Suchergebnisse

Different shortcomings have been attributed to both legislators (the people & the parliament) in all countries & at all times. The key shortcoming of the people as a legislator is its unability to duly solve state-level issues: the totality of citizens can easily be misled, they lack knowledge or competence on specific issues, their decisions are based on stereotypes etc. Another limitation of people is related to the possibility that anonymity of its decisions can provoke cruelty & intolerance. Despite logical validity of the above-mentioned shortcomings their practical correctness is not proven. Falseness is also not proven as the only existing example of a frequent people's participation in legislation (Switzerland) among other things proving the falseness of the above-mentioned reproaches could hardly serve as a basis for generalization. To the disadvantage of people as a legislator, a procedural argument is presented: during a referendum it is not possible to adopt a maximum best & balanced law as in every case there is a choice "either... or." There is a vote en bloc & no editorial (even most rational) amendments are possible. Besides, the legislation that involves a referendum is related to huge costs. The people's participation in legislation is beneficial because it ensures a higher legitimacy of the decisions & brings people closer to the ruling elite (thus the gap between what citizens expect from the administration & what they receive from the administration is minimized), moreover, this guarantees every citizen's right to participate in tackling his/her affairs. There is one case where the laws adopted by the people have all the strengths of the laws adopted by the parliament & the people, & avoid almost all the failings. These are ratification referenda where the parliament-approved draft laws are adopted (or rejected). The people are only a nominal legislator in Lithuania. The recent practice proves that currently the requirements for holding a referendum make it impossible to pass laws in referenda. This conclusion is confirmed by the fact that the requirements for initiating a referendum are practically impossible to meet: so far nobody has managed to collect 300.000 signatures required to initiate a referendum, ie., 12 percent of the citizens of the Republic of Lithuania who have the right to vote. Consequently, the Seimas is de facto the only legislator in Lithuania. The Parliament as a lawmaker also has some weaknesses. First parliament members, unlike the people, are more prone to bribing or may be subject to some other personal impact. On the other hand, in contemporary electoral system, the parliamentarians who seek to stay in office pander both certain social or territorial groups of the electorate by adopting laws beneficial to them. The people as the whole is not the only popular actor in the legislative process. Individual citizens & their groups have certain powers as well. Yet they are not legislators as such, but rather merely participants of the legislative process. As compared to foreign practice, in Lithuania the conditions & procedure exercising citizens' legislative initiative (50.000 signatures required) are subject to relatively liberal regulation. Unlike in many countries of Europe, there are no direct restrictions on exercising this initiative. There are two indirect restrictions: 1) a draft law on the state budget of the Republic of Lithuania can only be prepared & submitted to the Seimas by the Government, 2) draft laws on ratification & denouncing international treaties are submitted by the President. In practice, however, citizens' legislative initiatives are related to politicians' rather than citizens' initiatives. Citizens' legislative initiative most often is used not to promote the idea of lawmaking but to use citizens' signatures for exerting political pressure on the Seimas ruling majority by opposition & communicating a certain message to the electorate. Out of seven initiatives, one brought some results. Exercising the right of petition at the Seimas is in fact an indirect legislative initiative. It diminishes the significance of the Constitutional right of 50.000 citizens' initiative. This right does not make any practical influence: so far only two laws have been passed on the basis of the problems addressed in petitions. Adapted from the source document.

