bezpieczeństwo jądrowe, energetyka, infrastruktura, współpraca transgraniczna, rozwój zasobów ludzkich, zdrowie, edukacja i praworządność. "Wymiar Północny" w coraz większym stopniu stymuluje integracją Europy Bałtyckiej i stanowi wspólną platformą dla różnych polityk i instrumentów finansowych, w których uczestniczą nawet organizacje i inicjatywy nie będące integralną częścią UE. Finlandia zaproponowała "Wymiar Północny" ze względu na brak strategii UE wobec Rosji. Dla Finlandii, bezpośredniego sąsiada Rosji i do 2004 r. jedynego państwa członkowskiego UE graniczącego z tym krajem, wdrażanie tego projektu jest bardzo korzystne; dzięki niemu promuje i realizuje swoje narodowe interesy. Kaliningrad ma szansą stać się w ramach "Wymiaru Północnego" regionem modelowym współpracy między UE a Rosją. Wymaga to jednak zdecydowanych decyzji Moskwy, których jak na razie nie widać. W interesie Polski leży jak najlepsze wykorzystanie tej inicjatywy dla rozwijania kontaktów z Rosją oraz współpracy bałtyckiej. Dla naszego kraju szczególnie istotne było włączenie Obwodu Kaliningradzkiego do "Wymiaru Północnego" UE. Polska zainteresowana jest stabilizacją w tym rejonie i umacnianiem wzajemnego zaufania. Obecnie "Wymiar Północny" stanowi mocno ugruntowaną, oficjalną część polityki zagranicznej UE, której zadaniem jest zapewnienie trwałego pokoju poprzez współpracą gospodarczą i pozytywne współzależności. Koherentna polityka Unii w tym regionie będzie nadal rozwijana. "Wymiar Północny" przesuwa kierunek zainteresowania UE z basenu Morza Śródziemnego w kierunku Bałtyku i Morza Barentsa. ; Marcin Polom

Immediately after the dicision of the Ambasador's Council of July 28, 1920,concerning the division of the Cieszyn Silesia, it became clear thet the said delimitation did not win the acceptance of any serious political forces in Poland. The Polish state's difficult international situation, however, made the Polish authorities abandon the idea of resolving the Zaolzie question by force. Fruitless negotiations were, at the same time, conducted to obtain the cossion of at least a part of the disputed territory in Poland's favour and various diplomatic interventions were undertaken to improve the situation of the Polish population inhabiting the Zaolzie Silesia. In spite of the low efficiency of such initiatives, in 1925 the political relation between Poland and Czechoslovakia were normalised and a liquidation agreement was signed, which led to a normalisation of mutual relations in the divided area. The actions of the Polish Republic in relation to the Zaolzie were influenced by various factors that were difficult to harmonise. One of them was the necessity to subjugate the Zaolzie question to the atate's general interests, which included an acceptance of the Versailles status quo, and attempts to find a platform of co-operation with Czechoslovakia in view of the growing German threat. Another factor was the desire to maintain the Polish national character of the Zaolzie motivated by the reluctance to give up that territory in an unequivocal way. The expectation of a cooperation with Czechoslovakia in the international context led to the policy of letting bygones be bygones. The democratic nature of the Chechoslovak state afforded a possibility of making the defence of the Polish national rights the responsibility of the Polish deputies in the parliament in Prague. The Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs tried then to persuade the leaders of the Polish community in the Zaolzie to assume a more activistic attitude. At the same time, the Polish Consul in Moravska Ostrava supported financially the institutions of the Polish national life nad tried to resist the assimilating policy of the Czech authorities. This tactics brought, up to a point, some results, but it did not prevent all attempts at an assimilation on the part of influential Czech organisations and bussiness circles, neither did it safeguard the conditions of the national life in the Zaolzie so as to obviate the need for the steady flow of the Polish financial aid without which the Polish educational and cultural institutions would not survive. In the late 1920s and early 1930s a rapprochement between Warsaw and Prague seemed to substantiate the hopes for a betterment of the situation of the Poles in the Zaolzie. In the wake of such hopes there appeared Polish-Czechoslovak societies and Czechoslovak-Polish clubs. These clubs reised high expectations in the consular centre in Moravska Ostrava, which hoped that they would help to break down the barriers between the Polish and Czech population and to obtain the support of influential Czech circles for the postulates of the Polish minority. The most committed members of the clubs (just like all, with no exceptions, Polish cosuits in Moravska Ostrava) were treated, however, with great suspicion and aversion by the Czech nationalist circles, as well as by the personalities representing the views of the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The most far-reaching initiative, that is the idea of calling a reconciliation conference concerning the matters of the Cieszyn Silesia in 1932, ended in a fiasco. Such factors as the way the 1930 sensus was carried out, the obvious deterioration of the living standards at the time of the Great Depression, and the attitude of the persons responsible for the Czech foreign policy who insisted on all Polish citizens leaving Czechoslovakia before "equitable" negotiations with Poland could begin, signalled the end of the period in which a positive and active conduct of the Polish population could seem an efficient antidote to the growing pressure for assimilation. The political events of 1933 changed the perception of the chances for a cooperation between Poland and Czechoslovakia, both of them being situated between Germany and the Soviet Union, which, in early 1934, made the representatives of the Polish Republic change their policy in the Zaolzie. From then, on the support of the Polish authorities and society for the Polish minority was emphasised, also a pressure was being exerted on the Czechoslovak government by means of an organised press campaign in Poland. The Czechoslovak government, however, did not yield under pressure, and assumed an intransigent attitude, taking this opportunity to get rid of a certain number of the Poles in the Zaolzie. The assimilation of the local Poles both of a natural kind and enforced by political and economic pressure seemed to the Czech authorities to be the best way to pacify this important borderline region. The tactics to which the Polish side resorted did not then lead to an improvement of the situation of the ethnic Poles in Czechoslovakia, it had, however, a different result, namely it aroused the national feelings and kindled the hopes for the Polish state's stronger support for the minority aspirations. In Poland, on the other hand, the internal situation in Poland's southern neighbour state, beginning with the elections of 1935, started to be looked at from the perspective of the apparently imminent crisis. In view of this, while the idea of an intensive propaganda camping was abandoned, the Czech policy in relation to the ethnic minorities was carefully watched, and the internal integration of the Polish community in the Zaolzie was strongly supported.