Suchergebnisse

Roads have been an essential part of transportation since man began to travel and to take his goods with him. This fact is sometimes obscured by the intense current preoccupation with motor vehicles which are often regarded as the cause of roads rather than instruments for utilization of roads. In any event, it is true that, with the advent of the motor vehicle, highways have become an increasingly important part of the nation's transportation system. That this tendency and importance will continue and even be accelerated is portended by the creation of the National System of Interstate and Defense Highways' and the state road programs now being undertaken in connection therewith. Under these circumstances it is certain that the interstate movement of persons and goods by motor vehicle will be expanded far beyond present activity and that licensing of interstate commercial vehicles and procedures to accommodate free movement of such vehicles will receive more attention from state governments' as developments progress. In the words of the Federal Highway Administrator, the problem of the states is the reconciliation of two "praiseworthy" objectives:"First, that of insuring the free movement of vehicles in interstate commerce; and second, that of requiring that all vehicles traveling in the state pay their due shares of user taxes for the support of the state's roads and streets."' He has also expressed the thought that''an increasing awareness of the federal road-user taxes will bring about a trend toward somewhat greater uniformity in states' schedules."

This article analyzes the relationship between Mande hunters (dozos) and the Ivorian state in the prefecture of Ouangolodougou in northern Côte d'Ivoire. Having adopted a prominent security role during the violent conflict of 2002–2011, dozos have made continuing efforts to maintain their position in the post-conflict state. To negotiate their position, they draw on a performative repertoire, such as the display of powerful attributes in the context of processions. Although they have had to concede some more strategic and profitable activities to the reestablished state, dozo chiefs effectively govern the rural northern borderlands of Côte d'Ivoire.

The success of the International Criminal Court is highly determined by cooperation from States. The Court lacks an enforcement mechanism and has to rely on the cooperation of State and non State-Party in the arrest and surrender of the perpetrators of crimes under its jurisdiction. It is undeniable that without State Cooperation, the Court will encounter great difficulty to conduct its proceedings. United Nations Security Council possesses specific role in the enforcement of State Cooperation, however, such role is very limited — and even ineffective, since the Court is a treaty-based International Criminal Tribunal, meaning that it is independent, and it shall not bound third State without its consent. Finally, this article will highlight both the implementation of the responsibilities to cooperate under international law, as well as State willingness to cooperate with the Court in practice thus far, and also the power of Security Council in the enforcement of State Cooperation in the International Criminal Court.

EU Competition law has recently incurred main procedural reforms. Their basis must be found in Regulation 1/2003, decentralizing the control on the application of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, thus emphasising the role of National Competition Authorities and Courts. This system has proved to be far from complete and perfect, as the first part of this article aims at demonstrating. A new political wave has enabled to strengthen the enforcement of EU Competition Law under two strands: the private and the public enforcement. Directive 2014/104 harmonises parts of the national (civil) procedural law regarding damages actions. Powers and duties of National Courts are its focus. Its main features are recalled within this contribution. The long-awaited Directive 2019/1 aims at further reinforcing the role of NCAs, establishing a very detailed piece of legislation, whose main elements are briefly examined here. Since the two acts have been adopted in a quite short period of time, their coordination is analysed too. This exam can lead us to offer some remarks on the perspective role of EU Competition Law, both from the Member States perspective and the needs for reform, and the new Commission's approach to the consistent application of the new legislation.