Siame ivadiniame straipsnyje pristatomi specialiojo 'Politologijos' numerio tiriamieji klausimai ir turinys, taip pat pateikiamas bendras analizes pagrindas, kuri taikant nagrinejama, kokie veiksniai gali paaiskinti vadovu kaita ir politizacija skirtingose Lietuvos viesojo sektoriaus organizaciju (agenturu, valstybes valdomu imoniu, asmens sveikatos prieziuros ir svietimo istaigu) grupese. Palyginus visu straipsniu rezultatus nustatyta, kad viesojo sektoriaus organizaciju vadovu kaita geriausiai paaiskina valdanciosios daugumos ir vyriausybiu pokyciai, o politizacija - politiniu partiju dalyvavimas valdzioje, ju tinklai ir politiku isitikinimai. Taciau asmens sveikatos prieziuros ir svietimo istaigu grupese, kurioms budinga didesne politizacija, yra statistinis rysys tarp vadovu stabilumo ir politizacijos. Valstybes tarnybos reglamentavimo bei teisiniu nuostatu igyvendinimo uztikrinimo veiksnys nera labai reiksmingas - tai daro itaka tik ribotam istaigu prie ministeriju vadovu skaiciui. Pagaliau aiskinant politizacijos skirtumus gana svarbus yra tokie viesojo administravimo veiksniai kaip politinis valdymo sriciu jautrumas ir finansiniai organizaciju istekliai This introductory article presents the common research questions of this special issue and offers a joint framework for analysing the change and politicisation of the senior levels of management of different groups of Lithuanian public sector organisations (agencies, state-owned enterprises, personal health care organisations and educational organisations). A comparison of all contributions to this special issue revealed that repeating alterations of governing majorities and governments best explain the frequent turnover of heads of different Lithuanian public sector organisations (except those of personal health care and educational organisations). However, their politicisation is associated with party entrenchment in power, density of the party networks and politicians' beliefs. Furthermore, variations in the scope of politicisation are related to such administrative factors as the political salience of policy areas and organisational functions, as well as the budget size. Therefore, it is the interplay of political and administrative factors that determines the change and politicisation of management in various public sector organisations. Adapted from the source document.

The aim of the article is to disclose a possible view held by Kant towards the solution of the KOnigsberg problem after World War II. Philosophers of today usually show little interest in discussing the so-called "Kaliningrad puzzle." This is a certain misunderstanding. As one of the most outstanding representatives of the idealistic paradigm of international relations, Kant can be treated as a full-fledged participant of the discussions on the future of the Kaliningrad region. His political philosophy contributes towards a better understanding of certain important aspects related to the Kaliningrad problem. Kant would strongly criticize the decisions made at the Potsdam conference. The above decisions contradict his understanding of international relations. However, Kant would not demand an urgent solution to the Kaliningrad problem. His flexibility is worthy of the respect shown by the realpolitik supporters. On the other hand, Kant did not have the slightest doubt as to the necessity of amending the injustice of improper political decisions. The European future of the Kaliningrad region is first & foremost related to the ability of the population to enforce the political principles formulated by Kant -- the freedom of the citizens, the rule of law & the equality of every single citizen under the law. This seems to be the most topical message made by Kant to the present day population of his native town. The Kaliningrad region of today has failed to justify the requirements of civil society. It reminds one more of a hostage to the central power. From the perspective of Kant's political philosophy, one could state that the Kaliningrad region has not yet used the opportunity to become an association of free citizens. This is the only trustworthy way for this hostage of international politics of the 20th century to become part of cultural & political life within the unifying Europe. Adapted from the source document.

The main aim of the article is to reveal problem of decentralization of autonomy for local authorities & territorial administration in Lithuania. The reform of administrative division & autonomy for local authorities of the country runs slowly & complicated. Though society, scientists, various branches of government has a lot of various propositions & discussions have been taking place for more than 15 years, the important decisions cannot be made because of the lack of political willpower. One could be under impression that the reform will never be completed. The main reasons of such a disturbances are related to the absence of authentic traditions of autonomy for local authorities as well as to constant changes of centralized models of territorial administration. The unfinished re-form not only disturbs even development of the country but also complicates development of autonomy for local authorities system, which is one of the most important institutions of modern democracy. This also disturbs formation of regional self-consciousness, identity at regional & local level. Finally, it complicates the development of modern civil society in Lithuania. The history of Lithuania shows that even during 20th century models of territorial administration of the country have been changed several times, though centralized government prevailed & autonomy for local authorities was very limited. This prevented formation of territorial autonomy for local authorities & community traditions, solidarity among population was decreasing while indifference to the social needs was increasing. The Soviet period demolished the first appearances of territorial (regional) identity. This consequently caused the lack of willpower to implement new reform of territorial administration. The same as during the years of independence before World War II there is still uncertainty whether centralized or vast autonomy for local authorities should be chosen as a priority. Lithuanian government has always paid the main attention to the reform of regional governing system but autonomy for local authorities is almost totally forgotten. The absence of local & regional autonomy for local authorities makes Lithuania a unique rather unitary state, with a transformed soviet administrative division. Because of these reasons the problem of reformation & decentralization of territorial administration of Lithuania remains topical. Adapted from the source document.

