Suchergebnisse

What can states expect to receive in return for the military aid they provide to other states? Can military aid buy recipient state compliance with donor objectives? In this study, we systematically investigate the effects of US military assistance on recipient state behavior toward the United States. We build on existing literature by creating three explicit theoretical models, employing a new measure of cooperation generated from events data, and controlling for preference similarity, so that our results capture the influence military aid has on recipient state behavior independent of any dyadic predisposition toward cooperation or conflict. We test seven hypotheses using a combination of simultaneous equation, cross-sectional time series, and Heckman selection models. We find that, with limited exceptions, increasing levels of US military aid significantly reduce cooperative foreign policy behavior with the United States. US reaction to recipient state behavior is also counterintuitive; instead of using a carrot-and-stick approach to military aid allocations, our results show that recipient state cooperation is likely to lead to subsequent reductions in US military assistance. Adapted from the source document.

Abstract
Professor Bernt's article details how the transition from voice service to broadband under the FCC's National Broadband Plan leaves unresolved many issues regarding the role of the states. She proposes using a new "functional" model in which the role of the states in protecting rural and low-income consumers is maintained.

Abstract
Professor Bernt's article details how the transition from voice service to broadband under the FCC's National Broadband Plan leaves unresolved many issues regarding the role of the states. She proposes using a new "functional" model in which the role of the states in protecting rural and low-income consumers is maintained.

Extradition as an act of international cooperation for the repression of criminal activities of the criminal offenders is one of the various models whereby one sovereign state delivers up the alleged accused criminals found within its jurisdiction, on demand, to another sovereign state, so that they might be dealt with according to the penal laws. Extradition has evolved among states because they are vitally interested in the repression of crimes and punishment of criminals who violate their national laws and thus disturb the general peace of the society. This article aims to describe the problems with which extradition is faced, especially with the obligation to extradite and with the obligation to take care of her own citizens in situations when the Constitution does not allow extradition of own nationals and in the absence of an extradition treaty.

International Relations scholars tend to focus their attention on agents with institutional sources of power, such as presidents. Yet, decades of scholarship in other fields has shown that ordinary individuals–traders, missionaries, and soldiers–often have the ability to shape international cooperation and conflict. Under what conditions do individuals distant from institutional power shape international politics? I argue that intermediaries — key figures who broker deals between parties — are crucial for cooperation when information is low and contact between the parties is sparse. To demonstrate the argument that intermediaries matter, I investigate alliances between the US and its non-state allies — non-state political communities abroad and in North America — between 1776 and 1945. In each case, there are intermediaries who are uniquely suited to broker cooperation by identifying partners for cooperation, explaining others' interests, providing reassurances, and managing identity issues. These intermediaries are often those who we tend to think of as unimportant political agents. However, because they fill key information roles, they have unexpected sources of political power. Using four case studies, I test to see whether intermediaries' performance of these roles matters in a diverse range of cases.

AbstractThe opinion-writing process is a vital yet understudied aspect of judicial decision making on state supreme courts. We argue that this process is influenced by the political context and particularly by institutional rules that serve to reactivate and reinforce divisions among justices, leading to less cooperation on the court. We test our theory with original data comprising all education cases decided from 1995 to 2005 in all 50 states and find evidence to support our theory. Specifically, we find that elections lead to fewer unanimous decisions and more separate written opinions, indicating that judicial elections may have a more pervasive effect on the daily work of these courts than previously thought.

Empirical research suggests that the existence of territorial disputes makes armed conflict more likely to occur. Yet, there are many states that have engaged in militarized interstate disputes that not only maintain normalized bilateral relations, but cooperate with one another on an increasing number of bilateral issues. How can disputing states like Argentina and the UK so frequently cooperate with each other on bilateral issues when there remains a significant amount of tension regarding their territorial dispute over the Falklands/Malvinas Islands? Our theory suggests that challengers involved in territorial disputes are willing to engagein bilateral cooperation with their adversaries in order to influence upcoming territorial settlement attempts. Bilateral cooperation is purposively and strategically used by the challengers as a form of confidence building measure (CBM) with the goal of reducing the negative impact of the territorial dispute. Empirical analyses of monthly data (1978—2003) on Argentina—UK relations, as well as qualitative evidence from the case, support our theoretical expectations by showing that challengers deliberately link cooperation on bilateral issues to territorial dispute settlement attempts as a form of bargaining incentive to increase the likelihood of peaceful resolution.

This article examines relations between the BRICS and leading industrialized states. It starts by analyzing the former's mutual relations, focusing on how the ideational construct presented by Jim O'Neill in his "BRIC hypothesis" became formalized as a leader‐level diplomatic group at a summit in Yekaterinburg, Russia, in 2009. I evaluate how the BRICS have influenced international issues and whether "cooperation" or "conflict" characterizes their relations with key industrialized states, concluding that there has been greater multilateral cooperation since 2008, especially through international forums such as the G20. The BRICS partnership is one of unequals, significant for international economic relations primarily due to China. This has had important consequences as the Chinese government has prioritized economic cooperation with leading industrialized states. Influential countries can continue to benefit by enhancing multilateral ties in what are often nonzero–sum situations.