This article examines Croatia's involvement with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY). The factors that have made the issue of cooperation so volatile in Croatia are addressed, shedding light on domestic politics of state cooperation with the ICTY. The issue of cooperation--and the challenges it poses to stability and democratization in the former Yugoslavia and to the ICTY's struggle for institutional survival--will continue to be volatile as long as the tribunal exists. The strong domestic resistance to cooperation in the Balkans underscores the challenge confronting both the ad hoc tribunals as well as the permanent International Criminal Court: how to institutionalize a system of international tribunals in which neither the winners nor losers are immune from standing trial for atrocities committed during battle. Although the international criminal tribunals prosecute individuals and not nations, nationalist groups in Croatia have raised the political costs of cooperation with the ICTY through rhetoric that equates the tribunal's indictments against Croatian individuals with an attack against the dignity and legitimacy of the Homeland War (1991-1995) and against the legitimacy of Croatia as a nation. The politics of cooperation reach beyond the domestic arena and also involve an interaction with ICTY officials, international institutions, and foreign governments. The Croatian government is caught between the competing pressures of nationalists who oppose cooperation and members of the international community who have conditioned Croatia's entry into Western organizations upon increased cooperation with the ICTY. The result has been an inconsistent, ad hoc policy that has quickly transformed the aftermath of each tribunal indictment of a Croatian general into a political crisis that threatens to undermine stability and the country's nascent democratization process. This article begins with a discussion of the tribunal's mandate and its limited power to compel state cooperation. It then places the Croatian government's dilemma concerning cooperation with the tribunal in the larger context of the experience of newly democratizing countries that confronted the question of transitional justice in the 1980s and the early 1990s. This is followed by an assessment of Croatia's cooperation with the ICTY under the authoritarian regime of Franjo Tudjman, which ruled the country from 1990 through 1999. It then evaluates cooperation with the ICTY during the first year of the reformist government of Ivica Racan. Next, the domestic politics of cooperation is examined through narratives of the government's response to several controversial war crimes indictments: the Mirko Norac indictment in early 2001; the Ante Gotovina and Rahim Ademi indictments in mid-2001, and the Janko Bobetko indictment in the fall of 2002. The article concludes with a discussion of the inherent conflict between the tribunal's mission to prosecute violations of international humanitarian law and the objective of many transitional regimes to delay such prosecutions in order to bolster their political standing vis-a-vis domestic opponents.

The contribution of this paper is twofold. First, we analyse the failure of the Prisoner's Dilemma and Suasion Game in explaining refugee protection burden-sharing cooperation through a literature review of both game-theory models. Second, the paper also supports an alternative to these theoretical models: the Issue Linkage. This paper is set out in three main parts: fi rst, we provide the background to the 2015 Emergency Relocation Scheme as part of the EU's immediate response to the migration and refugee crisis; second, we review the existing Prisoner's Dilemma and Suasion Game literature on international cooperation in general, and on refugee protection in particular, followed by an Issue Linkage literature review to get some insight into overcoming collective action failure in EU asylum cooperation; third, we apply these theoretical models to explain EU refugee protection burden-sharing through an analysis of Germany's and Poland's approaches to the implementation of the 2015 Emergency Relocation Scheme.

The GIZ Transboundary Water Management in Central Asia programme supports Tajik-Kyrgyz cooperation on the shared Isfara river basin by means of sustainable basin planning and management through capacity building. In addition, the rehabilitation of small-scale infrastructure and automatised flow measurement systems ensure a safe and fair allocation of water resources. As a result, improved water management and infrastructure in the Isfara River contribute to better information and water availability for more than 200,000 agricultural water users across both countries. Alongside already established methods of transboundary cooperation in the basin, which has complicated boundary issues, the hereinafter described measures counteract latent tensions among Tajik and Kyrgyz communities over the limited resource of arable land, which is closely linked to water. The GIZ Transboundary Water Management in Central Asia programme is implemented on behalf of the German Federal Foreign Office and cofunded by the European Union.

For more than a decade, suicide rates in Australia have shown no improvement despite significant investment in reforms to support regionally driven initiatives. Further recommended reforms by the Productivity Commission call for Federal and State and Territory Government funding for mental health to be pooled and new Regional Commissioning Authorities established to take responsibility for efficient and effective allocation of 'taxpayer money.' This study explores the sufficiency of this recommendation in preventing ongoing policy resistance. A system dynamics model of pathways between psychological distress, the mental health care system, suicidal behaviour and their drivers was developed, tested, and validated for a large, geographically diverse region of New South Wales; the Hunter New England and Central Coast Primary Health Network (PHN). Multi-objective optimisation was used to explore potential discordance in the best-performing programs and initiatives (simulated from 2021 to 2031) across mental health outcomes between the two state-governed Local Health Districts (LHDs) and the federally governed PHN. Impacts on suicide deaths, mental health-related emergency department presentations, and service disengagement were explored. A combination of family psychoeducation, post-attempt aftercare, and safety planning, and social connectedness programs minimises the number of suicides across the PHN and in the Hunter New England LHD (13.5% reduction; 95% interval, 12.3–14.9%), and performs well in the Central Coast LHD (14.8% reduction, 13.5–16.3%), suggesting that aligned strategic decision making between the PHN and LHDs would deliver substantial impacts on suicide. Results also highlighted a marked trade-off between minimising suicide deaths versus minimising service disengagement. This is explained in part by the additional demand placed on services of intensive suicide prevention programs leading to increases in service disengagement as wait times for specialist community based mental health services and dissatisfaction with quality of care increases. Competing priorities between the PHN and LHDs (each seeking to optimise the different outcomes they are responsible for) can undermine the optimal impact of investments for suicide prevention. Systems modelling provides essential regional decision analysis infrastructure to facilitate coordinated federal and state investments for optimal impacts.