The paper deals with the specific features of the construction of an international identity by the EU & Lithuania. We do this by comparing the narrative of "Normative Power Europe" to that of "Lithuania, the regional center." The term "Normative Power Europe," though in use for some two years, still has no clear-cut place in the studies of European integration. So in the paper we first try to explicate its content by drawing a contrast with the more familiar concept of "civil power." We show that the term is an attempt at a new conceptualization of a problem that has been on the agenda of constructivist international relations studies for some time already, namely, that of the power of ideas in international politics. "Normative Power Europe" is defined as a discursive practice, as a narrative shaping the EU as a unique political institution which, by realizing itself via free exchange of ideas & opinions, is capable of changing the "normalcy" perception in international relations. In the EU political discourse the identity of EU as a normative power is constructed via the contrast of EU/USA politics, with America conceived as Europe's "Other." Next, in analyzing Lithuania's foreign politics in the context of the EU New Neighborhood Policy, we draw the parallels in the narratives made use of in constructing the identities of EU & Lithuania. A brief examination of the narrative "Lithuania, the regional center" shows its similarity to the narrative of "Normative Power Europe." First, the "Normative Power Europe" & the "Lithuania, the regional center" are both discursive constructions of their international identity. Second, both narratives are promoting a normative model, based on similar values & principles. Third, in both narratives regionalization is held a major instrument in spreading the values conducive to the creation of a common identity. Finally, both narratives perceive the common regional identity as a major security guarantee. The conclusion is that the narrative of "Lithuania, the regional center" is merely a nationalist replica of the "Normative Power Europe," with some peculiarities to be explained by differences in historical context & Lithuania's specifics in domestic politics. These are mainly due to Lithuania's attempt at reconciling her nation state identity & the ambitions of an active actor of the EU Common Foreign & Security Policy. Adapted from the source document.

The article deals with the impact of globalization on social security & social exclusion in Lithuania for the first time in Lithuanian social sciences literature. The article consists of 5 parts: in the first part "globalization risk" & related non-traditional methodology is examined, in the second part the relation between globalization & glocalization is analyzed, in the third part of the article the changes of Lithuanian macrosocial indicators are examined, in the fourth part the role of libertarian ideology & practice for social exclusion development is shown & the fifth part reveals the positive & negative shifts in Lithuanian state social security. The author relies on Lithuanian macrosocial data & tries to prove that parallelly with globalization its antipode -- glocalization -- is thriving in the social processes. Globalization impact on social exclusion may be understood not only in its narrow sense -- as marginalization of different "traditional" social risk groups but also in the wider meaning because globalization is raising risks for many life spheres & even for entire society. Globalization often positively influences the social position of the "winners" & enables their better self-realization. But globalization often negatively influences the situation of the "losers" when they are imprisoned in glocalization for the longer or shorter time without any clear perspectives to rise. Among social security backwardness & the reasons of social exclusion formation were: a) the lack of financial resources, b) accelerating globalization & transformation rates -- when the system could not "develop into deepness" but was forced to chase headlong perfunctory all the time accelerating processes. The strife was followed not against the reasons but against the separate negative social consequences. The preventive activities were very limited, c) the lack of new progressive administrative theories & decisions, d) insufficient development of social policy, social security & social exclusion research, e) frequent confinement of social administration agents on barely theoretical solutions & solving problems "on paper," f) unfavorable international & native influence of ideology & practice of extreme liberalism. The article shows that globalization had influenced the distinctive administrative reforms & measures in Lithuania, which have given controversial results (New Public Management, private pensions funds reform, development of social services). The conclusion is possible to make that characteristic contradiction in Lithuanian social security is between organizational maturity & scarcity of real results after implementation of social security measures. Adapted from the source document.

