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At head of title: no. 1-2, Library of Congress. State law index; no. 3- , The Library of Congress. Legislative Reference Service. State law index. ; Mode of access: Internet.

Vols. 1-5 (1925/26-1933/34) include digests of important State legislation: important statutory changes; important changes in State laws relating to administrative organization and personnel. Beginning with 1938 digests on selected subjects were published separately as numbers of the series: State law digest report. ; Vols. 1-5 (1925/26-1933/34) include digests of important State legislation: important statutory changes; important changes in State laws relating to administrative organization and personnel. Beginning with 1938 digests on selected subjects were published separately as numbers of the series: State law digest report. ; Mode of access: Internet. ; Compiled by the Legislative Reference Service of the Library of Congress (1935/36-1947/48 by its State Law Section (varies) )

Parratt v. Taylor is among the most puzzling Supreme Court decisions of the last decade, and the lower federal courts have been thrown into considerable confusion in their efforts to implement it. In large part, this confusion stems from the fact that Parratt decided two independent points: first, the negligent loss or destruction of property by state officials could constitute a "deprivation" thereof for purposes of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment; and second, the existence of an adequate state remedy to redress the wrong meant that the deprivation was not "without due process of law." In this Comment, I hope to show that this second, or "state action," holding contradicts long-embedded understandings of when a denial of due process occurs for fourteenth amendment purposes. The state action issue remains important even after this term's decision in Daniels v. Williams. Daniels expressly overruled Parratt's first holding. In Daniels, the Court held that, ordinarily, negligently inflicted injuries to "liberty" and "property" are not the kind of "deprivations" with which the due process clause is concerned. But Daniels left undisturbed Parratt's state action theory. Indeed, the Daniels Court cited with approval Hudson v. Palmer, which had extended Parratt's state action holding to intentional deprivations of property by state officials. Parratt's state action theory is best seen in a larger context. Parratt is one part of an ongoing effort by the Supreme Court, particularly Justice Rehnquist, to reorient fourteenth amendment jurisprudence. The goal is to keep the lower federal courts out of the business of monitoring the routine day-to-day administration of state government in areas that only marginally implicate constitutional values. Philosophically, this development embodies a belief that a clear distinction can be drawn between constitutional violations and state law wrongs. Linguistically, it stresses a close parsing of section 1983 and the due process clause. Analytically, it generates two decisional lines: cases like Board of Regents v. Roth and Paul v. Davis narrow the domain of constitutionally protected "liberty" and "property," while decisions like Daniels v. Williams and Parratt v. Taylor limit the state action that constitutes a "deprivation" or a "denial of due process" of interests admittedly entitled to constitutional protection.

Title from cover. ; Each no. has also a distinctive title. ; Mode of access: Internet. ; No. 1-3 issued by the State Law Index, Library of Congress; No. 4-7 issued by the Librarys' Legislative Reference Service, State Law Index; No. issued by the Services' State Law Section.

This article examines an important yet overlooked form of federal regulation implicating efficiency and fairness concerns - congressional statutes that impose federal sanctions on individuals convicted of state crimes. These sanctions may profoundly influence state criminal proceedings, but the scholarly literature has all but ignored their effects. The article demonstrates that by raising the stakes involved in state cases, federal sanctions may cause defendants to contest state charges more vigorously, thereby producing one of two unintended consequences. First, the sanctions may make it more costly for state prosecutors to enforce state laws. Second, due to resource constraints or dislike of the federal sanctions, state prosecutors may circumvent them by manipulating charging decisions. But in the process, state prosecutors may have to reduce state sanctions as well, thereby undermining deterrence and the fair application of both state and federal law. The article theorizes that the severity of the sanctions and the emphasis they place upon state outcomes, among other factors, determine how much the sanctions will distort state proceedings. The article then substantiates the theory with five in-depth case studies of federal sanctions: deporting criminal aliens, barring domestic abusers from possessing firearms, and disqualifying drug offenders from receiving federal welfare, public housing, and student financial aid. It suggests ways Congress, states, and the Judiciary might respond to ameliorate the concerns raised herein. It concludes by demonstrating that the analytical framework can be applied more broadly to sanctions imposed and determinations made by any party, including a private citizen