Published also as thesis (Ph. D.) University of Pennsylvania, 1918. ; Discussion of advisory opinion. ; Bibliography: p. [295]-296. ; Mode of access: Internet.

Addressing the complex challenges that fragile states face is an important area for action on the international development cooperation agenda. Danish development cooperation prioritizes countries that are considered fragile states. This DIIS Working Paper provides an overview of Danish aid to fragile states and reviews Danish aid delivery approaches in six countries: Afghanistan, Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, Palestine, and Somalia. These countries are labelled as "poor, fragile" priority countries in Denmark's Strategy for Development Cooperation and Humanitarian Action. The paper focuses on cooperation modalities implemented through country programmes. While the country programmes include a mix of modalities tailored to the diverse contexts profiled, the paper points to a growing emphasis on multilateral organisations as implementation partners. This indicates potential for further analysis of the consequences of intermediated cooperation for aid management and development effectiveness. The paper also concludes that the complementarity between development cooperation administered inside and outside country programmes, and the clarification of activities contributing to conflict prevention goals are worthy of further study.

Over the past few years addressing state fragility in the third world has become an important priority in international development cooperation. However, it seems that the international donor community has so far not been able to develop adequate instruments for dealing with the problems posed by state failure. We see two reasons for this: (i) there is growing recognition within the donor community that the lack of absorptive capacity, or bad economic policies in the partner country can actually make aid counterproductive, even harmful; and (ii) it is very difficult to manage effective development cooperation with weak governments. Channelling aid through NGOs, or giving limited aid in the form of capacity-building is clearly not sufficient to solve the problems fragile states face. In order to minimize distortions caused by aid, the literature advocates a policy-based selective approach, i.e., limiting aid funds to recipients with 'good policies'. However, failed states (and many weak states for that matter) do not have the capability to formulate good economic policies, and some countries face serious challenges in meeting the criteria of good policies posed by the World Bank/IDA or the US in its Millennium Challenge Account. An important reason for this is that reforms within recipient countries aimed at forming good policies (especially liberalizing international trade, curbing inflation and cutting the budget deficit) create winners and losers, and the losers in fragile states can be strong enough to block policy changes or even cause conflict. We conclude that in order to better help weak states, the criteria for good policies must also include criteria for forming policies that compensate losers. Donors must help recipients in formulating such policies. To further ensure that losers of policy reforms do not block change, donors must pay greater attention to conflict prevention and social mediation in weak states, and to conflict management and peacebuilding in the case of failed states.

Indonesan and the United States during the presidency of Joko Widodo from 2014 to 2019 as folows: Defense Cooporation In Arrangement of Capacity Building, Joint Exercise Of Indonesia And The United States; Military Law Workshop; Indonesia-US Security Dialogue (UISSD) XII On 1-2 September 2015; Defense Corporation Between Indonesia And The United States Under Confidence Building Measures (CBM) arragement; Bilateral Cooperation State Visit Between Indonesia an The United States; Cooperation Between The Defense Industry, The Transfer Of Conventional Weaponns; Education and Training. The factors are driving Indonesia's Coorporation with The United States are: The long history of good reations both Indonesia and The United States; the same counter terrorism mission; while the inhibing factor is Indonesia's preparation; both in terms of human resources or the system that Indonesia has, and there are also obstaces from The United States side, such as the goverment contuning to expain that the US cannot intervene in thecnology transfer process since the authority held by the corporatin, therefore the purchasing and selling process is strictly business to bussines.