2003 EU accession referenda results in the 8 East Central European countries (Slovenia, Hungary, Lithuania, Slovakia, Poland, Czech Republic, Estonia, & Latvia) have been analyzed examining regional dimension of their results. Two criteria, active euro-optimism (percentage of YES voters out of all the electorate in particular region), & active euro-skepticism (percentage of NO voters out of all the electorate in the region), have been used. Comparison with two other variables, economic (GDP per capita in the region) & ethnic (percentage of ethnic group other than title one, if remarkable) has been made; Pearson correlations have been calculated. Though there is common agreement on suppositional influence of regional factors (possibly, North-South, East-West, urban-rural, richer-poorer regional cleavages, exceptional case of the capital city, influence of densely inhabited ethnic groups etc.) in previous euro-integration referenda, there were no consistent analyses on it. Examining of 8 East Central European countries has showed both varieties from country to country as well as a number of general trends. In Slovenia, region of its capital city, Ljubljana, is more euro-optimistic compared with eastern Pomurska region (Maribor & Ptuj). Though regional economic irregularities not enough significant, as well as the number of examples too small for generalization, one can suppose West-East cleavage connected with the economic factor here. In Hungary, though voters' turnout was exceptionally low, both factor of higher euro-optimism in the capital city, Budapest, was evident, as well as strong relation between economic factor & voting behavior. However, Hungary has its own specifics: higher economic development of the region increases both active euro-optimism & active euro-skepticism, too. This, in turn, cannot exclude that factor of "passive euro-skepticism" is important here. In Lithuania, strong relations between size of ethnic minorities in the region & both active euro-optimism (negative) & active euro-skepticism (positive) were evident. More complications were, to evaluate influence of the economic factor: present statistics of GDP per capita in apskritys are far not enough to support supposition that voting results in particular Lithuania's territories are related with their economic development, too. In Slovakia, quite strong influence can be found of the size of Hungarian ethnic minority, but the opposite compared to Lithuania: increasing number of ethnic Hungarians do increase active euro-optimism & decrease active euro-skepticism. This is in good accordance with widely known believe of Hungarian ethnic group that EU membership will improve their status. Surprisingly, in Slovakia it was impossibly to evaluate the influence of another ethnic factor: though this country is widely known by the problems connected with Roma ethnic group, official statistics does not even show remarkable percentage of Roma in any region at all. Influence of economic factor, though number of examples is very small, is also present in Slovakia: the higher is GDP per capita, the higher is active euro-optimism, & at the same time the lower active euro-skepticism. In Poland, clear pattern of lower active euro-optimism was shown for its eastern regions, Podlaskie, Lubelskie, & Podkarpackie; they are economically poorest, at the same time, & characterized by specific political culture (bigger number of orthodox, smaller agricultural incomes, dependence on small trans-border trade, etc.). In the Czech Republic, regional economic pattern is also present: increase in regional GDP per capita also increases the active euro-optimism. Capital city, Prague, has exceptional position: it is most economically developed, & most euro-optimistic, too. For Estonia, complicated picture of inter-related influence of both ethnic & economic factors is typical. On one hand, there are no clear correlations between economic & voting variables. On the other, eastern Ida-Virumaa region, densely populated by ethnic Russians & the least economically developed, is described at the same time as mostly active euro-optimistic, & less euro-skeptical. The most reliable explanation would be, economic underdevelopment & ethnicity, complicated by stronger trans-border relations of individuals living near Russian border, may reinforce uncertainty in euro-integration perspective. For Latvia, the ethnic factor is very much evident: Pearson correlation between regional percentage of Russian population & active euro-skepticism is 0.906; reversely, it is connected with active euro-optimism. Eastern regions of Daugavpils & Rezekne affected also by economic underdevelopment were the most euro-skeptical among all 8 East European countries & became only regions where bigger part of inhabitants were actively opposed EU integration than supported. Thus, a number of cleavages can be generalized for majority of the acceding countries examined. "Center-periphery" cleavage is more or less evident for all countries except of Lithuania & Latvia: better socio-economic development seems to be overcomplicated by ethnic factors in two the latter. In Slovenia, Poland, and, especially, the Baltic States, the East-West cleavage is important. This can be explained by specifics of eastern regions: economic underdevelopment, personal & business ties beyond border, especially among Russian ethnic group in the East of the Baltic States, can lead to rational individual arguments against integration into European Union. With reversed relation, ethnic factor is typical for Hungarian ethnic group in Slovakia: support for euro-integration is predominant within it. The universal factor influencing electoral behavior in referenda is economic one, especially remarkable for Visegrad countries & Slovenia. Adapted from the source document.

