Suchergebnisse

While game theory has been useful in the strategy of pure conflict, it has not performed well re 'games' in which mutual dependence is part of the logical structure & demands some kind of collaboration or mutual accommodation. Thus the scope of game theory must be enlarged, with the zero-sum game taken to be a limiting case rather than a point of departure. Such an extension is proposed along 2 lines: (1) identification of the perceptual & suggestive element in the formation of mutually consistent expectations, & (2) identification of some of the basic 'moves' that may occur in actual games of strategy & the structural elements that the moves depend on. The following problems are analyzed: mutual perception & suggestive behavior, enforcement, communication, & strategic moves; & coordination of expectations in the 'pure'-bargaining game. It is concluded that in the methodology appropriate to a study of bargaining games: (a) the mathematical structure of the payoff function should not be permitted to dominate the analysis, (b) there is a danger in too much abstractness; the character of the game is changed when there is a drastic alteration in the amount of contextual detail that it contains or when such complicating factors as the players' uncertainties about each other's value systems are eliminated, & (c) some essential part of the study of mixed-motive games is necessarily empirical. I. Taviss.