Sign Lithuania has joined NATO & the EU. However, one should ask themselves a question whether the integration process has already ended & whether we have become an integral part of Europe. Such doubts appear after taking a closer look at our information space, which contains signs of informational cultural expansion from the East. In the information age the concept of power is changing. Some countries compete for ideological & cultural dominance in the information space of other countries and, consequently, the latter seek to protect their space from such influences. Lithuania has also entered such a battlefield, therefore, the conception of a national information space & information attacks towards that space should be analyzed more thoroughly. At the present moment, the main goal is to make the Lithuanian academic society & especially the general public aware of the problem of the information warfare, its threats as well as the principles of information security in respect of an individual & the whole of society. In Russia, the theoretical level of this issue has been traversed a long time ago & practical actions are being taken today: strategic documents concerning information security were adopted five years ago, concrete institutions responsible for the implementation of a particular information policy in the "near abroad" countries are being established Russia has been aiming & still aims to keep Lithuania in the sphere of its control. Thus, Russia has started to employ new tools of power, namely, information resources, telecommunications & the media. The consequences of such information pressure from the East are evident: the results of a research conducted by RAIT last September show that the majority of Lithuanians prefer watching Russian films with Lithuanian subtitles & English or other Western films dubbed in Lithuanian. In order to change the present situation, an active & independent information policy in the Lithuanian information space is necessary. The article analyses changes in the concept of power in the information age. Soft power, comprised of information & media control, is presented as a significant lever used by major states in informational & geopolitical warfare. The article also discusses a transformed concept of geopolitics & the concept of neocolonialism. The general understanding of information space is presented & measures how to influence it are discussed. The programs broadcast by the Lithuanian television networks are presented as a specific reflection of the Lithuanian information space. An assumption is made based on the analysis of the Russian share of TV broadcasts in Lithuania that there are evident signs of informational-cultural expansion from the East in the Lithuanian information space. Adapted from the source document.

Muslims have known & used the term 'da'wa' throughout the history of Islam. The concept, or rather concepts, of da'wa has been elaborated upon since the early centuries of Islam. Muslims have applied the term to various specific activities of theirs. The broadly known explanation in Europe & North America for da'wa is that it constitutes activities, which in the Christian context fall under the term 'missions' or 'missionary activities.' Recently, however, there has been much discussion whether da'wa at all can be rendered as 'missionary activity,' for it is argued by some Muslims as well as non-Muslim scholars that da'wa distinctly differs from what in the Christian tradition 'missions' have encompassed. From the available historical evidence, it appears that after Muhammad's death Muslims did not immediately embark upon da'wa activities -- during & after the rapid conquests of the Byzantinian & Persian lands, they little if at all ventured to preach to local non-Muslims about the virtues of Islam. Da'wa in the sense of inviting non-Muslims to embrace Islam was not yet on conquering Muslims' agenda. The first waves of conversions to Islam from among the indigenous populations of the conquered lands took place with virtually no Muslim missionary activities in the background. But the concept of da'wa was not lost even on the early Muslims. They were very much aware of it & indeed capitalized on its exploitation. Yet, this first was done on the intra-community level, among the Muslims themselves. The term da'wa came into wider usage almost a hundred years after Muhammad's death, in the wake of the 'Abbasid propaganda against the then ruling Ummayad clan in the 720's. However, the 'Abbasid da'wa ceased as soon as the 'Abbasids were in power -- the fact that attests to its political nature. Da'wa as a truly missionary activity, albeit still within the Muslim Umma, appeared in the form of the Isma'ili da'wa of the 9th through 13th centuries. Isma'ilis, in many ways, can be seen as the pioneers of the organized Muslim missionary activities: their highly institutionalized & sophisticated da'wa structure has hardly been repeated until today. Moreover, for the Isma'ilis, da'wa was a state priority. The Isma'ili da'wa encompassed extra- & intra-ummaic forms & blended both theology & politics. The focal point of this article is the inter-relatedness of da'wa & politics on both theoretical & practical levels. On the one hand, the Quran nowhere directly implies da'wa to be a political activity. On the other hand, Muslims made it a part of their political theory (through relating da'wa to jihad) & life (using the concept of da'wa in their political agendas). Taken in general, the intertwining of da'wa & politics, then, has been a feature throughout the Muslim history, though practical implications of this have been different in different ages. [Abstract shortened by ProQuest.]. Adapted from the source document.

The contemporary information & communication technologies (ICT) will not, by themselves, resolve the issues, faced by Lithuanian public administration in designing & implementing its policies. This is the major argument of the article, supported by the available empirical information & various secondary sources. Why the bureaucracy, which is often considered as being slow, inflexible & inertic should suddenly change due to the mere fact of ICT being purchased & installed? The answer is often based on some intuitive logic, which is called in this article the "ideal model of e-government." The first of the assumptions in this model claim that the public sector has the right skills to select the relevant technology. The next assumption is that once the technology is installed, it will be used competently & open-mindedly -- with the right capacities, motivations & leaders available to do that. In turn, if the technology is used competently, one can indeed expect improvements in public policy making & implementation: organizational change, better inter-institutional co-operation, development of e-services, etc. Notably, many ICT projects in the public sector fail & Lithuania is no exception in this respect. The investment does not necessarily lead to a meaningful organizational change, it does not enhance co-operation between institutions & does not improve communication & trust between the citizens & the state. Surely, the e-government is a rather new development, so one should hardly expect that all the visions will be successful outright. However, while at least some of the major problems may be anticipated in advance, the solutions are not always clear-cut. In order to take a full advantage of the ICT potential in the public sector, a clear choice of an actual model of public administration is necessary. Here a number of classic dilemmas may be identified -- regarding the relations between the public & the private sectors, internal control within the organization, sharing of responsibilities between organizations, etc. It is argued in the article that the answers to these questions in Lithuania are clear only in the official strategies & statements. Meanwhile the practice shows, that the relations between the public & the private sector are unbalanced, organizations lack the culture of critically assessing their achievements, institutions are carefully avoiding "interference" from outside into their internal matters & government is far from being conceived as a "service" to the citizens. It is also noted, that the differences between the official rhetoric & the practice may well be explained by the experience of both the soviet period as well as the accession to the EU: the institutions developed the skill of flexible adjustment to the dominant discourse without finding it necessary to change the essence of policy process. All in all, while the ICT do provide opportunities for improvement of public management, in order to take a full advantage of these opportunities it is necessary to resolve some of the classical dilemmas of public administration. In order to do that, some deeper changes of attitudes, values, & culture are necessary both in the public sector as well as in the society at large. Therefore, notwithstanding the expectation of the big change towards modernization of public sector the old saying of "plus ca change, plus c'est la meme chose" is applicable for estimating the potential of the ICT to change the public sector. Adapted from the source document.

An unambiguous assessment of the results of changes in the post-communist political regime of Ukraine is hardly possible. The political system of this country has experienced both periods of democratic expectations & democratic setbacks during the last fifteen years. For example, in 1990-1994, before the first competitive parliamentary elections, there was a clear fragmentation among the old (communist) political elite in Ukraine; the country's first democratic constitution was adopted in 1996. However, after Leonid Kuchma was elected President in 1994, authoritarian tendencies gradually recrudesced, "oligarchic" clans took hold of the country's political system, & the elections were increasingly blatantly manipulated & rigged to the advantage of the ruling elite. This cycle of political development recurred ten years later. Manipulations of the results of the 2004 presidential election raised a massive protest among the inhabitants of Ukraine, which was symbolically dubbed the "Orange Revolution." A new influx of democratic expectations forced the ruling elite to concede to re-running the second round of Ukraine's presidential election, which was won by the opposition. However, the political crisis which struck the new government in September 2005 & the mutual accusations of corruption raised by the former "revolutionary" comrades-in-arms -- President Viktor Yushchenko & former Prime Minister Yuliya Tymoshenko -- raised new questions regarding the vitality of the democratic processes in Ukraine. The main question examined in this article is therefore whether the vacillation of Ukraine's political regime is not a regular, permanent condition. Having two main aims -- (1) to construct a theory of Ukraine's post-soviet political transformation, & (2) to disclose the possibilities of democracy consolidation in this country -- the article starts with making some "corrections" to the transitologist approach to regime change. Firstly, it is argued that political transformation theories should have a shared concept of democracy, irrespective of the number or type of the stages of democratization distinguished. The experience of post-communist countries shows that formal procedural democratic criteria are insufficient in order to characterize a political system as democratic. Secondly, traditional theories of regime change focus mostly on the analysis of the behavior of the main political actors (the political elite) & their decisions (agreements). The structural conditions (eg., the characteristics of socio-economic development) should be also included into theoretical thinking about regime change. Thirdly, the analysis of elites & their agreements is sufficiently developed to explain how & when the transition to democracy occurs. However, the democratic consolidation stage has remained somewhat mystified by 'transitologists.' The article argues that an assumption should probably be made that the behavior of political elite factions competing in the political system is always rational & self-interested, ie., democracy (or any other form of political regime) becomes "the only game in town" only if & when it is mostly advantageous for the political elite functioning in that system. Taking into account the above mentioned "corrections" to the transitologist approach, in the article, there is produced a model for analyzing post-soviet regime transformations. The model consists of three main explanatory variables: (1) the structure of political elite, (2) the 'rules of game' prevalent in the system, & (3) the strategies of political elite aiming at gaining business and/or mass support. Consequently, various interrelations of these variables may produce four possible ideal-type outcomes of regime change -- (1) democracy, (2) 'democracy with adjectives,' (3) zero-sum game (a very unstable option when political regime may be temporarily democratic but is at a huge risk of downfall), (4) authoritarianism. In post-soviet countries, it is not enough to examine the structure of political elite & the institutions in order to predict the consolidation of one or another form of political regime. 'Building politicians' "alliances" with business & (or) mobilizing mass support may negate any such predictions & produce additional (regressive, in terms of democratization) impulses to further regime change. The very possibilities of the political elite to form "alliances" with business & (or) to mobilize the masses are mostly determined by the structural characteristics of the country. Thus, the analysis of the latter may not also be omitted in examining post-soviet transitions. Political regime in Ukraine, which beginning of 1990s started evolving as a probable liberal democracy or at least 'democracy with adjectives,' after 1998 Verkhovna Rada elections moved to the situation of the zero-sum game. Such transition was conditioned by two factors. First, the changes within political elite structure -- the communist camp, which occupied an important, although not the most important place in the pluralist political elite structure in 1994-1998, became an anti-systemic political force after the adoption of the 1996 Constitution. For these reasons, only two opposing elite factions (oligarchs-"centrists" vs. national democrats) remained in the political system of Ukraine after the 1998 elections, the ideological confrontation of which was constantly increasing & became particularly acute at the outset of the "Orange Revolution" in 2004. Second, the fact that the business class in Ukraine was forming with the "assistance" of politicians allowed the political elite to build an alliance with business community already in 1994-1996 & maintain these tight clientelist relations even after the privatization period was over. When at the end of 2004 the national democrats gathered mass support & became virtually equal or even more influential than the so-called "centrists," who traditionally draw support from business structures, the zero-sum game in Ukraine became especially acute. Such it remains by now, even after the Orange revolution is over. In more than ten years of independence the business community of Ukraine has consolidated its positions in the Verkhovna Rada & accumulated control over almost all national TV channels & other media outlets, as well as separate industrial regions. Therefore even anti-oligarchically disposed government cannot ignore this power. The ruling elite that cares about its survival & political success is forced to co-ordinate its decisions with the interests of various business clans. On the other hand, since Ukraine's business class consists of several competing clans, any government decisions that seek to limit the political influence of business groups immediately affect the interests of competing business clans. The government cannot remain neutral in principal. Any attempts of the supposed "deoligarchisation" will only result in provoking sharper disagreements between business groups because the curtailment of the positions of one clan will open new prospects for the strengthening of the influence of its competitors. It may be argued that for these reasons there will always be at least one (and, most likely, the strongest one) oligarchic political camp supported by an "alliance" with business. In other words, Ukraine's political regime does not have any chance to be consolidated in the liberal democracy perspective. Another structural characteristic of Ukraine is the politically unorganized working class. At least several competing political forces claim to represent the workers' interests -- the Communist Party of Ukraine, the Socialist Party of Ukraine, & the Progressive Socialist Party of Ukraine. The internal competition among the left-wing forces encourages at least one of them (the Communist Party of Ukraine, the Progressive Socialist Party) to take a radical, anti-systemic position in order that potential supporters may distinguish it from other leftist parties. Therefore, it is likely that the political system of Ukraine will preserve a left-wing segment that will not wield much power but will propagate an anti-systemic ideology without "communicating" with other political forces. Due to its anti-systemic nature it will not be able to participate in the government of the state & the votes of the left-wing voters (comprising the basis for mass support) will probably be collected by the national democrats. This circumstance enables predicting that the zero-sum game will remain very intensive in Ukraine in the future as well. Thus, the permanent instability of the state & both -- democracy & authoritarianism -- in Ukraine (a zero-sum game) may actually be considered to be its consolidated political regime form. Adapted from the source document.